Demografisches Wissen und ‘Nation‐Building’: Der peruanische Zensus von 1940. Die Demografen, die 1940 die peruanische Volkszählung organisierten, stellten die zunehmende ethnische Heterogenität Perus als Zeichen aufbrechender kultureller Grenzen und als Symbol einer tragfähigen peruanischen Identität dar. Diese besondere demografische Dynamik war ihrer Ansicht nach ein Motor der nationalen Entwicklung. Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die verschiedenen Formen, in denen Demografen kulturelle Heterogenität als einen potentiellen Vorteil des Landes konstruierten. Hierdurch wird deutlich, wie akademisches Wissen über ethnische Hybridität mit den nationalistischen (...) Projekten der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts verbunden war. Er analysiert weiterhin den Einfluss, den die ideologischen Sympathien der peruanischen Demografen für den Sozialismus auf ihre wissenschaftliche Arbeit hatte.Demographic Knowledge and Nation‐Building: The Peruvian Census of 1940. The demographers who organized the 1940 census of Peru portrayed the increasingly mixed‐race Peruvian population as indicative of the breaking down of cultural barriers to the emergence of a robust Peruvian identity, a process that, they claimed, would lead to greater national development. This paper analyzes the ways in which demographers constructed cultural heterogeneity as a potential national asset. This reveals how scientific knowledge of miscegenation affected the formation of a nationalist project in the second half of the twentieth century, and also how demographers' ideological commitments to socialism shaped scientific practice. (shrink)

Practical Knowledge, Science and Disasters. The History of Social Science Disaster Research, 1949–1979. During the second half of the twentieth century several US-American social science “disaster research groups” conducted field studies after earthquakes, factory explosions and “racial riots”. Their aim was to provide practical knowledge that could be applied in the planning and managing of future disasters of both peace- and wartime nature. In this paper, I will elaborate on how this research goal conflicted with some scientists’ aspirations (...) to develop more theoretical knowledge and their own ideals of “scientificity”. I will also show how the generated research results came to be ‘impractical knowledge’, which was difficult or impossible to apply. Furthermore this paper analyzes the scientific practices that were involved at different stages of the knowledge production process and contributed to disaster research's ‘precarious’ character. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg made an important – and as yet insufficiently researched – contribution to the transformation of the modern conception of science. This transformation involved a reassessment of the status of scientific knowledge from certain to merely hypothetical – an assessment that is widely recognized today. I examine Heisenberg’s contribution in particular by taking his conception of “closed theories” as an example according to which the established physical theories have no universal and exclusive, but only a restricted validity. (...) Firstly, I characterize the historical process of hypothetization of claims to validity. Then, secondly, I reconstruct Heisenberg’s conception, as far as it can be derived from his popular writings, relating it to the process of hypothetization. Finally, I touch on the history of its reception and compare it with conceptions of science that emphasize the significance of the hypothetical for the modern theories of natural sciences. Compared to these conceptions, Heisenberg’s contribution turns out to be rather independent. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg made an important – and as yet insufficiently researched – contribution to the transformation of the modern conception of science. This transformation involved a reassessment of the status of scientific knowledge from certain to merely hypothetical – an assessment that is widely recognized today. I examine Heisenberg’s contribution in particular by taking his conception of “closed theories” as an example according to which the established physical theories have no universal and exclusive, but only a restricted validity. (...) Firstly, I characterize the historical process of hypothetization of claims to validity. Then, secondly, I reconstruct Heisenberg’s conception, as far as it can be derived from his popular writings, relating it to the process of hypothetization. Finally, I touch on the history of its reception and compare it with conceptions of science that emphasize the significance of the hypothetical for the modern theories of natural sciences. Compared to these conceptions, Heisenberg’s contribution turns out to be rather independent. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg hat einen wichtigen, noch nicht hinreichend untersuchten Beitrag zum Wandel des neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsverständnisses geleistet. Der Wandel führte von der Charakterisierung des wissenschaftlichen Wissens als sichere Erkenntnis zu seiner - heute weithin anerkannten - Charakterisierung als bloß hypothetische Erkenntnis. Anfänge dieses Wandlungsprozesses lassen sich im 19. Jahrhundert nachweisen (z.B. bei John Hersehel, William Whewell oder Hermann von Helmholtz). Ich möchte am Beispiel von Heisenberg der Frage nachgehen, welchen Einfluss die Begründung der Quantenmechanik, die seine Wissenschaftsauffassung prägte, auf den Prozess (...) der Relativierung von Geltungsansprüchen hatte. Meine Vermutung ist, dass eine entscheidende Rolle hierbei weniger dem Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriff als vielmehr dem Wahrheits- und Realitätsbegriff zukam. Ich werde als erstes den historischen Prozess der Hypothetisierung von Geltungsansprüchen, zu dem ich Heisenbergs Konzeption ins Verhältnis setzen möchte, charakterisieren. Anschließend rekonstruiere ich Heisenbergs Konzeption, soweit sie sich seinen populären Reden und Aufsätzen entnehmen lässt. Als drittes werde ich ihre Wirkungsgeschichte kurz ansprechen und sie mit Wissenschaftsauffassungen vergleichen, die die Bedeutung des Hypothetischen für die modernen Theorien der Naturwissenschaften betonen. Ihnen gegenüber erweist sich Heisenbergs Beitrag als durchaus eigenständig. (shrink)

History of Science Today. The paper argues for a theoretically demanding history of science along three lines. (1) History of science requires a permanent reflection on the concept of history. (2) It demands an epistemological reflection on the historically changing forms of knowledge. (3) An intimate knowledge of scientific practice is necessary, be it more theoretically or more practically oriented. These competences can be brought together in a multitude of ways, but they need to complement each other.

