Uno de los motivos recurrentes del pensamiento contemporáneo, es la indagación sobre el concepto, la representación y la valoración de la comunidad como una dimensión de la experiencia, en particular en su incidencia política/impolítica. Pero "comunidad" se ha manifestado como un "semantema" elusivo, es decir, una familia de nociones y asociaciones significativas, que abren y complejizan más y más la búsqueda de un concepto preciso, hasta empujarnos hacia las típicas "vías negativas" para la caracterización o definición del mismo. A modo (...) de hipótesis, sin pretender con ello construir un esquema abarcador, sostendré que hay un núcleo estético en ese semantema, aludiendo con "estética" a la presencia, en el punto pivote de la constelación que delimita "lo comunitario", de términos como sonido/silencio, diferencia, doble, forma, identidad, imagen y semejanza. Se trata mayormente, como es evidente, de significaciones construidas sobre los planos auditivo y visual de lo sensorio. Como una especificación de dicha hipótesis, ensayaré la elaboración de una noción de comunidad a partir de la pregunta acerca de cuándo hay comunidad. La respuesta a articular, es que hay comunidad cuando hay imagen, esto es, corporización de una semejanza y de un sentido, capaces de conjurar tanto la amenaza de lo informe como la de la forma sin semejanza. El fundamento último de esta hipótesis, es que nuestro ser-en-común originario toma consistencia en el plano de lo sensible porque se vincula a la insuficiencia de toda representación para subordinarlo a un concepto, pues se presenta aquí, entre comunidad y concepto, la misma distancia infranqueable que hay entre la existencia y su teorización. One of the recurrent motifs of contemporary thought is the inquiry about the concept, representation and valuation of community as a dimension of experience, particularly in its political/impolitic influence. But "community" has proved to be an elusive semanteme, i.e., a family of notions and significant associations that make the search for a precise concept very complex, pushing us to the typical "negative ways" for its characterization or definition. As a hypothesis, and with no intention of building an all-encompassing frame, I will hold that there is an aesthetic nucleus to this semanteme, understanding "aesthetic" as the presence of terms such as sound/silence, difference, double, shape, identity, image and likeness, occurring at the very pivot point of the constellation that defines "the communitarian". It refers mostly to significances related to the hearing and seeing senses. Following this hypothesis, I will try to define a notion of community answering the question of when a community occurs. The answer to this being that there is a community when there is an image; that is, the embodiment of a likeness and a sense that can thwart the threat of what is shapeless or of a shape with no likeness. The ultimate foundation of this hypothesis is that our original being-in-common becomes consistent to the senses because of its inability to subordinate to a concept, as happens with any representation, being the unbridgeable distance between community and its concept the same there is between existence and its theorization. (shrink)

SPANISH: La suposición de la obediencia estricta, y las demás características de la sociedad bien ordenada (SBO), es una considerable idealización que hace Rawls de las circunstancias históricas reales en las que existen las sociedades contemporáneas. De allí la objeción de que todo el proyecto de la justicia como equidad es inútil, pues de nada sirve saber cuáles serían los principios de la justicia para una SBO que solamente existe en la teoría. Los objetivos de este artículo son aclarar el (...) significado de la suposición de una SBO del que se ocupa una teoría ideal, indicar las relaciones de este tipo de teoría con la metodología de la filosofía política y la noción de factibilidad y reevaluar la objeción de inutilidad a la luz de estas consideraciones. Se propone una respuesta doble a la objeción de inutilidad derivada de obra de Rawls. ENGLISH: The assumption of strict obedience, and other features of the well ordered society (WOS), is a great idealization that Rawls does from the actual and historical circumstances in which contemporary societies exist. From there comes the objection according to which the whole Project of justice as fairness is just useless, for it has no purpose at all to know what would it be the principles of justice for a well ordered society that only exist in theory. The aims of this paper are to make clear the meaning of the well ordered society’s assumption - the society which the ideal theory takes care of -; to point out the links between this kind of theory and the methodology of the political philosophy and the notion of feasibility; and to look again the useless objection in the light of the above considerations. Before the useless objection, it is proposed a twofold answer that could be inferred from Rawls work. (shrink)

What if "liberal democracy" were a contradiction in terms? This book distinguishes liberalism from democracy to defend a Rancirean vision of impure politics. Disclosing Rancire's refusal of ontology as political, The Lessons of Rancire enacts a critical theory beyond unmasking and a democratic politics beyond liberalism.

