The fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship requires clinicians to act in the best interest of their patients. Patients are vulnerable due to their health status and lack of medical knowledge, which makes them dependent on the clinicians’ expertise. Competent patients, however, may reject the recommendations of their physician, either refusing beneficial medical interventions or procedures based on their personal views that do not match the perceived medical indication. In some instances, the patients’ refusal may jeopardize their health or life (...) but also compromise the clinician’s moral responsibility to promote the patient’s best interests. In other words, health professionals have to deal with patients whose behavior and healthcare decisions seem counterproductive for their health, or even deteriorate it, because of lack of knowledge, bad habits or bias without being the patients’ free voluntary choice. The moral dilemma centers on issues surrounding the limits of the patient’s autonomy (rights) and the clinician’s role to promote the well-being of the patient (duties). In this paper we argue that (1) the use of manipulative strategies, albeit considered beneficent, defeats the purpose of patient education and therefore should be rejected; and (2) the appropriate strategy is to empower patients through patient education which enhances their autonomy and encourages them to become full healthcare partners as opposed to objects of clinical intervention or entities whose values or attitudes need to be shaped and changed through education. First, we provide a working definition of the concept of patient education and a brief historical overview of its origin. Second, we examine the nature of the patient-physician relationship in order to delineate its boundaries, essential for understanding the role of education in the clinical context. Third, we argue that patient education should promote self-rebiasing, enhance autonomy, and empower patients to determine their therapeutic goals. Finally, we develop a moral framework for patient education. (shrink)

While the implementation of digital technology in psychiatry appears promising, there is an urgent need to address the implications of the absence of ethical design in the early development of such technologies. Some authors have noted the gap between technology development and ethical analysis and have called for an upstream examination of the ethical issues raised by digital technologies. In this paper, we address this suggestion, particularly in relation to digital healthcare technologies for patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The introduction (...) of digital technologies in psychiatry offers a broad spectrum of diagnostic and treatment options tailored to the health needs and goals of patients’ care. These technologies include wearable devices, smartphone applications for high-immersive virtual realities, smart homes, telepsychiatry and messaging systems for patients in rural areas. The availability of these technologies could increase access to mental health services and improve the diagnostics of mental disorders.Additional Instruction AbstractIn this descriptive review, we systematize ethical concerns about digital technologies for mental health with a particular focus on individuals suffering from schizophrenia. There are many unsolved dilemmas and conflicts of interest in the implementation of these technologies, such as (1) the lack of evidence on efficacy and impact on self-perception; (2) the lack of clear standards for the safety of their daily implementation; (3) unclear roles of technology and a shift in the responsibilities of all parties; (4) no guarantee of data confidentiality; and (5) the lack of a user-centered design that meets the particular needs of patients with schizophrenia. mHealth can improve care in psychiatry and make mental healthcare services more efficient and personalized while destigmatizing mental health disorders. To ensure that these technologies will benefit people with mental health disorders, we need to heighten sensitivity to ethical issues among mental healthcare specialists, health policy makers, software developers, patients themselves and their proxies. Additionally, we need to develop frameworks for furthering sustainable development in the digital technologies industry and for the responsible usage of such technologies for patients with schizophrenia in the clinical setting. We suggest that digital technology in psychiatry, particularly for schizophrenia and other serious mental health disorders, should be integrated into treatment with professional supervision rather than as a self-treatment tool. (shrink)

