Discussions regarding which norms, if any, govern our practices of forming, maintaining and relinquishing beliefs have come to be collected under the label “The ethics of belief”. Included in the ethics of belief are debates about how those normative issues relate to the nature of belief, whether belief formation is, for example, ever voluntary. The present talk concerns an analogous set of questions regarding our practices of attention. “The ethics of attention” thus concerns the discussion of which norms, if any, (...) govern our practices of attention: what norms govern what we should attend to, how we should engage our capacity for attention, when we should begin and when we should stop to pay attention to something? Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, what may or may not be subject to such normative pressures. Compared with rich, complex, and systematic investigation of the ethics of belief, the study of the ethics of attention is more or less undeveloped. This paper aims to begin to change that. Specifically, it shows that attention is an appropriate target for serious normative investigation and then classifies potential norms of attention along three dimensions: whether they are manner or object based, instrumental or non-instrumental, and whether its source is moral, prudential or epistemic. -/- [EDIT. 10. November 2021: this paper has been superseded by a new version. Please cite that in turn]. (shrink)

The topic of this book is self-consciousness, which is a kind of knowledge, namely knowledge of oneself as oneself, or self-knowledge.

The 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage (...) singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland’s recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails. The paper also suggests that even if heightened blood testosterone levels do differ relevantly from other types of biological advantage, the regulation is further challenged by studies indicating that athletes with blood testosterone at the high end of the normal range have a competitive advantage over athletes with blood testosterone levels at the low end of it. Finally, the paper contends that the premises of the fairness-based argument do not unequivocally support the conclusion that DSD athletes with heightened levels of testosterone should diminish those levels, since, just as powerfully, they support allowing athletes with normal levels of testosterone to use performance-enhancing drugs in the name of fairness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, DavosSebastian LuftPeter E. Gordon. Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 448. Cloth, $39.95.Much ink has been spilled on the dispute between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger that took place in the Swiss resort town Davos in 1929—famous since Thomas Mann staged his Magic Mountain there—and which has since been referred to as the “Davos Dispute.” While the debate (...) itself and accounts accompanying it have been widely known to historians [End Page 508] of philosophy, Harvard historian Peter E. Gordon shows in this marvelous new book how memory has shaped the event into something much larger than anyone could have foreseen. It is, Gordon claims, the silent work of memory that has made this debate, rather innocuous at the time, into what can be retrospectively be considered the truly earth-shattering philosophical event of the twentieth century.In hindsight, the symbolism of the debate between a German who became a leading Nazi philosopher in 1933 and a Jew who, in the same year, was dismissed from his professorship and forced to flee Germany, could not be greater. It only grows if one connects the historic events with their respective philosophies: on the one side the liberal modern Cassirer, whose philosophy allegedly glorified the Weimar stalemate, and on the other side the radical Heidegger, whose call for “authentic existence” took on a bone-chilling reality as he embraced Hitler in 1933 as the führer to lead Germany back to its authentic roots.Two volumes—the 1999 collection, 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation, edited by E. Rudolph and D. Kaegi, and, in 2000, A Parting of the Ways by Michael Friedman—were the first to delve into the debate’s symbolic meaning. It was Friedman’s thesis that the fateful “parting of the ways” between Continental and Analytic philosophy could be traced to this meeting, which was also attended by Rudolf Carnap. Despite these studies, there has until now not been a comprehensive treatment that pulls together all threads into one narrative, covering the entire intellectual, historical, cultural, and philosophical landscape of the time. Gordon’s book achieves just that and will be, for years to come, the landmark work on this encounter.The book begins from the background in post-World War I philosophy in Germany, which was perceived, along with culture, as being in crisis (ch. 1), to “set the stage” on the “Magic Mountain” (ch. 2). It proceeds to summarize the individual lectures by Cassirer and Heidegger, giving a detailed interpretation of the protocol prepared by students of the interlocutors (chs. 3–4). The author then takes a deep breath in chapter 5 to place the debate in the larger context of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. But the story does not end there, as chapter 6 examines the relation between both thinkers after the debate. Finally, in chapter 7, Gordon assesses the newer debates concerning this dispute up to the debate between Bourdieu and Habermas concerning Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, though it does not re-engage with Friedman’s thesis, as might have been desired.Regarding his interpretation, Gordon juxtaposes Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies along the Kantian distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, where both paradigms make different claims on the “normative image of humanity” (5 ff.). Whether humanity is interpreted as spontaneous and world-creating, in optimistic Enlightenment terms (Cassirer), or as receptive and open to the world, i.e. as the “shepherd” rather than the “lord of being” (Heidegger), both are answering the fourth of Kant’s questions, “What is man?” While this distinction is useful for understanding the basic relation between them, it is also—as the author would concede—somewhat too coarse to do justice to their mutual differences and commonalities. Were one to assert a systematic critique, Gordon does not really make up his mind as to the true significance of these paradigms: are they mutually exclusive oppositions or, as he implies elsewhere, two alternative versions of philosophical modernism with a common ground? There is evidence for both readings. This question, however, is for the philosopher to answer—the philosopher who wants to push... (shrink)

