This chapter introduces the concept of self-restraint in politics. Since citizens of liberal democracies enjoy wide freedom of choice and expression, inquiry sensibly begins with simple arguments against self-restraint. Citizens in a liberal democracy are free to vote and advocate as they choose. Indeed, these liberties are fundamental aspects of our form of government, and if citizens enjoy them, they should also regard themselves as free to rely upon whatever grounds seem apt, and to make public arguments (...) in those terms. Further, an implicit assumption of democratic government is that outcomes will be best if they reflect the feelings of most citizens. This aspiration will come closer to achievement if citizens regard themselves as free to rely upon all they care about, rather than some restricted subset of what matters to them. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple but, by my lights, effective argument for a subclassical account of logic—an account according to which logical consequence is (properly) weaker than the standard, so‐called classical account. Alas, the vast bulk of the paper is setup. Because of the many conflicting uses of ‘logic’ the paper begins, following a disclaimer on logic and inference, by fixing the sense of ‘logic’ in question, and then proceeds to rehearse both the target subclassical account of logic and (...) its well‐known relative (viz., classical logic). With background in place the simple argument—which takes up less than five pages—is advanced. My hope is that the minimal presentation will help to get ‘the simple argument’ plainly on the table, and that subsequent debate can move us forward. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple argument against life being the product of design. The argument rests on three points. We can conceive of the debate in terms of likelihoods, in the technical sense – how probable the design hypothesis renders our evidence, versus how probable the competing Darwinian hypothesis renders that evidence. God, as traditionally conceived, had many more options by which to bring about life as we observe it than were available to natural selection. That is, the relevant (...) parameters were, in many cases, far more constrained under natural selection. Utterly mundane features of the world, like that the earth is very old, are actually powerful evidence that the world was not designed, since that outcome was optional on the design hypothesis but nearly inevitable on natural selection. (shrink)

Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by (...) Lei Zhong and is shown to be superior to the latter. (shrink)

It is argued that the components of the superposed wave function of a measuring device, each of which represents a definite measurement result, do not correspond to many worlds, one of which is our world, because all components of the wave function can be measured in our world by a serious of protective measurements, and they all exist in this world.

Conscience is widely misunderstood. For many, conscientious objection, both religious and nonreligious, is regarded as nothing more than a convenient excuse to get around the rules. This essay provides an argument for respecting conscience. It shows how the conscience is an integral part of responsible decision-making and must be recognized and protected and ends with an application of the right of conscience to recent debates over mandatory COVID-19 vaccination. The goal of this essay is to show why there is a (...) strong case for taking conscience seriously in ethics and public policy. (shrink)

I argue that Kroedel's 'Simple Argument' for downward causation fails and that this failure has consequences for any attempt to establish the reality of downward causation by appealing to counterfactual theories thereof. A central premise in Kroedel's argument equivocates. On one reading, it is true but renders the argument invalid; on another, it renders the argument valid but is likely false. I dedicate most of my efforts to establishing the second of these two claims. I show that the purported (...) physical effects of mental properties do not counterfactually depend upon the total realizers of these properties. If counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation, it follows that mental properties are not causes. If counterfactual dependence is merely sufficient for causation, it follows that no appeal to counterfactuals will by itself succeed in showing that mental properties are causes. (shrink)

William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I (...) then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple. (shrink)

It is shown that the superposed wave function of a measuring device, in each branch of which there is a definite measurement result, does not correspond to many mutually unobservable but equally real worlds, as the superposed wave function can be observed in our world by protective measurement.

In The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce presents a simple and very influential argument for the truth of moral error theory. In this paper I point out that the argument does not have the form Joyce attributes to it, the argument is not valid in an extensional propositional logic and on the most natural way of explicating the meanings of the involved terms, it remains invalid. I conclude that more explanation is needed if we are to accept this particular (...) argument for moral error theory. (shrink)

Here is a simple, clear, useful proof that quantum mechanics contradicts Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's local realistic assumptions. It is a variant of the powerful argument first worked out by Daniel Mordechai Greenberger, Michael A. Horne, and Anton Zeilinger. This version uses the eigenstates of two orthogonal spin components for three spin-1/2 particles. No operator or matrix algebra is necessary. A novel discussion of the background and history serves to introduce this proof and to place it in the context (...) of Danny's work. (shrink)

One of the most persuasive objections to the identity thesis.

