To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest anAesthetic Self Effectsupporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such (...) as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect (Study 3). Exploring the breadth of this effect we also found anAnaesthetic Self Effect.That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure activities, such as hiking or playing video games (Study 4). Across our studies, the Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take these to be transformative changes. (shrink)

We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and argue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After presenting a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four (...) different categories: emotions of pleasure, contemplation, amazement, and respect. The emotions that we identify in each category, including feelings of fluency, intrigue, wonder, and adoration, have been widely neglected both within aesthetics and in emotion research more broadly. (shrink)

In konsequentialistischenKonsequentialismusTheorienEthikdeontologische (s. a. Pflichtenethik) hängt die moralische Richtigkeit oder Falschheit einer Handlung nur davon ab, wie gut oder schlecht ihre Konsequenzen (verglichen mit den Konsequenzen der anderen HandlungsalternativenKonsequentialismusHandlungskonsequentialismus) sind. Aus dieser definierenden Eigenschaft konsequentialistischer Theorien ergibt sich fast zwingend als weitere typische Eigenschaft die Maximierung des Guten, die in einer schwächeren Form als Maximierungserlaubnis und in einer stärkeren Form als Maximierungsgebot vertreten werden kann: Wenn die Richtigkeit einer Handlung nur von den Konsequenzen abhängt, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass es (...) niemals moralisch falsch und folglich immer moralisch erlaubt ist, die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen auszuführen. Diese Maximierungserlaubnis unterscheidet konsequentialistische Theorien insbesondere von deontologischen Theorien, in denen die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen oft verboten ist: Da in deontologischen Theorien die Richtigkeit nicht nur von den Konsequenzen, sondern auch von anderen Faktoren (z. B. der intrinsischen Schlechtheit bestimmter Handlungsweisen) abhängt, kann es Situationen geben, in denen ein solcher Faktor die Gutheit der Konsequenzen überwiegt und es deshalb verboten ist, die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen auszuführen. (shrink)

Transsexuality has been subject to careful reflections in many disciplines outside philosophy. I first contextualize my philosophical approach by relating to the existing scholarship on transsexuality. Focusing on matters of sexual identity, I then propose a characterization of what might be considered the philosophical dimension of transsexual identity. Paying particular attention to the propositional consciousness of transsexuals, I develop the main thesis that transsexuality helps philosophers of sex to forcefully establish the contingency of sexual identity in terms of the underlying (...) biology of the sexed human body. I eventually argue that sexual identity is a cluster concept, which is constituted by sex, gender, sexual practice and desire. In this sense the following argument against "foundationalism" in philosophy of sex emerges: none of the four aspects of sexual identity can function as basic, prior to any normative commitments regarding the nature of human sexuality. (shrink)

Metaphysics as the foundation of science, philosophy as an exact method to discover this foundation: These are central themes in the Kant-Friesian philosophy which, at the beginning of the 20th century, Leonard Nelson, using the methods of mathematical axiomatics, further developed into interdisciplinary research programmes. Nelson carried out this research programme in his ethics but his untimely death prevented a systematic presentation of his natural philosophy and his doctrine of method. The present volume contains four transcripts of his seminars on (...) natural philosophy which he held over a period of 15 years. The transcripts, which may be taken as a comparatively complete presentation of Nelson's natural philosophy, supplement the writings published during his lifetime and convey a representative picture of his natural philosophy. // Metaphysik als Fundament der Wissenschaften, Philosophie, eine exakte Disziplin, die dieses Fundament offenlegt: Leitmotive des Kant-Fries’schen Denkgebäudes, die Leonard Nelson zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in interdisziplinäre Forschungsprogramme umsetzt. Die dabei angewandten – an der mathematischen Axiomatik ausgerichteten – Methoden haben nichts an Aktualität eingebüßt. Kann Nelson dieses Vorhaben bezüglich seiner Ethik verwirklichen, so verhindert sein früher Tod eine systematische Darstellung seiner Naturphilosophie und Methodenlehre. Der vorliegende Band enthält vier Mitschriften von Lehrveranstaltungen Nelsons. Diese Schriften, die die zu seinen Lebzeiten veröffentlichten Arbeiten zur Naturphilosophie ergänzen und erweitern sollen, decken einen Zeitraum von ca. 15 Jahren ab und geben somit einen repräsentativen Einblick in Nelsons naturphilosophisches Schaffen. Die vorliegende Zusammenstellung naturphilosophischer Nachlassschriften darf als verhältnismäßig vollständig gelten. (shrink)