Why do we seek out and enjoy uncertain success in playing games? Game designers and researchers suggest that games whose challenges match player skills afford engaging experiences of achievement, competence, or effectance—ofdoing well. Yet, current models struggle to explain why such balanced challenges best afford these experiences and do not straightforwardly account for the appeal of high- and low-challenge game genres like Idle and Soulslike games. In this article, we show that Predictive Processing (PP) provides a coherent formal cognitive framework (...) which can explain the fun in tackling game challenges with uncertain success as the dynamic process of reducing uncertainty surprisingly efficiently. In gameplay as elsewhere, people enjoydoing better than expected, which can track learning progress. In different forms, balanced, Idle, and Soulslike games alike afford regular accelerations of uncertainty reduction. We argue that this model also aligns with a popular practitioner model, Raph Koster’sTheory of Fun for Game Design, and can unify currently differentially modelled gameplay motives around competence and curiosity. (shrink)

Should artificial agents (such as robots) be granted moral status? This seems like an important question to resolve, given that we will encounter a growing number of increasingly sophisticated artificial agents in the not too distant future. However, many will think that before we can even start to tackle questions about the moral status of artificial agents, we first need to solve tricky issues in the philosophy of mind. After all, most orthodox views about moral status imply that only entities (...) with a mental life are eligible for moral status. But, whether an unfamiliar entity like an artificial agent has a mental life raises controversial questions in the philosophy of mind. Given this, one might hope that we can resolve questions about the moral status of robots via “minimalist” views that give sufficient conditions for granting moral status to an entity that we can know to be satisfied without knowing whether the entity in question has a mind. This paper argues that we should be pessimistic about the prospects of minimalist views avoiding controversial questions in the philosophy of mind, by arguing that minimalist sufficient conditions are only plausible if combined with assumptions in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In this paper I will give a systematic account of Husserl's notion of the natural attitude in the development from its first presentation in Ideas I (1913) until Husserl's last years. The problem of the natural attitude has to be dealt with on two levels. On the thematic level, it is constituted by the correlation of attitude and horizon, both stemming from Husserl's theory of intentionality. On the methodic level, the natural attitude is constituted by three factors: naturalness, naivety and (...) normality. I shall conclude by sketching out a possible motivation for leaving the natural attitude and thus for entering the sphere of phenomenology. (shrink)

Autor omawia ontologię polityczną współczesnego anarchizmu, nawiązujący przy tym do klasycznego anarchizmu oraz do myślicieli postanarchizmu, w szczególności do Saula Newmana. Wskazuje przy tym, jak współcześni filozofowie związani z postanarchizmem pracują nad statyczną ontologią polityczna anarchizmu poprzez myśl poststrukturalną oraz jak za pomocą współczesnych pojęć filozoficznych dekonstruują oświeceniowe podstawy anarchizmu. Zamiarem tekstu jest wskazanie nie tylko na różnice pomiędzy anarchizmem a postanarchizmem, ale raczej dostrzeżenie pomiędzy nimi silnej zależności. Tekst stanowi przegląd i omówienie koncpecji postanarchizmu w kontekście ontologii politycznej, współczesnej (...) filozofii politycznej oraz historii idei. (shrink)

