The purpose of this paper is to understand if and how interactions with Sexual Robots will modify users’ relational abilities in human-human relations. We first underline that, in today’s scholar discussion on the ‘symbolic argument’, there is no theoretical framework explaining the process of symbolic shift between human-robot interactions (HRI) and human-human interactions (HHI). To clarify the symbolic shift mechanism, we propose the concept of objectual mediation. Moreover, under the lens of Winnicott’s object-relation theory, we argue that HRI can (...) structurally modify users relationality, degrading intersubjective abilities: Sexual Robots may blurry the limit between the ‘internal object’ and the external one. We conclude that, under certain conditions, interactions with Sexual Robots may bring the user back to an infantile object-relation setting, worsening the user ability to manage relational frustration. This will negatively impact on human-human interactions and social values in general. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper we propose the notion of “subjective reference” as a conceptual tool that explains how and why human-robot sexual interactions could reframe users approach to human-human sexual interactions. First, we introduce the current debate about Sexual Robotics, situated in the wider discussion about Social Robots, stating the urgency of a regulative framework. We underline the importance of a social-relational approach, mostly concerned about Social Robots impact in human social structures. Then, we point out the (...) absence of a precise framework conceptualizing why Social Robots, and Sexual Robots in particular, may modify users’ sociality and relationality. Within a psychological framework, we propose to consider Sexual Robots as “subjective references”, namely objects symbolically referring to human subjects: we claim that, for the user experience, every action performed upon a Sexual Robot is symbolically directed toward a human subject, including degrading and violent practices. This shifting mechanism may transfer the user relational setting from human-robot interactions to human-human interactions. (shrink)

As technology continues to grow (and sex-robots gain a more prominent position in our society), so too does concern about the way they will impact our lives and our sexuality. While many ethicists have started to assess what this impact could be (and if it would be positive or negative), the challenges and opportunities presented by sex-robots span over a wide range of topics and cannot be assessed easily. Hence, in this paper, I will attempt to categorize the main questions (...) concerning the ethics of sexual robotics in order to help ethicists gather their thoughts on this new technology. While doing so, I will principally identify four overarching issues: (1) how robots’ representation of human sexuality affects human gender issues; (2) how robots could potentially be utilized for medical purposes; (3) if robots could possibly deceive their users; (4) if sex-robots could end up as a new form of sex-slaves. (shrink)

Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The (...) argument consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others. The second claims that the use of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. (shrink)

I argue that the right to sexual satisfaction of severely physically and mentally disabled people and elderly people who suffer from neurodegenerative diseases can be fulfilled by deploying sex robots; this would enable us to satisfy the sexual needs of many who cannot provide for their own sexual satisfaction; without at the same time violating anybody’s right to sexual self-determination. I don’t offer a full-blown moral justification of deploying sex robots in such cases, as not all (...) morally relevant concerns can be addressed here; rather, I put forward a plausible way of fulfilling acute sexual needs without thereby violating anybody’s sexual rights. (shrink)

Much of modern ethics is built around the idea that we should respect one another’s autonomy. Here, “we” are typically imagined to be adult human beings of sound mind, where the soundness of our mind is measured against what we take to be the typical mental capacities of a neurodevelopmentally “normal” person—perhaps in their mid-thirties or forties. When deciding about what constitutes ethical sex, for example, our dominant models hold that ethical sex is whatever is consented to, while a lack (...) of consent makes sex wrong.1 Consent, in turn, is analysed in terms of autonomous decision-making: a “yes” or “no” that reflects the free and informed will of our idealised, sound-minded adult. Whether such models provide adequate normative guidance for ethical, much less good, sex between neurotypical human adults is an open question.2 3 When it comes to the ethics of sexual activity between humans and non-humans—robots, say—or between humans who don’t fit the rational stereotype, we hardly know where to begin.4–7 It is therefore heartening to see a number of papers in this issue tackling the difficult question how to respectfully facilitate or respond to the needs, desires, and decisions of people with different kinds or degrees of autonomy.8 For example, Sumytra Menon and colleagues9 explicitly discuss the notion of “borderline capacity” and argue, in the medical domain, for shared and supportive decision-making practices to “foster the autonomy of patients with compromised mental capacity while being mindful of the need to safeguard their well-being.” Touching on a similar theme, Zahra Ladan 10 asks how we should conceive of liberty in the case of persons with certain inborn physical or mental limitations. Might it sometimes be necessary to …. (shrink)

The development of highly humanoid sex robots is on the technological horizon. If sex robots are integrated into the legal community as “electronic persons”, the issue of sexual consent arises, which is essential for legally and morally permissible sexual relations between human persons. This paper explores whether it is conceivable, possible, and desirable that humanoid robots should be designed such that they are capable of consenting to sex. We consider reasons for giving both “no” and “yes” answers to (...) these three questions by examining the concept of consent in general, as well as critiques of its adequacy in the domain of sexual ethics; the relationship between consent and free will; and the relationship between consent and consciousness. Additionally we canvass the most influential existing literature on the ethics of sex with robots. (shrink)