This article is a study of the trajectory of the contemporary French liberal philosopher Marcel Gauchet from his early, ‘anarchist’ commitments through the 1970s to his discovery and defense of liberalism, notably as expressed in his 1980 revival and interpretation of his 19th-century countryman Benjamin Constant’s post-revolutionary liberalism. Discussed in the article are Gauchet’s devotion to and revision of the portrait of primitive society he inherited from the French anthropologist Pierre Clastres, how his early political and theoretical concerns are transmuted (...) in Gauchet’s reading of Constant, and the relevance of this trajectory for comprehending even Gauchet’s most recent pronouncements about the nature and future of liberal society. (shrink)

Over the past decade, Jacques Rancière’s writings have increasingly provoked and inspired political theorists who wish to avoid both the abstraction of so-called normative theories and the philosophical platitudes of so-called postmodernism. Rancière offers a new and unique definition of politics, la politique, as that which opposes, thwarts and interrupts what Rancière calls the police order, la police — a term that encapsulates most of what we normally think of as politics (the actions of bureaucracies, parliaments, and courts). Interpreters have (...) been tempted to read Rancière as proffering a formally pure conception of politics, wherein politics is ultimately separate from and in utter opposition to all police orders. Here I provide a different account of Rancière’s thinking of politics: for Rancière politics goes on within police orders and for this reason he strongly rejects the very idea of a pure politics. Politics is precisely that which could never be pure; politics is an act of impurity, a process that resists purification. In carefully delineating the politique—police relation I show that the terms of Rancière’s political writings are multiple and multiplied. Rancière consistently undermines any effort to render politics pure, and therein lies his potential contribution to contemporary political theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a series of objections that may be expected against this position. The paper concludes with a metaphilosophical explanation about our conflicting intuitions regarding the normativity of rationality.

This article examines the significance of Jacques Rancière’s work on pedagogy, and argues that to make sense of Rancière’s ‘lesson on the lesson’ one must do more but also less than merely explicate Rancière’s texts. It steadfastly refuses to draw out the lessons of Rancière’s writings in the manner of a series of morals, precepts or rules. Rather, it is committed to thinking through the ‘lessons’ of Rancière in another sense. Above all, Rancière wants to ‘teach’ his readers something absolutely (...) crucial about teaching. In making this claim the article emphasizes the extent to which Rancière advocates an utterly radical pedagogy, one that completely reconceives all the central elements of ‘schooling’, including teacher, student, intelligence and knowledge. Rancière thinks it possible to teach without knowing; he believes that the best schoolmasters can operate not on the assumption of their expertise, but on the equality of intelligence; and this means ultimately that Rancière contends that we can ‘teach what we do not know’. The best schoolmasters are ignorant schoolmasters. Rancière’s radical pedagogy depends upon, just as it consistently advances, a thoroughgoing resistance to a certain form of epistemological and ontological mastery. The rejection of mastery—of schoolmasters who would know it all, and convey this knowing to their students—forms the very backbone of all of Rancière’s writings and critical investigations. This is the chief reason why Rancière is, in a way, always talking about pedagogy, even when his subject matter appears to be something else entirely. (shrink)

My title could be taken to name an object, the politics of translation, but here I emphasize something related yet quite distinct: the practice that the title also identifies—the process of translating politics. This procedure remains bound up with the basic question of how to translate politics, how to put into English what Rancière means when he talks or writes about “politics.” Since the publication of Disagreement in English translation nearly twenty years ago, Rancière’s English-speaking audiences have been much exercised (...) by just this question. Indeed, the dominant response to Rancière’s work, particularly in the field of political theory, has been to read him as suggesting a radical redefinition of... (shrink)