Die öffentliche Diskussion um die „personalisierte Medizin“ legt nahe, dass mit diesem medizinischen Ansatz hohe Erwartungen an einen Beitrag zur klinischen Versorgung verbunden werden. Über die Wahrnehmungen und Bewertungen klinisch tätiger Ärzte ist jedoch wenig bekannt. Die vorliegende qualitative Interviewstudie gibt einen Einblick bezüglich des Einflusses „personalisierter Medizin“ auf die klinische Praxis aus ärztlicher Perspektive. Die Ärzte im vorliegenden Sample nehmen „personalisierte Medizin“ zwar als einen medizinischen Fortschritt wahr, sehen allerdings keine grundsätzliche Veränderung der bisherigen medizinischen Praxis. Als zentrales Problem (...) wird die Handhabung und Verwertung von molekulargenetischen Informationen für Diagnose und Therapie in der klinischen Praxis thematisiert. In Anbetracht der Ergebnisse muss infrage gestellt werden, ob „personalisierte Medizin“ nicht das Gegenteil von dem, was ihr Name nahe legt – eine personenorientiertere Medizin – bewirkt. Die Strategien im Umgang mit den Informationsmassen produzieren selbst neue Herausforderungen, die ein Hindernis für eine personenorientierte Medizin darstellen könnten. (shrink)

Samantha Matherne’s Cassirer (in the series Routledge Philosophers) is at the top of the list of newer research testifying to the recent Cassirer renaissance.1 While this book marks a formal end po...

It has recently been suggested that personalized advertising is often _more _an affront to a person's autonomy and thus more morally worrisome than its generic counterpart precisely because it involves or takes advantage of such personalization. This paper argues that central reasons that have been forwarded to support this claim are unpersuasive and that generic and personalized advertising should therefore be treated as morally on par in terms of their potential to undermine consumer autonomy. The paper then suggests that, if (...) this is true, it presses scholars who wish to maintain there to be a moral asymmetry between personalized and generic advertising in terms of their effect on consumer autonomy to choose between three argumentative avenues, but that none of these is likely to be particularly attractive for a defender of the asymmetry. (shrink)

A relatively detailed review (~ 4000 words) of Christopher Mole's (2010) book "Attention is Cognitive Unison". I suggest that Mole makes a good case against many types of reductivist accounts of attention, using the right kind of methodology. Yet, I argue that his adverbialist theory is not the best articulation of the crucial anti-reductivist insight. The distinction between adverbial and process-first phenomena he draws remains unclear, anti-reductivist process theories can escapte his arguments, and finally I provide an argument for why (...) no personal level adverbialism can provide a complete and unified theory of attention. Despite my disagreements, I have learned a lot from engaging with Mole's book. It's a central contribution to the new philosophical literature on attention. (shrink)

In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article online in which they introduce a Gedankenexperiment that led them to conclude that single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent. In a new version of the paper, published in September 2018, the authors moderate their original claim by concluding that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner. The purpose of this short article is to clarify the core of the F-R (...) argument, in order to show how the contradiction is obtained. On the basis of this clarification, we argue that the result of the F-R argument has been overestimated and should be reconsidered from a more cautious perspective. (shrink)

Hume is an avowed critic of contractarianism. He opposes the idea that a legitimate government is based on an ‘original contract’ or on the consent of those who are governed. Most scholars assume, though, that his criticisms apply only to a limited range of contractarian theories, namely to theories according to which actual contractors reach an actual agreement. Theories on which the agreement in question is understood in hypothetical or counterfactual terms, however, are oftentimes seen as being compatible with Hume’s (...) views. Against such interpretations, this paper shows that Hume rejects all contractarian theories, including hypothetical ones. It argues, first, that Hume employs a so far unacknowledged empiricist debunking strategy against contractarianism; if successful, this strategy undermines all variants of contractarianism. Second, it shows that the Humean conception of the state of nature (a topic that has received virtually no scholarly attention) is incompatible with hypothetical contractarianism. Finally, it argues that Hume rejects contractarianism in part because he anticipates a line of criticism which nowadays is often leveled against so-called ideal theory. On Hume’s view, the agreements reached by highly idealized contractors are of little relevance to the non-ideal individuals in the actual world. (shrink)