This paper studies the English poems of Richard Crashaw from a historicist and formalist perspective. It specifically considers Crashaw’s poetry in its religious but also intellectual and early scien­tific context to investigate the frequently overlooked influence of science on his poetry. Metaphors drawn from alchemy and particularly from the trans­formation of matter to achieve its purification and spiritualisation enrich the poet’s expression of mystical devotion to underline that access to the spiritual as well as mystical union with Christ are deeply (...) rooted in the devotee’s body. Representations of the earth as a chemical laboratory focus on materiality and corporality to emphasise the constant movement animating matter. A form of spiritual alchemy underscores Crashaw’s Christocentrism and references to the metamorphoses of matter consistently aim to express mystical union. A meta-poetic analysis eventually highlights a significant analogy between reading and alchemical processes in order to demonstrate the anagogical aim of Crashaw’s verse and the way his poems work on his reader’s heart to lift his soul. References to liquefaction, distillation or sublimation echo the published works of mystics but alchemical conceits based on symbolically evocative topoï and polysemic vocabulary reinforce the importance of the corporal in the expe­rience of mystical union. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that an important part of our knowledge is acquired via testimony. One of the main objectives of social epistemology is therefore to specify the conditions under which a hearer is justified in accepting a proposition stated by a source. Non-reductionists, who think that testimony could be considered as an a priori source of knowledge, as well as reductionists, who think that another type of justification has to be added to testimony, share a common conception about children development. Non-reductionists (...) believe that infants and children are fundamentally gullible and their gullibility could be seen as an example for justifying testimony, while reductionists believe that this gullibility is merely an exception that should be taken into account. The objective of this paper is to review contemporary literature in developmental psychology providing empirical grounds likely to clarify this philosophical debate. What emerges from current research is a more elaborated vision of children’s attitude toward testimony. Even at a very young age, children do not blindly swallow information coming from testimony; doubtful or contradictory information is automatically screened by their cognitive system. Even if they are unable to give positive reasons for the acceptance of a given testimony, young children are not gullible. Such empirical findings tend to call into question the radical opposition between reductionism and non-reductionism. (shrink)

Danielle Macbeth's purpose in Macbeth 2005 is threefold. Her monograph proposes "to provide a logical justification for all aspects of Frege's peculiar notation, to motivate and explain the developments in Frege's views over the course of his intellectual life, and to explicate his most developed, critically reflective conception of his Begriffschrift, his formula language of pure thought". I shall focus here on a few selected aspects of the first and third points and leave on the side the discussion of the (...) historical development of Frege's views on logic, semantics and mathematics. The book's underlying claim is that although Frege's logical language, "can of course be read as a language of quantificational logic, [it] can also be read very differently", so much so, as a matter of fact, that although Frege's logic is usually thought of as a "notational variant of standard quantificational logic", it is nevertheless "unknown to us". This naturally prompts three questions : "What is Frege's logic?", "What is quantificational logic?", and given the way we understand formal languages for first and higher order predicate logic, most notably the notions of argument 2 place, of scope and of binding : "How come Frege's logic says nothing about such notions, or something so different from what we say?". (shrink)

La question n'est plus : 'L'écologie, pour ou contre?' Le label vert a partout remplacé le label rouge (ou bleu ciel). La question est : 'Quelle écologie?' Or il y a là un problème, et même un 'problème à cornes,' selon la formule de Nietzsche : peut-on vraiment fonder l'écologie sur la Nature, dont la notion est si ambivalente? Elle n'a pas attendu l'homme pour produire cinq extinctions massives. Laissée à elle-même, elle éteindra tout, y compris les étoiles. Par ailleurs, (...) s'il faut bien sauvegarder les espèces dans leur admirable diversité, est-ce uniquement dans un but de conservation? La seule conservation eût été la finalité de la Nature que la vie n'aurait même pas dû commencer: une pierre dès le départ était plus performante. Et si le sens du vivant ne se trouvait pas tant dans la conservation que dans l'exposition de soi--et une exposition glorieuse--, jusqu'au sacrifice? Si la Madone était plus vraie que la Méduse? Fabrice Hadjadj nous offre ici une puissante méditation sur le vivant, l'interdépendance spirituelle de l'homme et des bêtes, la relation entre écologie et eschatologie. A travers une approche à la fois philosophique et biblique, il pense une tragédie heureuse, où il ne s'agit pas de donner pour durer, mais de durer pour donner encore.. En bref, il prend le taureau par les cornes."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Danielle Macbeth's purpose in Macbeth 2005 is threefold. Her monograph proposes "to provide a logical justification for all aspects of Frege's peculiar notation, to motivate and explain the developments in Frege's views over the course of his intellectual life, and to explicate his most developed, critically reflective conception of his Begriffschrift, his formula language of pure thought" (p. vii). I shall focus here on a few selected aspects of the first and third points and leave on the side the discussion (...) of the historical development of Frege's views on logic, semantics and mathematics. The book's underlying claim is that although Frege's logical language, "can of course be read as a language of quantificational logic, [it] can also be read very differently" (p. vii), so much so, as a matter of fact, that although Frege's logic is usually thought of as a "notational variant of standard quantificational logic", it is nevertheless "unknown to us" (p. 1). This naturally prompts three questions : "What is Frege's logic?", "What is quantificational logic?", and given the way we understand formal languages for first and higher order predicate logic, most notably the notions of argument 2 place (for a predicate symbol), of scope and of binding (of variables - either individual or predicate of first or higher order): "How come Frege's logic says nothing about such notions, or something so different from what we say?". (shrink)

