Appearing in the feminist social science literature from its beginnings are a series of questions about methodology. In this collection, Sandra Harding interrogates some of the classic essays from the last fifteen years in order to explore the basic and troubling questions about science and social experience, gender, and politics.

This book articulates and defends an interpretation of Schopenhauer's ethics as an original and credible contribution to the history of ethics. It presents Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion in direct tension with his resignationism and aims to show surprising continuities with Kant's ethics.

For Stanley Cavell, the specific and contemporary theme of the ordinary sets off from America and the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau, in order to reinvent itself in Europe with ordinary language philosophy – Wittgenstein and Austin. But in order to understand this, it is necessary to perceive what Cavell calls, inspired by Wittgenstein and Thoreau, “the uncanniness of the ordinary,” inherent to its anthropological thematization. In his preface to the recent work of Veena Das, Life a...

English summary: Through the concept of the ordinary, and what is ordinary, the present volume explores contemporary American philosophy. More specifically, the author presents Stanley Cavells role at the center of this movement to examine its innovative approach to philosophy, one that draws on what we have at hand, but also seeks to discover and invent. French description: Savons-nous vraiment ce qu'est l'ordinaire, ce qui nous est ordinaire? Penser la philosophie americaine, et le role qu'a son coeur joue Stanley Cavell, (...) signifie poser de nouveau ces questions, afin de mettre en evidence une nouvelle voix ou tradition contemporaine qui, a partir du langage ordinaire, parvient a redonner de la vie a des enjeux philosophiques devenus trop conformistes ou etroits, et a rearticuler les questions de langage (ordinaire) au moral et a l'esthetique, comme au politique. A la fois objet de rejet et de fascination, l'ordinaire est comme l'autre de la philosophie, ce qu'elle veut, dans son arrogance, depasser, mais aussi ce vers quoi elle aspire, nostalgiquement, a retourner. Penser la philosophie americaine signifie repenser l'ordinaire en dehors de ces deux tendances: recommencer la philosophie, non pas a zero, mais avec ce qu'on a sous la main, sous les yeux, et qui reste a decouvrir, ou a inventer. (shrink)

Analysis in bioethics has relied primarily on the identification and application of general principles and on the examination of particular paradigmatic cases. Principalism and casuistry depend on an assumption of generalizability; that is, that learning and insights gained from an understanding of the principles or the case may be effectively applied to other similar situations. For the most part, the particular characteristics of the institutional setting have not played a central role in these approaches. It would appear, then, that what (...) has been learned in the context of one health care setting is transferable, with some few adjustments, to another.The institutional context does make both a practical and a substantive difference, however, and shifting ethical analyses from one context to another has sometimes proven difficult. This has been so, for example, in the context of nursing home care. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone indagar acerca de la distinción entre el Decir y lo Dicho en la obra de Emmanuel Levinas. Esta distinción sirve a Levinas para proponer una comprensión ética del lenguaje, en la que la significación y la expresión sean capaces de superar las limitaciones y determinaciones del lenguaje sistemático de la ontología, del ser y las esencias. Sobre la base de que el “lenguaje de la ontología” es impertinente para comprender, expresar o comunicar esa “experiencia ética” fundamental (...) del encuentro “cara a cara” con el Rostro del Otro: la experiencia misma de la significancia misma, Levinas propone una comprensión pre-ontológica del lenguaje. Esta comprensión pre-ontológica sería capaz de dar respuesta a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál es el lenguaje, la palabra propia, de ese sujeto pasivo, de ese sujeto que es rehén del Otro , que está sujeto a él? ¿Cuál es el lenguaje del dar-se, qué palabra puede hacerse cargo de lo que es siempre in-apropiable? ¿Cómo será ese lenguaje que intenta decir lo otro del ser, ese lenguaje capaz de “traducir” la significancia que se da en la experiencia ética originaria, aquella en la que la “unicidad insustituible de una persona se expone a otra persona”? En este sentido, proponemos que el Decir es, con respecto a lo dicho, su tener-lugar, la posibilidad misma de comunicación y expresión, en la que se expone la condición pasiva del sujeto. Por otra parte, en la medida en que el Decir es la expresión de la significancia que adviene en la proximidad con el Otro, el Decir es siempre testimonial.This text proposes an inquiry regarding the distinction between the Saying and the Said in Emmanuel Levinas works. Levinas uses this distinction to propose an ethical understanding of language, where significance and expression are capable of overcoming the limitations of ontology`s systematic language, of the being, and the essences. On the basis of that “the language of ontology” is impertinent to understand, express, or communicate this “ethical experience” fundamental for the “face to face encounter” with the Face of the Other: the experience of significance itself, Levinas proposes a pre-ontologic understanding of language. This pre-ontologic understanding would be capable of answering the following questions: What is the language, the word itself of that passive subject, that subject who is a hostage of the Other who is attached to him? Which is the language of giving oneself, which word can take charge of what is always non appropriable? What kind of language will it be that tries to say the other of the being, that language able to “translate” the significance given in the original ethical experience, that where the “irreplaceable uniqueness of a person is being exposed to another person”? In this respect, we propose that the Saying is, regarding the said, its having-occurred, the possibility itself of communicating and expressing, where the passive condition of the subject is exposed. On the other hand, in the measure that the Saying is the expression of the significance which occurs in the proximity with the Other, the Saying is always testimonial. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate that in Emmanuel Levinas’ thinking, justice is the necessary opening – and dissolution- of the “I” which makes fecundity – procreation – possible, and that in that same measure makes possible that the Logos transforms into a “desire to say” and the world into a “among us”. At the same time it wants to demonstrate that this notion of justice is directly related to the ideas of expression and nudity. Due to which the “Other” imposes (...) itself in front of the “same” , as man, singular and vulnerable, and that in the same measure it is linked to the notion of the Face and its particular mode of manifestation. In this respect, we propose that justice. As long as necessary condition, can fund an ethically constituted world, where an “erotic order” mandates over logic orderings. (shrink)

