Translation of: Talkhaios kitaab al-Akhlaaq, book 4.

A critical edition, with translation and notes, of Samuel's 14th century Hebrew translation, otherwise available only in Mantinus' 1539 Latin translation from the Hebrew. The translator's English is surprisingly intelligible in view of the difficulties of the text which are helpfully indicated and discussed in the notes. The commentary itself is especially interesting as an instance of the influence of Aristotle on the Medieval Platonic tradition. Republic I and X are explicitly ignored as containing "no proof except by accident" (...) and as not "necessary for this science," respectively; the Divided Line passage is adumbrated beyond recognition and its position taken by an Aristotelian discussion of the Good after the Nicomachean Ethics.--R. P. (shrink)

Les présentes remarques se proposent d’observer la façon dont les noms propres ont été traités par Averroès dans son Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque, rédigé à partir de la traduction arabe du traité aristotélicien, dont une seule copie unique existe aujourd’hui, conservée dans la bibliothèque Quaraouiyine de Fès. Perdu dans sa version originale arabe, ce Commentaire n’existe – à l’exception d’une trentaine de petits fragments – que dans sa traduction latine, réalisée en 1240 par Hermann l’Allemand, et dans sa (...) traduction hébraïque, achevée par Samuel de Marseille en 1340. Analyser l’attitude d’Averroès devant les noms propres de ENar, qui pour la plupart ont été translittérés par le traducteur arabe, entraîne par voie de conséquence un examen de la façon dont Hermann et Samuel ont à leur tour réagi face à des noms propres, dont ils ne connaissaient pas nécessairement les référents puisqu’ils appartiennent à une aire c... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Otot ha-Shamayim: Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew Version of Aristotle’s “Meteorology.” by AristotleSteven HarveyAristotle. Otot ha-Shamayim: Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew Version of Aristotle’s “Meteorology.” Translated and edited by Resianne Fontaine. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995. Pp. lxxx + 268. Cloth, $108.50.This modest, seemingly unimportant, volume is in fact a surprisingly fascinating text that should be of interest to all historians of philosophy. Under the rather boring guise of (...) an edition and English translation of a medieval Hebrew translation of an early ninth-century Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Meteorology, this book is destined to be ignored by most historians of philosophy and even by those who have a special interest in Aristotle. This is a shame, and it is the goal of this brief review to alert the reader to the book’s value.The Hebrew translation of the Meteorology is, to be more precise, a creative translation of an inadequate Arabic version of the text, corrected, interpreted, and expanded on the basis of the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes, by a philosopher struggling to understand what was for him a seminal text of Aristotle’s. The philosopher-translator was Samuel Ibn Tibbon, best known for his faithful translation into Hebrew of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed. What is immediately significant about the translation of the Meteorology, which was completed in 1210, is that it was the first text of Aristotle’s to be translated into Hebrew and, as far as is known, the first Hebrew translation of any philosophic or scientific work of a non-Jew. For the philosophically inclined Jew who did not know Arabic and who had struggled through Maimonides’s Guide without the benefit of translations, paraphrases, or even commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and other prerequisite writings on natural science, the translation must have been an eagerly awaited and much welcome work. But why, of all things, the historian of philosophy will ask, the Meteorology? And however much appreciated the translation may have been in 1210, what possible use could an English translation of this patchwork Hebrew translation of a garbled and abridged Arabic translation of perhaps a Syriac translation of the Greek original or compendium of the Meteorology have for us today when we have a fine Greek edition of the text and modern translations from that edition?There were good reasons not to translate the Meteorology first. In contrast to most of Aristotle’s writings on natural science which existed in impressively reliable Arabic translations, the Meteorology existed in a poor and incomplete one. Ibn Tibbon comments in his Introduction to the translation that “errors and omissions” in the Arabic translation are evident from the context, from a comparison with Alexander’s commentary and the lemmata found therein, and from a comparison with other Aristotelian works that existed in trustworthy translations. The text could not simply be translated, [End Page 130] but needed to be reconstructed on the basis of a careful study of the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and the other commentaries that were available. Yet, even if the text had existed in a reliable translation, the tradition of text-study required that the sciences be studied in a proper order and this meant—as is clear from the opening words of the Meteorology—beginning the study of natural sciences with the Physics and turning to the Meteorology only after completing On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption. Ibn Tibbon acknowledged this, and, in fact, interjected in his own name (27, 29) that “all the statements the philosopher has [made] thus far, are introductory remarks taken from earlier discussions in other books.... Someone who has not previously acquired knowledge and learning from his books that precede this one, will understand very little of this introduction.” Unfortunately for Ibn Tibbon’s reader, it would be forty years before any of those books or epitomes of them would be translated into Hebrew. Resianne Fontaine, in her wide-ranging and informative Introduction (xi–xii), brings support for A. Ravitzky’s suggestion that Ibn Tibbon’s decision to translate the Meteorology was motivated by his personal interest in the text... (shrink)

