S. I. Benn; VI*—Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 109–130, https://.

Automated Influence is the use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate, and analyse people’s data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the interactional focus of “AI Ethics” in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of AI, we show that the real problem (...) with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy that it precipitates. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts (...) can be rationally resolved, the objectivity of value, the concept of moral personality, the principles of non-interference and respect of persons, the ideals of autonomy and community and various aspects of individual rights - focusing on the rights to freedom, welfare, and privacy. (shrink)

Supererogatory actions must go beyond duty not only by being optional, but also by being good to do. Understanding the evaluative condition that supererogatory actions must meet is vital in order to understand the very concept of supererogation. I argue for two key features of the goodness of supererogatory actions: firstly, that they are comparative, and secondly, that they are relative. Specifically, I argue that an action meets the evaluative condition of supererogation if and only if it is (i) better (...) than some permissible alternative and (ii) better than (or at least as good as) all permissible alternatives that are (a) as costly or (b) less costly; where the sense in which it is better is relative to a particular beneficiary. Seeing why this is so reveals the complexity of our notion of the supererogatory and captures our intuitions on core and complex cases. Furthermore, it makes room for supererogation’s mirror: the suberogatory. (shrink)

In the context of health care system complexity, nurses need responsive leadership and organizational support to maintain intrinsic motivation, moral sensitivity and a caring stance in the delivery of patient care. The current complexity of nurses’ work environment promotes decreases in work motivation and moral satisfaction, thus creating motivational and ethical dissonance in practice. These and other work-related factors increase emotional stress and burnout for nurses, prompting both new and seasoned nurse professionals to leave their current position, or even the (...) profession. This article presents a theoretical conceptual model for professional nurses to review and make sense of the ethical reasoning skills needed to maintain a caring stance in relation to the competing values that must coexist among nurses, health care administrators, patients and families in the context of the complex health care work environments in which nurses are expected to practice. A model, Nurses’ Ethical Reasoning Skills, is presented as a framework for nurses’ thinking through and problem solving ethical issues in clinical practice in the context of complexity in health care. (shrink)

The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation: we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case (...) that we are rationally required to carry out that act. We argue that a response to this ‘paradox’ can be found by reflecting on normative conflicts: cases where what is best according to some normative domain is different from what is best according to some other normative domain. (shrink)

This article offers a qualified defence of the view that there is a moral difference between telling lies to one's patients, and deceiving them without lying. However, I take issue with certain arguments offered by Jennifer Jackson in support of the same conclusion. In particular, I challenge her claim that to deny that there is such a moral difference makes sense only within a utilitarian framework, and I cast doubt on the aptness of some of her examples of non-lying deception. (...) But I argue that lies have a greater tendency to damage trust than does non-lying deception, and suggest that since many doctors do believe there is a moral boundary between the two types of deception, encouraging them to violate that boundary may have adverse general effects on their moral sensibilities. (shrink)

Vor dem Hintergrund eines kurzen historischen Rückblicks argumentiert der Beitrag für die Bedeutung einer an Texten (statt nur Begriffen oder Sätzen) ausgerichteten ideenhistorischen Forschung und plädiert spezifisch für das Forschungsfeld einer ›Literaturgeschichte der Philosophie‹ (doppelter Genitiv) als ein zentrales Arbeitsgebiet der vorliegenden Zeitschrift.

Standing in San Marco Cathedral in Venice, you immediately notice the exquisitely decorated spandrels: the triangular spaces bounded on either side by adjoining arches and by the dome above. You would be forgiven for seeing them as the starting point from which to understand the surrounding architecture. To do so would, however, be a mistake. It is a similar mistaken inference that evolutionary biologists have been accused of making in assuming a special adaptive purpose for such biological features as fingerprints (...) and chins. I argue that a mistake of just this sort is being made by ethicists who appeal to the intrinsic value of supererogatory acts in their efforts to make space for supererogation in ethical theory. Many cases of supererogatory action are simply spandrels: by-products of uncontroversial commitments elsewhere in our moral thought. This is not to downplay their value but rather to show that their value need not be the justification for making room for the supererogatory. I demonstrate this by examining two areas: rights and the distribution of burdens among a group. My argument has significance for those who take themselves to be defends of the possibility of supererogatory actions, as well as those who are committed to the contrary and those who believe themselves to be indifferent on the matter. (shrink)

The question of why Nietzsche writes as he does defines his philosophy—much more so than for almost any other thinker. Let me begin with the following claim: Nietzsche does not primarily write books. Rather, he edits them from a huge reservoir of different kinds of notebooks. In the process, the “I” that is the subject of the “writing” becomes increasingly unstable. This is of course an intended philosophical effect. Take the case of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which Nietzsche considered to be (...) his most important and long-lasting book. Most philosophers, when they engage with it at all, still take it more or less at face value. Zarathustra’s speeches are quoted as if they were enunciations of Nietzsche himself... (shrink)

