This book provides an account of the nature of time, especially time's arrow and the role of entropy, at a semi-popular level. Special attention is given to statistical mechanics, the past hypothesis, and possible cosmological explanations thereof.

I discuss "Poetic Naturalism" -- there is only one world, the natural world, but there are many ways of talking about it -- both as a general concept, and how it accounts for our actual world. I talk about emergence, fundamental physics, entropy and complexity, the origins of life and consciousness, and moral constructivism.

It is commonplace in discussions of modern cosmology to assert that the early universe began in a special state. Conventionally, cosmologists characterize this fine-tuning in terms of the horizon and flatness problems. I argue that the fine-tuning is real, but these problems aren't the best way to think about it: causal disconnection of separated regions isn't the real problem, and flatness isn't a problem at all. Fine-tuning is better understood in terms of a measure on the space of trajectories: given (...) reasonable conditions in the late universe, the fraction of cosmological histories that were smooth at early times is incredibly tiny. This discussion helps clarify what is required by a complete theory of cosmological initial conditions. (shrink)

On one popular view, the general covariance of gravity implies that change is relational in a strong sense, such that all it is for a physical degree of freedom to change is for it to vary with regard to a second physical degree of freedom. At a quantum level, this view of change as relative variation leads to a fundamentally timeless formalism for quantum gravity. Here, we will show how one may avoid this acute ‘problem of time’. Under our view, (...) duration is still regarded as relative, but temporal succession is taken to be absolute. Following our approach, which is presented in more formal terms in, it is possible to conceive of a genuinely dynamical theory of quantum gravity within which time, in a substantive sense, remains. 1 Introduction1.1 The problem of time1.2 Our solution2 Understanding Symmetry2.1 Mechanics and representation2.2 Freedom by degrees2.3 Voluntary redundancy3 Understanding Time3.1 Change and order3.2 Quantization and succession4 Time and Gravitation4.1 The two faces of classical gravity4.2 Retaining succession in quantum gravity5 Discussion5.1 Related arguments5.2 Concluding remarks. (shrink)

This study assesses the relationships among unethical corporate values, bullying experiences, psychopathy, and selling professionals’ ethical evaluations of bullying. Information was collected from national/regional samples of selling professionals. Results indicated that unethical values, bullying, and psychopathy were positively interrelated. Psychopathy and unethical values were negatively associated with moral intensity, while moral intensity was positively related to ethical issue importance. Psychopathy and unethical values were negatively related to issue importance, and issue importance and moral intensity were positively related to ethical judgment. (...) Finally, ethical judgment and moral intensity were positively linked to ethical intention; psychopathy was negatively associated with ethical intention. (shrink)

While a number of studies have examined the impact of gender/sex on ethical decision-making, the findings of this body of research do not provide consistent answers. Furthermore, very few of these studies have incorporated cross-cultural samples. Consequently, this study of 222 American and Spanish business executives explored sex differences in ethical judgments and intentions to act ethically. While no significant differences between males and females were found with respect to ethical judgments, females exhibited higher intentions to act more ethically than (...) males. This difference was true of both U.S. and Spanish executives. Further research is warranted to develop a clearer understanding of the linkage between ethical judgment and intention to act in an ethical manner. These findings have implications for global firms, particularly regarding codes of conduct and ethics training. (shrink)

This study explores differences between executives in the U.S. and Spain in their perceptions of ethical issues in pricing, specifically comparing a domestic firm's actions affecting a foreign market versus a foreign firm's actions affecting the domestic market. Overall, Spanish and American executives provided somewhat different responses to the scenarios. Findings indicate that ethical judgments and intentions among Spanish executives did not vary based on which country was harmed. U.S. executives generally perceived that a morally questionable act directed at a (...) foreign country was more unethical than a morally questionable act directed at the United States. Possible explanations for these findings are suggested. (shrink)

We provide a derivation of the Born Rule in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics. Our argument is based on the idea of self-locating uncertainty: in the period between the wave function branching via decoherence and an observer registering the outcome of the measurement, that observer can know the state of the universe precisely without knowing which branch they are on. We show that there is a uniquely rational way to apportion credence in such cases, which (...) leads directly to the Born Rule. Our analysis generalizes straightforwardly to cases of combined classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty, as in the cosmological multiverse. (shrink)

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's (...) inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio, or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed. (shrink)

I ask whether what we know about the universe from modern physics and cosmology, including fine-tuning, provides compelling evidence for the existence of God, and answer largely in the negative.