Four Remarks Concerning “the Situation of the History of Science in Germany”. The following remarks contain four brief reflections, based on my experience in teaching the history of science: (1) on the limitations of any national perspective on the history of science, (2) on the subject and task of the history of science, (3) on the power and weakness of knowledge as topics for the history of science, and (4) on the possibilities of scientific imagination as a critical (...) issue for the future development of our field. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag ist Teil des Forums COVID-19: Perspektiven in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften. Das neuartige Coronavirus stellt die Weltgemeinschaft vor eine große Herausforderung. Das Wissen über das Virus und seine Eigenschaften ist lückenhaft, aber der Bedarf, politische und medizinische Entscheidungen an wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis auszurichten ist groß. Diese Lage führt zu einer Dynamisierung der Forschung. Ein prominentes Beispiel ist die WHO-Studie SOLIDARITY. Die epistemologischen Besonderheiten und die daraus resultierenden ethischen Implikationen werden in diesem Beitrag näher beleuchtet.This paper is part of (...) Forum COVID-19: Perspectives in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The novel coronavirus poses a huge challenge to the world community. Knowledge about the virus and its properties is limited, but there is a great need to base political and medical decisions on scientific knowledge. This situation is leading to a dynamization of research. A prominent example of such a development is SOLIDARITY. The epistemological dimensions of this trial, which is coordinated by the WHO, and the resulting ethical implications are discussed in this article. (shrink)

Paces of Rationality in the History of Science: On the Temporal Structures of the Quantum Revolution. I argue that the Kuhnian picture of scientific revolutions must be modified by introducing various levels of historical reality (or historiographical reconstruction) and reference points for rational justification in order to permit the constant movement back and forth between long shots and close‐ups that is indispensable in the history of science. Such an account makes it possible to describe a scientific revolution not (...) as a simultaneous break on all levels, but as a sequence of ruptures on different levels, in which some levels allow the formulation of the new points of view or a justification of the transition. The proposed account appears reconcilable both with Michael Friedman's recent philosophical analysis of the dynamics of reason, even though it also admits of social and technological levels that are not representing a constitutive a priori, and Michel Foucault's archeology of nature, which does not contradict the fact that in studying the history of physical theory one typically finds precisely formulated and well‐separated levels of knowledge. It is ironic that Kuhn's original account, which helped to shape the ‘new epistemology’, is still largely indebted to the Logical Empiricists' conception of a single linguistic framework, the establishment of which is merely a matter of convention and pragmatics. At the example of Mara Beller's assessment of the quantum revolution. I argue that the Kuhnian picture represents an obstacle against assessing one particular trait of the German physics of the 1920s, the important formative part played by philosophical convictions of the German physicist‐philosophers. (shrink)

English summary: Ordinary, unmethodical experience forms our lives. It accumulates when we interact with our environment as living beings, and combines cognitive, affective and volitional elements. In it, questions of meaning and value and issues of knowledge become strongly interdependent. In a normative sense, modern culture has tremendously upgraded the status of ordinary people's experience. However, at the same time, our world is increasingly determined by the methodological experience of the (natural) sciences and by the technology they have made (...) possible. Will scientific experience now replace ordinary experience, or will it complement and regulate it? How do facts and values relate to one another and what does this mean for our understanding of democracy? Matthias Jung starts by developing an integrated approach to ordinary experience, taking into account insights from areas including hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism and cognitive science. As a result, three main areas of discussion emerge: knowledge, values and ideology, all of which are covered in their respective individual chapters. German description: Gewohnliche, unmethodische Erfahrung formt unser Leben. Sie vollzieht sich, wenn wir als lebendige Wesen mit unserer Umwelt interagieren, und verbindet jeweils kognitive, affektive und willentliche Dimensionen. Fragen nach Sinn und Wert und Wissensfragen sind in ihr eng aufeinander bezogen. Normativ hat die Kultur der Moderne die Erfahrung gewohnlicher Menschen enorm aufgewertet, doch gleichzeitig wird unsere Welt immer starker von der methodischen Erfahrung der (Natur-)Wissenschaften und der von ihr ermoglichten Technik bestimmt. Ersetzt nun wissenschaftliche die gewohnliche Erfahrung oder erganzt und korrigiert sie diese? Wie verhalten sich Fakten und Werte zueinander und was ergibt sich daraus fur unser Verstandnis von Demokratie? Matthias Jung entwickelt zunachst ein integriertes Konzept gewohnlicher Erfahrung und nimmt dabei Einsichten u.a. aus Hermeneutik, Phanomenologie, Pragmatismus und Kognitionswissenschaften auf. Daraus ergeben sich drei exemplarische Problemfelder: Wissen, Werte und Weltanschauung. Ihnen sind jeweils eigene Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung1989/90 war die DDR ein ökologisch gescheiterter Staat. Doch während Eingaben aus der Bevölkerung und kritische Umweltgruppen im Laufe der 1980er Jahre immer offener gegen die vorhandenen Umweltprobleme protestierten, blieben die etablierten Wissenschaften merkwürdig stumm und waren allem Anschein nach nicht in der Lage, geeignete Konzepte zur Lösung der Umweltkrise zu entwickeln. Knapp 20 Jahre zuvor hatte jedoch in der DDR ein umweltpolitischer Aufbruch eingesetzt, der maßgeblich von wissenschaftlichen Reforminitiativen getragen wurde. Die Aufnahme des Natur- und Umweltschutzgedankens in die Verfassung (...) von 1968 und die Verabschiedung des Landeskulturgesetzes zwei Jahre darauf, waren Ausdruck eines gesellschaftspolitischen Konsenses in der Umweltfrage.Wie ist diese scharfe Diskrepanz zu erklären? Der Aufsatz fragt nach dem Einfluss wissenschaftlicher Umweltkonzepte auf den umweltpolitischen Aufbruch in der DDR. Am Beispiel des wissenschaftlichen Naturschutzes, der seit 1951 institutionell in der Deutschen Akademie der Landwirtschaftswissenschaften verankert war, wird gezeigt, dass Naturschützer in den 1950er Jahren eine Phase der „Normalisierung“ durchliefen, die eine wesentliche Voraussetzung dafür war, ihren Anliegen politische Legitimation zu verleihen. Dieser erzwungene Anpassungsprozess beeinflusste aber nicht nur die Konzepte und Ziele des ostdeutschen Naturschutzes, sondern eröffnete seinen Protagonisten auch Partizipationsmöglichkeiten.In diesem Aufsatz plädiere ich für eine Neubewertung der ostdeutschen Umweltgeschichte, die bislang einseitig vom Ende her blickt. Zudem schlage ich vor, das begriffliche Konzept der „partizipatorischen Diktatur“ (Fulbrook) auf die Wissenschaftsgeschichte der DDR zu übertragen und vorhandene Ansätze damit zu erweitern. (shrink)

