If we express our knowledge in sentences, we will find that these sentences are linked in complex patterns governed by our observations and our inferences from these observations. These inferences are to a large extent driven by logical rules. We ask whether the structure logic imposes on our knowledge restricts what we forget and what we remember. The model is a two period S5 logic. In this logic, we propose a memory loss operator: the agent forgets a sentence pif (...) and only if he knows pat time 1 and he does not know pat time 2. Equipped with the operator, we prove theorems on the relation between knowledge and memory loss. The main results point to classes of formulas that an agent cannot forget, and classes of formulas he must forget. A desirable feature is that most results hold in the S4 logic. The results illustrate bounds to memory loss, and thus to bounded rationality. We apply the model to single-agent conventions: conventions made between an agent and himself. (shrink)

How do communities establish shared communication systems? The Common Knowledge view assumes that symbolic conventions develop through the accumulation of common knowledge regarding communication practices among the members of a community. In contrast with this view, it is proposed that coordinated communication emerges a by‐product of local interactions among dyads. A set of multi‐agent computer simulations show that a population of “egocentric” agents can establish and maintain symbolic conventions without common knowledge. In the simulations, convergence to a (...) single conventional system was most likely and most efficient when agents updated their behavior on the basis of local rather than global, system‐level information. The massive feedback and parallelism present in the simulations gave rise to phenomena that are often assumed to result from complex strategic processing on the part of individual agents. The implications of these findings for the development of theories of language use are discussed. (shrink)

Conformity by an agent to a convention to which the agent is a party is rational only if the agent prefers to conform given the other parties conform and believes the others will conform. But this justification is inadequate; what, for example, is the justification for this belief? The required rational justification requires recourse to (a) preferences for general conformity (as opposed to merely conditional preferences for one's own conformity) and (b) procedures. An agent adopts a (...) procedure when he chooses to perform a whole set of future actions, as opposed to a single action. (shrink)

This paper investigates Western professional bankers’ perceptions of Islamic finance. Exploiting data from an original survey, we carry out a principal component analysis to characterize the main dimensions on which financial agents diverge. The PCA extracts five dimensions—accounting for 61 % of the variance in the agents’ answers—that we interpret with the help of a pilot field survey. In addition to confirm the increased association of Islamic financial values with ethical practices in the West, our results allow us to understand (...) how the observed growth of the industry has been conceptualized by conventional agents. The five dimensions identified shed light on the multitude of constructs that have informed the diffusion of Islamic financial ideas to international markets. This supports the fact that Islamic finance cannot be seen as a single movement but is characterized by opposing and concurrent logics in global markets. (shrink)

Conventional economic theory assumes that agents should be consistent across decisions. However, it is often observed that experimental subjects fail to report consistent preferences. So far, these inconsistencies are almost always examined singly. We thus wonder whether the more inconsistent individuals in one task are also more inconsistent in other tasks. We propose an experiment in which subjects are asked to report their preferences over risky bets so as to obtain, for each subject, three measures of inconsistencies: classical preference reversals, (...) framing effects and preference instability. In line with previous experimental findings, subjects are largely inconsistent according to each of these three measures and there are considerable individual differences. The main result is that we find no correlation among these three measures of inconsistency. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory” by Etienne B. Roesch, Matthew Spencer, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay & J. Mark Bishop. Upshot: We support Roesch and his co-authors’ theoretical stance on constructivist artificial agents, and wish to enrich their “exploration of the functional properties of interaction” with complementary results. By revisiting their experiments with an agent that we developed previously, we explore two issues that they deliberately (...) left aside: autonomous intentionality and dynamic reutilization of knowledge by the agent. Our results reveal an alternative pathway to constructivism that addresses the central question of intentionality in a single agent from the very beginning of its design, suggesting that the property of distributed processing proposed by Roesch et al. is not essential to constructivism. (shrink)

In this paper we present a sequent calculus for the multi-agent system S5 m . First, we introduce a particularly simple alternative Kripke semantics for the system S5 m . Then, we construct a hypersequent calculus for S5 m that reflects at the syntactic level this alternative interpretation. We prove that this hypersequent calculus is theoremwise equivalent to the Hilbert-style system S5 m , that it is contraction-free and cut-free, and finally that it is decidable. All results are proved (...) in a purely syntactic way and the cut-elimination procedure yields an upper bound of ip 2 (n, 0) where ip 2 is an hyperexponential function of base 2. (shrink)