Fabrice Teroni,Julien Deonna | : Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que (...) la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitudes plus spécifiques, à savoir les émotions. La suite de la discussion évalue la plausibilité d’une analyse FA souscrivant à l’une ou l’autre des approches contemporaines en théorie des émotions. La deuxième section souligne qu’il est difficile d’associer l’analyse FA aux théories en termes de contenu évaluatif et la troisième présente les atouts d’une théorie en termes d’attitudes évaluatives. Dans la dernière section, nous revenons au défi normatif et esquissons une manière de le relever. | : According to the FA analysis of evaluative concepts, our conception of an object as having a given value is the conception of a given evaluative attitude towards it as being appropriate. In this paper, we explore two challenges that this analysis has to take up. The psychological challenge requires that the analysis appeal to attitudes that are apt to shed light on our evaluative concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these same concepts. The normative challenge requires that we understand the appropriateness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, again without this presupposing the mastery of the relevant evaluative concepts. To determine whether the FA analysis can meet these challenges, we start by clarifying the sort of attitudes the analysis should appeal to. In section 1, we consider generic attitudes like desires and give some reasons to favor more specific attitudes, namely emotions. The ensuing discussion assesses the prospects of an FA analysis in light of contemporary accounts of emotions. In section 2, we argue that the FA analysis should not be combined with accounts according to which emotions have evaluative contents and then offer, in section 3, some reasons for combining the FA with an account in terms of evaluative attitudes. In section 4, we show how this allows for solving the normative challenge. (shrink)

Psychologists have emphasized children's acquisition of information through firsthand observation. However, many beliefs are acquired from others' testimony. In two experiments, most 4yearolds displayed sceptical trust in testimony. Having heard informants' accurate or inaccurate testimony, they anticipated that informants would continue to display such differential accuracy and they trusted the hitherto reliable informant. Yet they ignored the testimony of the reliable informant if it conflicted with what they themselves had seen. By contrast, threeyearolds were less selective in trusting a reliable (...) informant. Thus, young children check testimony against their own experience and increasingly recognise that some informants are more trustworthy than others. (shrink)

This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...) as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology. (shrink)

It is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the techno-scientific claims of the transhumanists. Instead, I question seriously the nature of the ethics and morals they claim can, or soon will, be manipulated artificially. I argue that while the possibility to manipulate human behavior via emotional processes exists, the question still remains concerning the content of morality. In other words, neural moral enhancement does not capture the fullness of human moral psychology, which includes moral capacity and moral content. (...) In this article, I revisit the debate between Hume and Kant concerning the role of emotions and reason in moral philosophy. I do so with reference to the work of philosopher Alasdair McIntyre. His moral philosophy has long stood as an essential text in virtue ethics, which constitutes the basis for my critique of the promise to engineer virtues (what I call “neural moral enhancement”). First, I outline three specific shifts that occurred in the history of Western moral philosophy in order to contextualize current debates on the nature of morality/moral agency. Second, I summarize MacIntyre's critique of contemporary moral philosophy and show its relevance to an assessment of neural moral enhancement. Finally I argue that moral neuroenhancement is a one-dimensional conceptualization of moral agency that does not reflect the fullness of human moral psychology. It envisions a world in which individual moral capacities will be enhanced and controlled but says nothing about the nature of the morality. (shrink)