Robots today serve in many roles, from entertainer to educator to executioner. As robotics technology advances, ethical concerns become more pressing: Should robots be programmed to follow a code of ethics, if this is even possible? Are there risks in forming emotional bonds with robots? How might society--and ethics--change with robotics? This volume is the first book to bring together prominent scholars and experts from both science and the humanities to explore these and other questions in this emerging (...) field. Starting with an overview of the issues and relevant ethical theories, the topics flow naturally from the possibility of programming robot ethics to the ethical use of military robots in war to legal and policy questions, including liability and privacy concerns. The contributors then turn to human-robot emotional relationships, examining the ethical implications of robots as sexual partners, caregivers, and servants. Finally, they explore the possibility that robots, whether biological-computational hybrids or pure machines, should be given rights or moral consideration. Ethics is often slow to catch up with technological developments. This authoritative and accessible volume fills a gap in both scholarly literature and policy discussion, offering an impressive collection of expert analyses of the most crucial topics in this increasingly important field. (shrink)

Sex robots are humanoid robots with artificial intelligence, designed to interact sexually with humans. They have received much attention in recent discussions about technology, human relationships and the future of human sexuality. Based on available evidence so far, this outlook aims to give tentative answers to two fundamental questions surrounding the topic of human–robot intimate relationships. First, whether intelligent humanoid robots are technologically ready to be our intimate partners. Second, whether humans are ready to accept the idea of developing intimate (...) relationships with robots, and how far we have engaged and will engage in such activity. We highlight the importance of a scientific transdisciplinary approach to the study of human sexuality in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Sexbots are coming. Given the pace of technological advances, it is inevitable that realistic robots specifically designed for people's sexual gratification will be developed in the not-too-distant future. Despite popular culture's fascination with the topic, and the emergence of the much-publicized Campaign Against Sex Robots, there has been little academic research on the social, philosophical, moral, and legal implications of robot sex. This book fills the gap, offering perspectives from philosophy, psychology, religious studies, economics, and law on the possible (...) future of robot-human sexual relationships. (shrink)

In this article, I present three scenarios regarding human sexual interactions with robots. I approach them by considering the development, distribution, and engagement with these technologies. These three scenarios, show different levels of advancements, potential stereotypes, and ethical dilemmas, clarifying the wide spectrum of expectations, principles, and social outcomes intertwined with sexual robotics. Underscoring the significance of individual decision-making in this domain, in this article I advocate for the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) as a relevant framework (...) for understanding and assessing the moral implications of these choices. Due to this fact, I consider PAP to be a valid research framework for sexual robotics, since it respects the diversity of choices, upholds the moral agency of social agents, and addresses the ethical responsibilities inherent in decision-making processes. It is important to clarify, at the same time, that this article is conceptual and pre-experimental. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that valid consent is a necessary condition for permissible sexual activity. Since non-human animals, children, and individuals who are severely cognitively disabled, heavily intoxicated or unconscious, lack the cognitive capacity to give valid consent, this condition explains why it is impermissible to have sex with them. However, contrary to common intuitions, the same condition seems to render it impermissible to have sex with robots, for they too are incapable of consenting to sex due to insufficient (...) cognitive capacitation. This paper explores whether the intuition that non-consensual sex with robots is permissible can be vindicated, whilst preserving valid consent as a general requirement for permissible sexual activity. I develop and evaluate four possible ways to argue that there is a morally significant difference between robots on the one hand, and insufficiently cognitively capacitated humans and non-human animals on the other hand, to substantiate and justify the intuition that it is permissible to have non-consensual sex with the former but not with the latter. (shrink)

In this paper we present a theoretical framework to understand the underlying psychological mechanism involved in human-Companion Robot interactions. At first, we take the case of Sexual Robotics, where the psychological dynamics are more evident, to thereafter extend the discussion to Companion Robotics in general. First, we discuss the differences between a sex-toy and a Sexual Robots, concluding that the latter may establish a collusive and confirmative dynamics with the user. We claim that the collusiveness leads (...) to two main consequences, such as the fixation on a specific and atypical type of sexual interaction, called paraphilic, and to the infantilization of the user, which we explain through the theoretical framework of “object-relation theory”. We argue that these dynamics may degrade to an infantile stage the relational abilities of users, extending this argument to Companion Robots in general. Then, we enquire if and how the relational dynamics enacted in HRI may shift to human relations: we discuss the analogy with virtual reality concluding that, under certain condition, a symbolic shift might happen. In the last part of this work, we propose an experimental setup to verify if a collusive and confirmative interaction with a Companion Robot can, over time, impact on the user’s ability to manage relational frustration. (shrink)

Nancy Jecker is right when she says that older persons ought not to be ashamed if they wish to remain sexually active in advanced old age. She offers a useful account of the role that sexuality plays in supporting key human capabilities. However, Jecker assumes an exaggerated account of what sex robots are likely to be able to offer for the foreseeable future when she suggests that we are obligated to make them available to older persons with disabilities. Moreover, whether (...) older persons should be ashamed to desire sex robots—or, more importantly, whether we should be ashamed at the thought that we should respond to the sexual needs of older persons by providing them with sex robots—turns on a range of arguments that Jecker fails to adequately consider. (shrink)