Temporal epistemic logics are known, from results of Halpern and Vardi, to have a wide range of complexities of the satisfiability problem: from PSPACE, through non-elementary, to highly undecidable. These complexities depend on the choice of some key parameters specifying, inter alia, possible interactions between time and knowledge, such as synchrony and agents' abilities for learning and recall. In this work we develop practically implementable tableau-based decision procedures for deciding satisfiability in single-agent synchronous temporal-epistemic logics with interactions between (...) time and knowledge. We discuss some complications that occur, even in the single-agent case, when interactions between time and knowledge are assumed and show how the method of incremental tableaux can be adapted to work in EXPSPACE, respectively 2EXPTIME, for these logics, thereby also matching the upper bounds obtained for them by Halpern and Vardi. (shrink)

Starting from 2009, national courts of the EU Member States for the first time gained a “real” right to request the EU Court of Justice for preliminary rulings in asylum matters. First judgments of this Court demonstrate equivocal tendencies: some are blaming the Court for incompetence in asylum matters, others believe that the adoption of authoritative decisions at the European level will assist in developing consistent practice of applying asylum law in the European Union, something that failed at international level (...) due to absence of a single authoritative body to provide guidance on interpretation and application of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Considering that the judgments of the EU Court are part of the EU law, the Member States should develop their national asylum law with due regard being taken to those judgments. By the beginning of 2012, the Court has issued eight judgments on the interpretation of various problematic issues of EU asylum law. This Article analyses the jurisprudence of the EU Court in asylum cases, related to the granting of refugee status and subsidiary protection. It also provides a critical evaluation of those judgments. The main objective of the Article is to familiarise the relevant Lithuanian institutions and lawyers with the first judgments of the EU Court in asylum cases and encourage discussions concerning the application of rules established by the Court in the Lithuanian context. Due to limited size, this Article presents the analysis of two EU Court judgments adopted on interpretation of the 2004 Qualification Directive: Elgafaji v. The Netherlands (2009) dealing with granting of subsidiary protection, and Abdulla and others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2010), dealing with cessation of refugee status. The value of those judgments first of all lies in the guidance they provided to the Member States on such concepts as: protection in a situation of an armed conflict, agents of protection, effectiveness of protection; as well as determination of a relationship between refugee status and subsidiary protection, relationship of the Qualification Directive with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), also cessation of protection. Elgafaji decision, while quite liberal with regard to persons seeking international protection, is not so liberally applied in the Member States’ practice and does not in itself guarantee positive outcome of the application of a concrete individual fleeing from an armed conflict, or a liberal approach to granting subsidiary protection in the Member States. Based on Elgafaji judgment it is clear that: Art. 15(b) of the Qualification Directive correspond to Art. 3 ECHR, while Art. 15(c) provides additional protection and in that it expands the Member States’ obligations beyond the ECHR to provide protection to persons fleeing in situations of armed conflict. While not every person arriving from an armed conflict situation would automatically fall under the granting of subsidiary protection, in certain exceptional situations indiscriminate violence may amount to individual threat without invoking personal circumstances. The EU Court departed from the individualisation requirement applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Art. 3 cases and did not also rely on international humanitarian law, by introducing a “sliding scale” formula for establishing an individual threat in armed conflict situation instead. This formula addressed the alleged internal discrepancy between “individual threat” and “indiscriminate violence”. The Abdulla decision brought in the human rights and law enforcement perspectives to the interpretation of cessation clauses, however it represents a rather superficial approach in the context of the analysed concepts (e.g. towards effectiveness of protection provided by the multinational armed forces) and is likely to be incompatible with the latest legislative trends in the EU asylum instruments (e.g. determination of refugee status and subsidiary protection by means of a single procedure) and the recent jurisprudence under the ECHR (e.g. failure to ensure a minimum standard of living may violate the ECHR). (shrink)

We present in this paper an axiomatization of Belnap and Perloff's stit theory (a logic of "seeing to it that") with a single agent. The idea of the proof is to apply the notion of companion sets--the same notion as used in another paper by the author that showed the decidability of stit theory with a single agent and Refref equivalence.

