Diminishing resources seem to be forcing rationing of medical services. Rationing the public health care system means that there needs to be ethical discussion on justice. Several years before resource allocation could impact on the levels of morbidity and mortality, economic problems created numerous methods of regulating medical and nursing services. In clinical practice, regularisation means a reduction of the possibility to decide autonomously and therefore requires specific ethical discussion. The different methods of regularisation from standards and quality control to (...) managed care are discussed with respect to their influence on medical thinking and decision making. Formalised decisions in severe disease can also be a field for regularisation, for example guidelines on the termination of life sustaining treatment (vs. Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders). The debate on futility is discussed as a part of the economic discussion, with special regard to the impact of the macroeconomic situation on ”peripheral” medical decisions, which very often are made unconsciously, as shown by a new German study. It is impossible to discuss the influence of macroeconomy, different attempts at regularisation and the individual decision of the doctor without reflecting on their principle interdependency. Ethical reflection in this field cannot be sectioned into an economic, medical decision-making and futility sections. (shrink)

For many years a debate has raged over what constitutes futile medical care, if patients have a right to demand what doctors label as futile, and whether physicians should be obliged to provide treatments that they think are inappropriate. More recently, the argument has shifted away from the difficult project of definitions, to outlining institutional policies and procedures that take a measured and patient-by-patient approach to deciding if an existing or desired intervention is futile. The prototype is the Texas Advance (...) Directives Act, but similar procedures have been widely implemented both with and without the protection of the law. While this method has much to recommend it, there are inherent moral flaws that have not received as much discussion as warranted. Because these strategies adopt a semblance of procedural justice, it is assumed that the outcomes of such proceedings will be both correct and fair. In this paper, I argue that there are three main irremediable defects in the policy approach: there is the potential for arbitrary decision-making about futility in specific cases; there are structural, pre-ordained consequences for ethnic minorities who would be disproportionately affected by the use of these procedures; and the use of rationing justifications to support the use of these policies. These flaws detract so much from any benefit that could be derived that they make such strategies more harmful than helpful. (shrink)

It has been reported as an ethical problem within prehospital emergency care that ambulance professionals administer physiologically futile cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to patients having suffered cardiac arrest to benefit significant others. At the same time it is argued that, under certain circumstances, this is an acceptable moral practice by signalling that everything possible has been done, and enabling the grief of significant others to be properly addressed. Even more general moral reasons have been used to morally legitimize the use of (...) futile CPR: That significant others are a type of patient with medical or care needs that should be addressed, that the interest of significant others should be weighed into what to do and given an equal standing together with patient interests, and that significant others could be benefited by care professionals unless it goes against the explicit wants of the patient. In this article we explore these arguments and argue that the support for providing physiologically futile CPR in the prehospital context fails. Instead, the strategy of ambulance professionals in the case of a sudden death should be to focus on the relevant care needs of the significant others and provide support, arrange for a peaceful environment and administer acute grief counselling at the scene, which might call for a developed competency within this field. (shrink)

‘Futility’ is a contentious term that has eluded clear definition, with proposed descriptions either too strict or too vague to encompass the many facets of medical care. Requests for futile care are often surrogates for requests of a more existential character, covering the whole range of personal, emotional, cultural and spiritual needs. Physicians and other practitioners can use requests for futile care as a valuable opportunity to connect with their patients at a deeper level than the mere biomedical diagnosis. (...) Current debate around Canada’s changing regulatory and legal framework highlights challenges in appropriately balancing the benefits and burdens created by requests for futile care. (shrink)

“Futility of futilities,” said Kohelet, “futility of futilities, all is futile!” Once again we are exploring futility, a concept understood by humanity at least from the beginning of the written word. Our oldest written story, the Epic of Gilgamesh, reminds us of the futility of chasing immortality. At least a millennium later, yet still in ancient times, the Book of Kohelet teaches that all human pursuits, not only the pursuit of immortality, are futile or vain—terms once (...) used synonymously. The ancient Greeks introduced an element of punishment into their stories of futility—for example the Danaides sisters were condemned for the murder of their betrothed to use small urns to fill a leaky... (shrink)

Futility is easily defined as uselessness. The mistaken appearance that it cannot be defined is explained by difficulties applying it to particular cases. This latter problem is a major goal of clinical training and cannot be solved in a pithy statement.