The most influential physicist of the 20th century considered his scientific activity to be a contribution to ,,cosmic religion". Starting from his own writings, the article presents Einstein's religious views and questions the extent to which his pantheistic convictions can provide the necessary foundations for human knowledge and action. German Der bedeutendste Physiker des 20. Jahrhunderts fasste seine wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit als Beitrag zur ,,kosmischen Religion auf. Der Artikel zeichnet die Religionsauffassung Einsteins an Hand von Originaltexten nach und fragt, (...) inwieweit seine weitgehend pantheistisch geprägten Überzeugungen menschliches Wissen und Handeln begründen können. (shrink)

Die Erkenntnistheorie wird meist als Theorie des Wissens charakterisiert. In jüngerer Zeit ist der alleinige Fokus auf Wissen kritisiert und sind weitere epistemische Güter diskutiert worden. Verstehen und Weisheit sind von besonderer Bedeutung. Erstens ist Verstehen ein hohes und Weisheit vielleicht das höchste epistemische Gut; beide scheinen epistemisch wertvoller zu sein als Wissen (Riggs 2003). Zudem ist unklar, ob der epistemische Wert von Wissen den Wert seiner Bestandteile (z.B. wahre, gerechtfertigte Meinung) übersteigt. Es ist behauptet worden, dass (...) sich für Verstehen kein solches Wertproblem stellt und die Erkenntnistheorie deshalb Verstehen ins Zentrum rücken sollte (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). Zweitens ist Verstehen ein Ziel von Wissenschaft (Elgin 2017) und von wissenschaftlicher Erklärung (Friedman 1974). Theorien der Erklärung und der kognitiven Leistungen der Wissenschaft verlangen deshalb nach einer Theorie des Verstehens (de Regt u.a. 2009). Drittens mag ein geeigneter Begriff des Verstehens es erlauben, tiefsitzende Intuitionen zur epistemischen Rechtfertigung anzuerkennen, die für Wissen zurückgewiesen wurden, z.B. internalistische und kohärentistische Intuitionen sowie solche zur Rolle von intellektuellen Charaktertugenden (Riggs 2003; Zagzebski 1996). Diese Idee ist kürzlich kritisiert (z.B. Greco 2014) und dafür vorgeschlagen worden, dass solche Intuitionen Merkmale von Weisheit betreffen (Grimm u.a. 2017, Kap. 10). Dieser Artikel behandelt die Natur von Verstehen und von Weisheit, indem er Verstehen mit Wissen und beide mit Weisheit vergleicht (für die Wertfrage s. Kap. „Der Wert des Wissens“). (shrink)

The monograph offers an in-depth, source-oriented presentation and analysis of the complex discussions that took place between ca. 1230 and 1350 on the differentiation and expansion of the structural concept of scientific knowledge and certainty in lifeworld-contingent areas of investigation. It makes transparent a development in the course of which a graduated, multidimensional conception of knowledge and certainty emerges. In the process, the masters gain pioneering insights into the philosophy of science. Starting from the key data provided (...) by Aristotle, the scholastic scholars' productive, far-reaching further thinking leads to a deeper understanding of the nature and reliability of scientifically acquired knowledge. These intellectual endeavours were significantly challenged by the increasing knowledge of the spectrum of the transmitted Aristotelian and Arabic sciences. They also received significant impulses from epistemological reflection in theology. (shrink)

Producing, Localising, and Imagining Knowledge. On “false maps” and “scientific expeditions” in the Brazilian‐French Debates about Guyana (1880s–1900s). This paper analyses the interferences between knowledge production, space and colonial claims from translocal, actor‐based perspectives. Due to its ‘thickness’ the examined material, found particularly at the Perthes collection (Gotha/Germany), allows multifaceted views on a topic which influences our scientific knowledge‐based world views. In his writings the Swiss naturalist Emil Göldi underlined his point of view that was (...) both ‘Brazilianized’ and scientific. Especially his letters and articles between the 1880s and the 1900s are testimony to his positioning in situ (‘an Ort und Stelle’) against the cartographic ‘alienated’‐colonial perspectives of French scientists, especially those of his counterpart Henri Coudreau. Sometimes it reads more like an adventure story than a scholarly debate. By working with and using the internationally renowned periodical Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen (Perthes), Göldi managed to design an image of the spatial situation that convinced the deciding people and thus to obtain for Brazil a huge territory in the Eastern part of the Guyanas. (shrink)

Scientific creativity, i.e. the production of new and socially effective empirical knowledge, can itself be subjected to empirical analysis. Research on the determinants of creative work in science suggests that the internal and external world of creative scientists is characterised by a series of tensions or "oppositions of forces" which "normally" cannot be integrated. Conversely, creative work in science can be understood as the provision of new answers to scientific problems where conventional answers are no longer sufficient (...) to reduce incongruities between cognitive, affective and social standards of satisfactory problem solution. (shrink)