"Man ist nicht umsonst Philologe gewesen, man ist es vielleicht noch" - Nietzsches Bekenntnisse zur Philologie sind zahlreich. Auf der Grundlage von Quellenstudien beschreibt die Abhandlung Nietzsches tiefe Prägung durch die historisch-kritische Methode der Bonner Schule. Um Philosoph zu werden, musste er sich nicht, wie bisher angenommen, von der Philologie lösen, sondern sprach ihr gerade im Spätwerk eine zentrale Rolle zu. Diese Einsicht führt zur Neubestimmung von Begriffen wie Text, Genealogie, Interpretation, Perspektivismus und zur Zurückweisung herrschender Auffassungen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, der (...) Hermeneutik und des Dekonstruktivismus. Die Studie endet mit einem von Nietzsche ausgehenden, historisch begründeten Plädoyer für die skeptisch-philologische Literaturwissenschaft. (shrink)

A familiar part of debates about supererogatory actions concerns the role that cost should play. Two camps have emerged: one claiming that extreme cost is a necessary condition for when an action is supererogatory, while the other denies that it should be part of our definition of supererogation. In this paper, I propose an alternative position. I argue that it is comparative cost that is central to the supererogatory and that it is needed to explain a feature that all accounts (...) agree is central to the very notion of supererogation: optionality. Perhaps because of this agreement on its importance, few attempts have been made to clarify and explain the notion of optionality. I argue that giving an account of the optionality of supererogatory requires drawing a line between doing the bare minimum permissible and going beyond the bare minimum and that this line ought to be drawn based on comparative cost of alternative permissible acts. Having outlined my account and motivated it, I discuss and reject two concerns that might be raised: firstly, that it is extreme cost, not comparative cost, that matters and, secondly, that in fact no cost is needed for an act to be supererogatory. (shrink)

Political deepfakes have prompted outcry about the diminishing trustworthiness of visual depictions, and the epistemic and political threat this poses. Yet this new technique is being used overwhelmingly to create pornography, raising the question of what, if anything, is wrong with the creation of deepfake pornography. Traditional objections focusing on the sexual abuse of those depicted fail to apply to deepfakes. Other objections—that the use and consumption of pornography harms the viewer or other (non-depicted) individuals—fail to explain the objection that (...) a depicted person might have to the creation of deepfake pornography that utilises images of them. My argument offers such an explanation. It begins by noting that the creation of sexual images requires an act of consent, separate from any consent needed for the acts depicted. Once we have separated these out, we can see that a demand for consent can arise when a sexual image is of us, even when no sexual activity was actually engaged in, as in the case of deepfake pornography. I then demonstrate that there are two ways in which an image can be ‘of us’, both of which can exist in the case of deepfakes. Thus, I argue: if a person, their likeness, or their photograph is used to create pornography, their consent is required. Whenever the person depicted does not consent (or in the case of children, can’t consent), that person is wronged by the creation of deepfake pornography and has a claim against its production. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be powerful, (...) if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible. (shrink)

The recent murder of two schoolgirls in Soham provoked calls for a return of the death penalty. Piers Benn examines the case for execution.

In this article I would like to express my personal ideas and points of view about strike action, which I think many colleagues will share. I am a qualified paediatric nurse, currently working in the central operating theatre of a university hospital in Germany. At the same time, I am also finishing my studies in health care sciences. Apart from two short protest strikes, I have not taken part in any strike, because there have not been any during my whole (...) professional career at the hospitals where I have worked. I am personally deeply convinced that strikes are important and are a good and useful tool, in particular to protest against ‘rationalizations’, which so far have led only to lower salaries and fewer jobs for nurses, and have brought no improvement in the conditions for staff or patients. (shrink)

In this engaged and engaging survey Piers Benn examines the major currents of ethical theory, concentrating on sound reasoning about morality. Benn's account offers a qualified defence of Aristotelian virtue theory, while bringing out what is distinctive and valuable in a broad range of approaches, such as those of Kant and the Utilitarians. His examples emphasize the ordinary choices of everyday life - gossip, friendship, honesty, sexual relations, work, and self-realization.

In Playtest, our thrill‐seeking protagonist Cooper tests SaitoGemu's “interactive augmented reality system.” As the fears he must face in “the most personal survival horror game in history” ramp up, Cooper begins to lose the ability to tell what's real and what isn't and decides he wants out, only to find that isn't so simple. But will virtual reality really be that scary? Perhaps no more than books, films and traditional video games, especially when the novelty wears off. Perhaps the real (...) moral of Playtest is “Call your mom”. But beneath the surface a much darker lesson lurks: that when our fantasies feel real, and have the power to hurt, they are no longer just a game. Virtual reality can build a bridge between what seems real and what is real, and this means its power to scare us silly is not just novel: it's revolutionary. (shrink)