Background: Despite the progress made in recent decades on the phenomenon of futility in adult intensive care, recognizing it during clinical care practice remains a complex and sensitive process, during which questions are often raised for which concrete answers are difficult to find. Aims: To analyze the frequency with which futile nursing interventions are implemented in critically ill patients admitted to adult intensive care in specific situations and how often futile autonomous and interdependent nursing interventions are implemented in the (...) same population, as perceived by adult intensive care nurses. Research design: Cross-sectional, quantitative, and descriptive study, which employed a questionnaire constructed specifically for this research to assess the perception of therapeutic futility in nursing in adult intensive care. Following an evaluation of the psychometric properties, the questionnaire was made available in an electronic format on the EUSurvey platform between August and October 2024. The data was analyzed between November 2023 and March 2024 using the statistical software packages SPSS and R. Participants and research context: A simple random sample of nurses working in level II and level III intensive care units in Portugal. Ethical considerations: Research ethical approvals were obtained, and the participants provided informed consent. Findings/results: Four hundred and fourteen valid questionnaires were obtained. The results allow the identification of thirty-three statistically significant associations, the inference of intervals for the mean and median for the perception of futility of nursing interventions with a 95% confidence interval, and enable the hierarchization of nursing interventions implemented in critically ill patients admitted to adult intensive care units according to the nurses’ perception of their futility. Conclusion: There is a balance in nurses' perception of the futility of their interventions in the specific situations analyzed. There is statistically significant evidence that interdependent nursing interventions are, in general, more frequently perceived as futile when compared to autonomous nursing interventions. (shrink)

Futile medical interventions have virtually no chance of success. Doctors might perform such procedures because of pressure from families or patients. The doctor might also have an ulterior motive of gain or prefer to do it rather than take time to communicate with the patient about a poor prognosis. Established ways to communicate bad news to patients are not always used by managing physicians with time constraints. The SPIKES protocol method is outlined to assist in sensitive communication where further intervention (...) is futile. This review primarily explores various aspects of medical futility. It also explores strategies for effectively communicating with patients and their families regarding futility interventions. A side-effect of futile interventions is burnout in doctors and other health practitioners (HPs). The complex relationship between futility and burnout is described. (shrink)

The provision of intensive care enables the lives of neonates, infants and children to be sustained or extended in circumstances previously regarded as impossible. However, as well as benefits, such care may confer burdens that resultingly frame continuation of certain interventions as futile, conferring more harm than or any, benefit. Subsequently, clinicians and families in the paediatric intensive care unit are often faced with decisions to withdraw, withhold or limit intensive care in order to act in the best interests of (...) the child. An integral consideration in respect of these decisions is that futility is a concept that has to be contextualised for all those involved. Recent high-profile legal cases highlight the professional, clinical, legal and social conflicts that can arise when parents and clinicians have different interpretations of futility. In acknowledging the complexity of these conflicts for clinicians, this paper aims to support a better understanding of futility as an integral concept in such difficult and emotive decisions within professional practice. We utilise the concept of futility to frame how these decisions to withdraw or withhold certain invasive life-prolonging interventions are ethically and legally justifiable, even when they disagree or conflict with parental views. To support clinicians in understanding these decisions, we in part use the familiar bioethical framework of Principlism developed by Beauchamp and Childress. We suggest that understanding legal and ethical analysis of futility ultimately will help clinicians in approaching and reflecting on such decision-making. (shrink)

In Japan, people are negative towards life-prolonging treatments. Laws that regulate withholding or discontinuing life-prolonging treatments and advance directives do not exist. Physicians, however, view discontinuing life-prolonging treatments negatively due to fears of police investigations. Although ministerial guidelines were announced regarding the decision process for end-of-life care in 2007, a consensus could not be reached on the definition of end-of-life and conditions for withholding treatment. We established a forum for extended discussions and consensus building on this topic.