Many philosophers have argued that logical pluralism is not compatible with the normativity of logic. They developed different versions of the collapse argument: if two logics are correct, then the weaker one will be normatively irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that the collapse argument is based on a controversial premise: the assumption that every logic can be characterized by the same bridge principle. I provide a solution to the collapse argument based on the modification of this premise, maintaining both (...) logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. (shrink)

La question de ce petit livre est simple : peut-on aller au-delà du constat de crise et d'impuissance dont le philosophe se fait le prophète depuis plus d'un siècle? Peut-on parler de la science sans complexe d'infériorité, de Dieu sans obscurantisme, d'existence sans tomber dans la banalité du café du commerce, de politique sans consacrer le cynisme, de morale sans faire dans le sermon? Bref, la philosophie peut-elle aider à faire comprendre et à dépasser les apories du temps présent (...) qu'elle a fait siennes, comme un malade ressasse sa propre maladie pour se donner le sentiment qu'ainsi il peut la mettre à distance à défaut de la vaincre? Toutes ces questions sont aujourd'hui les nôtres, et il ne faut pas avoir peur de parler des grands problèmes qui agitent les hommes depuis l'aube des temps, car si la philosophie a un sens, c'est bien en ce qu'elle envisage les questions ultimes dans une plus ou moins grande systématicité selon les époques. (shrink)

Anselm’s Proslogion argument is fascinating, important, and notoriously difficult. Many introductions to the argument are either as difficult as the original (such as those that use modal concepts to explain it) or are unfaithful to it. This paper presents an accessible introduction, faithful to the original, which breaks the argument down into four basic components: “That-Than-Which-a-Greater Cannot-be-Conceived,” “From Conceptual Existence to Real Existence,” “From Real Existence to Necessary Existence,” and “‘That-Than-Which-a-Greater Cannot-be-Conceived’ as God.”.

While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments. I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the theory contravenes several (...) typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as aiding in the identification of enthymemes and keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions. (shrink)

The author argues that simple constructive dilemma is a valuable argument form for reasoning under relative conditions of uncertainty. When applied to legal argument this value of simple constructive dilemma is shown in its political, strategic, rhetorical, and especially economic, uses by lawyers and judges. After considering some examples of the use of the form by trial lawyers, the author gives examples of the more interesting use of the form by appellate courts. Research into the use of (...) class='Hi'>simple constructive dilemma by appellate courts helps us to understand how those courts distribute judicial resources. It also helps us to understand the political role of the appellate courts with respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Given some of the specific examples of legal reasoning used by the appellate courts presented in this article, and given the discussion of the doctrine of precedent, the article’s focus is on common law legal systems of the Anglo-American-type. (shrink)

Perhaps the most commonly discussed argument against the possibility of extended simples is the argument from heterogeneity. The argument states that, if extended simples are possible, then extended simples which exhibit intrinsic qualitative variation across space (or spacetime) are also possible [Premise 1]. But, the argument goes, it is impossible for an extended simple to exhibit intrinsic qualitative variation across space (or spacetime) [Premise 2]. Thus, extended simples are impossible. I argue that there is a serious problem with the (...) argument from heterogeneity: the best arguments in support of the first premise undermine support for the second. Thus, there appears to be no good reason to accept both premises. (shrink)

Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument only (...) shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view. (shrink)

The contact argument is widely cited as making a strong case against a gunk-free metaphysics with point-sized simples. It is shown here that the contact argument's reasoning is faulty even if all its background assumptions and desiderata for contact are accepted. Further, the simples theorist can offer both metric and topological accounts of contact that satisfy all the contact argument's desiderata. This indicates that the contact argument's persuasiveness stems from a tacit reliance on the thesis that objects in contact are (...) inseparable: the simples theorist must allow that separated objects might be in contact. The concluding section critically considers this contact-separability thesis and argues that rejecting it is not so terrible. The upshot of all this is that the contact argument is simply unconvincing. (shrink)

In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory (...) of sense perception and his Copy Principle. I will also show why Hume's argument should be seen as relevant nowadays. David Lewis and his followers in metaphysics continue Hume's line of thinking in this respect, which is opposed by power ontologists (Brian Ellis, Stephen Mumford), for example. (shrink)