Leibniz is an eclectic and ecumenical philosopher. He often worked out philosophical positions that reconciled seemingly opposed theoretical systems and chastised people for rejecting certain views too quickly. In this paper, I describe one episode of Leibnizian reconciliation. My target is the phenomenon of deliberation. Traditionally, philosophers have offered two different accounts of deliberation based on two different accounts of the compatibility of freedom and determinism. Leibniz, I argue, cannot accept either account because of his broader theoretical commitments. This leads (...) Leibniz to formulate an interesting account of deliberation that adopts certain elements from each account while excising the untoward aspects of each one. I outline the various mechanisms involved in deliberation on Leibniz’s view and show how deliberation fits into a broader theory of free action. I close with an assessment of whether Leibniz in fact succeeds in offering an account of deliberation that is distinct from the traditional positions. (shrink)

I THE REHABILITATION OF RHETORIC The ancients denned rhetoric as the art of speaking and writing both well and convincingly: ars bene dicendi and ars ...

Friedrich Engels, in 1895, reissued Marx's 'The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850', with an Introduction endorsing peaceful political tactics. We review the primary evidence to bring order to a confusing picture that emerges from a range of conflicting interpretations of the document. Our conclusions are as follows: First, the 1895 Introduction does not signify a new position, considering Engels' recognition over several decades of political concessions by the British ruling class. Secondly, since from the 1840s Marx too had applauded the (...) potential of the 'Social Democratic' route, at least under the appropriate conditions, we may be confident that he would have approved of Engels' Introduction. Thirdly, the case for universal suffrage was to set the foundations for a classless communist system; Engels, we show, would have found unacceptable a Parliamentary system generating a working-class majority unwilling to carry out a communist program, or a working-class electorate choosing to replace the party at the polls. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Political Identity of the Philosopher:Resistance, Relative Power, and the Endurance of PotentialSamuel McCormickThe troublemaker is precisely the one who tries to force sovereign power to translate itself into actuality.—Giorgio AgambenBeyond the Straussian Practice of "Philosophic Politics"In the second half of the 1920s, Bertolt Brecht began a series of short stories about a "thinking man" named Mr. Keuner. Among the first stories he published was "Measures Against Power" ("Maßnahmen (...) gegen die Gewalt"), the opening passage of which provides the subject of this essay:As Mr. Keuner, the thinking man [Denkende], was speaking out against power in front of a large audience in a hall, he noticed the people in front of him shrinking back and leaving. He looked around and saw standing behind him—Power [Gewalt]."What were you saying," Power asked him."I was speaking out in favor of Power," replied Mr. Keuner. [End Page 72]After Mr. Keuner had left the hall, his students inquired about his backbone [Rückgrat]. Mr. Keuner replied: "I don't have a backbone to be broken. I'm the one who has to live longer than Power [Gerade ich muß länger leben als die Gewalt]."(2001, 3)How are we to understand the political activity of this "thinking man"? Clearly, Mr. Keuner is no Cynic. Unlike Diogenes, who famously ordered Alexander the Great to step out of the way and then openly rebuked his authority as king, Mr. Keuner refuses to play the part of the parrhesiastes.1 His political activity more closely resembles that of a Stoic philosopher. Consider, for instance, the way his reply to Power echoes that of Seneca the Younger: "It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loyally dedicated themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorners of magistrates or kings or of those who control the administration of public affairs. For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with the philosopher as the ruler is" (Ep. 73.1–2 [1920, 105]).Given this attitude toward the powers that be, we might also figure Mr. Keuner's conduct in terms of the Straussian practice of "philosophic politics." For Leo Strauss, one of the most striking, and sometimes strident, twentieth-century scholars to consider the political identity of the philosopher, philosophic politics consists in "satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are not subversives, in short, that they are not irresponsible adventurers but good citizens and even the best of citizens." This is the defense of philosophy that is required "always and everywhere," Strauss concludes, regardless of what the dominant political order might be (1991, 205–6).Although he is certainly willing to appease Power, Mr. Keuner differs from Strauss's philosophic politician in three fundamental ways, each of which suggests that a closer examination of his speech and action is in order. First, the Straussian practice of philosophic politics does not consist in advocating for political or social change but in defending the discipline of philosophy. For Strauss, "there is no necessary connection between the philosopher's indispensible philosophic politics and the efforts which he might or might not make to contribute toward the establishment of the best regime" (1991, 205). For Mr. Keuner, however, the discipline of philosophy—and with it his identity as a "thinking man"—is neither in need of defense nor distinct from his political activity but, instead, available for use as a persuasive resource in his interaction with Power. How he [End Page 73] avails himself of the tropes and topoi of philosophical inquiry can only be determined by examining his conduct closely.Second, the proper site of philosophic politics is not the political activity of "thinking" men and women but their philosophical tracts and treatises. Thus, in searching for the "philosophic politics" of Mr. Keuner, Strauss would have us focus not on his interaction with Power but on the writings for which he has come to be known as a "thinking man." As I argue in a recent edition of this journal (2005, 302–3), this... (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread arguments in favor of the normativity of epistemic reasons before advancing two arguments against this thesis. The first is supported by an analysis of what it means to “have” some evidence for p. The second is supported by the claim that beliefs, if they are to be considered as states, cannot have epistemic reasons as (...) normative reasons. (shrink)