This volume offers a critical edition of Samuel Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew version of the Arabic paraphrase of Aristotle's Meteorology , together with an English translation and an introduction which discussed Ibn Tibbon's comments incorporated in his translation.

Plato and Aristotle on the vocation of the philosopher -- Halevi's Kuzari as a platonic dialogue -- Maimonides and the imagination -- Elia del Medigo, Averroes and Averroism -- Paduan Averroism reconsidered -- Philosophy and mysticism -- Maimonides and Spinoza on good and evil -- A note on natural right, nature and reason in Spinoza -- Spinoza and Luzzatto : philosophy and religion -- On the interpretation of Maimonides: the cases of Samuel David Luzzatto and Ahad Haxam -- Harry (...) a. Wolfson as interpreter of medieval thought -- On the limitations of human knowledge. (shrink)

The book and its title -- Averroes' life and works -- The meaning of Averroes' work -- Being and language in the Decisive Treatise -- A sociology of language -- Averroes, the double truth and his heritage -- The Decisive Treatise on the connection between Islamic religious law and philosophy.

"In one fashion or another, the question with which this introduction begins is a question for every serious reader of Plato's Republic : Of what use is this philosophy to me? Averroes clearly finds that the Republic speaks to his own time and to his own situation.... Perhaps the greatest use he makes of the Republic is to understand better the shari'a itself.... It is fair to say that in deciding to paraphrase the Republic, Averroes is asserting that his world—the (...) world defined and governed by the Koran—can profit from Plato's instruction."—from Ralph Lerner’s IntroductionAn indispensable primary source in medieval political philosophy is presented here in a fully annotated translation of the celebrated discussion of the Republic by the twelfth-century Andalusian Muslim philosopher, Abu'l-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, also know by his his Latinized name, Averroes. This work played a major role in both the transmission and the adaptation of the Platonic tradition in the West. In a closely argued critical introduction, Ralph Lerner addresses several of the most important problems raised by the work. (shrink)

The author is one of the greatest contemporary authorities on Classical Jewish philosophy. He applies his vast scholarship to probe into the inter-relationship between medieval Jewish philosophy and the cabala. The profound and daring speculation of the theosophists of the early cabala did not fail to provoke a violent reaction on the part of Jewish scholasticism, and the two long studies in the present volume try to analyze two cases of such antagonistic relationships. The first of the studies is a (...) comparison of the philosophico-theological treatise of Samuel Judah Ibn Tibbon, "The Reconciliation of Philosophy and the Religious Law," with a treatise on the Spanish cabalist Jacob ben Seset. While in this study we see the confrontation of the spirit of Averroes with the cabalistic inspiration, the second essay is devoted to a treatise from the fourteenth century, written by Joseph ben Abraham Ibn Waquar, in which philosophical and cabalistic elements are intimately interwoven in one and the same work. To the two major studies are added ten highly interesting short treatises on cabalistic notions and texts, making the present books together with the writings of Gershon Scholem the most important monument to cabalistic scholarship available in a Western language.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Averroës, the greatest Aristotelian of the Islamic philosophical tradition, composed some thirty-eight commentaries on the "First Teacher's" corpus, including three separate treatments of De Anima : the works commonly referred to as the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries. The Middle Commentary--actually Averroës's last writing on the text-remains one of his most refined and politically discreet treatments of Aristotle, offering modern readers Averroës's final statement on the material intellect and conjunction as well as an accessible historical window on (...) Aristotle's work as it was interpreted and transmitted in the medieval period. (shrink)

I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.