This paper suggests that the enactive approach to ethics could benefit from engaging a dialogue with the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, a philosopher who has given ethics a decisive role in the understanding of our social life. Taking the enactive approach of Colombetti and Torrance as a starting point, we show how Levinas’ philosophy, with the key notions of face, otherness, and responsibility among others can complement and enrich the enactive view of ethics. Specifically, we argue that Levinas can provide, (...) on the one hand, a phenomenological characterisation of ethics itself, of its nature and fundamental meaning, and on the other, an account of how sociality, affectivity and embodiment, as presented in Colombetti and Torrance’s work, combine to bring about the ethical experience. However, we also point out that introducing Levinas to the enactive approach could be challenging. It is not obvious how sense-making and value-making, as centred on the precariousness and potential death of the subject, would account for the ethical experience as grounded on the precariousness and potential death of the other. (shrink)

May the theory of radical interpretation developed by Donald Davidson on the basis of Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of translation help fix the meaning of the logical constants? In particular, may the theory exclude ways of conferring meaning on the constants which, although developed within the Davidsonian framework, would lead to unexpected results? Could an interpreter fix the meaning of the constants in a non classical way, although still in accordance with the guiding principles of the interpretative strategy? Or, (...) on the contrary, does the theory incorporate constraints on interpretation which are stronger than those imposed by the possibility of non classical, or deviant logics? I examine the particular case of negation within the framework of the natural deduction system developed by Gentzen and Prawitz, and conclude that Davidson's theory, understood as an empirical theory of truth, leaves the problem of knowing which meaning should be assigned to the constant for negation without a satisfactory solution. Although interpetation has to be carried out according to the principle of charity, disagreements may come up regarding which meaning should be assigned to "not" in a properly regimented natural language. (shrink)

Grounding is a hyperintensional notion: necessarily equivalent sentences need not be equivalent from a ground-theoretic perspective. How fine-grained, exactly, is grounding? There is a striking lack of consensus on this question. In this chapter, I try to systematize and review the main options that have been put forward in the literature. For reasons that have to do with both naturalness and convenience, I for the most part take the question to be about what is sometimes called, following Kit Fine’s (2012a) (...) terminology, strict full grounding, and I take for granted a conception of grounding as a relation that is many-to-one and non-factive. I discuss the consequences of making alternative assumptions only in the very last section. (shrink)

The debate over moral bioenhancement has incrementally intensified since 2008, when Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas wrote two separate articles on the reasons why enhancing human moral capabilities and sensitivity through technological means was ethically desirable. In this article, we offer a critique of how Persson and Savulescu theorize about the possibility of moral bioenhancement, including the problem of weakness of will, which they see as a motivational challenge. First, we offer a working definition of moral bioenhancement and underscore some (...) of the challenges in determining whether moral bioenhancement, as conceptualized by Persson and Savulescu, falls into the category of enhancement or constitutes a type of therapeutic intervention. Second, we provide a critical analysis of the way Persson and Savulescu pathologize human behavior in relation to what they see as the main threat to the survival of the human species: weak moral motivation. Next, we critique the claim that the use of genetic manipulation and drug treatment will increase moral motivation. We argue that Persson and Savulescu mischaracterize the nature of human moral psychology because moral motivation includes affective and cognitive dimensions. The type of interventions they envision focus almost exclusively on the former. In the final two sections, we outline three main criticisms of moral bioenhancement and offer a more robust account of moral psychology and moral development than what Persson and Savulescu recommend, through the lens of Aristotle’s work on virtue ethics. Ultimately, we argue that what Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas consider as moral bioenhancement is a misnomer because they do not fully account for the complexity of moral agency. (shrink)

Social learning is likely to include affective processes: it is necessary for newcomers to discover what value to attach to objects, persons, and events in a given social environment. This learning relies largely on the evaluation of others’ emotional expressions. This study has two objectives. Firstly, we compare two closely related concepts that are employed to describe the use of another person’s appraisal to make sense of a given situation: social appraisal and social referencing. We contend that social referencing constitutes (...) a type of social appraisal. Secondly, we introduce the concept of affective social learning with the hope that it may help to discriminate the different ways in which emotions play a critical role in the processes of socialization. (shrink)