John Taylor complains that the "Kalam" cosmological argument gives the appearance of being a swift and simple demonstration of the existence of a Creator of the universe, whereas in fact a convincing argument involving the premiss that the universe began to exist is very difficult to achieve. But Taylor's proffered defeaters of the premisses of the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe are themselves typically undercut due to Taylor's inadvertence to alternatives open to the defender of (...) the "Kalam" arguments. With respect to empirical confirmation of the universe's beginning Taylor is forced into an anti-realist position on the Big Bang theory, but without sufficient warrant for singling out the theory as non-realistic. Therefore, despite the virtue of simplicity of form, the "Kalam" cosmological argument has not been defeated by Taylor's all too swift refutation. (shrink)

An argument is offered that externalism can compromise the first‐person transparency of mental contents. The premises are John McDowell's view that experience is passively structured by concepts, and the Simple Theory of Colour advocated by John Campbell, according to which those properties that are the actual semantic values of colour concepts are just as they appear to normal observers under standard conditions. An example is offered to suggest that it must be an epistemic possibility that the semantic values of (...) such concepts, as externally determined, are not the properties the Simple Theory takes them to be. The possibility highlights a mismatch between the properties that the colour concepts present as their semantic values and their actual, externally determined semantic values. Such a mismatch is shown to induce an incoherence into colour concepts leaving them unfit passively to structure our colour experience. Under such circumstances, it would not be transparent to a subject on the basis of colour experience, whether those experiences are conceptually structured by concepts answering to the Simple Theory, or precisely what content they carry. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is (...) generally understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn’t to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion, is whether there is a well-motivated notion of ‘module’ such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. I shall be arguing (in the end) that there is. (shrink)

Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. If existence, he argues, were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent: first that existence is an analytical property for essence; second that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one; and third that essence (...) is a property of existence. In this paper, I will argue that the first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument and then it would be in contrary with Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence, unless this account is augmented with the third one. The third account, however, can evade the argument. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence. Keywords: existence, to be existent, simple-if question, compound-if question, property. 1. Introductıon In al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn Mīr Dāmād claims that not all predicates of a subject manifest a real property for that subject. A real property of a subject is something which is superadded to the subject. Examples include a body’s being red or a body’s being above another body. In such cases, the predicates correspond with some feature of the subjects which are not the same as those subjects, in reality. This is opposed to the body’s being itself, for example. In this case, the body itself is not something which is superadded to the body. 2. Mīr dāmād agaınst the realıty of exıstence The controversial example is essence’s being existent. Is the existence of an essence something superadded to the essence? In Mīr Dāmād’s words, is existence a real property for essence? Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. For this end, he notifies that there is a distinction between propositions that is parallel to the distinction between real and non-real properties. If P is a real property for a, then the proposition that a is P is a compound-if proposition. On the other hand, it is a commonplace that the only example of simple-if propositions is one that contains existence as its predicate. Now, he continues, suppose that existence is a real property. Then, the proposition that a exists would become a compound-if proposition. But this contradicts the well-established premise that the proposition that a exists is a simple-if proposition. Consequently, he argues, if existence were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. The major problem that Mīr Dāmād is dealing with is how to explain essence’s being existent. His view is that, in reality, essence’s being existent is nothing but the essence itself. He, then, goes a step forward and claims that existence is nothing in reality. We only have the concept of existence in our minds. With these moves Mīr Dāmād, in some sense, resolves the problem of the relationship between essence and existence, in reality. 3. Mullā sadrā on the relatıonshıp between exıstence and essence It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā, Mīr Dāmād’s pupil, was in disagreement with the teacher with respect to the reality of existence. He believes that existence is a real entity in the world as opposed to essence. So, he should explain how essence is existent. Actually, he has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent. Mullā Sadrā’s first account is that existence is an analytical property for essence. He defines analytical property as the following: P is an analytic property for a iff a cannot be but not has P. Mullā Sadrā’s second explanation is that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one. His third thesis is that essence is a property of existence. 4. Mullā sadrā v.s. mīr dāmād My major concern in this paper is this problem: which of these three accounts for essence’s being existent offered by Mullā Sadrā can overcome Mīr Dāmād’s seminal argument? The first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument, since, any kind of real property, whether it is analytical or not, are associated with a compound-if proposition. This causes essence’s being existent to be manifested by a compound-if proposition. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument. As we saw, Mīr Dāmād claims that the conclusion of his argument guarantees that existence is nothing in the world. This cannot be swallowed by Mullā Sadrā whose own view is that existence is real. The third account, however, can evade the argument, insofar as existence is not a property of essence. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence. 5. Concluding remarks If the arguments rendered above are sound, we reach to a criterion in order to interpret Mullā Sadrā’s view on the relationship between existence and essence: his thesis that existence is real is more fundamental than his explanation for the problem of essence’s being existence. (shrink)