The intercellular junctions connecting the cytoplasms of fibre cells in the mammalian lens have until recently been regarded as a class of junction which is fundamentally different from that of the gap junctions in other organs. Recent observations, however, suggest that the lens junctions fit protein topology predictions common for all gap junctions. While the homologous peptide portions are predicted to form the channels, the divergent peptide portions of the gap junction polypeptides may adapt channel activity to the special tissue (...) requirements. (shrink)

Across the globe, conditions of labour are worsening, providing both challenges and opportunities. As labour is one of the places where the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class is always at work, new models of resistance are created here as well. Deep solidarity describes what happens when the 99% who have to work for a living realise what they have in common, in order to employ their differences productively in the struggle. In this article, a theologian and a (...) labour and community organiser work together showing how the Abrahamic religious traditions and developments in the world of labour help us to shape deeper forms of solidarity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Suffering of Economic Injustice:A Response to Ulrich Duchrow and David LoyJoerg RiegerThat economic injustice is one of the central topics of our time is hard to dispute. Even those who seek to avoid the topic cannot escape the numbers and the stories of gross economic disparity. It affects life everywhere, as—using the language of the Occupy Wall Street movement—economic injustice pits the 99 percent against the 1 percent (...) even in the United States. More and more of us are not benefitting from capitalism anymore.Ulrich Duchrow’s presentation puts matters in stark relief when he reminds us that 60 million people are dying of hunger and its consequences every year. If we do the math based on this one number, this amounts to one Holocaust every two months. Nevertheless, even this large number shows only a tiny tip of the iceberg, as it does not include the countless millions who die from the consequences of malnourishment, from lack of resources like clean drinking water, employment opportunities, health care, and many other problems. In the United States alone, forty-five thousand people die annually simply because of the lack of affordable health care.1When we are dealing with economic injustice, we are dealing with what ultimately amounts to a matter of life and death. Here, all religion necessarily becomes engaged religion in one way or another: In the struggle between life and death caused by economic injustice, religion has the option of placing itself on the side of life. If it does not place itself on the side of life, I suspect that it places itself on the side of death by default. Neutral ground does not seem to exist here.Nevertheless, let us not forget that the topic of economic injustice is not just a matter of those who suffer from economic injustice; it is also a matter of those who impose the suffering of economic injustice on others. While people of religion often address the former topic, they often remain silent on the latter. Kwok Pui-lan and I have tried to deal with this problem in our recent book Occupy Religion.2 When we talk about economic injustice and the 99 percent, we must also talk about the 1 percent. I will return to this topic shortly.What I have presented so far amounts to a fairly dualistic picture. Given the current economic status quo, this dualism appears to be something that we have to contend [End Page 51] with, whether we like dualisms or not: As people are dying and lives are being destroyed, economic injustice confronts us with matters of life and death. While the dualisms of economic injustice are nothing to be celebrated, it may be necessary to fight back. It is significant to hear David Loy, who has consistently fought against dualisms in his work, admit that “there’s also a beneficial side” to dualism, for instance when Amos castigates those who “trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth” and “crush the needy” (Amos 2:7, 4:1). Loy further understands that our societies may be “becoming more unjust.” I wonder what would happen, though, if Loy were to take a closer look at what this injustice looks like and if he were to take into consideration actual people whose lives are being destroyed by it. What might this mean for his understanding of the Buddhist concept of dukkha (suffering)?Loy understands social justice as distributive justice, referring the Hebrew prophets’ frustration that the rich have so much and the poor have so little. While he does not dismiss this discourse of justice, he seeks to shift gears as a Buddhist, arguing that economic suffering (dukkha) is based on “our delusive sense of self.” This shift leads me to wonder who is included in this use of the first person plural; whose “delusive sense of self” is Loy talking about? At first sight it looks as if he refers to all of us, claiming that all human beings equally share in this delusion that causes suffering. Let me suggest, however, that we take a closer look and investigate more carefully whose delusive... (shrink)