Meinong's early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses, provides, despite its brevity, a very important discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in the following way. In section (1), I present Meinong's definition of memory, and (...) contrast it with more recent conceptions. In section (2), I present his epistemological discussion of memory judgements, which is further investigated in section (3), where I discuss the notion of presumptive evidence via the criticisms it elicited from Franz Brentano. At the end of this presentation, we will understand why Meinong's essay is a landmark in the philosophical investigation of memory. (shrink)

Vous avez peut-être lu l'Enfer de Dante mais jamais son Paradis : il équivaut à vos yeux à un néant immaculé. Or le paradis dantesque est bien plus différencié et violent que son enfer. Béatrice y déclare au poète : " Si tu voyais mon rire, tu serais réduit en cendres ". C'est pourquoi, au fond, vous mettez le paradis à la porte : vous redoutez l'exigence de sa joie. Et vous vous fabriquez à la place un petit paradis artificiel, (...) rassurant... qui fait un enfer très convenable. Certes, il ne s'agit pas de fuir vers un autre monde imaginaire, ni de régresser vers ce paradis terrestre dont la Genèse nous dit qu'il est définitivement perdu. A la notion d'un au-delà, vous opposez à bon droit la requête de vivre hic et nunc. Mais vous n'arrivez jamais à être vraiment ici, maintenant. C'est là que le vrai paradis révèle son paradoxe et se défend contre ses parodies : il n'est pas évasion vers un ailleurs, mais la grâce déchirante d'être présent à tous et à chacun, dans une ouverture symphonique, une créativité chorale. Ce livre vous invite à un itinéraire à travers la philosophie, la théologie et les arts - de Nietzsche à Bonnefoy de Baudelaire au Bernin, de Sade à Mozart - afin d'approcher ce que le paradis a de plus terrible et de plus beau : la béance de sa béatitude. Oh! il ne s'agit pas de vous consoler, non, mais de vous convoquer à cette joie qui doit vous faire perdre toute contenance - comme un clown - et détruire en vous tout contentement - comme un fleuve, lequel n'est lui-même que de se recevoir et de s'offrir sans fin... (shrink)

S’agissant de la réparation des préjudices résultant d’un accident de la circulation, le droit prospectif de la responsabilité civile oscille entre rafistolage déceptif et procrastination pusillanime, alors qu’un véritable chamboulement eût été le bienvenu.

Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal memory from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role, if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According to an important family of approaches, seemings play a fundamental epistemological role vis-à-vis propositional memory judgments: it is one’s memory seeming that Caesar was murdered, say, that justifies one’s judgment that he was murdered. Yet, it has been convincingly argued that these approaches lead to insurmountable problems and that memory (...) seemings are not wellsuited to play this justifying role. As a result, many contemporary accounts of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue, which I will approach as follows. In Section 1, I contrast episodic memory with propositional memory so as to clarify the nature of the latter. According to the account I put forward, episodic memory consists in the preservation of acquaintance with objects and events, whereas propositional memory consists in the preservation of thought contents. In Section 2, I turn my attention to the contrast between propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. I argue that they play different roles. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering explains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I argue, in Section 3, that the most appealing account of this attitude is in terms of feelings of familiarity. In Section 4, I turn my attention to the epistemology of propositional memory and revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are justifi ed by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by drawing a more general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes and contents. (shrink)

Ce texte a pour but de mettre en confrontation la conception ruyérienne de la philosophie avec la conception wittgensteinienne. L’opposition majeure consiste dans l’idée défendue par Ruyer selon laquelle on ne saurait concevoir ce qu’est l’esprit sans définir un domaine, intérieur au sujet, qu’on peut identifier avec sa subjectivité. Une telle idée est comprise par Ryle comme un mythe, celui de l’intériorité. Il y a en revanche une volonté commune (mais bien différente) à Ruyer et Wittgenstein de s’émanciper de la (...) science. Deux thèmes permettent alors de comparer les objectifs de Ruyer et ceux des philosophes wittgensteiniens : le thème des mythes en philosophie et celui de la traduction. (shrink)