An observational analysis of selected Nightline program transcripts was undertaken to advance understanding of conversational arguments used in the service of public policy debate. Results indicate that Nightline discussions involved more compound structural variations, but fewer simple, convergent and eroded argument structures than had been found in previous research. In contrast to previous efforts, the development of prompter and delimitor argument structures was also identified. In addition, the program's moderator, Ted Koppel, used challenge structures as his primary method (...) of proposing issues for debate. Discussion focuses on features of Nightline argument complexity and proposes directions for future research. (shrink)

This essay explores a simple argument for a Ground of Being, objections to it, and limitations on it. It is nonsensical to refer to Nothing in the sense of utter absence, hence nothing can be claimed to come from Nothing. If, as it seems, the universe, or any physical ensemble containing it, is past-finite, it must be caused by an uncaused Ground. Speculative many-worlds, pocket universes and multiverses do not affect this argument, but the quantum cosmologies of Alex Vilenkin, (...) and J. B. Hartle and Stephen Hawking, which claim that the universe came from literally nothing, would. I argue that their novel project cannot work for reasons both physical (their "nothing" is actually a vacuum state governed by eternal physical laws) and methodological (physical theory cannot explain the emergence of the physical per se). Thus my argument stands. However, as David Hume showed, a posteriori arguments like mine infer a creation, and Creator, of a certain character, namely, a stochastic concept of creation and a panentheistic, partly physical Creator lacking omniscience and omnipotence. Rather than undermining the cosmological argument, as Hume intended, these limitations liberate the concept of the Ground from unnecessary problems, as Hartshorne suggested. (shrink)

Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..

I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.

Let us say that an extended object is “composed wholly of simples” just in case it is an aggregate of absolutely unextended parts spread throughout an extended region—that is, just in case there is a set S such that: every member is a point-sized part of the object, and for every x, x is part of the object if and only if it has a part in common with some member of S. Could a truly extended substance be composed entirely (...) of unextended parts? Reflection upon the fact that it must be at least possible for extended objects to touch one another suggests that the answer to this question is: No. (shrink)

Sometimes logical support for a conclusion is provided exclusively by premises which are independently relevant to that conclusion. At other times, support is provided exclusively by independently irrelevant premises. On still other occasions, relevant and irrelevant premises may collectively offer a distinctive pattern of support. This paper provides a rigorous account of some of these differences in terms of a tripartite classification of convergent, linked and hybrid arguments. These various arguments are defined, diagrammed, and some of their logical (...) properties are explored. (shrink)

This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One (...) of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analysable.1. (shrink)

Perfect for students with no background in logic or philosophy, Simple Formal Logic provides a full system of logic adequate to handle everyday and philosophical reasoning. By keeping out artificial techniques that aren’t natural to our everyday thinking process, Simple Formal Logic trains students to think through formal logical arguments for themselves, ingraining in them the habits of sound reasoning. Simple Formal Logic features: a companion website with abundant exercise worksheets, study supplements (including flashcards for symbolizations (...) and for deduction rules), and instructor’s manual two levels of exercises for beginning and more advanced students a glossary of terms, abbreviations and symbols. This book arose out of a popular course that the author has taught to all types of undergraduate students at Loyola University Chicago. He teaches formal logic without the artificial methods–methods that often seek to solve farfetched logical problems without any connection to everyday and philosophical argumentation. The result is a book that teaches easy and more intuitive ways of grappling with formal logic–and is intended as a rigorous yet easy-to-follow first course in logical thinking for philosophy majors and non-philosophy majors alike. (shrink)