In July 2014, the roboticist Ronald Arkin suggested that child sex robots could be used to treat those with paedophilic predilections in the same way that methadone is used to treat heroin addicts. Taking this onboard, it would seem that there is reason to experiment with the regulation of this technology. But most people seem to disagree with this idea, with legal authorities in both the UK and US taking steps to outlaw such devices. In this paper, I subject these (...) different regulatory attitudes to critical scrutiny. In doing so, I make three main contributions to the debate. First, I present a framework for thinking about the regulatory options that we confront when dealing with child sex robots. Second, I argue that there is a prima facie case for restrictive regulation, but that this is contingent on whether Arkin’s hypothesis has a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Third, I argue that Arkin’s hypothesis probably does not have a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Consequently, we should proceed with utmost caution when it comes to this technology. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence -powered products have started to permeate various spheres of our lives. One of the most controversial of such products is the sex robot, an application of the AI-integrated robotic technology in the domain of human sexual gratification. The aim of this research is to understand the general public’s receptiveness towards this controversial new invention. Drawing upon the social intuitionist model, we find that the fear of AI, emblematic of the broader anxiety of technology’s encroachment on the human (...) sphere, shapes the public’s receptiveness to sex robots. Perceived substitutability of sex robots for human-to-human sexual interactions mediates this relationship. Religiosity is found to moderate this mediated relationship. Our findings are first established with a cross-sectional study. A “big data” field study further validates them. The present research is one of the first empirical studies to examine the underlying psychology of the public’s receptiveness to sex robots. By doing so, we aim to provide relevant government and industry bodies with a better understanding of this important topic for more informed policy making, and to raise awareness of the significant social and ethical implications should sex robots become widely accepted and adopted. (shrink)

This chapter discusses three types of sociable robots for older adults: robotic caregivers ; robotic friends ; and sex robots. The central argument holds that society ought to make reasonable efforts to provide these types of robots and that under certain conditions, omitting such support not only harms older adults but poses threats to their dignity. The argument proceeds stepwise. First, the chapter establishes that assisting care-dependent older adults to perform activities of daily living is integral to respecting dignity. Here, (...) the argument establishes the vital role that carebots-of-the-future might play in aged societies as the supply of working age adults falls shy of demand. Next, the chapter extends this analysis to designing friendbots for socially isolated older adults. The argument holds that reasonable efforts to provide access to friendbots for socially isolated adults is also a future societal responsibility. Finally, the chapter applies similar reasoning to show that societies ought to make reasonable efforts to support sexual capabilities for older adults who want to be sexual but are bereft of sex partners. The argument draws on capability accounts of justice to show that when central human capacities, such as bodily integrity; intimate relationships; and the use of senses, imagination and thought, are at risk of falling below a threshold level, society should intercede. (shrink)

In ‘Nothing to Be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities,’1 I make the case that the unwanted absence of sex from a person’s life represents not just a loss of physical pleasure, but a loss of dignity. Since people aged 65 and over suffer disproportionately from disabilities that impair sexual functioning, I focus on this population. Drawing on an analysis of dignity developed at greater length elsewhere,2 I argue that sex robots can help older adults with (...) disabilities and that societies ought to take reasonable steps to make them available to this population. Unlike other assistive technologies, robots invite human-robot relationships and can form close connections with older adults.3 In response to the proposal, four commentators have introduced objections that I address below. Sorell4 argues that people who are young and able-bodied may wish for sex in their lives too and its absence may be a bigger concern for them than for older people. In reply, while my focus is older adults with disabilities that impair sexual function, I also acknowledge that loss of sexual function can occur at any age as can the absence of a …. (shrink)

본고의 목표는 섹스로봇 도입을 반대하는 입장을 방어하는 것이다. 이를 위해 필자는 섹스로봇 도입에 반대하는 기존 논의들의 뼈대를 이루는 상징-결과 논변을 재검토하고 이를 옹호한다. 필자는 상징-결과 논변의 개요를 소개하는 것으로 이 작업을 시작한다. 본 논변은 (a) 섹스로봇은 윤리적으로 문제가 있는 성적 규범을 상징적으로 재현하며, (b) 이 점은 섹스로봇의 사용이 부정적인 결과를 낳을 것임을 가리키기에, (c) 섹스로봇에 대해 어떠한 조치가 취해져야 한다는 결론으로 정리된다(II장). 이어서 필자는 (b)에 대한 기존 공격들, 곧 섹스로봇의 부정적 상징성은 우연적이며 이러한 부정적 상징성은 변형 가능하다는 주장들을 논박한다(III장). 다음으로 (...) 필자는 (c)에 대한 기존 비판들, 즉 (a)로부터 (b)가 도출된다는 점이 정당화되지 않았으며 섹스로봇 사용에 반대하는 논자들이 이 로봇의 유익을 충분히 고려하지 않았다는 주장들을 재반박한다. (shrink)

This volume brings together a set of conceptual, moral, and cultural concerns carefully to assess a significant public policy issue: the development and proliferation of sex robots. Critics argue, for example, that sex robots present a clear risk to real persons as well as a degradation of society. They claim that the prevalence of sex robots will increase sexual violence, immorally objectify women, encourage pedophilia, reinforce negative body image stereotypes, increase forms of sexual dysfunction, and pass on sexually (...) transmitted disease. Proponents judge robotic sexual companionship as just another step in the exploration of human erotic desire. Sex robots, and similar technology, such as virtual reality pornography and other forms of “digi-sexuality,” are appreciated as providing autonomy affirming companionship, sexual release for the lonely, and a relatively harmless outlet for sexual fantasies that avoids the use of human prostitutes and thus reduces sexual victimization. As these chapters explore, to secure normative claims about sexual activity with artificial humanoids, one will need first to understand what the meaning of the morality of sexual activity can be as well as the significance of various practices with robotic partners on such cardinal social institutions as the family and the relationship between the sexes. One will also need to consider in terms of which ranking of human goods, right-making conditions, social outcomes, or personal virtues we ought to evaluate the significance of sexual relations with robots that look like women, men and children. Without such analysis, it will be unclear whether sex robots ought to be appreciated as a social evil that will further degrade moral culture, a positive technological innovation that will help preserve human dignity, or a more or less harmless pastime. (shrink)

