To articulate their understanding of Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’, commentators have often taken what I refer to as a ‘respect-first view’ on resemblance, in which they cat...

Early modern humans developed mental capabilities that were immeasurably greater than those of non-human primates. We see this in the rapid innovation in tool making, the development of complex language, and the creation of sophisticated art forms, none of which we find in our closest relatives. While we can readily observe the results of this high-order cognitive capacity, it is difficult to see how it could have developed. We take up the topic of cave art and archeoacoustics, particularly the discovery (...) that cave art is often closely connected to the acoustic properties of the cave chambers in which it is found. Apparently, early modern humans were able to detect the way sound reverberated in these chambers, and they painted artwork on surfaces that were acoustic “hot spots,” i.e., suitable for generating echoes. We argue that cave art is a form of cross-modality information transfer, in which acoustic signals are transformed into symbolic visual representations. This form of information transfer across modalities is an instance of how the symbolic mind of early modern humans was taking shape into concrete, externalized language. We also suggest that the earliest rock art found in Africa may constitute one of the first fossilized proxies for the expression of full-fledged human linguistic behavior. (shrink)

Many scholars have claimed that the psychology of the indirect passions in the Treatise is meant to capture how we come to regard persons as morally responsible agents. My question is exactly how the indirect passions relate to responsibility. In elucidating Hume’s account of responsibility, scholars have often focused not on the passionate responses themselves, but on their structural features. In this paper, I argue that locating responsibility in the structural features is insufficient to make sense of Hume’s account of (...) responsibility. I argue this on the grounds that without reference to the passions, Hume does not have the resources to distinguish between responsible and non-responsible entities. Instead, I attribute to Hume a distinctive, sympathy-based response-dependent conception of responsibility. (shrink)

Ascidian tadpole larvae, composed of only about 2500 cells, have a primitive nervous system which is derived from the neural plate. The stereotyped cell cleavage pattern and well characterized cell lineage in these animals allow the isolation and culture of identified blastomeres in variable combinations. Ascidian embryos express cell‐type‐specific markers corresponding to their cell fates, even when cultured under cleavage‐arrest by cytochalasin B. This system provides us with a unique opportunity to study the roles of cell lineage and cell contact (...) in early neuronal differentiation in the absence of events associated with complex morphogenesis. In addition, the isolated, cleavage‐arrested blastomeres are ideally suited to electrical recording, permitting the use of ionic channels as specific markers for differentiation. In the cleavage‐arrested embryos, suppression of one type of K+ channel, and induction of two types of Na+ channels, occur following cell contact with the vegetal blastomere. The combination of molecular and electrophysiological analyses on this simple animal system may provide insights into the nature of the cell interactions important in early neurogenesis, both in ascidians and in vertebrates. (shrink)

Transcendental reflection does not simply withdraw from natural life and go somewhere else. On the contrary, it is a self-elucidation of natural life performed within this life itself. However, natural life has an inherent automatic system for concealing itself. Therefore, in order to make manifest the truly natural state of natural life, we need a deliberate method of outfoxing the natural attitude as it constantly tries to trick us. If so, the transcendental perspective is closely related to Husserl’s perplexing concept (...) of “primal I”. It expresses a primitive perspective of our experience that cannot be identified with the first-person perspective. Phenomenology is not merely an investigation of experience from the first-person point of view, but a philosophical thinking from a “zero person” perspective that makes it possible for us to understand the relativity of our own first-person experience, and how it is related to other first-person experiences and the third-person perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a possible reinterpretation of phenomenology using a newly defined concept of ‘mediation.’ First, I address the question: What are the ‘things themselves’ that are given as the result of the phenomenological epoché? I would answer that they are neither material objects nor merely subjective experiences, but rather specific occurrences of ‘mediations.’ Second, under the influence of the Japanese philosopher Hajime Tanabe, I will define ‘mediation’ as a non-separable occurrence of differentiating and connecting. Third, I shall (...) claim that the concept of ‘phenomenon’ itself should be reinterpreted in terms of its character of mediation. Then, I will discuss central issues in phenomenology such as intentionality, time, and intersubjectivity in order to test the applicability of the proposed concept of mediation. To conclude, I shall summarize the potential of the idea that phenomenology can be reinterpreted using the concept of mediation. (shrink)

We revisit the EPR problem and make clear what is a correct comprehension of its problem. When one applies the quantum mechanics correctly, it will be shown that there is no paradox. According to these lines of thought, a quantum teleportation scheme without resort to the von Neumann projection postulate is presented.