The purpose of this paper is to prove the decidability ofstit theory (a logic of seeing to it that) with a single agent andRefref Equivalence. This result is obtained through an axiomatization of the theory and a proof that it has thefinite model property. A notion ofcompanions to stit formulas is introduced and extensively used in the proof.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Wu-wei as a Unifying MetaphorChris FraserEffortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China. By Edward Slingerland. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 352. $60.00.This provocative work is the most ambitious general study of pre-Qin thought to appear in more than a decade. It deals with what is increasingly recognized as one of the period's key themes, the ethical ideal of perfected (...) action and the processes of cultivation, or uncultivation, by which it might be achieved. The book has two specific aims, one substantive, one methodological (p. vii). The substantive aim is to show that the notion of wu-wei, which Slingerland renders as "effortless action," functioned as a shared ideal and problematic for both Daoists and Confucians and that internal tensions in this ideal motivated much of the development of Warring States thought (p. 5). The methodological aim is to illustrate the fruitfulness of conceptual-metaphor theory, familiar from the work of Lakoff and Johnson, by employing it to articulate and support the book's substantive theses (p. vii).For Slingerland, wu-wei is "a state of personal harmony in which actions flow freely and instantly from one's spontaneous inclinations... and yet nonetheless accord perfectly with the dictates of the situation at hand, display an almost supernatural efficacy, and (in the Confucian context at least) harmonize with the demands of conventional morality" (p. 7). Slingerland expands on this characterization in various ways, without making it entirely clear how all the features he identifies fit together. On the one hand, he explains that wu-wei is a phenomenological feature of the agent's subjective mental state: "wu-wei properly refers not to what is actually happening (or not happening) in the realm of observable action but rather to... the phenomenological state of the doer" (p. 7), primarily one of effortlessness and unselfconsciousness (pp. 29-33). But wu-wei is also "action that... accords in every particular with the normative order of the cosmos" (p. 5), so beyond its phenomenological features, it must include an objective normative component as well. Another remark suggests that wu-wei fundamentally is not a phenomenological state after all, since "it represents not a transitory state but rather a set of dispositions" (p. 7). Probably these various statements are meant to emphasize that the crux of wu-wei is to achieve and sustain a certain sort of psychological state, which then reliably generates effortless, normatively appropriate, efficacious action.The phrase 'wu-wei' plays essentially no role in Confucian texts and is absent from large chunks of the Zhuangzi. So Slingerland's thesis that wu-wei is the joint [End Page 97] ideal of both Daoist and Confucian thought faces a daunting justificatory challenge, which he proposes to meet by applying conceptual metaphor theory (p. 10). On his interpretation, wu-wei is not to be understood literally, as "non-doing," since in the state denoted by wu-wei, the agent is not actually inactive, doing nothing at all (p. 11). This gap between literal meaning and actual reference indicates that the term 'wu-wei' functions metaphorically, referring to "a metaphorically conceived situation" in which an action occurs even though the agent exerts no effort (p. 11). Slingerland hypothesizes that wu-wei became a technical term for effortless action because it is the most general of a network of conceptual metaphors for effortlessness and unselfconsciousness, including families of metaphors for "following" (p. 29), "ease" (p. 30), and "forgetting" (p. 33). This network expresses a unified, "deeper conceptual structure," appeal to which justifies the claim that "apparently diverse ideals of perfected action" are in fact articulations and developments of a single metaphorically conceived ideal, though the term denoting it—'wu-wei'—may not appear in a particular text (p. 11).Once we have a grip on the conceptual structure of wu-wei through the families of metaphors that constitute it, we can identify wu-wei as a central problematic of pre-Qin thought and trace its development by examining the use of these metaphors in texts from the Book of Odes and the Book of History (chapter 1) through the Xunzi (chapter 7). Each... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GOOD MEN'S WOMEN: HUME ON CHASTITY AND TRUST At the very heart of Hume's philosophy in the Treatise, namely between his discussion of the artificial and the natural virtues, he places a short chapter entitled "Of Chastity and Modesty." Its central position is appropriate, since these supposed virtues present something of a test case for Hume's account of the relation between nature and artifice, and, more generally, beyond his (...) moral philosophy, for his views on regularity and constancy in and out of individual lives. For these theoretical reasons, as well as for the calm realism of his treatment of sexual inequality, the chapter warrants more attention than it has received. Perhaps Hume's most important contribution to moral philosophy is his account of the difference between natural virtues, displayed in actions which do good one by one, each act having value independently of whether similar acts are performed by oneself and others on other occasions, and artificial virtues displayed in acts in essential conformity to established socially useful conventions, which do good only in so far as they are supported by general conformity. Hume does not, like Kant, insist that we always see morally good action as obedience to law, nor does he neglect the importance of those areas where good can be done only if acts are correctly seen as conforming to general laws, general conformity to which is not only willed by the agent but assumed by him to be in effect. Hume gives a subtle and elaborate account of when we do and when we do not need moral and social conformity, of which virtues are and which virtues are not mediated by changeable public will or convention. Conventions must operate before any act can count as property-respecting, but there is no need to ask 'can I will this as universal law?' before comforting a frightened child. Whatever the conventions, whatever others do, such an act does some good, and is the sort of 2. act which displays the natural virtue of kindness. Hume requires of a virtuous act not merely that it be helpful or agreeable to someone (or some public) but that it display a durable character trait in the agent. An uncharacteristic act of kindness to a child may do good without displaying a virtue or a good character. Approval is given, according to Hume, to persons on account of theii durable character traits, as displayed in their actions and reactions. The natural response to virtue is to welcome its possessor: His company is a satisfaction to me (T588), and virtue in rags will be the exception in a smoothly functioning society. The fact that Hume's ethics is an agent ethics, and that the concept of welcome virtue is more fundamental to it than that of a useful action, commits Hume, throughout his moral philosophy and especial!, in his treatment of the natural virtues, to an emphasis on consistency or integrity of character, to a search for durable character traits and so for characteristic actions. Now a person might be characteristically kind, yet on occasion, under stress, give expression to unaccustomed malice. The uncharacteristic malicious act may weaken but not destroy the virtue of kindness which kind acts have both expressed and infixed (T411). When the malicious act is known, the person's reputation for benevolence may be slightly sullied, but certainly not ruined. Both within one person's life, and within one population, there will be reason to encourage consistently virtuous action, but no reason to feel that all is lost or spoiled if lapses from the natural virtues occur. Even when cruelty is the norm, the rare kind act may be appreciated, if not rewarded, the rare kind person may be welcome, if also exploited and victimized. With the artificial virtues there is a stronger demand and need for uniformity in a population, since the value of any one just act, or one person's character trait, depends upon the support received from the similar acts and 3. traits of others. Every single act is performed in the expectation that others are to perform the like (T498). To display artificial virtues, actions must be seen as rule... (shrink)