This book provides cross-cultural ethical exploration of sex robots and their social impact. What are the implications of sex robots and related technological innovations for society and culture? How should we evaluate the significance of sexual relations with robots that look like women, men or children? Critics argue that sex robots present a clear risk to real persons and a social degradation that will increase sexual violence, objectify women, encourage pedophilia, reinforce negative body images, increase forms of (...) class='Hi'>sexual dysfunction, and pass on sexually transmitted disease. Proponents judge robotic sexual companionship as just another step in the exploration of human desire. They see sex robots, and similar technology, such as virtual reality pornography, as providing autonomy affirming companionship for the lonely and a relatively harmless outlet for sexual fantasies that avoids the use of human prostitutes and thus reduces sexual victimization. Some appreciate sex robots as a social evil, others as a positive good, and still others as a harmless pastime. How we come to terms with such conceptual and moral concerns will have significant implications for society and the future of human relations. This book is of great interest to researchers in bioethics, human sexual behavior, AI ethics, and philosophy of sex. (shrink)

This chapter examines a common objection to sex robots: the symbolic-consequences argument. According to this argument sex robots are problematic because they symbolise something disturbing about our attitude to sex-related norms such as consent and the status of our sex partners, and because of the potential consequences of this symbolism. After formalising this objection and considering several real-world uses of it, the chapter subjects it to critical scrutiny. It argues that while there are grounds for thinking that sex robots could (...) symbolically represent a troubling attitude toward women (and maybe children) and the norms of interpersonal sexual relationships, the troubling symbolism is going to be removable in many instances and reformable in others. What will ultimately matter are the consequences of the symbolism but these consequences are likely to be difficult to ascertain. This may warrant an explicitly experimental approach to the development of this technology. (shrink)

Nancy Jecker’s essay Nothing to be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities 1 presents a provocative application of the capabilities approach. Her ethical argument for providing access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities proceeds in five parts: 1. Older adults frequently suffer disabilities that impair sexual functioning. 2. The ability to function sexually is linked to central human capabilities, including: the ability to generate a personally meaningful life narrative; be physically, mentally and emotionally healthy; (...) experience bodily integrity; feel and express a range of human emotions; affiliate deeply with others; and reflect on and choose a plan for their life. 3. Society should take reasonable steps to support these human capabilities at a minimal threshold as part of a broader duty to respect human dignity. 4. Providing access to sex robots comprises part of reasonable efforts to support the six capabilities at a minimal threshold. 5. Therefore, society ought to make reasonable efforts to ensure access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities that impair sexual functioning. I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, having proposed a series of legal reforms that would facilitate sexual expression among older adults with cognitive impairments as well.2 3 …. (shrink)

Sex matters. How men and women regard sex and bond sexually powerfully shapes the lifeworld. Sex is one of the major forces that influence a society and its background taken-for-granted norms. This chapter explores the ways in which the now dominant Western secular culture has generally deflated and demoralized the significance of sexual activity. Differences in preferred sexual activities are, according to this secular culture, to be appreciated as morally neutral lifestyle choices provided that they are consensual and (...) affirm the “dignity” of the parties involved. As I argue, the dominant secular culture seeks to place consensual sexual acts, of which the use of sex robots is just one additional example, beyond moral judgment, further isolating individuals from the rich social connections of traditional family life, thereby transforming the family and advancing the secularization of society. (shrink)

How should we react to the development of sexbot technology? Taking their cue from anti-porn feminism, several academic critics lament the development of sexbot technology, arguing that it objectifies and subordinates women, is likely to promote misogynistic attitudes toward sex, and may need to be banned or restricted. In this chapter I argue for an alternative response. Taking my cue from the sex positive ‘feminist porn’ movement, I argue that the best response to the development of ‘bad’ sexbots is to (...) make better ones. This will require changes to the content, process and context of sexbot development. Doing so will acknowledge the valuable role that technology can play in human sexuality, and allow us to challenge gendered norms and assumptions about male and female sexual desire. This will not be a panacea to the social problems that could arise from sexbot development, but it offers a more realistic and hopeful vision for the future of this technology in a pluralistic and progressive society. (shrink)

The manufacture of humanoid robots with embedded artificial intelligence and for sexual purposes has generated some debates within bioethics, in which diverse competing views have been presented. Themes such as sexuality and its deviations, the objectification of women, the relational problems of contemporary life, loneliness, and even the reproductive future of the species constitute the arguments which have emerged in relation to this subject. Based on these themes, this article presents the current state of the use of female sex (...) robots, the bioethical problems that arise, and how bioethics could serve as a medium for both thinking about and resolving some of these challenges. (shrink)

Determining whether and/or how to enable older persons with disabilities to engage in sex raises several ethical considerations. With the goal of enabling the sexual functioning of older adults with disabilities, Jecker argues that sex robots could be used as a helpful tool. In her article, ‘Nothing to be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities’, Jecker acknowledges the importance of sexual functioning and the fact that ageist assumptions incorrectly classify older persons as asexual. Additionally, older (...) adults may experience disabilities that negatively influence their sexual functioning, which is problematic since sex may be linked to the following capabilities: developing a meaningful life narrative; being healthy; experiencing bodily integrity; feeling and communicating emotions; affiliating with others and reflecting on and choosing a life plan.1 In accordance with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach,2 Jecker says that society has a duty to support these capabilities at a minimal threshold. And insofar as sexual functioning may be relevant to the capabilities for older adults with disabilities, then we need to respond accordingly. One way of achieving this aim is by providing access to sex robots. I agree that sex robots ought to be made available for older adults with disabilities. Nevertheless, the article inspires several areas for further exploration. As Jecker rightfully mentions, older adults are often incorrectly labelled as non-sexual. For instance, in their analysis of older individuals’ views on sex and quality of life, Gott …. (shrink)