When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I will call the notion of objectual essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some of (...) my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine’s compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulatinghis view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence—a view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some sympathy. (shrink)

In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of relevant implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap's entailment. In this paper I provide for the first time the logic of first degree analytic containment, as presented in [2] and [3], with a semantical characterization—leaving higher degree systems for future investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special sort of truth-predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead of individual formulas, and (...) which behave in some respects like Gentzen's sequents. This semantics captures very general properties of the truth-functional connectives, and for that reason it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical consequence and Anderson and Belnap's tautological entailments. (shrink)

In “Ruyer’s Relation to Whitehead”, Fabrice Colonna seeks to establish the exact presence of Whitehead in the French philosopher’s work. The indisputable points of connection between the two thinkers, concerning the importance of metaphysics, the critics of the materialistic scheme, the relevance of a renewed platonism, should nevertheless not obscure certain differences in emphasis, which are apparent in the problem of the compounds beings and about certain principles of speculative theology, to which both of them have found deeply original (...) ways. (shrink)

The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...) of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion. (shrink)

En 1995, le premier numéro de notre nouvelle revue Clio. Histoire, Femmes et Sociétés, s’attachait à comprendre ce que la guerre avait à voir avec le genre. L’éditorial de Françoise Thébaud inscrivait cette première livraison, intitulée « Résistances et Libérations France 1940-1945 » dans les cérémonies du cinquantième anniversaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, regrettant le quasi oubli de l’instauration du suffrage universel en 1944 et la rareté des travaux français sur les femmes durant ce...

We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to (...) capture. (shrink)

L’ouvrage, publié sous la direction de Simona Feci et Laura Schettini, est le prolongement d’un colloque organisé par la Società Italiana delle Storiche (Société italienne des historiennes, association sœur de Mnémosyne) à Rome en 2015. Nos collègues italiennes souhaitaient apporter un regard historien sur les violences faites aux femmes, sujet qui connaissait alors, et en particulier autour de la notion de féminicide, une forte résonnance dans la péninsule. Le sujet n’était heureusement pas...

'Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as 'carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological 'non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characterization of substances, and these notions are still widely used to characterize other concepts and to (...) formulate metaphysical claims. This paper first gives an overview of the varieties of these notions, and then discusses some of their main applications. (shrink)

Ruyer et Bachelard ont en commun de concevoir le travail de la philosophie comme essentiellement lié à la science. Toutefois, alors que Bachelard s’en tient à des positions épistémologiques, Ruyer entend tirer des conclusions métaphysiques des résultats de la physique contemporaine. Il expose ses vues à l’occasion de deux comptes rendus qu’il fait des écrits de Bachelard. Selon Ruyer, les activités structurantes originales qui caractérisent les atomes et les molécules autorisent à les comparer aux êtres biologiques des étages supérieurs et (...) à défendre une vision panpsychiste du réel. L’imagination métaphysique peut alors proposer ce que Ruyer appelle une « lecture du monde » qui en donne une vision unifiée et intensifiée. Les deux directions opposées de l’œuvre de Bachelard, le concept et l’image, ont ainsi la possibilité d’être réconciliées. (shrink)

The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...) Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame and the Social Argument to shame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt have obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives. (shrink)

Le présent dossier consacré à Raymond Ruyer s’inscrit dans le contexte d’une redécouverte de ce penseur français admiré en son temps par plusieurs de ses pairs, tels que Merleau-Ponty, Canguilhem ou Deleuze, et dans la dynamique de ce qu’on peut désormais appeler les « études ruyériennes ». Plusieurs revues ont en effet consacré ces dernières années des numéros au philosophe nancéien : Les Études philosophiques, la Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger (n°1/...