So-called futile care : the experience of the Unied States -- The reality of medical futility in Brazil -- Medical futility and end-of-lfe issues in Belgium -- The concept of medical futility in Venezuela -- Medical futility in Russian Federation -- Medical futility in Australia -- Medical futility in Japan -- Ethical issues and policy in medical futility in China -- Medical futility in Korea -- Medical futility from Swiss perspective -- (...) Medical futility in Turkey -- Medical futility in the Untited Arab Emirates -- Medical futility in Iran. (shrink)

Medical futility, one of the most debated end-of-life issues in medical ethics, has been discussed among physicians and scholars for years but remained an unresolved question. Roger C. Bone (1941–1997), an outstanding pulmonologist and critical care specialist, devoted his last years to ethical issues of terminal care, while facing himself metastatic renal cancer. Criticising the abuse of technology in terminal care and the administrative and financial interference on medical decisions, he bequeathed important points on futility, bringing also patients’ (...) views into attention. He stressed the importance of physician-patient relationship and prompted physicians to remain honest with their patients and stand with them till their very last moments. Roger Bone’s insight of futility, terminal care and physician-patient relationship remains an important legacy for health care professionals and for families and patients facing end-of-life issues. (shrink)

Examination of the bioethical concept of futile-care theory reveals its deleterious effects on patients when put into practice. Futile-care policies and laws unilaterally locate health care decision making in persons and committees other than the patient and his surrogate. Although not voluntarily ceded by the patient, this authority is assumed by third parties whose interests and goals do not contribute to the material and spiritual flourishing of the individual patient. A prime example is the Texas medical futility law, which (...) blatantly disregards the natural right of patients to decide the course of their own health care. Christians are called on to oppose this unprecedented assault on human dignity, freedom, and life itself. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.4 : 619–624. (shrink)

As the rates of intravenous opioid use have increased, so have its associated medical complications, such as endocarditis, and known interventions, such as heart‐valve replacements. For many patients, including Jacob, whose case was brought to my psychiatric consult service and to my colleagues in the clinical ethics service, relapse increases the risk of repeat endocarditis and the need for repeat surgical interventions. Previous works have posed the bioethical quandary regarding the responsibilities of a surgeon in these repeat procedures and whether (...) a surgeon may ethically refuse to perform a repeat intervention in a patient who has relapsed. Notions of futility are commonly used to navigate this complex terrain, and they were the focus of the ethics consideration given to Jacob's case, in which surgeons were reluctant to perform valve replacements. In this narrative essay, I interrogate the concept of futility by appealing to its history and variable meanings, and I argue against its relevance in cases like Jacob's. I propose that a more suitable bioethical approach in such cases would consider resource allocation, the sociocultural stigma of addiction, and the interpersonal and narrative factors that make each case unique. (shrink)

Our response to death may differ depending on the patient’s age. We may feel that death is a sad, but acceptable event in an elderly patient, yet feel that death in a very young patient is somehow unfair. This paper explores whether there is any ethical basis for our different responses. It examines in particular whether a patient’s age should be relevant to the determination that an intervention is medically futile. It also considers the responsibilities of health professionals and the (...) rights of family members in situations where an interventions is clearly futile. (shrink)

The challenge of determining that therapeutic intervention is futile is a recurrent ethical theme in critical care medicine. The process by which that determination is reached often involves demanding collaborative and interdisciplinary conversation and deliberation within the context of hospital policy, including ethics committee guidelines. The subsequent decision as to what happens next depends on resources, such as palliative care services, hospice, other hospital protocols, and, of course, family support.

The futility debate may be considered as an effort to provide a clear and justified borderline between physician and patient decision–making authority. In this paper we argue that the search for a definition of futility that provides physicians with a final argument in discussions about life–prolonging treatment, is misplaced. An acceptable and meaningful criterion of futility that satisfies this effort seems impossible. As a consequence, we reject a dichotomous domain of decision–making power as the starting point for (...) definitions of futility. A good decision about withholding life–sustaining treatment should be justified from the perspectives of both physician and patient. In this light, a range of definitions of futility is still useful as it can clarify intuitions that a treatment is inappropriate. (shrink)