Eine neutrale Einführung in den Konsequentialismus, der die aktuelle ethische Diskussion dominiert und um den so heftig gestritten wird wie um keine andere ethische Theo-rie. Er scheint auf bestechenden Annahmen zu basieren, aber dennoch mit unserer herkömmlichen Moral unvereinbar zu sein. Wie geht man im Konsequentialismus mit dieser Spannung um? Was sind die Grundideen des Konsequentialismus? Wie unterscheidet er sich von deontologischen Theorien? Hat im Konsequentialismus das Gute Vorrang vor dem Rechten? Wie unterscheiden sich direkter Handlungskonsequentialismus, indirekter Handlungskonsequentialis-mus und Regelkonsequentialismus? (...) Wie vielversprechend ist das Projekt der Konsequentialisierung deontologischer Theorien? -/- A neutral introduction to consequentialism, which dominates current ethical debate and is more hotly contested than any other ethical theory. It seems to be based on compelling assumptions, yet incompatible with our conventional morality. How does consequentialism deal with this tension? What are the basic ideas of consequentialism? How does it differ from deontological theories? Does consequentialism prioritise the good over the right? How do direct act consequentialism, indirect act consequentialism and rule consequentialism differ? How promising is the project of consequentialising deontological theories? -/- Verlag Karl Alber 2022, 178 S., brosch., 24,– € ISBN 978-3-495-48525-5 (intro: Philosophie, Bd. 1). (shrink)

Traditionell gilt der Utilitarismus als unvereinbar mit Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. In dem Aufsatz werden zunächst mögliche Gründe für diese Unvereinbarkeit unterschieden. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass diese Gründe den Ausschluss von Verteilungsgerechtigkeit nicht rechtfertigen können. Insbesondere wird begründet, dass Welfarismus, Maximierung und Konsequentialismus entgegen der allgemein vertretenen Auffassung nicht unvereinbar mit Verteilungsgerechtigkeit sind. Da diese drei Komponenten von Utilitaristen als stärkste Gründe für ihre Theorie betrachtet werden, folgt, dass die besten Argumente für den Utilitarismus nicht zu dessen Begründung hinreichen. Man kann an allen (...) drei Komponenten festhalten und dennoch den Utilitarismus ablehnen. Berücksichtigt man zudem die intuitiv große moralische Bedeutung von Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, so sprechen alle vermeintlichen Argumente für den Utilitarismus in Wirklichkeit für einen distributionssensitiven Konsequentialismus. Die Argumentation in dem Aufsatz beruht wesentlich darauf, dass Verteilungsgerechtigkeit nicht als Gut, sondern als Prinzip des Rechten verstanden werden muss. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that the division between manas and atman in Nyaya philosophy can be interpreted in the light of Western discussions about irrationality. In Western philosophy irrationality has been explained by postulating a divided mind. This helps to account for a generally rational mind that is nevertheless sometimes prone to irrationality. I argue that the division of the mind bears similarities to the division between manas and tman. Looking at the arguments of the Naiy yikas Gautama and (...) V tsy yana for the existence of a permanent self, I do not find any of them convincing in the light of Buddhist criticism. However, by arguing for the division between manas and tman, the Naiy yikas have inadvertently provided their strongest argument for the existence of a self because they have managed to account for irrationality. (shrink)

"I cannot recommend this book highly enough!" Is this statement true or have I succeeded in lavishing enough praise on this book by writing this statement, making this statement in fact false? This is one way in which Adamson and Ganeri explain the view of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna that everything is empty. Nāgārjuna has to defend himself against the objection that if everything is "empty" then this surely also applies to his own view. He famously argues that he does (...) not have a thesis and provides the "silence" analogy, which I want to illustrate using my own example: if there is too much off-topic... (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss the significance of upam na in the Ny yas tra as a source of knowledge and its role in understanding and learning about the world. Some philosophers, particularly Buddhists, have argued that upam na is reducible to inference. I am going to defend the Ny ya view that upam na is in fact a fundamental source of knowledge which plays a significant role in teaching and learning. In fact, I am going to argue that (...) by introducing upam na as a pram a the Naiy yikas accounted for the way humans acquire certain types of knowledge. Finally, I will highlight the similarities between the role of upam na in the Ny yas tra and some of Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance and proof. (shrink)

