To the renowned psychoanalyst, philosopher, and linguist Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein was the most original innovator, male or female, in the psychoanalytic arena. Klein pioneered psychoanalytic practice with children and made major contributions to our understanding of both psychosis and autism. Along the way, she successfully introduced a new approach to the theory of the unconscious without abandoning the principles set forth by Freud. In her first biography of a fellow psychoanalyst, the prolific Kristeva considers Klein's life and intellectual development, (...) weaving a narrative that covers the history of psychoanalysis and illuminates Kristeva's own life and work. Kristeva tells the remarkable story of Klein's life: an unhappy wife and mother who underwent analysis, and -- without a medical or other advanced degree -- became an analyst herself at the age of 40. In examining her work, Kristeva proposes that Klein's "break" with Freud was really an attempt to complete his theory of the unconscious. Kristeva addresses Klein's numerous critics, and, in doing so, bridges the wide gulf between the clinical and theoretical worlds of psychoanalysis. Klein is celebrated here as the first person to see the mother as the source of not only creativity, but of thought itself, and the first to consider the place of matricide in psychic development. As such, Klein is a seminal figure in the evolution of the provocative ideas about motherhood and the psyche for which Kristeva is most famous. Klein is thus, in a sense, a mother to Kristeva, making this book an account of the development of Kristeva's own thought as well as Klein's. (shrink)

Smith's experience at Balliol College was disappointing, since the dons he encountered were not interested in teaching, and their easy enjoyment of sinecures as Fellows did not encourage that competition for students, and therefore revenue, prevalent among the Glasgow professors, which kept them abreast of their subjects and in touch with the advances of Enlightenment thought, especially the New Philosophy of Locke and the New Science of Newton. Smith read widely on his own, in politics and modern languages, but with (...) no one to supervise him, he seems to have overdone study and suffered a kind of nervous breakdown. He may have started reading Hume at this time, and been punished for doing so; certainly the religious orthodoxy of Balliol and the Jacobitism there, perhaps inflamed by the ’45 Rising’, must have repelled him, and he is reported to have left Oxford in 1746 ‘in disgust.’. (shrink)

This essay describes my progress bringing the core ideas of economics into conversations with noneconomists about important public policy issues within my faith community, through local politics, and through interdisciplinary conversations in academia. Thinking like an economist is essential to conducting research and performing careful analysis of public policy issues. However, it can reduce the economists’ effectiveness in teaching and interacting with neighbors and political leaders. Effective pedagogy requires that faculty be present as good economists to their neighbors, their fellow (...) citizens, in daily conversations and public policy debates. Our continuing education as teachers of economics requires that we enter those conversations as committed students as well--committed to learning how our neighbors process economic facts and principles and how their insights into public policy debates might alter our own understanding. (shrink)

Psychiatric researchers typically assume that the modelling of psychiatric symptoms is not influenced by psychiatric categories; symptoms are modelled and then grouped into a psychiatric category. I highlight this primarily through analysing research domain criteria. RDoC’s importance makes it worth scrutinizing, and this assessment also serves as a case study with relevance for other areas of psychiatry. RDoC takes inadequacies of existing psychiatric categories as holding back causal investigation. Consequently, RDoC aims to circumnavigate existing psychiatric categories by directly investigating the (...) causal basis of symptoms. The unique methodological approach of RDoC exploits the supposed lack of influence of psychiatric categories on symptom modelling, taking psychiatric symptoms as the same regardless of which psychiatric category is employed or if no psychiatric category is employed. But this supposition is not always true. I will show how psychiatric categories can influence symptom modelling, whereby identical behaviours can be considered as different symptoms based on an individual’s psychiatric diagnosis. If the modelling of symptoms is influenced by psychiatric categories, then psychiatric categories will still play a role, a situation which RDoC researchers explicitly aim to avoid. I discuss four ways RDoC could address this issue. This issue also has important implications for factor analysis, cluster analysis, modifying psychiatric categories, and symptom based approaches. (shrink)

Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that (...) symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses. (shrink)