Visual narratives, like comics, at times show depictions of characters’ imagination, dreams, or flashbacks, which seem incongruent with the ongoing primary narrative. Such “domain constructions” thus integrate an auxiliary domain (e.g. a dream) within the primary domain (the expected, physical storyworld), and may require readers to resolve seemingly non-co-referential figures as co-referential (e.g. when a character’s dream shows that character as an animal). In three self-paced reading experiments, we investigate the processing and understanding of single vs. multiple domains in (...) sequences with co-reference issues (Exp. 1) and whether graphic cues facilitate such domain switches (Exp. 2 and 3). Domain switches incurred greater updating costs but were comprehensible, with greater similarity across panels predicting faster processing, and comic reading experience affecting viewing times. The successful integration of fantasized agents which seem to lack co-reference implies that visual narrative comprehension goes beyond event and scene perception alone, but also involves proficiency in conventional constructions related to perspective-taking and inferencing. (shrink)

Although Habermas has never worked out a conception of virtue and indeed criticizes this notion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the virtuous attitude of participants in discourse — be it in the realm of democracy and law or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal only with the ethical foundations of morality, I argue first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppositional analysis of speech as such have to be (...) complemented by the sensitive perception on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are understood in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the ideal which is already anticipated in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows secondly that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for acting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude genuinely entails the obligation to strive to perfect all those capacities that enable us to sensitively understand the other's claim. A discussion of the capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of sensitivity as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agent's evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit well with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a possible caveat of Wellmer and Habermas who might claim that the proposed conception of virtue would only be valid for participants in discourse, but not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of wide latitude, it does not fall under this objection. (shrink)

