Essa proposta nasceu de uma experiência em uma escola de ensino médio e destaca as influências geradoras da Filosofia para Crianças (P4C) em jovens adultos. Primeiramente, discuto e dou exemplos de como o sistema escolar tradicionalmente não valoriza o aprendizado e o pensamento filosófico, reduzindo o processo à distribuição pré-embalada de respostas prontas. Essas formas de aprendizado, também conhecidas como modelo “bancário” de educação, desvalorizam as formas que as crianças têm de conhecer e estar no mundo. Essa postura pedagógica, entre (...) outros problemas, resulta em um foco na dimensão quantitativa-cronológica do tempo, deixando pouco ou nenhum espaço para a importância do momento presente, que pertence e é natural à maioria das experiências infantis. A parte central do artigo é uma tentativa de explicar melhor, por meio de conceitos derivados da antropologia e da pedagogia, em quê consiste essa dimensão alternativa do tempo e que possibilidades ela abre nos ambientes educacionais. Na seção final, defendo que participar de uma comunidade de investigação como a de Filosofia para Crianças como um jovem adulto representa uma complexidade maior, pois é mais difícil romper com certezas consolidadas. No entanto, também envolve a oportunidade de entrar em uma máquina do tempo metafórica que nos permite recuperar o tempo da infância. Essa máquina do tempo metafórica abre possibilidades para que alunos e professores reorientem seu relacionamento consigo mesmos, uns com os outros e com o mundo. (shrink)

Miran Božovič, an expert in modern philosophy, in his new work begins to read some literary works from the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries in the light of philosophical theories, either explicitly or implicitly contained in them. These range from little-known novels such as G. Daniel's Journey to the World of Descartes (1690) and Fontenell's State of the Philosophers (1682), through 18th century classics, Diderot's Rameau's nephew, to one of the greatest 19th century novels, Melville's Moby Dick (1851) and Tolstoy's (...) short stories Kreutzer's Sonata (1889)--Publisher's website. (shrink)

The supreme counsel of the religion of Islam insistently emphasizes and promotes social solidarity and solidarity at every stage of life. Among the encouraged advices; the Qur'an and the hadith how meticulously focused on orphans and promised conditions and provisions for a virtuous life. The aim of the protection of orphans, shelter, representation, surety, evaluation of his property for bestowal, approaching with compassion and mercy. The prophet of Islam, who was born as orphan, Muhammad (pbuh.), by addressing the conscience of (...) humanity in order to protect the rights and law of orphan, brought preventive, encouraging orders and prohibitions. When it comes to dealing with orphans and protecting their rights and laws, it is not a correct approach to understand only in the form of protecting and meeting their material needs. On the contrary, it has been emphasized to meet his spiritual and psychological needs, not to insult his personality, and to contribute to his growing up as a beneficial individual for the society. This issue is stated as follows in the verse: “So don't crush the orphan” (Duhâ, 93/9). This order and the person of the Messenger of Allah also, draw the attention of mankind to respect for the material and spiritual rights of the orphan. The main target of the related things is not to leave the orphans alone, but to protect them, to provide an atmosphere of love. Otherwise, orphans deprived of the environment of love may pose problems for themselves and society while struggling with some psychological problems. The main purpose of our study is to draw attention to the compliance of the orphans' rights-law in the axis of the Qur'an and hadith according to the rapidly developing and changing life conditions in our age. (shrink)

???? Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky : Red. naukowa: Bożena Listkowska, Artur Andrzejuk Drugi tom słownika polskich filozofów tomistycznych (obejmujący lata 1919–1945), kontynuatorów myśli św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Znajdziemy w nim biogramy oraz omówienia poglądów, a także recenzje i wspomnienia. Tom drugi poświęcony jest omówieniu filozoficznych dokonań: Michała Klepacza, Kazimierza Kowalskiego, Franciszka Kwiatkowskiego, Czesława Martyniaka, Konstantego Józefa Michalskiego, Jana Salamuchy, Franciszka Sawickiego, Jana Stepy, Antoniego Szymańskiego, Jacka Woronieckiego, Aleksandra Żychlińskiego oraz przebiegowi Międzynarodowego Kongresu Tomistycznego, który odbył się w Poznaniu w 1935 r. (...) © Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky. (shrink)