This paper spotlights ways in which sexual capacities relate to central human capabilities, such as the ability to generate a personally meaningful story of one’s life; be physically, mentally and emotionally healthy; experience bodily integrity; affiliate and bond with others; feel and express a range of human emotions; and choose a plan of life. It sets forth a dignity-based argument for affording older people access to sex robots as part of reasonable efforts to support their central human capabilities at (...) a floor level. The argument develops stepwise: (1) first, I dispel ageism and negative stereotypes about later-life sexuality, showing their deep historical roots in medicine and science; (2) second, I set forth a positive argument, grounded in capability accounts of justice, for deploying sex robots for older people with disabilities; (3) finally, after responding to objections, I conclude that sex robots are a reasonable way to support later-life sexuality for persons with disabilities. While often depicted as a product for younger, able-bodied people, this paper is a bid for reimagining sex robots as a product for older, disabled people. (shrink)

이 글은 한국사회에서 논란이 되는 리얼돌(real doll)이 단순한 성적 만족을 위한 도구 가 아닌 인격적 존재로 발전될 수 있는가에 관해 논하고자 한다. 그를 위해서 우선 리얼돌 에 반대하는 대표적인 입장의 핵심 논변인 ‘상징-결과 논변(symbolic-consequences argument)’을 비판적으로 검토해보고자 한다. ‘상징-결과 논변’은 리얼돌(섹스봇 포함)이 윤리적으로 문제가 있는 성적 규범(sexual norms)을 상징적으로 보여주며, 이는 결과적 으로 사회에 부정적인 영향을 미치므로 리얼돌의 생산 및 판매가 금지되어야 한다고 주장 한다. 본 논문에서는 윤지영(2020)의 입장을 ‘상징-결과 논변’으로 재구성하여, 그 타당성과 건전성을 검토해보고자 한다. 결론적으로 리얼돌이 여성에 (...) 대한 남성의 왜곡된 성적 인식 을 상징적으로 보여주며, 그 결과 리얼돌의 생산 및 판매가 금지되어야 한다는 이 논변은 건전하지 못한 논변임이 드러날 것이다. 끝으로 만일 ‘상징-결과 논변’이 건전하지 못한 논변이라면, 우리 사회가 리얼돌을 어 떻게 바라봐야 하는지(바라 볼 수 있는지), 그리고 철학의 영역이 끝나고 제도적, 법적 규 제가 시작되는 지점이 어디인지를 분명하게 드러내 보고자 한다. (shrink)

Physical and emotional intimacy between humans and robots may become commonplace over the next decades, as technology improves at a rapid rate. This development provides new questions pertaining to how people perceive robots designed for different kinds of intimacy, both as companions and potentially as competitors. We performed an randomized experiment where participants read of either a robot that could only perform sexual acts, or only engage in non-sexual platonic love relationships. The results of the current study show (...) that females have less positive views of robots, and especially of sex robots, compared to men. Contrary to the expectation rooted in evolutionary psychology, females expected to feel more jealousy if their partner got a sex robot, rather than a platonic love robot. The results further suggests that people project their own feelings about robots onto their partner, erroneously expecting their partner to react as they would to the thought of ones’ partner having a robot. (shrink)

In this chapter, we focus on the simple sounding question: What is it to have sex? On the assumption that having sex is what you do with all and only your sexual part-ners, this offers a way of focusing the question: What would it take for a sex robot to be a sex partner? In order to understand the significance of the development of robots with whom (or which) we can have sex, we need to know what it is (...) to have sex with a robot. And in order to know this, we have to know what it is to have sex, period. In the bulk of the chapter, we develop an account of shared sexual agency we think is a plausible precondition of genuinely having sex. In the final section, we remark briefly on the issue of what it would take to form a sexual we (as we call it) with a robot. For if we can do this, we can probably have sex with robots; but if we can’t, we can’t. (shrink)

How should we react to the development of sexbot technology? Taking their cue from anti-porn feminism, several academic critics lament the development of sexbot technology, arguing that it objectifies and subordinates women, which is likely to promote misogynistic attitudes towards sex, and may need to be banned or restricted. This chapter argues for an alternative response. Taking its cue from the sex-positive ‘feminist porn’ movement, it argues that the best response to the development of ‘bad’ sexbots is to make better (...) ones. This will require changes to the content, process and context of sexbot development. Doing so will acknowledge the valuable role that technology can play in human sexuality, and allow us to challenge gendered norms and assumptions about male and female sexual desire. This will not be a panacea to the social problems that could arise from sexbot development, but it offers a more realistic and hopeful vision for the future of this technology in a pluralistic and progressive society. (shrink)

Sex is an important part of human life. It is a source of pleasure and intimacy, and is integral to many people’s self-identity. This chapter examines the opportunities and challenges posed by the use of AI in how humans express and enact their sexualities. It does so by focusing on three main issues. First, it considers the idea of digisexuality, which according to McArthur and Twist (2017) is the label that should be applied to those ‘whose primary sexual identity (...) comes through the use of technology’, particularly through the use of robotics and AI. While agreeing that this phenomenon is worthy of greater scrutiny, the chapter questions whether it is necessary or socially desirable to see this as a new form of sexual identity. Second, it looks at the role that AI can play in facilitating human-to-human sexual contact, focusing in particular on the use of self-tracking and predictive analytics in optimising sexual and intimate behaviour. There are already a number of apps and services that promise to use AI to do this, but they pose a range of ethical risks that need to be addressed at both an individual and societal level. Finally, it considers the idea that a sophisticated form of AI could be an object of love. Can we be truly intimate with something that has been ‘programmed’ to love us? Contrary to the widely-held view, this chapter argues that this is indeed possible. (shrink)