Big cities and growing industrial areas bring high risk of different kinds of pollutions which would implicate to the quality of life of the society. Discovering and monitoring of polluted areas using autonomous mobile robots is nowadays a frequently considered solution concerning both environmental and human safety problems. Being part of a distributed control system, such robots can help to improve the efficiency of the existing conventional pollution prevention systems. On the other hand, during the last decade, wireless sensor networks (...) have provoked the interest of specialists from different areas by imposing a large number of theoretical and practical challenges related to their implementation. This paper attempts to deal with both issues by presenting a possible way for building robotized WSNs that can be suitable for solving different environmental monitoring tasks. The goal is to transform the WSN into an adaptive sensor system with intelligent behavior that can be used to discover and track spots or areas where given monitored environmental parameters violate defined thresholds. The inclusion of robotized agents into the WSN structure can provide additional flexibility with respect to the installation of the network sensors and allow reliable information gathering and transfer. The proposed algorithmic methods have been tested on a pre-built laboratory prototype of a robotized WSN. The robotized agents have been built using iRobot Create mobile platforms that are additionally equipped with a single-chip computers Gumstix Verdex pro TM XL6P with various expansion modules. (shrink)

Conventions are regularities in social behaviour of the past that enable us to coordinate our actions. Some conventions are lawlike: they are expected to be observed always or nearly always. However, in order to coordinate our actions, it may suffice that a precedent has occurred often enough, and sometimes even a single precedent will do. So, in general, conventions merely enable us to solve our coordination problems; lawlike conventions are a special case. Grammatical conventions (...) are often lawlike; sense conventions are typically enabling. In order to resolve the indeterminacies that sense conventions give rise to, interlocutors must rely on the common ground. In this and other ways, common ground is a prerequisite for convention‐based communication. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the use of event models for automated planning. Event models are the action defining structures used to define a semantics for dynamic epistemic logic. Using event models, two issues in planning can be addressed: Partial observability of the environment and knowledge. In planning, partial observability gives rise to an uncertainty about the world. For single-agent domains, this uncertainty can come from incomplete knowledge of the starting situation and from the nondeterminism of actions. In (...) multi-agent domains, an additional uncertainty arises from the fact that other agents can act in the world, causing changes that are not instigated by the agent itself. For an agent to successfully construct and execute plans in an uncertain environment, the most widely used formalism in the literature on automated planning is “belief states”: sets of different alternatives for the current state of the world. Epistemic logic is a significantly more expressive and theoretically better founded method for representing knowledge and ignorance about the world. Further, epistemic logic allows for planning according to the knowledge (and iterated knowledge) of other agents, allowing the specification of a more complex class of planning domains, than those simply concerned with simple facts about the world. We show how to model multi-agent planning problems using Kripke-models for representing world states, and event models for representing actions. Our mechanism makes use of slight modifications to these concepts, in order to model the internal view of agents, rather than that of an external observer. We define a type of planning domain called epistemic planning domains, a generalisation of classical planning domains, and show how epistemic planning can successfully deal with partial observability, nondeterminism, knowledge and multiple agents. Finally, we show epistemic planning to be decidable in the single-agent case, but only semi-decidable in the multi-agent case. (shrink)

At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders freely (...) from conventional wisdom through conventional medicine, conventions of art and "conventions of morality" to conventions of bidding in bridge.2 Surely it is unwise to try to fell these all with a single stone. Lewis's original goal, however, pursued further in (Lewis 1975), was to describe the conventionality of language, and this may be a more reasonable target. (shrink)

The paper considers two-agent order acceptance scheduling problems with different scheduling criteria. Two agents have a set of jobs to be processed by a single machine. The processing time and due date of each job are known in advance. In the order accepting scheduling problem, jobs are allowed to be rejected. The objective of the problem is to maximize the net revenue while keeping the weighted number of tardy jobs for the second agent within a predetermined value. (...) A mixed-integer linear programming formulation is provided to obtain the optimal solution. The problem is considered as an NP-hard problem. Therefore, MILP can be used to solve small problem instances optimally. To solve the problem instances with realistic size, heuristic and metaheuristic algorithms have been proposed. A heuristic method is used to determine and secure a quick solution while the metaheuristic based on particle swarm optimization is designed to obtain the near-optimal solution. A numerical experiment is piloted and conducted on the benchmark instances that could be obtained from the literature. The performances of the proposed algorithms are tested through numerical experiments. The proposed PSO can obtain the solution within 0.1% of the optimal solution for problem instances up to 60 jobs. The performance of the proposed PSO is found to be significantly better than the performance of the heuristic. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Three Conventions: Metaphysical Dialogues, Principia Metaphysica, and Commentary So long as we conceive the world to be only in the process of Becoming, so long will it be inevitable that all our world-conceptions be in constant flux. A world that never is but always to be cannot remain stable enough for a single moment to allow even of description, let alone of definition and interpretation; and a statement approximately true. Today may be anything but true (...) tomorrow. Metaphysics and Phi 1050phy, in these circumstances, are not so much as even guesses at truth, since the truth about a process of Becoming, if it be no more than that, can only be known when the process is complete, that is to say, when all life has ceased. They are, at best, a kind of meteorological prediction, but in a field vastly more complex than that of weather and, in consequence, at a vastly greater disadvantage than common mete orology. If, as is too. Generally assumed by modern science, what we call life is only Becoming, there is small wonder that Metaphysics and Philosophy proper should be regarded as fancies unworthy of serious attention. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance. We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. (...) Agreements stemming from conventions are “tacit” in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed. (shrink)