Exemptions from laws of general application are sometimes granted on the basis of an individual’s unwillingness to comply with the law. Most such volitional exemptions involve a conflict between the law and the demands of an individual’s religious or secular moral convictions. I argue here that a limited number of volitional exemptions can be justified on the basis of a futility principle. When otherwise morally permissible penalties for violating the law cannot be expected to induce the compliance of an (...) intransigent minority, the penalties are futile, and the state has some principled reason to exempt the minority from the law’s requirements. Since the futility principle only applies to some cases of conscientious objection, it differs in important ways from justifications grounded in a general entitlement to religious or moral exemptions. (shrink)

Futile treatment is one ethically challenging situation commonly encountered by junior doctors. By analysing an intern's story using a role virtues framework, I propose a set of three steps for junior doctors facing this problem. I claim that junior doctors ought always to investigate the rationale underlying decisions to proceed with apparently futile treatment and discuss their concerns with their seniors, even if such discussion will be difficult. I also suggest that junior doctors facing this ethical challenge ought always to (...) be willing to initiate and engage in ethical dialogue, and that in some situations further action (such as taking concerns outside the team or refusing to participate in treatment) may be morally appropriate. (shrink)

A physician recently asked how to respond in the case of an 87-year-old patient with advanced Alzheimer's disease, who was unable to swallow or tolerate a nasogastric tube, when the family insisted a gastrostomy tube be inserted but the physician believed the intervention futile. That question encompasses some of the crucial issues in the concept of futility of the treatment goals of physician, patient, and family; the rights of patients and families to demand care; physician judgment; family values; and, (...) to the degree that it represents many similar dilemmas, justice. What are professionals saying when they pronounce treatment futile? What are patients' rights if they or their surrogates disagree?The word “futile” implies a precision about outcome probability that we do not have, and it ignores the wide range of treatments for a given diagnosis. Is futile the same as useless or the opposite of hope? Futile for what? Cure? Restora tion of function? Prolongation of life? Relief from pain? Relief from anxiety? Com fort? Reassurance? To satisfy or placate the patient or the family? The word “futile” is so imprecise that, rather than clarifying, it confuses and clutters the discussion. (shrink)

The concept of futility in medicine refers to the incapability of an intervention to achieve its goal. Futility determinations form the basis for withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining interventions. Criticisms of attempted futility definitions relate to inconstant probability and value judgements concerning the goal pursued. This variability frustrates efforts to define futility. Language modifications and procedural approaches, both important ancillary measures, inherently lack the ability to resolve this difficulty. Beneath the notion of futility lie foundational factors (...) whose revised understanding is required to advance a definition. These factors include autonomy, death and the goals of medicine. Reconsidering the essence and influence of foundational factors is necessary to move beyond a seemingly irresolvable problem. In this essay, I assert that defining futility is not pointless but rather possible, necessary and unavoidable. With this assertion, I respond to the criticisms of futility. These responses together with a corrective understanding of foundational factors lead to a definition of futility. This definition balances respect for patients’ autonomy whilst allowing for interventions that do not undermine the essence of medicine and integrity of those practising it. Defining futility is an exercise in necessity requiring renewed perceptual foundations. (shrink)

The transition from the paternalistic paradigm of the Hippocratic tradition to the present model of shared decision making has altered the patient–doctor relationship. This change has engendered conflicts between patients and physicians, especially in pediatric medicine, where the patients are depen­dent on their parents because of their inability to consent to an intervention independently. Navigating this complex relationship can become particularly fraught when medical futility is invoked. This situation is complicated further by the divergent approaches to shared decision making (...) among physicians and the ethical perspectives these positions reflect. Catholic doctrine on the role of parents in medical-ethical decision making provides insight into navigat­ing these difficult clinical issues and ideologies. (shrink)

The term futility has been widely used in medical ethics and clinical medicine for more than twenty years now. At first glance it appears to offer a clear-cut categorical characterisation of medical treatments at the end of life, and an apparently objective way of making decisions that are seen to be emotionally painful for those close to the patient, and ethically, and also potentially legally hazardous for clinicians. It also appears to deal with causation, because omission of a futile (...) treatment cannot surely be a cause of death. The problem is that futility can be argued to be a false friend , in that it gives an appearance of representing a reliable conceptual basis, in ethics, for limitation of medical treatment—usually in the context of dying—without actually doing so. In fact, the concept of futility is a conflation of clinical judgement about outcomes of treatment and the quality or even value of life, and has really failed to contribute much to the advancement of decision-making and hence care at the end-of-life. It also has the capacity to medicalise the personal space. Deliberations about the likely outcomes of medical treatment are necessary, and medical expertise is pivotal. However, futility is argued to have a better future in partnership with a broad social action agenda about the process of dying, such as that articulated in health promoting palliative care, as a basis for better death-ways in the 21st century (Kellehear 2005). Medicine needs to more honest and upfront about its limits, as death is, after all, the elephant in everybody's room. (shrink)