This paper argues that we care especially about human health because of what we are and because of how we function properly. First, an argument is made against a mechanistic and for a holistic account of human nature. Second, it is argued that humans function properly when they are disposed to deliberate and decide easily and accurately about the means of health, deem that unrestraint pleasure hinders health as well as that combated disease furthers health, and judge it right to (...) will what health others are due. (shrink)

On Berkeley’s immaterialist ontology, there are only two kinds of created entities: finite spirits and ideas. Ideas are passive, and so there is no genuine idea-idea causation. Finite spirits, by contrast, are truly causally active on Berkeley’s view, in that they can produce ideas through their volitional activity. Some commentators have argued that this account of causation is inconsistent. On their view, the unequal treatment of spirits and ideas is unfounded, for all that can be observed in either case are (...) mere patterns of regularity; Berkeley should therefore adopt a full-blown occasionalism and follow Malebranche in holding that God is the only true cause. Other commentators have argued that Berkeley denies the tenet that causes necessitate their effects – that is, the idea that causation involves necessary connection – and that in this way he can avoid inconsistency. This paper argues that Berkeley can subscribe to the thesis that finite spirits are truly causally active without falling into inconsistency, even if it is granted that Berkeleyan causes necessitate their effects. His differing treatment of spirits and of ideas is well founded, since ideas are transparent in a way our notions of spirits are not. (shrink)

En este trabajo se construye un relato que intenta manifestar el íntimo vínculo establecido entre la investigación y la vida. Para lo cual se recorrerán senderos que atravesarán tres grandes espacios: la afectación generada en mi tesis doctoral, la dirección de nuevas tesis y la habitabilidad del universo corporeidad en mis actuales investigaciones. El recorrido propuesto tiene por objeto destacar el desbloqueo de espacios íntimos generado al hacer investigaciones, que en simultáneo afectan la investigación, la enseñanza y la dirección de (...) tesis. (shrink)

In this blog entry, which addresses a broader audience, I wonder what exactly historians of philosophy do and how their work relates to non-historical work in philosophy. In particular, I raise the question why systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are relatively close to each other. After all, they often publish in the same journals and work at the same departments. This is surprising, given that asking what X is seems to be rather different from asking what some person a (...) few hundred (or thousand) years ago thought what X is. I argue that systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are so close because their work proceeds in a similar way. To be sure, they have very different starting points. Historians of philosophy may start, for instance, with a number of texts from one and the same author which appear to be in conflict. Systematic philosophers, in contrast, may start with a set of intuitions which seem to contradict one other. The way historians of philosophy and systematic philosophers operate upon those different starting points, however, is very similar. This explains at least in part, I maintain, why they are a lot closer than is the case in many other disciplines. (shrink)

This article aims at theorizing a creative and processual theory of non-heterosexual identity. It will be argued that, so far, scholars have tended to theorize non-heterosexual identity from a monologic perspective, which establishes one-sidedly a casual and/or unproblematic relation between the emergence of forms of psychological suffering and the development of a non-heterosexual identity. Although it must be recognized that such a claim is important at a political level, at a subjective level, it leaves non-heterosexual people destined to be flooded (...) by distressing and painful emotional states. To counter monologism within theorisations of non-heterosexual identity development, without ignoring the negative impacts of heteronormativity, it will be argued that non-heterosexual identity needs to be theorized 1) as part of a creative process situated in a specific sociohistorical context marked by heteronormativity, 2) as part of a situated process that produces and never ceases to produce multiple effects (self-states), which are unified to create an identity, and 3) as part of a situated process of creation that can be artificially transformed through art. These are the three claims that will move forward the argument of this article. (shrink)

Charles Taylor's attempt to map the complexity and fullness of the modern identity has led him to recuperate its moral sources. This paper explores the zone of ontological contestation Taylor has engaged by defending a notion of the self that does not succumb to a narrowing or partiality of vision. Taylor's criticisms of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas are examined to draw out the features of his project and its own limitations.

Study of Cardinal John Henry Newman, 1801-1890.

Objections to child labour range from its creating unfair trade advantage to its infringing children’s human rights. Analysis of the responsibilities of various parties implicated in the use of child labour can lead to identifying stages in a cumulative ethical approach which is not self‐defeating. The author is an economist who has recently completed his MBA at London Business School.