Using an interdisciplinary approach, this book explores the emerging topics and rapid technological developments of robotics and artificial intelligence through the lens of the evolving role of sex robots, and how they should best be designed to serve human needs. An international panel of authors provides the most up-to-date, evidence-based empirical research on the potential sexual applications of artificial intelligence. Early chapters discuss the objections to sexual activity with robots while also providing a counterargument to each objection. (...) Subsequent chapters present the implications of robot sex as well as the security and data privacy issues associated with sexual interactions with artificial intelligence. The book concludes with a chapter highlighting the importance of a scientific, multidisciplinary approach to the study of human - robot sexuality. Topics featured in this book include: The Sexual Interaction Illusion Model. The personal companion system, Harmony, designed by RealbotixTM. An exposition of the challenges of personal data control and protection when dealing with artificial intelligence. The current and future technological possibilities of projecting three-dimensional holograms. Expert discussion notes from an international workshop on the topic. AI Love You will be of interest to academic researchers in psychology, robotics, ethics, medical science, sociology, gender studies as well as clinicians, policy makers, and the business sector. (shrink)

Generally speaking, sex robots are artificial entities designed to be humanlike in appearance and behavior, and which are primarily used for sexual purposes. In the literature on robot ethics, most work is influenced by either deontology or utilitarianism. In this article, I address some issues concerning sex robots from a Confucian standpoint. The first question that will be raised is whether sex robots can be morally permitted. Intuitively, such machines might not be morally acceptable for Confucianism since Confucians seem (...) to hold a negative and mortifying attitude toward sexual desire. However, this intuition is likely incorrect. I argue that sexual desires guided by the heavenly principle are not immoral. Hence, from the Confucian perspective, sex robots, which are created to meet humans’ sexual desires, can at least sometimes be justified. The second question addresses what kinds of sex robots Confucianism can morally allow. As I explore, following Confucian insights, the answer to this question likely depends on the purpose for which one seeks to use sex robots. Sexual thoughts that involve incest, threesomes, fornication, and pedophilia are usually regarded as morally wrong from the Confucian perspective. Thus, it would likely be morally unacceptable to use sex robots to fulfil such illicit and inappropriate desires. By contrast, Confucianism might morally permit other kinds and uses of sex robots. In some cases, people want sex robots because they are unable to find human sexual partners. Sex robots might be able to fulfil such people’s sexual needs, while also enabling those individuals to build emotional bonds with their sex robots. The therapeutic use of sex robots can also be allowed. The paper consists of four sections. The first section demonstrates the specialty of sex robots. The second section explores the Confucian views of yin-yang theory and sex. In the third section, Confucian theories of family relations and sex are illustrated. Lastly, based on the features of Confucianism, I argue that some kinds of use of sex robots can be morally allowed by Confucians. (shrink)

A common sentiment among anti-sex-robot scholars is the apprehension that sex robots will normalize and perpetuate sexual violence towards humans. In this new chapter within the feminist sex war, the authors of this article tend to agree with anti-sex-robot concerns and seek to further identify potential harms of sex robots. However, instead of characterizing the harm in terms of what the robots represent and symbolize, we are primarily interested in the internal state of the user and the type of (...) relationship that will emerge between human users and sex robots, which we argue is an unprecedented sexual relation. Unlike other comparable sex products and services, sex robots occupy a liminal space between being perceived as both a sexual property and agent, oscillating based on the preferences and convenience of the user. We argue that this oscillation that enables human–sex robot intimacy requires self-deception, which in turn entails individual moral responsibility. Thus, we articulate a novel virtue-based approach of examining human–robot intimacy that focuses on cultivating erotic flourishing. We conclude that people have a moral responsibility to exhibit self-awareness within the dynamics of their intimate relationship with sex robots and the (contradictory) beliefs required to maintain such intimacy. (shrink)

It is likely that sex robots will exist in the near future, making the effect they might have on human relationships a pressing concern. In this future world, we can imagine sex robots shaping our personal and social relationships through their unique access to, and potential for influencing, our most intimate of behaviours. We investigate whether they might be employed to influence social behaviours in a positive way. The paper begins with an account of the state of the art, acknowledges (...) powerful feminist criticisms that have been made of sex robots, and evaluates suggestions that it might be possible to design sex robots which do not raise these concerns and which might even work to influence social behaviours in a positive way. It then outlines a number of ways that sex robots might be used to educate, “nudge”, and influence people in positive ways. It defends the idea that it would be ethical to use sex robots to promote socially positive behaviours — behaviours that benefit others and improve social cohesion, such as fostering respect and empathy for persons — but not to promote commercial products for parochial interests. We argue that the former project could advance individual and social welfare, while preserving personal autonomy — a minimum requirement of which is the ability to make informed decisions — whereas the latter depends on a lack of transparency and democratic control for its success, targets the vulnerability of the user to achieve its ends, and reinforces the problematic symbolism of negatively gendered sexuality. If sex robot design and application meet public requirements of transparency — enabling informed consent and reflective decision making — and democratic oversight — promoting accountability and the sharing of power with the public — it is conceivable that sex robots might assist, rather than harm society. (shrink)

I argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment qua simulation and enjoyment qua substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys qua substitution (...) one's surrogate fantasy about (for example) sexualized enslavement and rape, but not if one enjoys qua simulation one's idle fantasy about the same sexualized enslavement and rape. I therefore conclude that whether one's enjoyment is immoral depends on the motivation for the enjoyment and the type of fantasy one creates to procure it (where the motivation for enjoyment and fantasy share the same desire), and not the media used to facilitate one's fantasy and subsequent enjoyment. (shrink)

The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics is a comprehensive collection of recent research on the ethics of sexual behavior, representing a wide range of perspectives. It addresses a number of traditional subjects in the area, including questions about pre-marital, extra-marital, non-heterosexual, and non-procreative sex, and about the nature and significance of sexual consent, sexual desire, and sexual activity, as well as a variety of more recent topics, including sexual racism, sexual ableism, sex robots, (...) and the #metoo response to sexual harassment. Each chapter defends a substantive thesis about the topic it addresses and the handbook as a whole thereby provides a strong foundation for future research in this important and growing field of inquiry. (shrink)

Is sex work (specifically, prostitution) vulnerable to technological unemployment? Several authors have argued that it is. They claim that the advent of sophisticated sexual robots will lead to the displacement of human prostitutes, just as, say, the advent of sophisticated manufacturing robots have displaced many traditional forms of factory labour. But are they right? In this article, I critically assess the argument that has been made in favour of this displacement hypothesis. Although I grant the argument a degree of (...) credibility, I argue that the opposing hypothesis -- that prostitution will be resilient to technological unemployment -- is also worth considering. Indeed, I argue that increasing levels of technological unemployment in other fields may well drive more people into the sex work industry. Furthermore, I argue that no matter which hypothesis you prefer -- displacement or resilience -- you can make a good argument for the necessity of a basic income guarantee, either as an obvious way to correct for the precarity of sex work, or as a way to disincentivise those who may be drawn to prostitution. (shrink)

As robots evolve from functional machines to potential sexual companions, they embody both utopian hopes and dystopian fears. This article explores the ethical implications of sex robots, focusing on power dynamics, objectification, and gender performance. Through Ann Cahill’s concept of derivatization, the article argues for a nuanced understanding of sexual objectification in the context of robo-erotics. While sex robots offer new possibilities for intimacy and desire, they also risk reinforcing problematic gender norms and power structures. The article introduces (...) a queer utopian framework, oscillating between hope and disgust, to examine how sex robots might subvert or perpetuate traditional scripts of sexuality. Ultimately, this work aims to situate sex robots within the broader landscape of technological advancement and its potential to reshape human sexuality. (shrink)

In this chapter, we ask three questions about pedophilia: Is it immoral to be a pedophile? Is it immoral for pedophiles to seek out sexual contact with children? Is it immoral for pedophiles to satisfy their sexual preferences by using computer-generated graphics, sex dolls, and/or sex robots that mimic children? We argue that it is not immoral to be a pedophile, it is immoral for pedophiles to seek out sexual contact with children because of the expected harm (...) to children, and it is morally permissible for pedophiles to satisfy their sexual preferences in ways that do not involve any real children. (shrink)

In this chapter I'd like to focus on a small corner of sexbot ethics that is rarely considered elsewhere: the question of whether and when being a sexbot might be good---or bad---*for the sexbot*. You might think this means you are in for a dry sermon about the evils of robot slavery. If so, you'd be wrong; the ethics of robot servitude are far more complicated than that. In fact, if the arguments here are right, designing a robot to serve (...) humans sexually may be very good for the robots themselves. (shrink)

Humanoid robots used for sexual purposes are beginning to look increasingly lifelike. It is possible for a user to have a bespoke sexbot created which matches their exact requirements in skin pigmentation, hair and eye colour, body shape, and genital design. This means that it is possible—and increasingly easy—for a sexbot to be created which bears a very high degree of resemblance to a particular person. There is a small but steadily increasing literature exploring some of the ethical issues (...) surrounding sexbots, however sexbots made to look like particular people is something which, as yet, has not been philosophically addressed in the literature. In this essay I argue that creating a lifelike sexbot to represent and resemble someone is an act of sexual objectification which morally requires consent, and that doing so without the person’s consent is intrinsically wrong. I consider two sexbot creators: Roy and Fred. Roy creates a sexbot of Katie with her consent, and Fred creates a sexbot of Jane without her consent. I draw on the work of Alan Goldman, Rae Langton, and Martha Nussbaum in particular to demonstrate that creating a sexbot of a particular person requires consent if it is to be intrinsically permissible. (shrink)

As the pagan classical world was subsumed into Christianity sexually hyperactive gods and goddesses transmuted into saints, their former statues that glorified the perfection of their bodies smashed into pieces and reimagined as austere two-dimensional icons to be worshipped by the new faithful. That dualistic and polemic narrative, where the soul’s purpose was to annihilate the body, survives today in the distinction between software and hardware, algorithms and robots, the former as the “ghosts” that animate the empty vessels, the “machines”. (...) But how does this narrative impact our cultural and social fantasies in the twenty-first century as we accelerate toward coexisting, uniting, or merging with intelligent artifacts? How does “humanness” blur when it is claimed by no-biological human-like entities too, or when humans augment their perception, consciousness and physical power through genetic engineering, drugs, or software and mechanical prostheses? Suppose we are destined to remake ourselves in the image of our ancient gods. Will it be through the embodiment of technologies in the physical reality, or through the complete disembodiment of our minds inside virtual worlds? (shrink)