Neo-pragmatists propose that content is determined by social convention. A convention is a coordination problem in which each agent prefers any solution to none, yet has no preference amongst the alternative solutions. This paper argues that the best known theory of convention, David Lewis’, cannot yield a theory of content because it appeals to beliefs and other states that themselves have content. The question then arises whether a theory of convention that does not appeal to states with content can (...) be developed. The idea that a radical enactivist approach to convention based on basic emotions is then tentatively proposed. (shrink)

Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? (...) In a pioneering study, Lewis (1969) addresses these questions by applyingnoncooperative game theory. Lewis defines a convention as aNash coordination equilibrium of a noncooperative game that issalient, that is, it is somehow conspicuous to the agents so that all expect one another to conform with the equilibrium. This paper presents a new game theoretic definition of conventions, which formalizes the notion of salience and which also generalizes the class of conventions Lewis discusses in his work. I define a convention as acorrelated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) satisfying apublic intentions criterion: Every agent wants his intended action to becommon knowledge. I argue that many conventions correspond to correlated equilibria that are not Nash equilibria, and that this is consistent with Lewis' general viewpoint. Finally, I argue that game theoretic characterizations of convention, such as Lewis' and my own, help to explain a convention's stability, but that a fully satisfactory account of the emergence of convention requires a theory of equilibrium selection beyond the scope of Lewis' work. (shrink)

Grice coined the term ‘conventional implicature’ in a short passage in ‘Logic and conversation’. The description is intuitive and deeply intriguing. The range of phenomena that have since been assigned this label is large and diverse. I survey the central factual motivation, arguing that it is loosely uni- fied by the idea that conventional implicatures contribute a separate dimen- sion of meaning. I provide tests for distinguishing conventional implicatures from other kinds of meaning, and I briefly explore ways in which (...) one can incorporate multiple dimensions of meaning into a single theory. (shrink)

Macromolecular interactions play a central role in many biological processes. Protein‐protein interactions have mostly been studied by co‐immunoprecipitation, which cannot provide quantitative information on all possible molecular connections present in the complex. We will review a new approach that allows cellular proteins and biomolecular complexes to be studied in real‐time at the single‐molecule level. This technique is called single‐molecule pull‐down (SiMPull), because it integrates principles of conventional immunoprecipitation with the powerful single‐molecule fluorescence microscopy. SiMPull is used to (...) count how many of each protein is present in the physiological complexes found in cytosol and membranes. Concurrently, it serves as a single‐molecule biochemical tool to perform functional studies on the pulled‐down proteins. In this review, we will focus on the detailed methodology of SiMPull, its salient features and a wide range of biological applications in comparison with other biosensing tools. (shrink)

Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, but it is the most likely outcome in a finite (...) population model of learning known as the Moran process. On the basis of this result it is suggested that evolutionary game theory’s standard models may yield results that are systematically distorted for a class of signalling games that have the abstract structure of social dilemmas. 1 Introduction2 The Seduction Game3 Imitation Dynamics with Small Mutations4 Dynamics with Unverifiable Message5 Analysis of a Related Three-Strategy Game6 Conclusion. (shrink)

Important medical advances over the last several decades have vastly improved the technical capacity to control human pain. Millions of patients suffering from cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other conditions have been able to find relief from incapacitating chronic and acute pain. However, despite these developments, pain remains severely under treated worldwide, particularly in developing countries. The tragic consequence is that for millions of people around the globe, excruciating pain is an inescapable reality of life.