In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in (...) the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit. (shrink)

A fast growing family of ATPases has recently been highlighted. It was named the AAA family, for ATPases Associated to a variety of cellular Activities. The key feature of the family is a highly conserved module of 230 amino acids present in one or two copies in each protein. Despite extensive sequence conservation, the members of the family fulfil a large diversity of cellular functions: cell cycle regulation, gene expression in yeast and HIV, vesicle‐mediated transport, peroxisome assembly, 26S protease function (...) etc. In addition, several members of this family can be found in the same organism (up to 17 in S. cerevisiae). The contrast between functional diversity and structural conservation of the module, from archaebacteria to mammals, suggests that it plays an essential, but as yet unknown, role at key points of the cellular machinery. Two (non‐exclusive) such possibilities are: (1) ATP‐dependent proteasome function and (2) ATP‐dependent anchorage of proteins. Finally, the basic biochemical activity of the AAA module is still a matter of speculation, and we propose that it acts as an ATP‐dependent protein clamp. (shrink)

Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more (...) specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions”, that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper. (shrink)

We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...) most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness. (shrink)

Anti-realists about the past claim that no one has yet manifested a knowledge of the truth of tensed instances of the realist schema '‡,' instances such as '‡. It is true that we cannot decide specific instances of the realist schema and that, consequently, neither our understanding of these instances, nor our knowledge of their truth may be constituted by the recognitional and executive capacities which, according to Michael Dummett's antirealism, constitute grasp of meaning. Although we cannot decide these issues, (...) we can meet Dummett's anti-realist's manifestability challenge by arguing for them from contingency. While no recognitional and decisional skills may constitute our knowledge that their truth-conditions are satisfied, we can, without begging the question, derive that knowledge from our folk and scientific theories of the workings of nature. The evidence we have in favor of the fact that evidential relations between us and past facts are naturally contingent allows us to infer tensed instances of the fundamental realist modal claim. The joint possibility of truth and undecideability pro tempora is a natural possibility and, thereby, a logical and metaphysical possibility. (shrink)

Si un philosophe a fondé son oeuvre sur la conscience historique, c'est bien Raymond Aron. Le rapprochement entre Aron et la post-modernité pourrait surprendre. Il en va tout autrement si l'on considère la conception historique de la post-modernité : celle-ci suit logiquement les Temps Modernes. Elle comprend alors les deux siècles de tensions idéologiques qui ont suivi 1789, jusqu'à la chute du mur de Berlin. Raymond Aron a commenté et pensé les convulsions apocalyptiques du dernier siècle post-moderne. D'où l'idée de (...) le considérer sous plusieurs angles : face au basculement du monde, la critique des idéologies (D. Steinmetz-Jenkins), la théorie des relations internationales (O. Rosenboim), son jugement sur la "tragédie algérienne" (O. Dard). Mais Aron est aussi sensible aux permanences, à ce qui ne bascule pas : c'est un penseur de la nation et des identités régionales, qui s'interroge sur sa propre judéité (G. De Ligio). La philosophie d'Aron, où l'historien est créateur et incarné, présente une analogie avec la théologie chrétienne : Pierre Manent décrit la relation d'Aron au christianisme. Enfin, Aron reste un intellectuel tout engagé dans la défense de la liberté, ce qu'explorent deux contributions : sur ce qu'il doit au libéralisme d'Edmund Burke (M. Oppermann), et sur sa recherche d'une stratégie modérée chez l'historien Hans Delbrück (J. Mouric). Encadrées par l'introduction de Fabrice Bouthillon et la conclusion de Pascal David, ces études esquissent les traits d'une pensée subtile : sceptique contre le dogmatisme des idéologies totalitaires, mais non relativiste, attachée à l'historicité, sans tomber dans le déterminisme historique. Ce volume est issu de la journée d'études du 18 novembre 2014 à l'Université de Bretagne occidentale à Brest."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper presents a propositional version of Kit Fine's (quantified) logic for essentialist statements, provides it with a semantics, and proves the former adequate (i.e. sound and complete) with respect to the latter.