The book "Wer hat das Wissen in der Wissenschaft versteckt?" [Who had hidden knowledge in science?] is about the organisational character of science - "science" as understood in continental Europa as social & natural sciences. The reason for this interest is that, as it is the case with other things, human beings undertake scientific enquiries because they, as individuals, have certain interests related to the content of their activities, they want to know certain things. Then, when an (...) activity is organised, the organisation (or organisational structure) itself develops own interests and imposes them on the individuals. Soon, the individuals do not follow anymore (so much) their own interests but the interests of the organisation. This phenomenon is exemplarified by an analysis of the foreword of Wilhelm Schmid's book: "Philosophie der Lebenskunst" (1998) [Philosophy of the art of living], his habilitation at the University of Erfurt: The analysis shows how Schmid in this foreword is trying hard to present the art of living (which is first and foremost useful for the individual human person) as something which is useful for society because this is what science, represented by the academic environment in which we are socialized requires. In total, the book comprises 12 individual studies of which the analysis of the foreword of Schmid's "Philosophie der Lebenskunst" is one. The other 11 studies analyse texts by: Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, Sandra Beaufays, andreas Hütig, Carl Djerassi, Monika Wogrolly, Friedericke Hassauer, Michel Foucault, John Stuart Mill, Erich Visotschnig & Siegfried Schrotta, Gordon A. Frutschnigg, and Oliver Sacks. One important aspect of the book is the relationship between philosophy and science, analysed e.g. with the help of Gordon A. Frutschnigg's diploma theses on the diploma theses completed at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Vienna between 2005 and 2007: Can philosophy, which primarily serves for the orientation of the individual in life be scientific in the sense of the organisational character of science (which tries to exclude individual interests as best as it can for they are deemed to bring subjectivity into science striving for objective truth). The choice of the books/texts which are analyzed in this study was partly (admittedly) random; however, they bear a common characteristic which is: these are texts which show/make visible the organisational character of science. The character of the studies in this book is phenomenological because they provide a close look at 12 texts/books and their use of language, supported by extensive quotes. (shrink)

Knowledge and the History of Science. This essay asks how the object of history of knowledge could be delineated so as to keep it distinct from the history of science (that has always dealt with knowledge) and, at the same time, to keep it specific enough not to turn into a general history of all human activities. By way of discussing the type of knowledge we could call ‘scientific’, and arguing that history of science should (...) take an integrative approach, I propose that a history of knowledge should focus on generalizing accounts taken in most various domains and cultures. (shrink)

Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung. Von E. MACH Emer. Professor an der Unlversltlt Wlen. LEIPZIG Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth 1905. INTRODUCTION XIII On a number of occasions Mach expressed the sentiment, especially in his correspondence, that America was the land of intellectual freedom and opportunity, the coming frontier for a new radical empiricism that would help to wash metaphysics out of philosophy. In 1901 he sponsored the German edition of Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881) (...) 2 by J. B. Stallo, Cincinnati lawyer and philosopher. Mach warmly endorsed Stallo's book because his scientific aims so closely approximated his own, and because Stallo rejected the latent metaphysical elements and concealed ontological assumptions of the mechanical-atomistic inter­ pretation of the world. The second edition of Wiirmelehre was dedicated to Stallo in 1900. The fourth edition of Populiir-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen (1910), containing seven new essays, was dedicated to Harvard Professor of physiology, philosophY, and psychology, William James. Mach had a strong intellectual affinity for James' pragmatism because, like himself, he recognized that James had come to radically empirical views from science. Both men took pure pre-conceptualized experience, from which the mental and physical predicates of experience are composed, to be neutral rather than real, unreal, objective or subjective. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Glauben und Denken kann als Angelpunkt und Motor der neuzeitlichen Geschichte begriffen werden. Walter Falks Werk zeigt in singulärer Weise, auf welchen teilweise verdrängten Fundamenten der wissenschaftliche Fortschrittsglaube beruhte und bietet eine kritische Analyse der 'Legitimität der Neuzeit', die ebenbürtig neben den großen Arbeiten von Hans Blumenberg, Michel Foucault oder Joachim Ritter bestehen kann. Walter Falk geht anhand der Metapher von der Weltmaschine, die sich seit 1770 in verschiedenen Texten und in Modifikationen findet, der Fortschrittsgeschichte und ihrer (...) Kritiker nach. So entwirft er, vor dem Hintergrund einer neuartigen Epochendeutung ein geistesgeschichtliches Panorama, das von Comte und Schlegel und Kleist bis zu Kafka und Heidegger reicht. Das Buch zeigt vor dem Hintergrund der Wissenschaftsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, wie die Gestalt des personalen Gottes in den großen geistes- und naturwissenschaftlichen Innovationsschüben der Moderne zunehmend wieder in den Blick genommen wurde. Dabei erfahren die Ansätze von Foucault, Konrad Lorenz oder René Girard eine eigenwillige und profilierte, Natur- und Kulturwissenschaften innovativ miteinander verbindende Deutung. Das eigentliche Interesse des Buches ist aber nicht historischer Natur. Falk demonstriert eindrucksvoll, wie Glauben und Denken in der Gegenwart zugleich differenziert und integriert werden müssen, um auf der Höhe der Moderne wieder fruchtbar in ein Gespräch kommen zu können. (shrink)