Nous avons trois objectifs dans cet article. Le premier est de montrer la pensée et le comportement de Yasuma Takata (1883-1972), auteur quasiment inconnu en Occident, mais qui donna pourtant au Japon ses premières théories sociologiques et socio-économiques générales. Le deuxième est d’examiner comment ces pensée et comportement sont liés à la responsabilité de la guerre dans la seconde guerre mondiale. Le troisième consiste à montrer que cette pensée est profondément connectée au courant de la pensée japonaise moderne à travers (...) la théorie de Maruyama et des opinions des Ôe et Kawabata. Classification JEL : B15, B31, N45. (shrink)

The purpose of the study was twofold: Experiment 1 tested the possibility that the mere recollection of food aroused a state of hunger and that different types of food influenced the state of hunger differently; Experiment 2 tested the possibility that food cues affected altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1, 28 participants reported how hungry they felt before and after their recollection of certain foods. Results suggest that recollection of food increased hunger and that the type of food influenced the degree (...) of hunger = 31.88, p <.001, η2 =.54). In Experiment 2, 63 participants were randomly assigned to one of three recollection conditions: noodles, pudding, and control. Participants in the two conditions described each food in detail; control group participants did not. Participants were then asked how much they would be willing to participate in an ostensible experiment. Results indicate that recollection-induced hunger reduced altruistic behavior = 4.11, p =.021, η2 =.12). Cue reactivity theory and the hierarchy of needs could explain these results. (shrink)

The development of phenomenological philosophy in Japan is a well-established tradition that reaches back to the early 20th-century. The past decades have witnessed significant contributions and advances in different areas of phenomenological thought in Japan that remain unknown, or only partially known, to an international philosophical public. This volume offers a selection of original phenomenological research in Japan to an international audience in the form of an English language publication. The contributions in this volume range over classical figures in the (...) phenomenological movement, recent trends in French phenomenology, and contemporary inter-disciplinary approaches. In addition to this diverse engagement with European thinkers, many of the contributions in this volume establish critical and complimentary discussions with 20th-century Japanese philosophers. (shrink)

Many functional glycoproteins are expressed on the lymphocyte cell surface. Some of them carry O-linked oligosaccharides (O-glycans), which are conjugated through serine or threonine residues. During various biological processes, including T-cell activation, a tetrasaccharide on the T-cell surface is dramatically converted to a branched hexasaccharide, called core2 O-glycan. The same structural change in O-glycans is also found on the lymphocytes from patients with immunodeficiency conditions such as Wiskott-Aldrich syndrome and AIDS. Several studies revealing the roles of core2 O-glycans in immune (...) responses show that this is a biologically significant change. In particular, core2 O-glycans expressed on the cell surface reduce cell–cell interactions, thereby regulating immune responses. Furthermore, core2 O-glycan is a key backbone structure in forming selectin ligands. Thus, O-linked oligosaccharides, in particular those containing core2 branches, play vital roles in immune responses and may play dual roles in certain situations. This review will summarize the results obtained from various studies investigating the roles of O-glycans in immunological processes. BioEssays 23:46–53, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

本書の第1部は近代日本の思想家がグリーンの理想主義をどのように受容し、それをどう批判し、日本の伝統的思想とどのように融合させ、独自の思想を展開してきたかを中心問題とする。とりあげられる思想家・学者は中 島力造・高山樗牛、綱島梁川、西田幾多郎、河合榮治郎の五人である。第2部はグリーンの形而上学、道徳哲学、政治哲学、宗教思想の中心問題を永遠意識の視点から体系的に再検討することを目的とした。.

In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychological description can provide a principled reason to overcome his scepticism. In this paper, I (...) will argue that Hume’s discussions of the “indirect passions” and social identity provide a constitutivist ground for the naturalistic epistemic standards in the “Conclusion”: being the object of the indirect passions constitutes what kind of person one is, and being the kind of person (philosopher in Hume’s case) gives non-optional reason to pursue certain kinds of reasoning. (shrink)

Pockett has drawn an alternative conclusion from the data of Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein , and suggested that it takes 80 ms, rather than 500 ms, for the sensation evoked by a stimulus to enter awareness. Here, I suggest that our conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.

Using artificially synthesized stimuli, previous research has shown that cotton-top tamarin monkeys easily learn simple AB grammar sequences, but not the more complex AnBn sequences that require hierarchical structure. Humans have no trouble learning AnBn combinations. A more recent study, using similar artificially created stimuli, showed that there is a neuroanatomical difference in the brain between these two kinds of arrays. While the simpler AB sequences recruit the frontal operculum, the AnBn array recruits the phylogenetically newer Broca’s area. We propose (...) that on close inspection, reported vocal repertoires of Old World Monkeys show that these nonhuman primates are capable of calls that have two items in them, but never more than two. These are simple AB sequences, as predicted by previous research. In addition, we suggest the two-item call cannot be the result of a combinatorial operation that we see in human language, where the recursive operation of Merge allows for a potentially infinite array of structures. In our view, the two-item calls of nonhuman primates result from a dual-compartment frame into which each of the calls can fit without having to be combined by an operation such as Merge. (shrink)

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will (...) point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches. (shrink)

In theLysisSocrates deals with the problem of what is a friend and what is friendship. After giving an introduction and a synopsis of theLysisin section one, I explain, in section two, Socrates’ view that a true friend is “what is akin” or “what is belonging to oneself” which is what is taken from oneself and discovered in another person. When this happens among two persons, they become friends to each other. The content of what is akin is either a good (...) characteristic or ways or form of the soul. Friendship is the desire for what is akin. In section three I show that Socrates remains inaporiawhile he faces several problems. Unless he is able to answer such problems, he will not be truly confident about what is a friend. In section four I deal with and refute Penner’s and Rowe’s view that a true friend means wisdom. In section five I examine the view of friendship which occurs among people who share common deficit. As a conclusion, in section six, I reflect on the significance of my interpretation and the role of theLysisin Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)