Futility is not a purely medical concept. Its subjective nature requires a balanced procedural approach where competing views can be aired and in which disputes can be resolved with procedural fairness. Law should play an important role in this process. Pure medical models of futility are based on a false claim of medical sovereignty. Procedural approaches avoid the problems of such claims. This paper examines the arguments for and against the adoption of a procedural approach to futility (...) determination. (shrink)

In traditional decision theory, utility is regarded as a mathematical representation of preferences to be inferred from agents hedonic experiences. Some go as far as to contend that utility is literally computed by specific neural areas and urge economists to complement or substitute their notion of utility with some neuro-psychological construct. In this paper, I distinguish three notions of utility that are frequently mentioned in debates about decision theory and examine some critical issues regarding their definition and measurability. Moreover, I (...) provide various empirical and conceptual reasons to doubt that economists should base decision theoretic analyses on some neuro-psychological notion of utility. (shrink)

Since its introduction in the 1980s, futility as a concept has held contested meaning and applications throughout medicine. There has been little discussion within the psychiatric literature about the use of futility in the care of individuals experiencing severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI), despite some tacit acceptance that futility may apply in certain cases of psychiatric illness. In this paper, we explore the literature surrounding futility and argue that its connotation within medicine is to describe (...) situations where patients (or their substitute decision-makers) believe that interventions will almost certainly provide no meaningful benefit. We then provide two arguments in support of the use of futility within the care of individuals experiencing SPMI: that some SPMI can be considered a terminal illness, and that the risk-benefit ratio is a dynamic entity such that futility can help describe what Gillett calls the ‘risk of unacceptable badness’ when it comes to considering how an intervention might impact a patient’s quality of life. We posit that capacity should not pose an obstacle to declaring futility when caring for individuals experiencing SPMI and explain how futility is not antithetical to recovery in mental health. Finally, we describe how using futility within psychiatric practice can allow for a reorientation of care by signalling the need to shift to a palliative approach. (shrink)

In Wrong Medicine, Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D., and Nancy S. Jecker, Ph.D., address issues that have occupied the media and the courts since the time of Karen Ann Quinlan. The authors examine the ethics of cases in which medical treatment is offered--or mandated--even if a patient lacks the capacity to appreciate its benefit or if the treatment will still leave a patient totally dependent on intensive medical care. In exploring these timely issues Schneiderman and Jecker reexamine the doctor-patient relationship and (...) call for a restoration of common sense and reality to what we expect from medicine. They discuss economic, historical, and demographic factors that affect medical care and offer clear definitions of what constitutes futile medical treatment. And they address such topics as the limits on unwanted treatment, the shift from the "Age of Physician Paternalism" to the "Age of Patient Autonomy," health care rationing, and the adoption of new ethical standards. (shrink)

This article argues that while the presence and influence of “futility” as a concept in medical decision-making has declined over the past decade, medicine is seeing the rise of a new concept with similar features: suffering. Like futility, suffering may appear to have a consistent meaning, but in actuality, the concept is colloquially invoked to refer to very different experiences. Like “futility,” claims of patient “suffering” have been used (perhaps sometimes consciously, but most often unconsciously) to smuggle (...) value judgments about quality of life into decision-making. And like “futility,” it would behoove us to recognize the need for new, clearer terminology. This article will focus specifically on secondhand claims of patient suffering in pediatrics, but the conclusions could be similarly applied to medical decisions for adults being made by surrogate decision-makers. While I will argue that suffering, like futility, is not sufficient wholesale justification for making unilateral treatment decisions, I will also argue that claims of patient suffering cannot be ignored, and that they almost always deserve some kind of response. In the final section, I offer practical suggestions for how to respond to claims of patient suffering. (shrink)

Who should decide? In When Doctors Say No, philosopher and bioethicist Rubin examines this controversial issue.