Not all intellectual property rights grant the right to exclude that is indicative of “property rules,” as that term was used by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal article. Some intellectual property rights are “liability rules,” in which the right holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of the protected invention, not a right to preclude the use. Although patent laws normally grant a right to exclude others from use of the protected invention as a default, (...) most countries’ laws allow the government to convert the patent property rule into a liability rule through a compulsory license. It has been noted, for example, that by the end of the 1950s, the U.S. had issued compulsory licenses covering 40 to 50 thousand patents, including substantial portions of the patent portfolios of AT&T, General Electric, IBM, and Xerox. The U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed a willingness to accept liability rules over injunctions in some patent infringement cases. (shrink)

This dissertation treats two themes crucial for the emergence of modern aesthetics. First, it considers the "aesthetic consciousness," which results from a rejection of the Aristotelian mimesis doctrine, and which seeks to establish art as independent from either morality or nature. Second, it treats the "historical consciousness," required to bring about the aesthetic consciousness, and eventually to raise it to the level of a moral ideal. Thus, the dissertation begins by considering that version of the mimetic argument rejected by the (...) moderns: it treats Lessing's moral interpretation of dramatic catharsis. Lessing's moral interpretation of catharsis, it is argued, jeopardizes the harmony between nature, morality and art on which the mimetic argument rests. Thus, the second chapter treats the first decisive challenge to the mimetic tradition: Rousseau's attack on the moral interpretation of catharsis. This attack follows two steps. First, Rousseau argues that the arts efface man's natural moral character. Second, Rousseau's developmental/historical account of man supports this opposition between art, on the one hand, and nature and morality, on the other. Rousseau, thus, is seen to be the first to introduce a historical consciousness of development into discussions of art, which revises the traditional links between art, nature and morality, and established a direction for Kant and Schiller. ;In light of Lessing and Rousseau, Kant's foundation of an aesthetic consciousness can be more clearly understood. Thus, the third chapter considers Kant's argument for aesthetic by considering three themes: first, Kant's notion of autonomy; second, Kant's analysis of the disinterestedness of the aesthetic judgement; third, his account of genius as the cause of fine art. ;Kant's argument, however, suggests that the aesthetic consciousness supercedes morality. Although Kant himself never pursues this suggestion, Schiller does. Thus, the final chapter treats Schiller's attempt to retrieve the moral and the natural without sacrificing the autonomy of the fine arts. Schiller does this by bringing Rousseau's historical consciousness of the human as a development beyond nature with Kant's aesthetic consciousness. This chapter, therefore, treats three themes. First, it considers how Schiller's distinction between naive and sentimental poetry translates into historical categories: ancient and modern. Second, it shows how the goal of the sentimental poet is a "moral unity" between art and nature, the necessity of which is unknown to the naive poet. Third, it considers how, through the search for a moral unity achieved only through a historical consciousness of progress from naive to sentimental, the nature of art becomes, for the first time, a function of human history. The dissertation concludes with a summary of these themes in terms of the distinction between the good and the beautiful. (shrink)

Foucault’s disciplinary society and his notion of panopticism are often invoked in discussions regarding electronic surveillance. Against this use of Foucault, I argue that contemporary trends in surveillance technology abstract human bodies from their territorial settings, separating them into a series of discrete flows through what Deleuze will term, the surveillant assemblage. The surveillant assemblage and its product, the socially sorted body, aim less at molding, punishing and controlling the body and more at triggering events of in- and ex-clusion from (...) life opportunities. The meaning of the body as monitored by latest generation vision technologies formed from machine only surveillance has been transformed. Such a body is no longer disciplinary in the Foucauldian sense. It is a virtual/flesh interface broken into discrete data flows whose comparison and breakage generate bodies as both legible and eligible (or illegible). (shrink)