Scientific findings nowadays often rely on statistical analyses, are expressed in terms of probabilities, and are frequently developed based on model calculations. These circumstances contribute to a disconnect between scientific predictions and people's everyday risk assessments. Situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate issues, or the downsides of global trade are particularly affected by this phenomenon. In these areas especially, the growth of knowledge implies new and far-reaching ethical (preventive) obligations for humanity. This chapter argues that a (...) successful relationship between scientific knowledge and people's everyday decision-making behavior in these domains can only emerge if several demanding prerequisites are met: understanding statistical findings and probabilities must be generally improved; the ethical implications resulting from this understanding must be recognized as moral progress; and the challenging delineations of new ethical obligations and political necessities that arise in risk contexts require careful and patient consideration, rather than being used as an excuse to maintain the status quo. -/- ----- Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse basieren heutzutage oft auf statistischen Auswertungen, werden in Wahrscheinlichkeit angegeben und sind nicht selten auf Grundlage von Modellrechnungen entwickelt. Diese Umstände tragen zu einer Abkoppelung der wissenschaftlichen Prognosen von den lebens- weltlichen Risikoeinschätzungen der Menschen bei. Situationen wie die COVID-19-Pandemie, die Klimaproblematik oder auch die Nachteile des globalen Handels sind von diesem Phänomen in besonderem Maße betroffen. Gerade auf diesen Gebieten impliziert der Wissenszuwachs neue und weitreichende ethische (Verhinderungs-)Pflichten für die Menschen. In diesem Kapitel wird argumentiert, dass ein gelingendes Verhältnis zwischen wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und dem alltäglichen Entscheidungsverhalten der Menschen in diesen Bereichen nur dann entstehen kann, wenn mehrere anspruchsvolle Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind: Das Verständnis von statistischen Erkenntnissen und Wahrscheinlichkeiten muss generell verbessert werden; das Verständnis der hierdurch resultierenden ethischen Implikationen muss als moralischer Fortschritt verstanden werden; und die schwierigen Grenzziehungen für die neuen ethischen Pflichten sowie politischen Notwendigkeiten, die im Rahmen von Risikokontexten notwendig werden, bedürfen einer differenzierten und geduldigen Bearbeitung, anstatt als Ausflucht in ein Weiter-so genutzt zu werden. -/- . (shrink)

Modern sciences produce knowledge and findings which improve technological advance and our quality of life in every regard. But do the sciences also provide us with a genuine knowledge about the world in the sense of giving us insights into that which is taking place? This book traces the most important approaches, which have in past decades attempted to make intelligible the contemporary forms of scientific research and progress. The book suggests a new approach for a philosophy (...) of science fit for the 21st century. This new approach brings together and unites the various competing trends, from the philosophy of science to the sociology of science. Based on the findings the book discusses whether the sciences do in fact follow 'scientific' methods in order to reach their successes and whether what they produce can be considered 'knowledge' for us as individuals and for society at large. The discussion also asks whether philosophy itself is a science that produces knowledge"--Page 4. (shrink)

The concept of »systematic knowledge research« is being developed. Systematic knowledge research assumes an irreducible variety of types of knowledge. The focus lies on researching the intersections and interactions of the different types of knowledge. Clarifying the mechanisms of interaction of the knowledge types in everyday life, sciences, technologies, and arts represents a cross-cutting issue for philosophy and all scientific disciplines, technologies, and arts as well as an independent research subject. At the same time, (...) expansions and re-orientations of epistemology are connected with systematic knowledge research. What exactly knowledge research is capable of achieving and why it is of value is spelled out in this paper. Five examples shall illustrate knowledge research in action. (shrink)

The Reshaping of Phytogeographical Knowledge as the “Transition zone” Wallacea: An American Expansion Project in the Philippines, 1902–1928. This paper examines the development of a concept that to this day plays an important role in biogeography: the region Wallacea. Focussing on the work of the American tropical botanist Elmer D. Merrill in the Philippines, I argue that his research on the geographical movement and settlement of Philippine plants reflects a shift in the United States’ scientific and cultural understanding (...) of the Pacific area towards a notion of “American tropics”. While inventorying plants for the American administration from 1901 to 1923, the composition of Philippine flora prompted Merrill to question biogeographical regionalization in Wallace's Malay Archipelago. Not being able to situate the Philippine flora within “Asian” or “Australasian” biota, Merrill described the islands as an area of trans‐regional plant migration. Together with the paleontologist Roy E. Dickerson, he later conceptualized the region Wallacea as biogeographical “transition zone” between the Philippines and Australia. In addition to the scientific conceptualization, Wallacea constitutes a space between two biogeographical subregions, whose flora was considered as being part of both, but could not be unambiguously attributed to either of these regions. In this respect, the plants resembled the inhabitants of the United States’ insular overseas territories, who were legally defined neither as aliens nor as citizens. In this sense, Wallacea embodies epistemic as well as geopolitical boundaries, while its case also illustrates some of the ways in which colonial interests in the usability of plants found expression in botanical research during the early period of American overseas expansion. (shrink)

Do the changes that have taken place in the structures and methods of the production of scientific knowledge and in our understanding of science over the past fifty years justify speaking of an epochal break in the development of science? Gregor Schiemann addresses this issues through the notion of a scientific revolution and claims that at present we are not witnessing a new scientific revolution. Instead, Schiemann argues that after the so-called Scientific Revolution in the (...) sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a caesura occurred in the course of the nineteenth century that constituted a departure from the early modern origins of science. This change was characterized by the loss of certainty on the part of the scientists, by the steadily increasing importance of scientific communities (rather than individuals), and by the systematic intertwinement of scientific and societal development. As to present science, Schiemann admits that important changes have occurred, but he denies the conflation of nature and culture: even the OncoMouse is a natural organism, though a seriously damaged one. (shrink)

Datafizierung, Publizierung, Metrisierung – unter diesen Stichpunkten untersuchen die AutorInnen des vorliegenden Bandes die Auswirkungen der zunehmenden Digitalisierung auf die Erzeugung, Auswahl, Bereitstellung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Wie wird Wissen aus den Weiten des digitalen Raums herausgefiltert? Wie wird es generiert? Was wird als Wissen verfügbar gemacht – und was nicht? Wie und von wem wird das digital erfasste Wissen evaluiert? Diese den Wissenschaftsbetrieb herausfordernden Fragen diskutieren ExpertInnen aus Philosophie, Informations- und Bibliothekswissenschaft sowie Informatik. Ihre Beiträge reflektieren (...) in kritischer und konstruktiver Weise die Gestaltung und Folgen der digitalisierten Wissenschaftspraxis. (shrink)