In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful communication in terms of standard game theory requires agents to be very rational and fully informed. The main goal of the paper is to show that in terms of evolutionary game theory we can motivate the emergence and self-sustaining force of (...) (i) conventional meaning and (ii) some conversational interpretation strategies in terms of weaker and, perhaps, more plausible assumptions. (shrink)

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human (...) being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic. (shrink)

M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka claimed that their reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction’ can “serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory”. The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense (...) of deduction’ allows to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a continuum of behavioral strategies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Norms, Conventions, and PsychopathsNeil Levy (bio)Keywordspsychopathy, morality, conventions, responsibilityI am grateful to my commentators for their provocative challenges to my claim that psychopaths ought to be excused moral responsibility for their wrongdoing owing to their (alleged) failure to grasp the moral/conventional distinction. I have learned from all the commentators—now, and in some cases in the past as well—and I am sincerely honored by their having taken my (...) work seriously enough to comment on it, even if only to take issue with it. In what follows, I shall attempt to reply to their main criticisms. As will shortly become clear, I do not here have the space for anything like adequate responses. Instead, I shall have to content myself with programmatic statements of how such responses might go. Let me admit at the outset that until the details of these responses are fully worked out, and the relevant empirical research conduced, I cannot be sure that the responses will succeed. Nevertheless, there are grounds for confidence, given the available data.Because there is some overlap between the criticisms, I shall address some of them—those of Blair, Nichols, and Vargas—by topic rather than by commentator, before turning to Mullen and Matravers.Is the Ability to Understand the Moral/Conventional Distinction a Necessary Condition of Aptness for Moral Responsibility?Blair, as well as Vargas and Nichols, suggests that an agent's knowing that an action is against the rules might be sufficient to ground responsibility for performing that action, even if the agent lacks the ability to draw the moral/conventional distinction. As Blair points out, we do not reserve blame only for those who violate moral rules. Blame, and sometimes punishments, are also meted out to those who violate merely conventional norms. Because psychopaths can understand conventional norms perfectly well, they may therefore seem to be appropriate targets of at least some kind of moral blame.But is it really the case that agents are (ever) blameworthy for violating conventional norms alone? Many philosophers, for instance when considering the morality of civil disobedience, have argued that conventional norms are typically backed by second-order moral norms. Hence, for many or all conventional norms, there is a (defeasible) moral obligation not to violate that norm, an obligation independent of the content of the conventional norm; it is because there are such second-order moral obligations that agents are blameworthy for violating conventional norms. [End Page 163] But if this is the case, then the fact that we sometimes blame agents for violating conventional norms is not evidence against the claim that the ability to grasp moral norms is a necessary condition of blameworthiness. There is no reason to think that psychopaths will find it any easier to grasp second-order moral norms than first-order (of course, they may understand that there are such things as second-order norms—norms concerning norms—but for them such norms will only be conventional). In fact, it might be more difficult to understand the moral force of second-order moral norms than first, inasmuch as the harms caused by violating such norms are emotional and not physical. Normal subjects invest (some) conventional norms with moral significance, and it is for this reason that we regard violations of such norms as apt to give rise to blame; lacking the ability to draw the moral/conventional distinction, psychopaths cannot invest such norms with moral significance. Once again, for them these norms are merely conventional, and they therefore fail to grasp the full significance of violating them.It might be objected that if conventional transgressions are (sometimes) backed up by second-order moral norms, children would not classify them as neatly as they do. They would misclassify some conventional norms as moral, insofar as they are backed up by second-order moral norms. They would therefore deny that violations of conventions are permissible on the say-so of an authority. There are two possible explanations of children's classifications, compatible with the suggestion that some conventions are backed by second-order moral norms. First, it may be that greater cognitive sophistication is required to grasp second-order moral norms than... (shrink)

This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cubitt and Sugden’s reconstruction) stresses the importance of including it in the definition of convention. I discuss arguments pro et contra (...) to argue that, although the assumption might be relevant to a descriptively adequate account of social convention, it is not required for its rational reconstruction. I then point out that Lewis’ account, properly speaking, is of common reason to believe, rather than of common knowledge, and argue that, in order to formalize aptly the distinction between reason to believe and belief, standard formal epistemic models need to be supplemented with so-called awareness structures. Finally, I stress that the notion of knowledge implicit in Lewis’ text involves interesting elements that cannot be captured in the standard propositional formalizations, but need the full expressive force of quantified epistemic logic. (shrink)