1. The philosophical problem of what we see My topic revolves around what is apparently a very basic question. Stripped of all additions and in its leanest, most economical form, this is the question: "What do we see?" But in this most basic form the question admits of at least three different interpretations. In the first place, one might understand it to be an epistemological question, perhaps one with skeptical overtones. "What do we see?", on this reading, is short for (...) something like "What things in the world are we justified in believing we see, given the possibility of evil demon scenarios and all the other impedimenta to genuine sight that have become the working tools of epistemologists over the last 350 years?" I shall not be concerned with the question in this skeptical sense. I intend the parenthetical addition to the question, "What do we see (when we do)?", along with the bald-faced assumption that the condition so specified at least sometimes obtains, to rule out discussion along these sorts of epistemological lines, at least for the purposes of this paper. Whether or not this condition in fact obtains, of course, will not effect the position I’m defending. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Je me demande ici si les conceptions pragmatiques de la vérité peuvent être réconciliées avec les intuitions ordinaires quant à la portée de la bivalence. Je soutiens que les pragmatistes sont conduits à accepter une distinction du genre «type/occurrence» entre les formes d’une investigation et ses instanciations particulières, sous peine de banaliser leur vérificationnisme. Néanmoins, même la conception révisée que j’examine échoue à sauver les approches épistémiques de la vérité de certaines conséquences peu plausibles.

In this paper, we reply to Eric Moore’s argument that Lance Armstrong did not cheat, at least according to one, standard account of cheating. If that is the case, we argue, so much the worse for th...

Descartes’s Discourse on Method proposes a radically democratic goal, science on behalf of the common good of humanity, and an equally radical elitism, wherein strong minds, possessed of true virtue, direct the efforts of weak minds. In this respect the argument of the Discourse entails what we might call a “revised Averroism”: a distinction between the few and the many intended not to protect the faith of the many, but to suborn it on behalf of the new science Descartes proposes. (...) The goal of this essay is henceforth threefold. First, the essay attempts to show how a distinction between strong and weak minds emerges in the argument of the Discourse; second, it indicates the use toward which Descartes puts this distinction; and finally, it attempts to clarify Descartes’s own relationship to both strong and weak minds. The essay concludes with some thoughts concerning the significance of Descartes’ “revised Averroism.”. (shrink)

Competitive pressures, resource constraints, high shareholder/stakeholder expectations, and other dynamics may lead to organizations putting pressure on employees to act unethically to meet goals. Yet, the effects of this pressure on employee health and factors that can abate it are unclear. Based on the job demands-resources model, this study examines whether, how, and when organizational ethical pressure harms employees' psychological and physical health and what factors can buffer its negative effects. According to the findings of a two-wave lagged data study (...) involving 212 healthcare employees, results show that organizational ethical pressure causes ethical strain in employees, resulting in both psychological and physical health problems, with these effects less pronounced when employees have higher levels of ethical efficacy. An integrated effect was also discovered, in which employees' ethical efficacy increases when led by a more ethical leader, thereby buffering the effect of ethical pressure on ethical strain and health problems. Overall, our research identifies organizational ethical pressure as a significant threat to employee health and provides preliminary approaches to mitigate its effects. (shrink)

ECOG data obtained from a patient under conditions of resting brain, sleep and epileptic seizure were analyzed. Contrary to some theorists, the seizure state was found to be informationally the most complex of the three states. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}.

In this essay, I begin by observing that dialectic is the method Aristotle explicitly associates with the activity of philosophizing, both when he introduces dialectic in the Topics and also, with some refinements and developments, in the methodological discussions of later works, the opening pages of the Physics being taken as exemplary. I then interpret these passages, attending very closely to the argument, the imagery, and the etymological resonances of Aristotle’s terminology. This leads me to argue that dialectic, in both (...) its earlier and later forms, is best understood as a proto-phenomenological method, which is to say, a method of clarifying what is already presenting itself in the initial, especially promising, pre-philosophical ‘appearances’ of one’s subject matter, for which Aristotle’s term is ἔνδοξα. Finally, given that this proto-phenomenological dialectic is a method for arriving at an understanding of ‘what is,’ its employment seems to entail a quite radical underlying Aristotelian ontology. That is, Aristotelian thought would seem to be aimed not at objective being, but rather at phenomenal being. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the Special Issue: Foundations of Mind II: A Dialogue of World-Views.