The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. — On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a (...) know-how instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated. (shrink)

It is the purpose to examine Krafts arguments and proofs on the basis of the evidence which gives reality. His derivation of principles with unlimited validity is not successful, judgements concerning "basic valuations of human culture" being inhomogeneous and historically bound. The way to introduce norms into scientific statements by "teleological" foundation is only valid for "normal" principles, basic must be excluded. The fruitfulness of the first step is appreciated and illustrated by economic examples. Jointly in connection with this (...) is the third question. In accordance with Kraft, the "ranking" of value judgements of different kinds must be solved without privileges. Scientific examination and foundation of value systems has its legitimacy, but relevant decisions of basic principles can only happen in the pre-scientific sphere. In order to avoid other value judgements in scientific contexts, one ought to dispose of really operational criterions. Today, there is an almost complete lack in the practical field. This is partly due to theoretical and dogmatic interpretations of science procedures. Critical science has to accept the provisional character of all scientific research and must, therefore, integrate those value judgements, which result from not fully testable hypotheses. Their "internalization" into the scientific progress of knowledge allows together to delete a great deal of this crucial point. (shrink)

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's texts on the philosophy of science (The Experiment as Mediator Between Object and Subject, 1793) and (Meteors of the Literary Sky, 1820) both discuss the fundamental epistemological question how knowledge emerges: They ask how scientists can gain universally valid knowledge by observing natural phenomena and to what extent the individual researcher is affected by the scientific community. In this paper, Goethe's writings are presented as alternatives to the contemporary discussions on scientific plagiarism. (...) Goethe shows that the linking of knowledge to an individual subject is less an effect of scientific practice than the result of a specific practice of attribution. Plagiarism thus appears as a logical consequence of the principle of priority in modern scientific culture. (shrink)

This article traces some of the transformation that the fields of folk psychology and anthropology underwent in the late nineteenth century. Ludwik Fleck, in developing his sociology of knowledge, drew on both of these fields; a legacy that makes it possible to conceive of his epistemology as a theory of communication. Fleck, in grounding his understanding of the relationship between sociality and communication on insights from these two disciplines, proposed the morphological concept of an organic formation of all (...) class='Hi'>scientific knowledge. Naturalising knowledge production in this manner, Fleck postulated a program of deciphering, reading, and translation that would relate all forms of knowledge back to the rules and conditions of its making. In this morphological conception of the processes of knowledge production, Fleck’s sociology bears significant similarities with the description of social institutions by French sociologists Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim, who also drew on insights from late-nineteenth-century folk psychology and anthropology. (shrink)

Malevich’s main Suprematist works, such as ›Black Square‹, ›Black Circle‹, and ›Black Cross‹ from 1915, consist of black shapes on white ground. Surprisingly this series of shapes strongly resembles scientific black-and-white images used for research on colour theory, physiological optics, and psychology throughout the 19th century. This paper examines the parallels between Malevich’s paintings and the scientific drawings in three steps: It first characterizes black-and-white images in general, using Edmund Husserl’s definition of the term ›contrast‹. Secondly, the paper (...) investigates the development and function of black-and-white images as tools of perception in the sciences. It finally discusses the specific knowledge generated through Malevich’s art and through scientific black-and-white images, following Max Scheler’s phenomenological identification of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper an attempt is made at developing the notion of a real and complete empirical explanation as excluding all forms of potential or incomplete explanations. This explanation is, however, no longer conceived as the proper aim of empirical science, for it can certainly be gleaned from recent epistemological publications that no comprehensive notion of a real and complete scientific explanation is likely to be constructed from within empirical science. Contrary to common understanding the empirical explanation, deductive-nomological as (...) well as statistical explanation, is considered here only as motive of scientific activities, i.e., as common aim of a transcending cooperation of scientific and non-scientific social practice. Following from this the proper aim of empirical science now consists in the development of practically relevant explanatory theories.This redetermination of the aim of scientific activities of empirical science also means criticism of the unification of deductive-nomological and statistical explanations, as it has been proposed by Wolfgang Stegmüller in his pragmatisch-epistemische Wende. For both forms of empirical explanation must be referred to fundamentally different kinds of practical relevance, the former playing a more important role in the advancement of social practice. Stegmüller's development of a comprehensive probabilistic notion of empirical explanation, as tied up to pragmatic knowledge-situations, in a way already transcends a scientifically immanent determination of it, but he seems to have stopped halfway on the road to practically relevant empirical explanations. Several insufficiencies with his probabilistic notion of empirical explanation are shown up in this paper as a consequence of his abiding by pragmatic, and not penetrating to practical, knowledge-situations. The final result of it, however, consists in a clarification and a modification of the concept of deductive-nomological explanation, originally developed by Hempel and Oppenheim. (shrink)

Was verstand man unter Wissen im 17. Jahrhundert? Welche Ideal des Wissens und welche Kriterien des Wissens wurden formuliert, wie konkurrierten diese Konzepte miteinander, wie und warum wurden einige etabliert, andere nicht? Welche notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen sollten erfüllt sein, damit einer Person Wissen zugeschrieben werden, und welchen Methoden wurden vorgeschlagen, um zu überprüfen, ob Wissensansprüche zu Recht bestehen? Dieser Sammelband vereinigt exemplarische Fallstudien international bekannter Spezialisten in der Erforschung der frühen Neuzeit, die das übliche Verständnis der Beziehung (...) von Wissensidealen und Wissenskulturen unterlaufen. Zumindest in der frühen Neuzeit wurden Wissensideale weitgehend "im Rahmen" bestimmter Wissenskontexte formuliert und auf diese Weise in eine Historisierung hineingezogen. Außerdem waren die verschiedensten Wissensformen, z. B. wissenschaftliche Projekte, politische Entwürfe, konfessionelle Vorstellungen, ästhetische Konzeptionen und autobiographische Selbstbilder auf das Engste miteinander verflochten. Die Beiträge im interdisziplinär angelegten Band betrachten anhand ausgewählter und historisch wichtiger Fälle aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln verschiedene "Methoden" des Erwerbs, der Begründung, Organisation, Darstellung, Anwendung und Vermittlung von Wissen im Europa des 17. Jahrhunderts. (shrink)