"An indispensable primary source in medieval political philosophy is presented here in a fully annotated translation of Averroes' discussion of the Republic. Averroes' book played a major role in both the transmission and the adaptation of the Platonic tradition in the West."--Goodreads.

Some normative theories are self-defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self-defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread and consequential assumption is false. In particular, I argue that (...) a theory can be self-defeating and still internally consistent, action-guiding, and suitable as a standard for criticism. (shrink)

This paper examines the interplay of semantics and pragmatics within the domain of film. Films are made up of individual shots strung together in sequences over time. Though each shot is disconnected from the next, combinations of shots still convey coherent stories that take place in continuous space and time. How is this possible? The semantic view of film holds that film coherence is achieved in part through a kind of film language, a set of conventions which govern the relationships (...) between shots. In this paper, we develop and defend a new version of the semantic view. We articulate it for a pair of conventions that govern spatial relations between viewpoints. One such rule is already well-known; sometimes called the "180° Rule," we term it the X-Constraint; to this we add a previously unrecorded rule, the T-Constraint. As we show, both have the effect, in different ways, of limiting the way that viewpoint can shift through space from shot to shot over the course of a film sequence. Such constraints, we contend, are analogous to relations of discourse coherence that are widely recognized in the linguistic domain. If film is to have a language, it is a language made up of rules like these. (shrink)

Mind wandering is a pervasive feature of subjective experience. But why does the mind tend to wriggle about rather than always staying focused? To answer this question, this paper defends the claim that mind wandering consists in task-unrelated thought. Despite being the standard view of mind wandering in cognitive psychology, there has been no systematic elaboration or defense of the task-unrelated thought view of mind wandering. Here, I argue for the task-unrelated thought view by showing how mind wandering reflects a (...) distinctive form of non-vigilant thinking. When the relationship between mind wandering and vigilance is clarified, several objections to the task-unrelated thought view can be defused. Not only does this provide a novel defense of the task-unrelated thought view of mind wandering, but it also presents an account of mind wandering that is compatible with a naturalistic account of subjectivity. (shrink)

Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report “losing themselves” in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of “taking on” or “assuming” the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.

Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgment of permissibility and wrongness are relatively scarce. Across 4 experiments (N = 1,438), we show that people judge that some behaviors can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgments track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgments of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not (...) permissibility. These findings suggest a picture in which moral evaluation is granular enough to express reasoning about different types of normative considerations, notably the possibility that people can exercise their rights in morally problematic ways. (shrink)

Suppose that a patient is receiving treatment options from her doctor. In one case, the doctor says, “the surgery has a 90% survival rate.” Now, suppose the doctor instead said, “the procedure has a 10% mortality rate.” Predictably, the patient is more likely to consent on the first description and more likely to dissent on the second. This is an example of a framing effect. A framing effect occurs when “the description of [logically-equivalent] options in terms of gains (positive frame) (...) rather than losses (negative frame) elicits systematically different choices.” Framing effects are ubiquitous, but they are particularly troublesome in medicine. Many worry that there is tension between valuing informed consent and using framing effects in clinical settings. In this paper, I answer this question: if an individual is subject to a framing effect when she gives her consent, does this undermine the validity of her consent? I argue that framing effects do not undermine consent in general. (shrink)

Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I (...) argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship. (shrink)