This paper is about the question of whether or not virtual rape should be considered a crime under current law. A virtual rape is the rape of an avatar in a virtual world. In the future, possibilities for virtual rape of a person him- or herself will arise in virtual reality environments involving a haptic device or robotics. As the title indicates, I will study both these present and future instances of virtual rape in light of three categories of (...) legal philosophical theories on rape in order to answer the aforementioned question. I will argue that a virtual rape in a future virtual reality environment involving a haptic device or robotics should in principle count as the crime of rape; for it corresponds to rape as it is viewed under the liberal theories that currently dominate the law. A surprising finding will be that a virtual rape in a virtual world re-actualizes the conservative view of rape that used to dominate the law in the Middle Ages and resembles rape as it is viewed under the feminist theories that criticize current law. Virtual rape in a virtual world cannot count as rape under current law; however, and at the end of this paper, I will suggest qualifying it as sexual harassment instead. (shrink)

Minor-attracted persons raise multiple ethical and legal challenges. Sexual contact between adults and children is justly prohibited on child welfare grounds. Advances in technology raise the prospect of interventions for minor-attracted persons that have the potential to reduce harm to children by diverting would-be offenders to other endeavors that nonetheless may generate moral disgust This essay examines three of these potential harm reduction technologies (sex robots, haptic devices and synthetic child pornography) and raises the possibility that their use can (...) be justified and their acceptance morally obligatory if doing so reduces harm to real children. (shrink)

Jecker’s paper focuses on the value of sex and sexuality in the lives of older people, and she argues that there is nothing wrong with the use of sex robots to realise that value. She concedes that sex robots marketed today are overwhelmingly designed for heterosexual males, and that their appearance corresponds to certain objectionable stereotypes of sexually attractive women, and of exciting sexual practices. Still, she says, sex robots do not have to be like that, and a less (...) stereotype-ridden design could take away the sexism, heterosexualism and ageism of current ones. I am sympathetic to these conclusions. But I believe that they are not general enough, and I want to take issue with the argumentative strategy that leads to them. The conclusions are not general enough, because disability or bad circumstantial luck can lead to the damaging absence of sex in the lives of people from many adult age groups, not just people in their 70s and 80s. Jecker’s paper starts with the case of couples whose sex life deteriorates with old age. But there are also many people, whether disabled or not, who fail to acquire a sex life, and who want one, sometimes desperately. They, too, have a problem that a suitable sex robot might help …. (shrink)

Reductionism--understanding complex processes by breaking them into simpler elements--dominates scientific thinking around the world and has certainly proved a powerful tool, leading to major discoveries in every field of science. But reductionism can be taken too far, especially in the life sciences, where sociobiological thinking has bordered on biological determinism. Thus popular science writers such as Richard Dawkins, author of the highly influential The Selfish Gene, can write that human beings are just "robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish (...) molecules known as genes." Indeed, for many in science, genes have become the fundamental unit for understanding human existence: genes determine every aspect of our lives, from personal success to existential despair: genes for health and illness, genes for criminality, violence, and sexual orientation. Others would say that this is reductionism with a vengeance. In Lifelines, biologist Steven Rose offers a powerful alternative to the ultradarwinist claims of Dawkins, E.O. Wilson, Daniel Dennett and others. Rose argues against an extreme reductionist approach that would make the gene the key to understanding human nature, in favor of a more complex and richer vision of life. He urges instead that we focus on the organism and in particular on the organism's lifeline: the trajectory it takes through time and space. Our personal lifeline, Rose points out, is unique--even identical twins, with identical genes at birth, will differ over time. These differences are obviously not embedded in our genes, but come about through our developmental trajectory in which genes, as part of the biochemical orchestra of trillions of cells in each human body, have an important part--but only a part--to play. To illustrate this idea, Rose examines recent research in modern biology, and especially two disciplines--genetics (which looks at the impact of genes on form) and developmental biology (which examines the interaction between the organism and the environment)--and he explores new ideas on biological complexity proposed by scientists such as Stuart Kauffman. He shows how our lifelines are constructed through the interplay of physical forces--such as the intrinsic chemistry of lipids and proteins, and the self-organizing and stabilizing properties of complex metabolic webs--and he reaches a startling conclusion: that organisms are active players in their own fate, not simply the playthings of the gods, nature, or the inevitable workings out of gene-driven natural selection. The organism is both the weaver and the pattern it weaves. Lifelines will be a rallying point for all who seek an alternative to the currently fashionable, deeply determinist accounts which dominate popular science writing and, in fact, crowd the pages of some of the major scientific journals. Based on solid, state-of-the-art research, it not only makes important contributions to our understanding of Darwin and natural selection, but will swing the pendulum back to a richer, more complex view of human nature and of life. (shrink)

This volume features original essays on the philosophy of love. The essays are organized thematically around the past, present, and future of philosophical thinking about love. In section I, the contributors explore what we can learn from the history of philosophical thinking about love. The chapters cover Ancient Greek thinkers, namely Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kierkegaard's critique of preferential love and Erich Fromm's mystic interpretation of sexual relations. Section II covers current conceptions and practices of love. These (...) chapters explore how love changes over time, the process of falling in love, envy in romantic partnerships, and a new interpretation of grand-parental love. Finally, Section III looks at the future of love. These chapters address technological developments related to love, such as algorithm-driven dating apps and robotic companions, as well as the potential of polyamory as a future romantic ideal. This book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in moral philosophy and social and political philosophy who are working on issues related to philosophy of love. (shrink)