I would like to thank Whitehurst et al for their comments on my paper.1 Although I will argue their approach will not eliminate the potential for disability discrimination from quality-adjusted life year -based assessment, their comments were very thought provoking. Whitehurst et al argue that, to the extent that allocating healthcare by QALYs discriminates against disabled patients, the fault is not with the QALY framework, but with ‘the descriptive systems of preference-based health-related quality of life instruments’.1 Specifically, they argue that (...) some HRQoL survey instruments do not characterise health impairments adequately. For example, Whitehurst et al mention an earlier study of HRQoL survey instruments that had different ways of asking about mobility. Some instruments asked specifically about the respondent’s ability to walk, while others asked about mobility. The study found that, in relation to individuals with spinal cord injuries, survey instruments focused on ability to walk produced lower quality of life scores than instruments focused on mobility. Whitehurst et al argue from this that survey instruments should include ‘adequate’ health state descriptions. This seems eminently sensible. However, contrary to their view, there is no guarantee that this will avoid discrimination. In fact, …. (shrink)

For those familiar with Machiavelli’s texts, Foucault’s interpretation of Macchiavelli in his 1978 lecture series Sécurité, Territoire, Population1 is surprising. Although Machiavelli figures prominently in five of the thirteen lectures,2 Foucault treats Machiavelli as if he were the author of only one book—The Prince—and his reading treats this complex text as if it covered only one topic: how to guarantee the security of the Prince. Clearly Foucault did not intend his interpretation of Machiavelli as a close exegesis. Other discussions of (...) Foucault’s treatment of Machiavelli have acknowledged the role Machiavelli plays in these lectures and even note the inadequacy of the interpretation given by Foucault, but most commentators do not pursue Foucault’s reading further.3 This investigation is not concerned with whether Foucault got Machiavelli right. Rather, Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli is noteworthy because it is partial and incomplete in a way reminiscent of Foucault’s reading of Hobbes in, Il faut défendre la société. This fragmentary character of Foucault’s inscription of Machiavelli as a forerunner of the history of biopolitique allows an innovative reading of the Florentine that connects Machiavelli’s thinking, however indirectly, on a trajectory that encounters, for instance, Foucault’s analysis of populations, the police state, and even his reading of liberalism during the 1978-­‐ 1979 lectures. My argument here is that the specific way Foucault’s inscribes Machiavelli in the history of gouvernementalité, while seeming to reject him, in fact acts to resuscitate, and thereby relay, a reading of Machiavelli as a thinker who articulates encounters among political practices engaged within a horizon of radical immanence. (shrink)

In this introduction to contemporary conceptions of time and change, I investigate what our experience of time, that is, our experience of change, seems to be and ask whether or not we can say that how it seems could match the reality. My conclusion is that more recent contemporary conceptions of time can do this but that more intuitive or traditional conceptions cannot. Thus, the more contemporary conceptions are preferable for research into time consciousness.

This paper is about the actual and potential development of an ethics that is appropriate to the practices and institutions of biobanking, the question being how best to develop a framework within which the relevant ethical questions are first identified and then addressed in the right ways. It begins with ways in which a standard approach in bioethics – namely upholding a principle of indivi-dual autonomy via the practice of gaining donors’ informed consent – is an inadequate ethical framework for (...) biobanking. In donating material to a biobank, the individual donor relinquishes a degree of control and knowledge over the way their material is used in large-scale and typically open ended projects; and the identifying nature of genetic material means that third parties have rights and interests which must be taken into account as well as those of the individual donor. After discussing the problems for informed consent in the biobanking context, the paper then considers three emerging alternative approaches which, broadly speaking, conceptualize the subject of biobanking ethics in communal or co-operative terms: one version sees participants in biobanking research as ‘shareholders’ whilst the other expands on the notion of participation to include the wider public beneficiaries of biobanking as ‘stakeholders’. It concludes by outlining a third view, on which the biobanking institution itself is conceived as an ethical subject whose defining function can do useful normative work in guiding and evaluating its activities. (shrink)