Carnap reports that while all of the members of the Vienna Circle "were strongly interested in social and political progress," except for Neurath, they all insisted that the "intrusion" of political points of view into the methodology of science would violate the purity of scientific method. In opposition to this still dominant view of the relationship between moral/political values and objective inquiry, this paper specifies four ways in which certain moral/political values are necessary for maximizing objective inquiry in social science. (...) If this argument is correct, a better conception of objectivity is needed. (shrink)

The objective of this investigation is to initiate the development of a design-specific methodology for synaesthetic research, which will provide insight into synaesthesia from a designer's point of view. In addition, it aims to explore the possible advantages that the awareness of the phenomenon may have, specifically in the field of design education. The following question will be addressed: Can transdisciplinary studies of visual communication and neuropsychology help designers explore different practical approaches and theoretical views about synaesthesia?

Danto's end of art thesis as well as his partial definition of art as “embodied meaning” have sparked much controversy, but I shall not quarrel with either here. Rather, my aim is to suggest that there was another distinct chapter in the grand narrative described by Danto, one taking place right under his nose. This was an environmental chapter, crystallized most forcefully in my view by the work of Latvian‐American artist Vija Celmins (1938‐ ), especially by her work To Fix (...) the Image in Memory I‐XI (1977‐82) consisting of 11 pairs of perceptually indiscernible stones, one found one made. Without the benefit of seeing her first retrospective in 2019, it would have been very hard to see how her own artistic narrative, culminating in these indiscernible stone pair works, offers “the appropriate next stage in the story.” Inspired by Danto, this is exactly what I hope to show. (shrink)

This manuscript identifies several important issues for philosophy of science at this moment in history raised in Fellows’ and Richardson’s generous comments. It also notes a couple of their assumptions that are problematic for this author, and tries to restate more clearly relevant arguments developed in Objectivity and Diversity.

Recent reports suggest that the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae caspase‐related metacaspase, Mca1, is required for cell‐autonomous cytoprotective functions that slow cellular aging. Because the Mca1 protease has previously been suggested to be responsible for programmed cell death (PCD) upon stress and aging, these reports raise the question of how the opposing roles of Mca1 as a protector and executioner are regulated. One reconciling perspective could be that executioner activation may be restricted to situations where the death of part of the population (...) would be beneficial, for example during colony growth or adaptation into specialized survival forms. Another possibility is that metacaspases primarily harbor beneficial functions and that the increased survival observed upon metacaspase removal is due to compensatory responses. Herein, we summarize data on the role of Mca1 in cell death and survival and approach the question of how a metacaspase involved in protein quality control may act as killer protein. -/- . (shrink)

The uprootedness of experience from its ontological embeddedness in a natural world is at the core of much contemporary philosophy which, like pragmatism, aims to reject foundationalism in all its forms. All hold positions that, in varying ways, there is a bedrock basis on which to build an edifice of knowledge, something objective that justifies rational arguments concerning what is the single best position for making available or picturing the structure of reality as it exists independently of our various contextually (...) set inquiries. There can be no non-perspectival framework within which differences—social, moral, scientific, etc.—can be evaluated and resolved. These positions may, like pragmatism, focus on the .. (shrink)

The problem of evil might better be called "the problem of problems." That there is "evil" in the world can be expressed most generally by saying that there are problems with the way things are, that at least something is not the way it should be. I shall propose that the various possible resolutions of the problem of evil correspond to varying approaches that people generally take to the problems in their lives. In this way, a connection can be made (...) between the problem of evil as discussed by professional philosophers - a problem concerning the consistency of beliefs - and the problem as often discussed by other writers - a problem concerning the proper response to the "evil" that we find around and within us. In the course of demonstrating the parallel between the philosophical and the practical problem, I shall elaborate on the contrasting points of view of exoteric and esoteric religion, and I shall conclude with an attempt to explain why the problem remains a problem. (shrink)

In his paper "Why a Class Can't Change Its Members," Richard Sharvy appears to establish the impossibility of the existence of a variable class—that is, a class that at one time has a member that is not a member of it at another time. I first indicate the importance of Sharvy's argument for our understanding of the concept of identity in the contexts of time and modality, and I summarize his argument. Sharvy says that a class C that has one (...) (non-variable) group of members at t2 and another (nonvariable) group of members at t2 would be identical with both the class C1 that always has the first group as members and the class C2 that always has the second group as members. This is an impossibility, since in general, one thing cannot be identical with two.I then criticize Sharvy's argument by pointing out a weakness in the defense of the claim that C = C1 and C = C2. This weakness is due to an ambiguity in Sharvy's Principle of Extensionality. (shrink)