Approximately 1,500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple argument for the existence of God. The argument runs thus: Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be. The universe came to be. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be. ;Due to the influence of William Lane Craig, this argument and the family of arguments that support it have come to be known as the "kalam" cosmological argument . Craig's account of (...) the KCA incorporates features that serve to distinguish his version as a significant advance. First, conceptual advances in mathematics now permit a clearer presentation of the argument than was previously possible. Second, contemporary Big Bang cosmology confirms the central contention of the KCA, namely, that the past existence of the universe is finite. Reflection upon the implications of using Cantorian transfinite mathematics to model physical processes allowed Craig to develop a distinctively philosophical version of the KCA which is relatively independent of changes in contemporary scientific cosmology. This dissertation is intended as a critical investigation and development of this philosophical strand of the KCA. The literature relating to the KCA has grown however to a significant bulk, and there is now danger of duplication and misassessment due to the plurality of interpretations that the argument has received. Part I of the dissertation addresses this need by laying bare the underlying logical structure of the KCA and by providing a comprehensive "state of the question" . Part II of the dissertation, comprising chapters 3 through 6, focuses upon an important species of objection made to the KCA. This species of objection relies upon thought-experiments designed to show that an actual infinity is possible. I reply: this objection is effectively answered by introducing a metaphysics of substances. In the course of presenting a systematic response I develop an interpretation of the notion of substance that is useful for analytic philosophy, present a general account of the logical requirements of KCA thought-experiments, and outline a theory of logical modality suited to the metaphysical requirements of the KCA. (shrink)

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and (...) only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. (shrink)

The simple systems methodology is a powerful reductionistic research strategy. It has problems as implemented in developmental genetics because the organisms studied are few and unrepresentative. Stronger inferences require independent arguments that key traits are widely distributed phylogenetically. Evolutionary and developmental mechanisms of generative entrenchment and self-organization provide possible support, and are also necessary components of a developmental systems approach.

The paper offers a critical response to the proposed “dis/analogy” between the restriction of Jehovah's Witness parental right to refuse life‐saving blood transfusions for their minor children and a “general” and “permanent” ban on “unnecessary” pediatric intersex surgery. The main argument of the analogy is “securing the patient's future autonomy.” Feinberg's theory of rights is used to demonstrate that the proposed analogy is untenable. A new category of developmental rights‐in‐trust is introduced to address specific needs of gender development in DSD (...) situations. Both premises are disputed. First, it is shown that the case of overriding Jehovah's Witness parental rights is not based on securing the patient's future autonomy, but a simple dependency right in Feinberg's theory. Second, it is demonstrated that pediatric intersex surgery is not in the same situation in all morally relevant respects as the Jehovah's Witness case because it represents a special type of developmental right‐in‐trust. In conclusion, the arguments based on the proposed analogy do not justify a “general and permanent” on pediatric intersex surgery. (shrink)

In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main (...) points of my book The Existence of God. (shrink)

In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points (...) of my book ’The Existence of God’. (shrink)

Charles Murray describes himself as a libertarian, most notably in his short book, What it Means to be a Libertarian. He might more accurately have described himself as having libertarian tendencies. My reading of Simple Justice is that the views it espouses are far more traditionalist than libertarian. Neither traditionalist state-retribution nor modernist state-leniency is libertarian. Nor does either provide as just or efficient a response to crime as does libertarian restitution, including restitutive retribution. Here, I shall respond directly (...) only to Murray's views, rather than also deal with state-leniency. This is because I accept Murray's thesis, without endorsing his specific arguments for it, that state-leniency is disastrous as a response to crimes against persons and their justly acquired property. (shrink)

The notion of an extended simple region (henceforth ESR) has recently been marshalled in the service of arguments for a variety of conclusions. Exactly how to understand the idea of extendedness as it applies to simple regions, however, has been largely ignored, or, perhaps better, assumed. In this paper we first (§1) outline what we take to be the standard way that philosophers are thinking about extendedness, namely as an intrinsic property of regions. We then introduce an (...) alternative picture (§2), according to which extendedness is extrinsic. In §3 we argue that it matters which way of thinking about extendedness is the right one, since how ESRs behave is sensitive to what extendedness consists in, and various arguments that appeal to ESRs turn out to be unsound if extendedness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. (shrink)

Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..