This book contains the first English translation of Abūl-Walīd Ibn Rushd's (Averroes') so-called Epitome of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The original Arabic text was composed around 1160 as a sort of appendix to a series of compendia of Aristotle's works on natural philosophy by the famous Andalusian philosopher. The two most interesting things about this work are the fact that Averroes restructures here the Aristotelian text according to his own conception of metaphysics, as opposed to his great literal commentary which follows the (...) order of the Metaphysics section by section, and that he constantly revised this work over more than three decades. The present translation is based on a wide range of documents including, apart from the available Arabic editions, a number of medieval Arabic manuscripts not taken into consideration in these editions as well as the Renaissance translation into Latin prepared by Jacob Mantinus. It is accompanied by a commentary dealing with the major philosophical topics, Averroes' sources and problems of the transmission and constitution of the text. In addition, the most important variant readings of the manuscripts are noted in footnotes underneath the translation. (shrink)

Can quantum theory provide examples of metaphysical indeterminacy, indeterminacy that obtains in the world itself, independently of how one represents the world in language or thought? We provide a positive answer assuming just one constraint of orthodox quantum theory: the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. Our account adds a modal condition to preclude spurious indeterminacy in the presence of superselection sectors. No other extant account of metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum theory meets these demands.

In this paper, I examine the connections between bipolar disorder and consent. I defend the view that many (although far from all) individuals with bipolar disorder are competent to consent to a wide variety of things when they are in a manic state.

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the proportion of papers (...) using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

We offer a framework for organizing the literature regarding the debates revolving around infinite idealizations in science, and a short summary of the contributions to this special issue.

Metaphysics-first approaches dominate the current literature in the epistemology of modality. According to metaphysics-firsters, metaphysical theses have an important role in the justification of modal epistemologies. For example, the thesis that essentialist truths constitute the metaphysical grounds of modal truths is meant to have an important role in the justification of essentialist modal epistemologies. In this article, we argue against this approach. We first pick up some of the groundwork on behalf of the metaphysics-firsters and explicitly spell out potential arguments (...) for their view. However, despite some initial plausibility, these arguments are ultimately found wanting. We conclude that the metaphysics-first approach lacks motivation and puts far too stringent demands upon modal epistemologists. (shrink)

The Gamer’s Dilemma consists of three intuitively plausible but conflicting assertions: (i) Virtual murder is morally permissible. (ii) Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden. (iii) There is no relevant moral difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation in computer games. Numerous attempts to resolve (or dissolve) the Gamer’s Dilemma line the field of computer game ethics. Mostly, the phenomenon is approached using expressivist argumentation: Reprehensible virtual actions express something immoral in their performance but are not immoral by themselves. Consequentialists, (...) on the other hand, claim that the immorality of virtual actions arises from their harmful consequences. I argue that both approaches have serious difficulties meeting the moral challenge posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma. They tend to confuse the morality of in-game actions either with the morality of their real-world counterparts or with the morality of games as objects. Following this critical analysis, I will develop a Kantian argument and defend it against two objections. So far, deontological responses to the Gamer’s Dilemma have been sought in vain. Yet, with Kant, its moral challenge can be met by looking at the gamer’s reasons. From this perspective, the Gamer’s Dilemma is based on a false assumption: the moral status of gaming acts does not derive from a normative equation with their real-world counterparts but only from their justifications. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; (...) I also confront a close relative of this view. In the third, I confront the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt the contradictory of that maxim. In the fourth, I confront two variations of the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests and an agent is deliberating about the action in the maxim, then the agent has a positive duty to adopt the contrary of that maxim. In the fifth, I confront the view that says that if an agent has adopted a maxim of ends, then the agent has a positive duty to universalize that end. I then wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks. (shrink)

One popular theory of moral responsibility locates responsible agency in exercises of control. These control-based theories often appeal to tracing to explain responsibility in cases where some agent is intuitively responsible for bringing about some outcome despite lacking direct control over that outcome’s obtaining. Some question whether control-based theories are committed to utilizing tracing to explain responsibility in certain cases. I argue that reflecting on certain kinds of negligence shows that tracing plays an ineliminable role in any adequate control-based theory (...) of responsibility. (shrink)