Con el objetivo de cuestionar aquellas interpretaciones que identifican la comprensión liberal del Estado con una estructura organizativa reducida a su mínima expresión cuyo desempeño debe quedar supeditado a las dinámicas económico-productivas, el presente artículo se propone revisar críticamente las propuestas de dos figuras destacadas dentro de la tradición del liberalismo: Adam Smith y Friedrich Hayek. Para ello se compara el modo en el que estos autores articulan el concepto de Estado sobre un plano operativo, en particular, en lo referido (...) al principio de “gobierno limitado”. Se identifican las funciones adjudicadas a las instituciones públicas y se caracteriza el modo en el que se presentan las relaciones entre la órbita estatal y la órbita social. Por último, se destacan continuidades y diferencias entre ambas posturas. Sobre esa base, se proponen algunas reflexiones en torno a la eventual distinción entre un liberalismo ético-político y un liberalismo económico. (shrink)

Sowohl bei Martin Heidegger als auch bei Søren Kierkegaard ist Langeweile kein triviales Phänomen, sondern erhält metaphysische Verweisfunktion, die auf die Möglichkeit eines eigentlichen Seinkönnens verweist. Dabei rückt die metaphysische Langeweile in beiden Fällen in den Horizont eines Erkenntnisbemühens, das um die Kontingenz des eigenen Standpunktes weiss. Beide Autoren bemühen sich in je eigener Weise dieser Konstellation gerecht zu werden, die sich in der impliziten oder expliziten Problematisierung der sprachlichen Vermittlung niederschlägt. Während dies bei Heidegger im Rückgriff auf das Konzept (...) der eigentlichen Rede geschieht, bemüht sich Kierkegaard, mit einem literarisch-ironischen Verfahren die begrenzte Tragweite philosophisch-existentieller Erkenntnis gegenwärtig zu halten. (shrink)

This essay attempts to spell out what might be left of Husserlian phenomenology when one leaves behind Husserl's own grounding ambitions. Husserl construes transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy. In a pragmatist vein of leaving it behind in the interest of something other, I discuss what would happen if one were to 'pragmatize' phenomenology. After first laying out Husserl's vision, in a second part I reconstruct the motives that led to it in reaction to a 'Cartesian anxiety' of not securing an (...) indubitable ground of knowledge. After that, the article spells out some pragmatic reflections on what phenomenology would be, without the need to secure foundations of knowledge. Such a liberation would in effect enable phenomenology to more fully make true on the ideals of the Enlightenment (which Rorty, too, underwrites) of emancipating oneself of one of the last vestiges of a dogmatic slumber. (shrink)

The extent to which philosophy and theology not only belong together, but also can be identified is one of the main problems in mediaeval philosophy. Out of this arises also the conflict of a supposedly free philosophy with the institutionalized theology administered by the Roman Catholic church. Here the thesis is argued that piety must be seen as the true cause of what is incompatible with philosophy – namely piety in the sense of a spiritual method concerning the possibility of (...) cognition. With the help of different positions of Duns Scotus it will be shown that piety, if there is such, posseses no relation to philosophy and that Scotus’ contribution – which was to save the unity of theological and philosophical thought through a rational foundation of the individual intelligible – can be seen as even excluding spiritual piety. (shrink)

This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points that remain especially crucial, i. e. the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction, and the question of the “meaning of the reduction”. The reading attempted here leads to two, not necessarily related, focal points: a Cartesian and a Life-world tendency. (...) In following these two paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am offering an interpretation which might be called a modified “departure from Cartesianism” reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the nineteen-fifties. This discussion should make apparent that Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look in light of material that has since appeared in the Husserliana and by incorporating the most important results of recent tendencies in Husserl research. (shrink)

The last technological developments have introduced in life of human beans a enormous amount of hardware’s, communication systems, informatic systems. But it has brought too a multiplicity of images, objects and sensitive experiences that has a direct effect in social life. It can be said that this amount of present elements deserve to be subject of analysis, to tray to clarify the nature of informatic technology and its political impact. That means that far over history of scientific developments, its is (...) precise to take on a critic task of the paper that fulfils the informatic technique in different levels in society (moral, social and economics), but after all the paper that plays in the way that we perceive the World. For that, we treat some of the technological developments related with virtual reality; then, we handle the concept of simulation, and finally, we establish the distinction between reality and virtuality. (shrink)