The diagnosis of childhood schizophrenia was widely employed in the U.S. from the 1930s to the late 1970s. In this paper I will provide a history of the diagnosis. Some of the earliest publications on childhood schizophrenia outlined the notion that childhood schizophrenia had different types. I will outline the development of these types, outlining differing symptoms and causes associated with various types. I outline how different types of childhood schizophrenia were demarcated from one another primarily on age of onset (...) and the type of psychosis which was believed to be present. I will outline how various child psychiatrists viewed the types of childhood schizophrenia posited by other child psychiatrists. I will outline the process of abandoning childhood schizophrenia. I use my history to challenge what I believe are misconceptions about childhood schizophrenia. Also, I will use my history to draw lessons for thinking about modern notions of autism. It shows potential problems around formulating psychiatric diagnoses around causes and how compromises might be needed to prevent those problems. Additionally, childhood schizophrenia shows that psychiatrists could formulate subtypes that are not based upon functioning levels and that we can conceive of subtypes as dynamic whereby someone can change which subtype they exhibit over time. (shrink)

I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intui- tion, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, (...) and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best. (shrink)

Ross Poole displays the social content of the various conceptions of morality at work in contemporary society, and casts a strikingly fresh light on such fundamental problems as the place of reason in ethics, moral objectivity and the distinction between duty and virtue. The book provides a critical account of the moral theories of a number of major philosophers, including Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Habermas, Rawls, Gewirth and MacIntyre. It also presents a systematic critique of three of the most significant (...) responses to modernity: liberalism, nationalism and nihilism. It takes seriously the suggestion that men and women are subject to different conceptions of morality, and places the issue of gender at the centre of moral philosophy. Poole has written a valuable addition to the Ideas series. (shrink)

The existing literature treats of several investigations with a certain bearing on the question which is roughly indicated by the title “Imperatives and Logic.” Some of those investigations, however, are entirely outside the scope of the present work.Mally sets himself the task of developing a “Logik des Willens” constituting a parallel to the usual logic, the “Logik des Denkens". In order to emphasize its independence, the author also calls this “Logik des Willens” “Deontik”, and he conceives it as being based (...) on the “Wesensgesetze” of will in the same way as the usual logic is conceived as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of thought. The author develops a formalistic deductive system on the basis of 5 axioms of demands, including the axiom that there is at least one fact which is unconditionally demanded, and through a lengthy series of theorems he arrives at the sentence that what is unconditionally demanded is identical with what is actually the case: “was sein soll, ist Tatsache”. Similarly, the author develops a system of axioms for “right” volition, including the axiom that right volition is non-contradictory. (shrink)

Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...) Nida-Rümelin is quite right to search for empirical tests for claims about the nature of visual states, philosophical issues remain pivotal in determining the correctness of these claims. (shrink)

We discuss Russell's 1913 essay arguing for the irrelevance of the idea of causation to science and its elimination from metaphysics as a precursor to contemporary philosophical naturalism. We show how Russell's application raises issues now receiving much attention in debates about the adequacy of such naturalism, in particular, problems related to the relationship between folk and scientific conceptual influences on metaphysics, and to the unification of a scientifically inspired worldview. In showing how to recover an approximation to Russell's conclusion (...) while explaining scientists' continuing appeal to causal ideas (without violating naturalism by philosophically correcting scientists) we illustrate a general naturalist strategy for handling problems around the unification of sciences that assume different levels of naïveté with respect to folk conceptual frameworks. We do this despite rejecting one of the premises of Russell's argument, a version of reductionism that was scientifically plausible in 1913 but is not so now. (shrink)

In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.

The paper essentially shows that the paraconsistent logicDR satisfies the depth relevance condition. The systemDR is an extension of the systemDK of [7] and the non-triviality of a dialectical set theory based onDR has been shown in [3]. The depth relevance condition is a strengthened relevance condition, taking the form: If DR- AB thenA andB share a variable at the same depth, where the depth of an occurrence of a subformulaB in a formulaA is roughly the number of nested ''s (...) required to reach the occurrence ofB inA. The method of proof is to show that a model structureM consisting of {M 0 , M1, ..., M}, where theM i s are all characterized by Meyer''s 6-valued matrices (c. f, [2]), satisfies the depth relevance condition. Then, it is shown thatM is a model structure for the systemDR. (shrink)

Systemic existential conditions are indelible aspects of a client's reflective and nonreflective modes of consciousness, and therefore fall within the purview of philosophical counseling. This paper focuses on the experience of the dehumanization that is a function of the monetization of all aspects of post-modern neoliberal society. Monetization demands radical self-abandonment, self-anesthesia, auto-aggressive self-exploitation and addiction for functionality within the system. The bankrupt logic of pandemic terrorism confirms that monetization has become the preeminent measure of value. Monetization distorts both reason (...) and value, concealing a covert nihilism masquerading as the new metaphysics. The symbiotic natural world evidences a level of cooperation and coexistence that escapes monetization. Therefore, a monetized society is a society at odds with the world ecosystemand life itself. Caught in a labyrinth ofmonetized dehumanization, clients often participate in the fictional metanarrative of belief in unlimited individual possibility as a hedge against anxiety, depression, powerlessness, anomie, and the logical loop of cognitive dissonance. (shrink)