Moral theories that demand that we do what is morally best leave no room for the supererogatory. One argument against such theories is that they fail to realize the value of autonomy: supererogatory acts allow for the exercise of autonomy because their omissions are not accompanied by any threats of sanctions, unlike obligatory ones. While this argument fails, I use the distinction it draws – between omissions of obligatory and supererogatory acts in terms of appropriate sanctions – to draw a (...) parallel with psychological perfectionism. Through this parallel, I demonstrate that requiring what is morally best is in fact counter-productive. Thus, by its own lights, a theory that wants us to do what is best ought at the very least to tell us to believe that some actions are supererogatory. As the old adage goes, the best is the enemy of the good; I argue here that the supererogatory is the solution. (shrink)

Amy saves a man from drowning despite the risk to herself, because she is moved by his plight. This is a quintessentially supererogatory act: an act that goes above and beyond the call of duty. Beth, on the other hand, saves a man from drowning because she wants to get her name in the paper. On this second example, opinions differ. One view of supererogation holds that, despite being optional and good, Beth’s act is not supererogatory because she is not (...) praiseworthy; the other agrees that Beth is not praiseworthy but holds that her act is nevertheless supererogatory because, while supererogatory actions are generally performed by praiseworthy agents, an individual need not be praiseworthy for their act to be supererogatory. In this paper, I raise a problem for this latter position, which I shall call the Anti-Motivation View of supererogation. While the Anti-Motivation View rejects the claim that the agent’s motivations are important, it accepts that the agent’s intentions are. Thus, this view assumes that a clear, coherent distinction can be drawn between intentions and motivations in the context of supererogation. This distinction is often attributed to Mill; however, his original discussion reveals an inconsistency. Consider Clara, who saves a man from drowning because she wants to torture him later. According to Mill, Clara’s act is not morally good; those who follow Mill will have to accept that it is therefore not supererogatory. Mill asserts that Clara’s act differs from Amy’s and Beth’s not just in motivation but also in intention. I question this explanation and demonstrate that the distinction between motivation and intention is not as clear as the Anti-Motivation View has supposed and that the gap between the Anti-Motivation View and the alternative Praise-Based View is either much greater or much smaller than previously thought. (shrink)

I SHALL develop, in this article, certain distinctions suggested by recent contributions to the philosophical discussion of punishment, which help to clarify the issues involved. Having separated out what I consider the four central philosophical questions, I shall suggest an approach to them, which, while mainly utilitarian, takes due account, I believe, of the retributivist case where it is strongest, and meets the main retributivist objections.

Contemporary moral philosophy rightly gives an important place not only to theories of right action, but to the nature and value of our interpersonal moral attitudes, including such reactions as resentment, admiration and forgiveness. Whilst these concerns have always been of interest to theologians and psychologists, their philosophical importance partly derives from wider concerns about the nature of persons. The recent resurgence, for instance, of retributivist theories of punishment, which are finding favour among many philosophical writers, largely bases itself on (...) the idea that a range of ‘participant reactive attitudes’ is both socially indispensable and morally legitimate. In this web of interpersonal responses is forgiveness, which cannot properly be examined without discussion of other responses such as indignation, anger and even hatred. (shrink)

This book offer a sustained and vigorous defence of free expression and objective enquiry situated in the context of the current culture wars. In the spirit of J. S. Mill, it investigates objections to free expression and enquiry in relation to harm and offence, reaching classically liberal conclusions and with particular reference to recent controversies on university campuses. While accepting that the concept of harm is broader than than merely physical harm, the book implicitly offers a critique of objections to (...) free speech and enquiry that are based on certain current understandings of power and privilege. In exploring and rejecting arguments against the possibility of obtaining objective truth, the book navigates hotly contested fields of contemporary debate, including feminism and identity politics. It challenges the dogma of social constructionism and examines current notions of identity, arguing that a case for fairness can be made without appealing to them. Offering a qualified endorsement of friendship between ideological opponents, the book highlights common obstacles to civil and rational discussion, concluding with a rational, moral and broadly spiritual solution to the cultural combat that monopolises present-day society. (shrink)

There has been some debate as to whether or not it is possible to keep a promise, and thus fulfil a duty, to supererogate. In this paper, I argue, in agreement with Jason Kawall, that such promises cannot be kept. However, I disagree with Kawall’s diagnosis of the problem and provide an alternative account. In the first section, I examine the debate between Kawall and David Heyd, who rejects Kawall’s claim that promises to supererogate cannot be kept. I disagree with (...) Heyd’s argument, as it fails to get to the heart of the problem Kawall articulates. Kawall’s argument however fails to make clear the problem with promising to supererogate because his discussion relies on the plausibility of the following claim: that supererogatory actions cannot also fulfil obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken because there are clear examples of supererogatory actions that also fulfil obligations. In the final section, I give my alternative account of the problem, identifying exactly what is wrong with fulfilling a duty, and thus keeping a promise, to supererogate. My diagnosis emphasises the importance of identifying non-supererogatory actions when it comes to understanding the way in which supererogatory actions go above and beyond the call of duty. (shrink)

The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, Page 819-821, October 2013.