Under which conditions may physicians who are requested to treat permanently unconscious patients refuse to do so? Wasserman et al. (2023) maintain that refusals on the basis of supposed futility are unethical as they amount to passing off personal value judgments as medical expertise. Instead, unwillingness to carry out an intervention should be framed as conscientious objection. I argue that referring to futility with regard to a patient’s presumed quality of life is appropriate if – and only if (...) – a total and irreversible loss of consciousness has been diagnosed with adequate certainty. The diagnosis turns a graded notion into a binary affair: conscious awareness is a necessary condition of any degree of quality of life to be meaningfully ascribed to an organism. Consequently, the complete absence of consciousness precludes such an ascription; further treatment is then indeed futile from a quality-of-life standpoint. (shrink)

Comparatively little scholarly attention has been given to the question of futility in chronic psychiatric disorders, with the exception of a small body of work on so-called end-stage anorexia nervosa. A review of this literature provides the background for a critical examination of whether the concept of futility has any clinically meaningful, ethically justifiable, and legally defensible application to AN. In this article, the arguments for and against futility judgments in AN are analyzed with special emphasis on (...) determinations of capacity in this serious mental illness. Parallels between the futility disputes in medical and psychiatric disorders, where applicable, will be drawn to further illuminate whether or not the concept that continued psychiatric treatment for AN is ever truly futile. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg’s political philosophy of technology uniquely connects the neo-Marxist tradition with phenomenological approaches to technology. This paper investigates how this connection shapes Feenberg’s analysis of power. Influenced by De Certeau and by classical positions in philosophy of technology, Feenberg focuses on a dialectical model of oppression versus liberation. A hermeneutic reading of power, though, inspired by the late Foucault, does not conceptualize power relations as external threats, but rather as the networks of relations in which subjects are constituted. Such (...) a hermeneutic approach replaces De Certeau’s tactics of resistance with a critical and creative accompaniment of technological developments. (shrink)

It probably should not be surprising, in this time of soaring medical costs and proliferating technology, that an intense debate has arisen over the concept of medical futility. Should doctors be doing all the things they are doing? In particular, should they be attempting treatments that have little likelihood of achieving the goals of medicine? What are the goals of medicine? Can we agree when medical treatment fails to achieve such goals? What should the physician do and not do (...) under such circumstances? Exploring these issues has forced us to revisit the doctor-patient relationship and the relationship of the medical profession to society in a most fundamental way. Medical futility has both a quantitative and qualitative component. I maintain that medical futility is the unacceptable likelihood of achieving an effect that the patient has the capacity to appreciate as a benefit. Both emphasized terms are important. A patient is neither a collection of organs nor merely an individual with desires. Rather, a patient (from the word to suffer ) is a person who seeks the healing (meaning to make whole ) powers of the physician. The relationship between the two is central to the healing process and the goals of medicine. Medicine today has the capacity to achieve a multitude of effects, raising and lowering blood pressure, speeding, slowing, and even removing and replacing the heart, to name but a minuscule few. But none of these effects is a benefit unless the patient has at the very least the capacity to appreciate it. Sadly, in the futility debate wherein some critics have failed or refused to define medical futility an important area of medicine has in large part been neglected, not only in treatment decisions at the bedside, but in public discussions—comfort care—the physician’s obligation to alleviate suffering, enhance well being and support the dignity of the patient in the last few days of life. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes four major types of futility (physiological, imminent demise, lethal condition, and qualitative) that have been advocated in the literature either in a patient dependent or a patient independent fashion. It proposes five criteria (precision, prospective, social acceptability, significant number, and non-agreement) that any definition of futility must satisfy if it is to serve as the basis for unilaterally limiting futile care. It then argues that none of the definitions that have been advocated meet the criteria, (...) primarily because their proponents have not paid sufficient attention to the problematic nature of the data supporting the use of their definitions. (shrink)

Bianchi, Stanley, and Sutander argue in an insightful, cogent manner for the consideration of harm reduction as an ethically-defensible, non-paternal management approach for capable persons...