Over the last fifteen years, studies on Sanskrit intellectual history between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries have produced a body of scholarship that has fundamentally reshaped our understanding of the period. Yet, despite significant advances in the understanding of the social-historical circumstances of authors and disciplines as well as success in elucidating major features of intellectual thought, a main point of difficultly has been in combining both the intellectuality and sociality of Sanskrit scholars. By examining a debate within the discipline (...) of nyāya during the seventeenth century about how one cognizes the universal property ‘Brahman-ness ’ and by connecting it with a social debate that is found in available historical documents of the period, this essay attempts to combine the sociality of the Brahman scholarly community in Vārāṇasī with their intellectuality and offer a larger analysis of nyāya intellectual history for this period. The essay concludes by considering the ways in which the social world impinged upon nyāya argumentation and nyāya argumentation upon the social world. (shrink)

Records the papers and commentaries, with an edited discussion, presented at an international consultation convened by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) to guide revision of the CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. The Guidelines, first issued in 1982 and then revised in 1993, are being updated and expanded to address a number of new and especially challenging ethical issues. These include issues raised by international collaborative trials of drugs in developing countries, especially (...) expensive drugs, and the use of placebo controls in randomized clinical trials. Others arise from the complexity of research in human genetics, including stem-cell research, and in reproductive biology. Throughout, particular attention is given to the difficult questions that arose during the heated debate over trials in developing countries, of short-duration zidovudine (AZT) therapy to reduce perinatal transmission of HIV. The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects set out a code of research ethics that is widely used by ethical review committees and other bodies responsible for reviewing and overseeing the ethical design of studies and conduct of research. The revision of the Guidelines is being coordinated by CIOMS, in collaboration with WHO. The consultation centered on seven specially commissioned papers, authored by international experts that explore some of the more difficult issues in depth. Each is followed by an invited commentary, often expressing opposing views, and a summary of the issues or conclusions that emerged during the subsequent debate. The first paper, on justice in international research, deals with the question of whether proposals for research to be conducted in a developing country should make provision for future access of the population involved to the interventions under investigation. Also considered are questions that arise when research uses populations in developing countries to investigate interventions that will be of exclusive benefit to the industrialized world. Case studies of recent drug trials and their research protocols are discussed to illustrate circumstances in which use of populations in developing countries is justified or constitutes exploitation. Ethical challenges of the randomized controlled trial are considered in the second paper, which includes a discussion on the equitable distribution of benefits and risks, the use of placebo for controls, and the obligation to ensure that the participation of controls does not compromise their medical care or endanger their health. A paper on informed consent in international health research considers how cultural factors influence communication and language in the informed-consent process and respect for privacy and confidentiality in the research. Subsequent papers address issues in genetics research and reproductive biology, including the moral status of fetuses and the use of embryos in research, and examine the contribution which international human rights instruments can make in the application of the general principles of ethics to research involving human subjects. The final paper gives an overview of capacity building and the role of communities in international biomedical research. (shrink)

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