Marx's concepts of individual and society have their roots in Hegel's philosophy. Like recent communitarian philosophers, both Marx and Hegel reject the idea that the individual is an atomic entity, an idea that runs through liberal social philosophy and classical economics. Human productive activity is essentially social. However, Marx shows that the liberal concepts of individuality and society are not simply philosophical errors; they are products and expressions of the social alienation of free market conditions. Marx's theory develops from Hegel's (...) account of "civil society," and uses a framework of historical development similar to Hegel's. However, Marx uses the concept of alienation to criticize the liberal, communitarian and Hegelian conceptions of modern society and to envisage a form of individuality and community that lies beyond them. (shrink)

A number of traditional roles that propositions are supposed to play are outlined. Philosophical theories of the nature of propositions are then surveyed, together with considerations for and against, with an eye on the question whether any single notion of a proposition is suited to play all or any of these roles. Approaches discussed include: (1) the structureless possible-worlds theory; (2) the structured Russellian theory; and (3) the structured Fregean theory. It is noted that it is often unclear whether these (...) are accounts of what propositions are, ontologically speaking, or whether they are accounts of how propositions are best represented in a formal semantic theory. (shrink)

In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.

There has been a large amount of scholarly controversy over the precise nature of the motivations at play in the Epicurean accounts of justice and friendship, and whether any form of altruism or other-concern is compatible with Epicurean hedonist ethics. This paper addresses this tension between self- and other-concern from a novel angle, by examining the motivations behind Epicurean educational practice. What emerges is a rather complex motivational picture that reaffirms the Epicureans' philosophical commitment to egoism, but at the same (...) time shows it to be more nuanced and sensitive than one might expect given their theoretical postulates and the reaction of ancient critics such as Cicero. (shrink)

In the wake of the Stoneman Douglas School shooting, Republican and Democratic leaders—like the American electorate they represent—remain sharply divided in their responses to gun violence. They are united in their condemnation of these mass shootings, but they disagree about whether stricter or looser gun control laws are the answer. Those on the right side of the political aisle suggest that the issue is one of mental illness rather than gun control. Conversely, those who are more liberal or progressive in (...) their political learnings are quick to condemn attempts to reframe the issue of mass shootings as a mental health problem. Both sides are wrong. Mass shootings are indeed partially a mental health problem, albeit one poorly addressed by our current laws and policies. But the solution to mass shootings also needs to consider strategies that may reduce gun violence in general. (shrink)

A two-stage procedure is described which induces type-logical grammar lexicons from sentences annotated with skeletal terms of the simply typed lambda calculus. First, a generalized formulae-as-types correspondence is exploited to obtain all the type-logical proofs of the sample sentences from their lambda terms. The resulting lexicons are then optimally unified. The first stage constitutes the semantic bootstrapping (Pinker, Language Learnability and Language Development, Harvard University Press, 1984), while the unification procedure of Buszkowski and Penn represents a first attempt at structure-dependent (...) distributional learning of the syntactic and semantic categories. This effort extends earlier induction procedures (Buszkowski and Penn, 1990, Studia Logica 49, 431–454; Kanazawa, 1998, CSLI Publications and the European Association for Logic, Language and Information) for classical categorial grammar to at first the non-associative Lambek calculus, and then to a large class of type logics enriched by modal operators and structural rules. (shrink)

Tough Choices: Bringing Moral Issues Home is a unique resource for use in Catholic high schools and parish religious education or youth ministry programs. It provides concrete ways for teenagers to learn about, apply, and make choices involving a number of current and practical moral issues. However, the real uniqueness of the material is that it suggests ways for these dilemmas to be shared and discussed between the teens and their parents. How so?