The theory of consequences was one of the most important developments in logic during the Middle Ages. The distinction between formal consequences and material consequences was probably introduced by Ockham and soon became the main division of consequences, to be found in nearly all 14th-century treatises on the theory of consequences. This paper discusses the concept of a formal and material consequence according to the English tradition. It is based mainly on Richard Bil­lingham’s De consequentiis, but also takes into account (...) other 14th-century authors. Billingham defines the formal consequence as one where the consequent is understood in the antecedent and differentiates this kind of consequence from the material one. The definition is followed by a list of rules for valid consequences. However, with respect to some of these valid consequences the question arises whether they are formal or not and, if they are formal, how it is possible to explain the criterion of the intelligitur in. After explaining the material and the formal consequence and discussing these difficulties, the question is raised whether the intelligitur in is an appropriate structural criterion to distinguish between formal and material consequences. Finally, two interpretations for the intelligitur in compatible with the text situation are proposed. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the following conclusions: 1. The widely shared beliefs that in utilitarianism and consequentialism (a) the good has priority over the right and (b) the right is derived from the good, are both false. 2. The most plausible components of utilitarianism that are used to present it as an intuitively compelling moral theory - welfarism, consequentialism and maximization - do not in fact support utilitarianism because they do not establish that the best state of affairs (...) is the one with the highest sum total of the non-moral good. These components cannot determine which state of affairs is the best and therefore leave it entirely open whether one should opt for distribution-insensitive utilitarianism or a distribution-sensitive welfarist consequentialism. Since this is left open, it is not the case that distribution-insensitive utilitarianism is the default option and every deviation from it towards a more just distribution needs to be defended against utilitarianism. Rather, in light of our moral intuitions and the persistence of the objection from justice against utilitarianism, it seems to be the other way round, that distribution-sensitivity is the default option and any deviation from it bears the burden of proof. (shrink)

Obwohl in nahezu allen Ethiklehrbüchern auf den grundsätzlichen Gegensatz zwischen deontologischen und konsequentialistischen Theorien hingewiesen wird, ist unklar, was eigentlich unter Deontologie zu verstehen ist. Das traditionelle und vielleicht immer noch beliebteste Unterscheidungskriterium zwischen beiden Arten von Theorien ist die moralische Relevanz der Handlungskonsequenzen. Wie ich zeigen will, werden aber gerade mit diesem Kriterium deontologische Theorien meist falsch und als ziemlich unplausible Theorien charakterisiert. Dieses falsche Verständnis deontologischer Theorien, das ich als „absolutistisches Missverständnis der Deontologie“ bezeichnen werde, behandle ich im (...) zweiten Teil des Aufsatzes, nachdem im ersten Teil die Unterscheidung zwischen Deontologie und Konsequentialismus anhand des genannten Kriteriums geklärt worden ist. Im dritten Teil schließlich wird der Einwand entkräftet, dass das Kriterium unbrauchbar sei, weil es eine scharfe Trennung zwischen Handlungen und Konsequenzen voraussetze, die es so nicht gebe. Da dieser Einwand nicht stichhaltig ist, kann das Kriterium beibehalten werden, sofern man das absolutistische Missverständnis vermeidet. (shrink)

This paper makes a contribution to debates in recognition theory by expanding the taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere. We argue that doing justice to the variety of ways in which recognition is engaged in economic relationships requires: (1) to take into consideration not just the recognition principle of esteem, but also (various aspects of) need and respect; (2) to distinguish a productive from a consumptive dimension with regards to each principle of recognition (need, esteem and respect); (3) and (...) to identify the specific economic relationship at stake (e.g. between consumers and producers, or between employers and employees). In this way, we can account for the diversity of demands for recognition made in the economic sphere, explain what underpins them, and bring structure into these diverse phenomena. What is more, our expanded taxonomy is a useful tool for social pathology theorists. They have to appreciate the full range of variants of misrecognition when diagnosing pathologies of misrecognition in the economic sphere. (shrink)

This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, (...) I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind. (shrink)

Using the lens of positive organizational ethics, we theorized that empathy affects decisions in ethical dilemmas that concern the well-being of not only the organization but also other stakeholders. We hypothesized and found that empathetic managers were less likely to comply with requests by an authority figure to cut the wages of their employees than were non-empathetic managers. However, when an authority figure requested to hold wages constant, empathy did not affect wage cut decisions. These findings imply that empathy can (...) serve as a safeguard for ethical decision making in organizations during trying times without generally undermining organizational effectiveness. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research. (shrink)

A myriad of sensations inform and direct us when we engage with the environment. To understand their influence on the development of our habitus it is important to focus on unifying processes in sensing. This approach allows us to include phenomena that elude a rather narrow view that focuses on each of the five discrete senses in isolation. One of the central questions addressed in this volume is whether there is something like a sensual habitus, and if there is, how (...) it can be defined. This is especially done by exploring the formation and habituation of the senses in and by a culturally shaped habitat. Two key concepts, Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics, are addressed as essential components for an understanding of the interface of habitat and the rich and multisensory experience of a perceiving subject. At a Berlin-based conference Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics, scholars from various disciplines gathered to discuss these issues. In bringing together the outcome of these discussions, this book gives new insights into the key phenomena of sensory integration and synaesthetic experiences, it enriches the perspectives on sensually embedded interaction and its habituation, and it expands this interdisciplinary inquiry to questions about the cultures of sensory habitus. (shrink)