The clock hypothesis of relativity theory equates the proper time experienced by a point particle along a timelike curve with the length of that curve as determined by the metric. Is it possible to prove that particular types of clocks satisfy the clock hypothesis, thus genuinely measure proper time, at least approximately? Because most real clocks would be enormously complicated to study in this connection, focusing attention on an idealized light clock is attractive. The present paper extends and generalized partial (...) results along these lines with a theorem showing that, for any timelike curve in any spacetime, there is a light clock that measures the curve’s length as accurately and regularly as one wishes. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions offers the first book-length defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Although the theory was much maligned by Wittgenstein and ultimately rejected by Russell himself, Lebens shows that it provides a rich and insightful way to understand the nature of propositional content. In Part I, Lebens charts the trajectory of Russell’s thought before he adopted the MRTJ. Part II reviews the historical story of the theory: What led Russell to deny the (...) existence of propositions altogether? Why did the theory keep evolving throughout its short life? What role did G. F. Stout play in the evolution of the theory? What was Wittgenstein’s concern with the theory, and, if we can’t know what his concern was exactly, then what are the best contending hypotheses? And why did Russell give the theory up? In Part III, Lebens makes the case that Russell’s concerns with the theory weren’t worth its rejection. Moreover, he argues that the MRTJ does most of what we could want from an account of propositions at little philosophical cost. This book bridges the history of early analytic philosophy with work in contemporary philosophy of language. It advances a bold reading of the theory of descriptions and offers a new understanding of the role of Stout and the representation concern in the evolution of the MRTJ. It also makes a decisive contribution to philosophy of language by demonstrating the viability of a no-proposition theory of propositions. (shrink)

This collection of essays combines the discussion of abstract questions in moral and political theory with an attention to the normative dimension of current social and political controversies. There are essays on immigration, terrorism, toleration, political equality, the role of partiality in ethics, and the importance of tradition.

Frege's picture of attitude states and attitude reports requires a notion of content that is shareable between agents, yet more fine-grained than reference. Kripke challenged this picture by giving a case on which the expressions that resist substitution in an attitude report share a candidate notion of fine-grained content. A consensus view developed which accepted Kripke's general moral and replaced the Fregean picture with an account of attitude reporting on which states are distinguished in conversation by their (private) representational properties. (...) I begin in support of the consensus by showing how a sort of de facto coordination on mental symbols is possible, even for unsophisticated agents. But I go on to argue that whenever conditions are ripe for de facto coordination on symbols, there is an inter-subjective relation that supports a fine-grained notion of content resistant to Kripke's challenge. The consensus view corresponds to a Kripke-resistant strain of the Fregean picture. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” Here, in Part 1, we focus on senses in which a relativistic spacetime has been said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” After critiquing several proposals in the literature, we present a result capturing a substantive sense in which every relativistic spacetime is locally approximately Minkowskian. We then show that Minkowski spacetime is not distinguished in this result: every relativistic spacetime is locally (...) approximately every other spacetime in the same sense. In Part 2, we will consider “locally specially relativistic” matter theories. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” In Part 1, we focused on senses in which a relativistic spacetime may be said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” Here, in Part 2, we consider what it might mean to say that a matter theory is “locally special relativistic.” We isolate and evaluate three criteria in the literature and show that they are incompatible: matter theories satisfying one will generally violate (...) others. We then consider what would happen if any of those criteria failed for a given theory. (shrink)

Taking a thematic approach to Butler as a political thinker, this text develops Butler's theory of the political through an exploration of her politics of troubling.

There is an old meta-philosophical worry: very roughly, metaphysical theories have no observational consequences and so the study of metaphysics has no value. The worry has been around in some form since the rise of logical positivism in the early twentieth century but has seen a bit of a renaissance recently. In this paper, I provide an apology for metaphysics in the face of this kind of concern. The core of the argument is this: pure mathematics detaches from science in (...) much the same manner as metaphysics and yet it is valuable nonetheless. The source of value enjoyed by pure mathematics extends to metaphysics as well. Accordingly, if one denies that metaphysics has value, then one is forced to deny that pure mathematics has value. The argument places an added burden on the sceptic of metaphysics. If one truly believes that metaphysics is worthless (as some philosophers do), then one must give up on pure mathematics as well. (shrink)