This January‐February 2020 issue marks the start of the Hastings Center Report's fiftieth volume. The issue introduces the column Looking Back, Looking Forward, which we plan to run in this volume only. Conceived by Hastings Center fellows Douglas Diekema and Lainie Friedman Ross, the column will explore the significance of landmark publications from the first fifty years of bioethics. For the first installment, Diekema looks at the unconventional moral position Hans Jonas took in his 1969 essay “Philosophical Reflections on (...) Experimenting with Human Subjects.” In the lead article, “Trust, Risk, and Race in American Medicine,” Laura Specker Sullivan contextualizes patient mistrust within a history of racism in general and in the nation's biomedical research and clinical institutions specifically. Specker Sullivan proposes ways for individual clinicians to improve relationships with distrustful patients and their families. Two commentaries provide additional insights and recommendations about the work of earning patient trust. (shrink)

Volume 13 in The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924, series brings together Dewey’s writings for 1921 and 1922, with the exception of Human Nature and Conduct. A Modern Language Association Committee on Scholarly Editions textual edition. Ralph Ross notes in his Introduction that the 53 items constituting this volume “defend Dewey’s beliefs at 63 and look forward to what he was yet to write.” The essays to which Dewey responded, as well as abstracts of articles that have been (...) published only in Japanese, appear as appendixes. The article “Valuation and Experimental Knowledge” treats a favorite Dewey theme: “Most of the important crises of life are cases where tastes are the only things worth dis­cussing, and where, if the life of reason is to exist and prevail, judgment must be per­formed with regard for its logical implica­tions.” The philosophical articles stress Dewey’s view that, as Ross remarks, “philosophies are not timeless and universal, but speak to times, places and conditions.”. (shrink)

Consider two of my properties: my mass and my weight. There seems to be an interesting distinction between the reasons for my having these two properties. I have my mass solely in virtue of how I am, whereas I have my weight in virtue of both how I am and how my surroundings are. I have my weight as a result of the gravitational pull exerted by the Earth on a thing having my mass, whereas I have my mass independently (...) of other things around me. If you change my surroundings, if you put me on the moon say, my weight will change, but my mass will stay the same. (shrink)

There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about (...) common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia. (shrink)

This paper surveys the various forms of Deduction Theorem for a broad range of relevant logics. The logics range from the basic system B of Routley-Meyer through to the system R of relevant implication, and the forms of Deduction Theorem are characterized by the various formula representations of rules that are either unrestricted or restricted in certain ways. The formula representations cover the iterated form,A 1 .A 2 . ... .A n B, the conjunctive form,A 1&A 2 & ...A n (...) B, the combined conjunctive and iterated form, enthymematic version of these three forms, and the classical implicational form,A 1&A 2& ...A n B. The concept of general enthymeme is introduced and the Deduction Theorem is shown to apply for rules essentially derived using Modus Ponens and Adjunction only, with logics containing either (A B)&(B C) .A C orA B .B C .A C. (shrink)

I examine a dispute about the nature of practical reason, and in particular moral reason, generated by Thomas Nagel's proposal of an internalist rationalism which claims we can explain motivation in terms of reason and belief alone. In opposition, Humeans contend that such explanations must also appeal to further desires. Arguments on either side of this debate typically assume that a rationalist or Humean conclusion can be reached independently of a claim about the nature of moral judgment. I'll maintain, to (...) the contrary, that a resolution of this dispute can only be achieved on the basis of such a claim. (shrink)