Europe's economic constitution is obviously affected in a very fundamental way. There is every reason to depart from an historical reconstruction of the origins of the economic constitution in the early 1920s, to consider its remarkable renaissance in postwar Germany, and to explore against this background its emigration to the European level of governance as well as its development and metamorphosis in the integration process. This chapter focuses on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which, once hailed as the crowning (...) achievement of Europe's market building and the precursor of a more truly political Union, has become the epicenter of the present crisis. Ordoliberalism and the social‐market economy managed to coexist peacefully and dominated public opinion. The chapter also discusses the practices of Europe's crisis management and the specifics of the governance modes that they are generating. (shrink)

Two kinds of membrane contacts in the vertebrate lens are described. Fiber gap junctions are domains where small molecules can pass between lens cells. Membrane structures of ball‐and‐socket type interlock adjacent lens fibers and thus contribute to the structural integrity of the lens. Both of these membrane contacts appear crucial for the maintenance of lens transparency.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics of Wealth in a World of Economic Inequality: A Christian Perspective in a Buddhist-Christian DialogueJoerg RiegerThere is common agreement that we find ourselves in a world of economic inequality. More precisely, we are living in a world where economic inequality continues to grow by leaps and bounds. Income inequality in the United States is greater than it has ever been, greater than that of most other wealthy (...) countries,1 and it is even greater than the income inequality known in the Roman Empire. In Ancient Rome, the top 1 percent controlled 16 percent of society’s wealth, compared to 40 percent in the contemporary United States.2 Nevertheless, although there is broad agreement on the existence of economic inequality, there are different perspectives on what it all means.While many lament the existence of economic inequality, others welcome it. Christians who follow the teachings of the so-called gospel of prosperity, for instance, are rarely bothered by economic inequality because they see economic success as a result of faithfulness to God, while stagnation or even poverty is the result of lack of faith. Among economists, one of the dominant perspectives on economic inequality is that it is necessary and beneficial. More specifically, one current economic theory that is widely agreed upon holds that cutting taxes for the wealthy and providing subsidies for large corporations is the only way to maintain economic growth as well as job growth. This theory is maintained despite mounting empirical evidence to the contrary. As a recent study by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service notes, “there is little evidence over the past 65 years that tax cuts for the highest earners are associated with savings, investment or productivity growth.”3Other prominent perspectives on economic inequality take more critical approaches, although some of the most common stereotypes also fail the reality test. One common assumption, for instance, is that the wealth gap is a matter of the so-called First World versus the so-called Third World. In the Americas, for instance, many believe that wealth resides north of the US-Mexico border, and that poverty resides to the south of it. Nevertheless, the world’s wealthiest individual is currently a Mexican citizen, business magnate Carlos Slim Helú. The case of Slim is, of course, [End Page 153] only the tip of the iceberg, as a tremendous amount of wealth resides in many places “south of the border.” Whenever I take seminary students on immersion trips into countries of the so-called Third World, I make it a point to take them not only into the poor neighborhoods but also into the wealthy ones.Observing wealth in Third World contexts never fails to create substantial cognitive dissonance, as most US residents do not expect to see so many expensive cars and expansive villas in São Paulo, Brazil; Lima, Peru; or Harare, Zimbabwe. By the same token, even most US residents do not expect to see so much dire poverty in the United States, although it often resides only a few miles from where they live. According to the National Center for Children in Poverty, 21 percent of all children in the United States live in families with incomes below the poverty level.4 Without ignoring the economic differences between North and South, substantial economic inequality exists in both so-called Third World and First World settings.Whose Wealth?One crucial insight emerges from our reflections so far: when we talk about an ethics of wealth in a world of economic inequality, we need to ask whose wealth we are discussing. When we are talking about wealth in many Christian communities, we tend to talk about ourselves and about the perceived wealth of the so-called middle class. What we are rarely discussing, however, is the tremendous wealth that is amassed at the upper levels of society, with the proverbial 1 percent or the 0.1 percent. I have observed similar discourses for many years, all around the world. There are several problems with this discourse.One problem is that by talking about members of the middle class as representatives of wealth, we fail to investigate the full scale of economic... (shrink)