In this paper, a model of norms as cognitive objects is applied to establish connections between social conventions and prescriptions. Relevant literature on this issue, especially found in AI and the social sciences, will be shown to suffer from a dychotomic view: a conventionalistic view proposed by rationality and AI scientists; and a prescriptive view proposed by some philosophers of law (Kelsen 1934/1979, Hart 1961, Ross, 1958).In the present work, the attempt is made to fill the gap between these (...) views by putting forward a hypothesis concerning the process from perceived behavioural regularities to normative assumptions. The emergence of norms will be here seen as intrinsically intertwined with the emergence of normative beliefs. Unlike that assumed by the conventionalistic sight, the process of emergence is seen as a non-continuous phenomenon. A given behavioural regularity will be argued to give rise to a normative belief if and as long as that regularity is believed to be prescribed within the community. Two corollaries of this hypothesis will be examined: (1) unlike that implied by the conventionalistic view, the spreading of norms is not only due to a passive behavioural social influence (imitation) but also to an active cognitive one (the spreading of normative wants and beliefs); (2) unlike that assumed by the prescriptive view, a norm is not necessarily explicitly and deliberately issued by some normative authority, but is grounded upon the norm-addressees' beliefs that they are generally prescribed to comply with it. (shrink)

I present a game-theoretical multi-agent system to simulate the evolutionary process responsible for the pragmatic phenomenon division of pragmatic labour (DOPL), a linguistic convention emerging from evolutionary forces. Each agent is positioned on a toroid lattice and communicates via signaling games , where the choice of an interlocutor depends on the Manhattan distance between them. In this framework I compare two learning dynamics: reinforcement learning (RL) and belief learning (BL). An agent’s experiences from previous plays influence his (...) communication behaviour, and RL agents act in a non-rational way whereas BL agents display a small degree of rationality by using best response dynamics . The complete system simulates an evolutionary process of communication strategies, which agents can learn in a structured spatial society. The significant questions are: what circumstances could lead to an evolutionary process that doesn’t result in the expected DOPL convention; and to what extent is interlocutor rationality necessary for the emergence of a society-wide convention à la DOPL? (shrink)

Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites. Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, (...) may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory. The position--"perspectival invariantism"-- introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science. (shrink)

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific (...) bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

Turiel and colleagues divided norms into two kinds: Moral norms and conventional norms. Moral norms are universal, concerned with welfare, justice, fairness, equality and/or rights, and rule/authority independent. Conventional norms are local, rule/authority dependent, and concerned with maintaining social coordination, preserving tradition, and avoiding punishment. This account has been challenged, and the existence of a crisp distinction remains debatable. In this paper, I defend a version of the moral/conventional distinction on the basis that people generally judge norms concerned with welfare (...) violations as moral, and that they distinguish between the morality of the action and that of the agent. I argue that we can make sense of the mixed data because people differ in how they perceive harm. Harm perception, rather than “objective” harm, is the relevant variable in knowing how people judge norms. To illustrate this, I explore why people perceive norms differently and how the moral/conventional distinction is reflected not only between cultures, but within them too. This should prompt us to reimagine the moral/conventional distinction to account for this diversity in perceptions. Doing away with the distinction risks misrepresenting both inter- and intra-cultural diversity in perceptions of harm. (shrink)

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth (...) and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense. (shrink)

Polysemy, understood as instances of a single linguistic expression having multiple related senses, is not a homogenous phenomenon. There are regular (apparently, rule‐based) cases and irregular (resemblance‐based) cases, which have different processing profiles. Although a primary source of polysemy is pragmatic inference, at least some cases become conventionalised and linguistically encoded. Three main issues are discussed: (a) the key differences between regular and irregular cases and the role, if any, of a “core meaning”; (b) the distinction between pragmatic polysemy (...) and semantic polysemy; and (c) the role of syntactic meaning in both generating and constraining polysemy. (shrink)

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous (...) game-theoretic definitions (Lewis 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,.. (shrink)

We consider how human subjects establish signaling conventions in the context of Lewis-Skyrms signaling games. These experiments involve games where there are precisely the right number of signal types to represent the states of nature, games where there are more signal types than states, and games where there are fewer signal types than states. The aim is to determine the conditions under which subjects are able to establish signaling conventions in such games and to identify a learning dynamics (...) that approximates how they succeed when they do. Our results suggest that human agents tend to use a win-stay/lose-shift with inertia dynamics to establish conventions in such games. We briefly consider the virtues and vices of this low-rationality dynamics. (shrink)

Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal principles. (...) Commitments like those generated by agreements may be necessary for rational expectations to arise. Social conventions, construed as group principles (following the analysis in my book On Social Facts), would suffice for this task. (shrink)