I consider David Efird and Tom Stoneham's recent version of the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantifiers in one range over a different set of objects from those which the quantifiers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or we should not accept (...) both its premises. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis ' principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination. This, I claim, leads to a vicious circularity: warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catullus: The Shorter PoemsJoseph B. SolodowJohn Godwin, ed. Catullus: The Shorter Poems. Ed. with intro., trans., and comm. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1999. xii + 223 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $28.Godwin's volume joins two other recent ones that also offer a text and English translation of the poet, along with introduction and notes: G. P. Goold, Catullus: Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes, 2d ed. (London 1989; 1st (...) ed., 1983), and Guy Lee, Catullus: Edited with a Translation and Brief Notes (Oxford 1990). The proportion of commentary varies considerably among the three editions. Goold's notes are very brief, occupying less than one-sixth the number of the pages of the text plus translation; they identify references mostly, or sketch a background, either historical or personal. Lee's notes, somewhat more devoted to language and interpretation, amount to one-fourth. In Godwin's book the commentary equals the text and translation. This, clearly, is intended to be the author's chief contribution, and indeed it is easily the most valuable part. (In the same format he dealt with the longer poems, 61-68, in a volume published in 1995.) Rather than an editor or translator, Godwin is an interpreter of literature.Most parts of the introduction are reliable. "Catullus' Life and Times" balances familiar scholarly positions with criticism. Against Ross's view (originating with Reitzenstein, actually) that the poet applied the language of politics to love, he cites Lyne's, that poet and politician alike used the language of the governing class. He is skeptical of identifying Lesbia with Clodia Metelli. The next section describes the performance of poetry, an important subject, if less obvious. The discussion of poets' financial rewards here would be less neat had the instructive researches of Peter White been taken into account (JRS 64 [1974]: 40-61; HSCP 79 [1975]: 265-300; JRS 68 [1978]: 74-92). Godwin afterward sets forth well first the poetic standards and strivings of Catullus and his fellow-neoterics, then the major interpretative strategies practiced by literary critics: biography, New Criticism, New Historicism, and attention to intertextuality, to the arrangement of poems, to their closure (but not structuralism or deconstruction). His own stance is characterized by a keen awareness of the literary artifact, and this will make for some fine, persuasive interpretations.The section on meter, however, is seriously defective. Addressed to the rank beginner, who is taught when syllables are long, when short, what elision is, and which patterns of longs and shorts constitute the various meters, it is bound to mislead in important ways. It ignores prodelision (which Goold, for the sake of correct reading, represents in his text: gratumst, for example). Nowhere does it say that the fifth foot of a hexameter is regularly a dactyl, much less that the substitution of a spondee there is a neoteric affectation (see Cic. Att. 7.2.1). It claims that "the second half of the pentameter is in the overwhelming majority of cases dactylic" (17, my emphasis). For iambic senarii and choliambics it fails to mention the caesura. Lack of attention to meter probably explains why Godwin prints vehemens (rather than vemens) at 50.21 and vastasque paludesque at 115.5 (no other verse among the elegiacs is hypermetric, though 64.298 is), and also why in the commentary on poem 4 he does not draw attention to Catullus' tour [End Page 283] de force in writing pure iambics; this would have strengthened his point that the verse gives "the movement of the poem a swift impetus appropriate to the movement of the yacht" (117). The last part of the introduction is a concise statement of how the text has been transmitted.The text here printed is Godwin's own. Let it be compared with Goold's, which is, in my opinion, the truest ever produced--comprehensive in understanding the sources, fearless in replacing manuscript nonsensicalities with Catullan sense and elegance, from start to finish marked by sound judgment. As a sample I chose 49 poems, the verses of which represent 57 percent of the total number in Godwin's volume. Of the divergences from Goold's text in the sample, about two... (shrink)

In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no (...) more supportive of conservative complacency than Blackburn's noncognitivism. A victory for noncognitivism cannot be so easily won. (shrink)

It is argued that to possess the concept of distress is to be able to apply the concept to others, and that this implies a qualified form of altruism, in the sense that to perceive another as being in distress is, other things being equal, to see them as in need of help and be moved to help them.

With the success of cognitive science's interdisciplinary approach to studying the mind, many theorists have taken up the strategy of appealing to science to address long standing disputes about metaphysics and the mind. In a recent case in point, philosophers and psychologists, including Robert Kane, Daniel C. Dennett, and Daniel M. Wegner, are exploring how science can be brought to bear on the debate about the problem of free will. I attempt to clarify the current debate by considering how empirical (...) research can be useful. I argue that empirical findings don't apply to one basic dimension of the problem, namely the dispute between compatibilism and incompatibilism. However, I show that empirical research can provide constraints in connection with another fundamental dimension, namely the dispute between libertarianism, which claims that indeterminacy is, in certain contexts, sufficient for freedom, and hard determinism and compatibilism, which deny this. I argue that the source of the most powerful constraint is psychological research into the accuracy of introspection. (shrink)

"The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" response to commentators.

This chapter contains sections titled: Spinoza Leibniz.