In this paper, we clarify what proponents of the Growing Block Theory (GBT) should and what they should not say, and what they consistently can say. Once all the central tenets of the view are on the table, we address both David Braddon-Mitchell’s and Trenton Merricks’ recent eulogies for GBT, based on what is representative of a certain type of argument meant to show that GBT is internally incoherent. We argue that this type of argument proceeds from a mistaken assumption (...) about GBT’s core, viz. that GBT works with an untensed notion of what, in the metaphysically most fundamental sense, there is. We conclude that this type of argument accordingly misfires and that for all we know, we might be living on the brink of reality. (shrink)

In a recent article forthcoming in *Mind*, Leech (2020) presents a challenge for essentialist accounts of metaphysical modality: why should it be that essences imply corresponding necessities? Leech’s main focus is to argue that one cannot overcome the challenge by utilizing an account of essence in terms of generalized identity due to Correia and Skiles (2019), on pain of circularity. In this reply, we will show how to use identity-based essentialism to bridge ‘epistemic’ and ‘explanatory’ understandings of this alleged essence-to-necessity (...) gap without circularity, Leech’s arguments notwithstanding. We do so by first presenting a novel proof that generalized identities imply corresponding necessities. We then propose several substantive identity-based explanations of how it is, exactly, that essences imply necessities. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on two facets of emotional rationality—the first pertains to the relation between emotions and the mental states on which they are based, the second to the relation between emotions and the judgements and behaviour they elicit. These observations about (...) emotional rationality are then applied to emotions elicited by works of fiction. After having distinguished several families of emotions, I concentrate on what I call blob-emotions and emotions-for. I argue that, given their nature as direct responses to a restricted range of stimuli, blob-emotions are not irrational. As regards emotions-for fictional entities, I emphasize that a subject’s rationality shows in the way her emotions-for respond to evidence. On this basis, I discard an influential reason to think that emotions-for fictional entities are irrational. Finally, I offer an argument to conclude that they are typically correct and rational. (shrink)

Since the Nuremberg trials (1947–1949), informed consent has become central for ethical practice in patient care and biomedical research. Codes of ethics emanating from the Nuremberg Code (1947) recognize the importance of protecting patients and research subjects from abuses, manipulation and deception. Informed consent empowers individuals to autonomously and voluntarily accept or reject participation in either clinical treatment or research. In some cases, however, the underlying mental or physical condition of the individual may alter his or her cognitive abilities and (...) compromise the informed consent process. This is particularly true in chronic psychiatric conditions such as Treatment-Resistant Depression (TRD), where individuals may fail to respond to traditional antidepressant treatments (e.g., psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy). Moreover, it may raise further concerns for an individual’s motivation to consent and the level of understanding of the treatment or research procedure. This paper focuses on the informed consent process for Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) in the treatment of individuals diagnosed with TRD. Specifically, the paper addresses how depression may affect the decision-making capacity of an individual and the potential ethical and legal impact of failure to appreciate the seven elements of the consenting process (competence, voluntariness, disclosure, recommendation, understanding, decision, and authorization). To ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals with psychiatric disorders such as TRD and promote ethical behavior in biomedical research and patient care while avoiding potential legal pitfalls, we propose a paradigm that requires a stringent evaluation process of decision-making capacity for informed consent. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty, malgre ce que peut suggerer une lecture trop rapide, a refuse de placer son entreprise sous le signe de l'anti-metaphysique. Certes, il a tenu compte des critiques anterieures adressees a la metaphysique, cependant il occupe une position originale et singuliere dans le champ philosophique contemporain. Partant des travaux de la psychologie gestaltiste de la perception, encore largement ignores en France aujourd'hui, et sur lesquels le present ouvrage s'est largement appuye, Merleau-Ponty a ete conduit a renouveler l'ontologie traditionnelle, pour elargir (...) ensuite le domaine de la metaphysique a de nouveaux objets, jusqu'a remonter au mystere de l'espace et du temps. Un certain nombre de deplacements et de reagencements sont ainsi operes, qui temoignent d'une reappropriation vivante de la metaphysique, a partir d'une finitude que Merleau-Ponty dit non pas - bornee - mais - militante -.". (shrink)

In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification in not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory (...) in some detail and argue that it is a serious alternative to the positions identified by Fine. (shrink)