ObjectiveTo increase knowledge of how doctors perceive futile treatments and scarcity of resources at the end of life. In particular, their perceptions about whether and how resource limitations influence end-of-life decision making. This study builds on previous work that found some doctors include resource limitations in their understanding of the concept of futility.SettingThree tertiary hospitals in metropolitan Brisbane, Australia.DesignQualitative study using in-depth, semistructured, face-to-face interviews. Ninety-six doctors were interviewed in 11 medical specialties. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using (...) thematic analysis.ResultsDoctors’ perceptions of whether resource limitations were relevant to their practice varied, and doctors were more comfortable with explicit rather than implicit rationing. Several doctors incorporated resource limitations into their definition of futility. For some, availability of resources was one factor of many in assessing futility, secondary to patient considerations, but a few doctors indicated that the concept of futility concealed rationing. Doctors experienced moral distress due to the resource implications of providing futile treatment and the lack of administrative supports for bedside rationing.ConclusionsDoctors’ ability to distinguish between futility and rationing would be enhanced through regulatory support for explicit rationing and strategies to support doctors’ role in rationing at the bedside. Medical policies should address the distinction between resource limitations and futility to promote legitimacy in end-of-life decision making. (shrink)

Suffering repeated experiences of moral distress in intensive care units due to applications of futility reflects on nurses’ patient care negatively, increases their burnout, and reduces their job satisfaction. This study was carried out to investigate the levels of job satisfaction and exhaustion suffered by intensive care nurses and the relationship between them through the futility dimension of the issue. The study included 138 intensive care nurses. The data were obtained with the futility questionnaire developed by the (...) researchers, Maslach Burnout Inventory and Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire. It was determined that nurses who agreed to the proposition that the application of futility demoralizes health-care professionals had low levels of job satisfaction but high levels of depersonalization. It was determined that nurses had moderate levels of job satisfaction, emotional exhaustion, and personal achievements but high levels of sensitivity. Nurses’ job satisfaction and sensitivities are positively affected when they consider that futility does not contradict the purposes of medicine. (shrink)

Objective Futile treatment, which by definition cannot benefit a patient, is undesirable. This research investigated why doctors believe that treatment that they consider to be futile is sometimes provided at the end of a patient9s life. Design Semistructured in-depth interviews. Setting Three large tertiary public hospitals in Brisbane, Australia. Participants 96 doctors from emergency, intensive care, palliative care, oncology, renal medicine, internal medicine, respiratory medicine, surgery, cardiology, geriatric medicine and medical administration departments. Participants were recruited using purposive maximum variation sampling. (...) Results Doctors attributed the provision of futile treatment to a wide range of inter-related factors. One was the characteristics of treating doctors, including their orientation towards curative treatment, discomfort or inexperience with death and dying, concerns about legal risk and poor communication skills. Second, the attributes of the patient and family, including their requests or demands for further treatment, prognostic uncertainty and lack of information about patient wishes. Third, there were hospital factors including a high degree of specialisation, the availability of routine tests and interventions, and organisational barriers to diverting a patient from a curative to a palliative pathway. Doctors nominated family or patient request and doctors being locked into a curative role as the _main_ reasons for futile care. Conclusions Doctors believe that a range of factors contribute to the provision of futile treatment. A combination of strategies is necessary to reduce futile treatment, including better training for doctors who treat patients at the end of life, educating the community about the limits of medicine and the need to plan for death and dying, and structural reform at the hospital level. (shrink)

Death and futility are among a cluster of themes that closely track discussions of life’s meaning. Moreover, futility is thought to supervene on naturalistic meta-narratives because of how they will end. While the nature of naturalistic meta-narrative endings is part of the explanation for concluding that such meta-narratives are cosmically or deeply futile, this explanation is truncated. I argue that the reason the nature of the ending is thought to be normatively important is first anchored in the fact (...) that narrative ending qua ending is thought to be normatively important. Indeed, I think futility is often thought to characterize naturalistic meta-narratives because a narrative’s ending has significant proleptic power to elicit a wide range of broadly normative human responses on, possibly, emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels towards the narrative as a whole. (shrink)

Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that suicide is both foolish and futile. But while many commentators have expressed sympathy for his charge of foolishness, most regard his charge of futility as indefensible even within his own system. In this paper, I offer a defense of Schopenhauer’s futility charge, based on metaphysical and psychological considerations. On the metaphysical front, Schopenhauer’s view implies that psychological connections extend beyond death. Drawing on Parfit’s discussion of personal identity, I argue that those connections have personal (...) significance, such that suicide does not allow one, as Hamlet hopes, simply “not to be.” On the psychological front, I argue that a distinction between agents’ intentions and underlying desires makes room for Schopenhauer to claim that paradigmatic suicidal agents ultimately desire the opposite of what suicide accomplishes. I conclude by showing how the resulting account of futility can buttress the charge of foolishness as well. My interpretation still leaves Schopenhauer vulnerable to certain objections, but shows that his account is significantly more defensible than previous commentators have realized. (shrink)

The various jurisdictions worldwide that now legally permit assisted suicide (or voluntary euthanasia) vary concerning the medical conditions needed to be legally eligible for assisted suicide. Some jurisdictions require that an individual be suffering from an unbearable and futile medical condition that cannot be alleviated. Others require that individuals must be suffering from a terminal illness that will result in death within a specified timeframe, such as six months. -/- Popular and academic discourse about assisted suicide paradigmatically focuses on individuals (...) with ‘physical,’ i.e., non-psychiatric medical conditions, such as cancer or AIDS. Here I defend analyses of the notions of unbearable suffering, futility, and terminality that imply that, regardless of which of these medical conditions is invoked, at least some individuals with severe and persistent psychiatric illnesses satisfy these conditions and ought to be classified as legally eligible for assisted suicide. The legal and moral case for a right to assisted suicide is therefore not in principle weaker for the severely psychiatrically disordered than for those with ‘typical’ terminal or futile medical conditions. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 66-96, Winter 2025.

Objectives Medical futility at the end of life is a growing challenge to medicine. The goals of the authors were to elucidate how clinicians define futility, when they perceive life-sustaining treatment (LST) to be futile, how they communicate this situation and why LST is sometimes continued despite being recognised as futile. Methods The authors reviewed ethics case consultation protocols and conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 physicians and 11 nurses from adult intensive and palliative care units at a tertiary (...) hospital in Germany. The transcripts were subjected to qualitative content analysis. Results Futility was identified in the majority of case consultations. Interviewees associated futility with the failure to achieve goals of care that offer a benefit to the patient's quality of life and are proportionate to the risks, harms and costs. Prototypic examples mentioned are situations of irreversible dependence on LST, advanced metastatic malignancies and extensive brain injury. Participants agreed that futility should be assessed by physicians after consultation with the care team. Intensivists favoured an indirect and stepwise disclosure of the prognosis. Palliative care clinicians focused on a candid and empathetic information strategy. The reasons for continuing futile LST are primarily emotional, such as guilt, grief, fear of legal consequences and concerns about the family's reaction. Other obstacles are organisational routines, insufficient legal and palliative knowledge and treatment requests by patients or families. Conclusion Managing futility could be improved by communication training, knowledge transfer, organisational improvements and emotional and ethical support systems. The authors propose an algorithm for end-of-life decision making focusing on goals of treatment. (shrink)

Partly because physicians can “never say never,” partly because of the seduction of modern technology, and partly out of misplaced fear of litigation, physicians have increasingly shown a tendency to undertake treatments that have no realistic expectation of success. For this reason, we have articulated common sense criteria for medical futility. If a treatment can be shown not to have worked in the last 100 cases, we propose that it be regarded as medically futile. Also, if the treatment fails (...) to restore consciousness or alleviate total dependence on intensive care, we propose such treatment be judged futile. This definition provides clear end points and encourages the profession to review data from the past and perform, prospective clinical studies that not only report treatments that work but also treatments that do not work. We have also argued that, in a variety of settings, physicians have no ordinary ethical obligation to offer futile interventions. Although physicians should inform, and discuss all decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatments with patients, they need not obtain the patient's permission to desist from futile interventions. (shrink)

The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us (...) to articulate what is at stake in ethical judgments where outcomes are crucial in determining what should be done. (shrink)