The essay is an English version of the German article "Wissenschaftliche Rationalität, menschliches Bewusstsein und pro-religiöse Ideen". It discusses immanent versus transcendent concepts in the context of the art of living, as well as the understanding of human consciousness in the context of religion. Science provides us with a far reaching understanding of natural processes, including biological evolution, but also with deep insights into its own intrinsic limitations. This is consistent with more than one interpretation on the “metatheoretical“, that is (...) on the philosophical and cultural level, including liberal, enlightened forms of religion as well as agnostic views. Choices and preferences are mainly a matter of wisdom and art of living, and not just of knowledge, and this, in my view, supports metaphysical and anthropological optimism as expressed in liberal pro-religious ideas. Within Christian theology, metaphysical optimism and openness are most characteristic for the ideas of “apokatastasis” – “salvation for all” - repeatedly condemned as heretical, but also widely supported from early Christianity to modern times. (shrink)

Paul Ehrlich and the Nobel Prize. The Construction of Scientific Excellence. From the first award in 1901 until now the Nobel Prize was and is valued as the highest recognition of the scientific community for the outstanding – excellent – scientific work of a researcher. And insofar, winning the Nobel Prize was a highlight in Paul Ehrlich's life. But from the first nomination in 1901 until 1908, when he was awarded the prize, it was a long way. (...) Between these years Ehrlich had been nominated 89 times by 80 scientists all over the world. The article sketches how excellence has been constructed by using the example of Paul Ehrlich. On the one hand, scientific networks are a precondition for being nominated by colleagues, on the other hand, excellence had been valuated and constructed in complex valuation processes and administrative procedures. The article presents first an overview over the nominations of Paul Ehrlich – who nominated him for what reasons? Moreover, the chapter sketches the relations between some nominators and Paul Ehrlich. After he had been nominated, the nominations were evaluated by members of the Nobel committee. The second part follows the complex procedures of evaluation to find the most excellent scientific work in accordance to Nobel's will. Finally, the Nobel Prize is embedded in broader network relations and the moral and relational economy of networks, which is exemplified by describing Paul Ehrlich relations to Carl Julius Salomonsen. (shrink)

The history of the Vienna Circle is bound up with what was called the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. But with the requirements of the members when it came to deciding whether a sentence expressed scientific knowledge or not, the basic sentences expressing a Lebens- und Weltauffassung would scarcely qualify as such, nor would hypotheses about a scientific world view. The Wissenschaftlichkeit ofphysicalism, logical behaviorism,logical syntax, unity of science, were hypothetical at best, and in my opinion should not be identified (...) with the total philosophical enterprise of the Vienna Circle. To its strictly speaking philosophical enterprise I attribute a certain kind of scientific or research attitude and clarity as much as any set of philosophical opinion of a substantial sort. (shrink)

Bisweilen sind wir frei. Diese Gewissheit gehört zu lebensweltlichen Überzeugungen, die resistent sind gegen wissenschaftliche Wissensansprüche. Was sagt diese Resistenz über den erkenntnismäßigen Status solcher Überzeugungen aus? – Dass sie den Status von Präsuppositionen für wissenschaftliche Erklärungen haben können. Der Präsuppositionsstatus schließt nicht aus, dass lebensweltliche Überzeugungen ein Wissen vom menschlichen Geist sind, statt bloß arationale Gewissheiten zu sein.

"Der Aufsatz plädiert dafür, die Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Computersimulation auf eine spezifisch medienhistorische Weise zu untersuchen. Nach einigen Vorschlägen zur Charakterisierung der Besonderheiten von Computersimulationen werden zwei Beispiele interpretiert (Management-Simulationen der 1960er und verkehrstechnische bzw. epidemiologische Simulationen der 1990er). Daraus leiten sich Fragen nach dem veränderten Status wissenschaftlichen Wissens, nach der Genese wissenschaftstheoretischer Konzepte und nach wissenschaftskritischen Optionen ab. The paper suggests to analyze the history of scientific computer simulations with respect to the history of media. After presenting some (...) ideas concerning the peculiarities of computer simulation, two examples (management simulations of the 1960s; traffic-related and epistemological simulations of the 1990s) are interpreted. From them, further questions concerning the status of scientific knowledge, the genesis of epistemological concepts and their critique are derived. ". (shrink)

In “Scientific Knowledge,” Philip Kitcher challenges arguments that deny the truth of the theoretical claims of science, and he attempts to discover reasons for endorsing the truth of such claims. He suggests that the discovery of such reasons might succeed if we ask why anyone thinks that the theoretical claims we accept are true and then look for answers that reconstruct actual belief‐generating processes. To this end, Kitcher presents the “homely argument” for scientific truth, which claims that (...) when a field of science is continually applied to yield precise predictions, then it is at least approximately true. He defends this approach and offers a supplementary account that gives more attention to detail. This account includes a historical aspect that must answer to skeptical challenges and a social aspect. (shrink)

Historical sciences like paleontology and archaeology have uncovered unimagined, remarkable and mysterious worlds in the deep past. How should we understand the success of these sciences? What is the relationship between knowledge and history? In Scientific Knowledge and the Deep Past: History Matters, Adrian Currie examines recent paleontological work on the great changes that occurred during the Cretaceous period - the emergence of flowering plants, the splitting of the mega-continent Gondwana, and the eventual fall of the dinosaurs (...) - to analyse the knowledge of historical scientists, and to reflect upon the nature of history. He argues that distinctively historical processes are 'peculiar': they have the capacity to generate their own highly specific dynamics and rules. This peculiarity, Currie argues, also explains the historian's interest in narratives and stories: the contingency, complexity and peculiarity of the past demands a narrative treatment. Overall, Currie argues that history matters for knowledge. (shrink)

As the subtitle indicates, this book intends to discuss Descartes’ attempt of laying a new foundation of knowledge. In a lively and critical interpretation of Descartes’ writings, especially of his Discours de la Méthode and of his Meditationes, and a competent use of the corresponding philosophical literature the success of this attempt of enlightenment and its shortcomings, identified with the Cartesian re-introduction of the traditional metaphysics, are explained in order to allow the author in a concluding discussion to present (...) his ideas of the necessary revision of Descartes philosophy. Presenting the I as the subject not only for the first time but in an unique way, and concentrating upon the problem of the self-originating human knowledge in an exemplary manner, Descartes is found to have become the founder of subjective philosophy. As knowledge of knowledge, philosophy is not concerned primarily with objects, but with knowledge and has self-foundation as its main task. So it has to start with human knowledge and to place the self as the fountain from which all knowledge proceeds. The demands of subjective philosophy dictate its method described in the Discours. The foundation of knowledge, which as such can only be true and certain knowledge, leads to enlightenment, i.e., to the rebellion against and to the great confrontation with the culture of the time, that is, with the guiding principles of understanding and evaluating the world of his society, and to the introduction of self-experience as the primary source of knowledge. Appointing human reason as the only leader of his intellectual life, Descartes determines the program and future order of his thoughts; the method, in the form of the four rules, has "correctly to direct his reason and to seek the truth in the sciences." It brings Descartes over the methodical doubt to the unquestionable and unsurpassed foundation of human knowledge, the absolute certitude of the self in the Cogito. His analysis of the poor, unprotected I, related to itself knowingly, is unique and of priceless philosophical value. However, the further stations of the philosophical way of Descartes who, unable to stand the ontological loneliness of this philosophically determined self-awareness, sacrificed the idea of scientific progress to a rational theology, cannot be followed. The claim of the metaphysician to be able to discover or, at least, to test every humanly possible knowledge in terms of the absolute knowledge, disintegrates in view of the progress of the new sciences. Not eternal, necessary truth, but the finite human I is the origin of subjective philosophy. The stability of rational relations does not lie in these relations themselves as if they were existing for themselves, but in the strict consequence of logical reason. "'God’ is... the title for the transcendental-philosophical background of consciousness, for the conditions to which the I-think is always already subjected." All contents which allegedly are already given in the infinite knowledge and can always be deduced from it, have to be produced and developed out of the first human knowledge by way of scientific research. Science which received its new foundation in subjective philosophy and is sought in the efforts of communication of the scientists, is not characterized by truth, but by certitude. "'Truth’ is the concern of metaphysics or better of religion. It is of the essence of such truth, not to be capable of demonstration. The absolutely true has no need to prove itself; it is entitled to faith." Differences between metaphysics and religion, and the nature and possible justification of such metaphysical and religious faith are regrettably not discussed.—M. S. (shrink)

Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is seen as a tool for increasing evidence-based policy making and as such it is being integrated into decision-making procedures on a wide range of issues. Based on systematic consultation, clear criteria for policy choice, and economic analysis of how costs and benefits impact on a wide range of affected parties, this tool operates by using scientific knowledge and technical analysis rather than political considerations. Scientific knowledge can be used to achieve instrumental (...) learning (Radaelli, 2009, OECD), policy change (Sabatier, 1999), to impact on decision making (Caplan, 1979; C.H.Weiss, 1999) but also to seek legitimacy from the policy environment (Edelman, 1985; Schrefler, 2010). This article suggests an analytical framework for analysing RIA documents with insight from knowledge utilization theories. We argue that in order to better understand the RIA itself, we need to look at institutional factors as well. The combination of institutional context variables and variables for RIA document content analysis which make up worldviews in this framework provide the basis for the document analysis and exploration of RIA in its context. (shrink)

In this article, I address the question of whether science can and should be seen as a common good. For this purpose, the first section focuses on the notion of knowledge and examines its main characteristics. I discuss and assess the core view of analytic epistemology, that knowledge is, basically, justified true belief. On the basis of this analysis, I then develop an alternative, multi-dimensional theory of the nature of knowledge. Section 2 reviews and evaluates several answers (...) to the question of what to understand by the notion of a common good. It discusses both economic and socio-political interpretations of this notion. In Section 3, I develop an alternative account of the common good of scientific knowledge. This knowledge constitutes a common good if it is both non-exhaustible and in the public interest. The two notions are equally important, but in this article, the focus is on the former. For reasons of space, a detailed discussion of the latter is impossible; it will be provided in a forthcoming book. My answer to the question posed in the title of this article builds on the critical discussion of extant views in Sections 1 and 2: some aspects of these views are included in this alternative account, while others are shown to be unhelpful or untenable. The final section discusses some practical implications of this account for the politics of science. The main conclusion is that scientific research should not be privatized through patenting its products. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge-building is the consequence of a relational process, not of an utilitarian socio-economic process. Translation theory expresses the way in which science is constructed and used as a social link. In fact, translation theory contends that scientific knowledge is somehow governed by the logic of exchange. This logic of exchange would ultimately be the source of science and well being and characterize the way in which science and technology work in our contemporary world especially regarding (...) healing processes through mobilising a kind of hidden energy. (shrink)

The article explores epistemic and social conditions of the trustworthiness of scientific expertise. I claim that there are three kinds of conditions for the trustworthiness of scientific expertise. The first condition is epistemic and means that scientific knowledge enjoys high credibility. The second condition concerns the significance of scientific knowledge. It means that scientific generalizations are relevant for elucidating the particular cases that constitute the challenges for expert judgment. The third condition concerns the (...) social processes involved in producing science-based recommendations. In this context trust is created by social robustness, expert legitimacy, and social participation. (shrink)