One of the most important criteria for professionalism is accumulation of knowledge that is usable in professional practice. Nursing models and theories are important elements of accumulating nursing knowledge and have a chance to guarantee the ethical professional practice. In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of models in nursing research and newly created terminology has started to be used in nursing. In this study, a new model, termed as the Professional Values Model, developed by the (...) authors was described. Concepts comprising the conceptual framework of the model and relations between the concepts were explained. It is assumed that awareness about concepts of the model will increase not only the patients’ satisfaction with nursing care, but also the nurses’ job satisfaction and quality of nursing care. Contemporary literature has been reviewed and synthesized to develop this theoretical paper on the Professional Values Model in nursing. Having high values in nursing increases job satisfaction, which results in the improvement of patient care and satisfaction. Also, individual characteristics are effective in the determination of individual needs, priorities, and values. This relation, proved through research about the Professional Values Model, has been explained. With development of these concepts, individuals’ satisfaction with care and nurses’ job satisfaction will be enhanced, which will increase the quality of nursing care. Most importantly, nurses can take proper decisions about ethical dilemmas and take ethical action when they take these values into consideration when giving care. The Professional Values Model seems suitable for nurse managers and it is expected that testing will improve it. Implementation of the Professional Values Model by nurse managers may increase motivation of nurses they work with. It is suggested that guidance by the Professional Values Model may help in enhancement of motivation efforts of the nurse managers and therefore should be taken into account. (shrink)

When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...) Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this paper, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally distinguish between excuses and exemptions. We can excuse someone and still see them as a participant in normal human relationships, but when we exempt someone, we see them as something to be managed and handled: we take an objective attitude to them. Madness is typically assumed to ground exemptions, not excuses. So far, the standard philosophical picture. Seeing other people as objects to be managed and handled rather than as persons with whom one can have relationships is, however, (...) ethically problematic. If I am mad myself, consistently seeing myself this way becomes downright unsustainable. A better option, I will argue, is to fully appreciate my own difficulties and learn to show myself compassion and understanding. I, then, can excuse myself on those grounds. Furthermore, a compassionate self-excusing attitude leaves room for both nuance and improvement in a way that total exemption does not. Finally, I will argue that many mad actions ought to be considered justifiable and justified rather than in need of exemption or excuse. (shrink)

Praise, unlike blame, is generally considered well intended and beneficial, and therefore in less need of scrutiny. In line with recent developments, we argue that praise merits more thorough philosophical analysis. We show that, just like blame, praise can be problematic by expressing a failure to respect a person’s equal value or worth as a person. Such patronizing praise, however, is often more insidious, because praise tends to be regarded as well intended and beneficial, which renders it harder to recognize (...) and object to. Among other things, a philosophical analysis of patronizing praise helps people on the receiving end articulate why they feel uncomfortable or offended by it, shows patronizing praisers how their praise is problematic, and provides input for further philosophical analysis of blame.In the first section of the paper, we discuss how hypocritical praise, just like hypocritical blame, can fail to respect the equality of persons by expressing that the praiser applies more demanding moral standards to the praisee than to themself. We further discuss obstructionist praise, which loosely corresponds to complicit blame, and can similarly express that certain moral standards apply to others but not to the praiser. In the second part of the paper, we discuss another variety of patronizing praise. Praise can be an inaccurate appraisal of a person based on irrelevant considerations – like race, gender, or class – and thereby constitute a failure to recognize their equal worth as a person. We identify three ways in which such praise can manifest. (shrink)

Is our logical form of thought merely one among many, or must it be the form of thought as such? From Kant to Wittgenstein, philosophers have wrestled with variants of this question. This volume brings together nine distinguished thinkers on the subject, including James Conant, author of the seminal paper "The Search for Logically Alien Thought.".

Feasting on a plethora of social media platforms, news aggregators, and online marketplaces, recommender systems (RSs) are spreading pervasively throughout our daily online activities. Over the years, a host of ethical issues have been associated with the diffusion of RSs and the tracking and monitoring of users’ data. Here, we focus on the impact RSs may have on personal autonomy as the most elusive among the often-cited sources of grievance and public outcry. On the grounds of a philosophically nuanced notion (...) of autonomy, we illustrate three specific reasons why RSs may limit or compromise it: the threat of manipulation and deception associated with RSs; the RSs’ power to reshape users’ personal identity; the impact of RSs on knowledge and critical thinking. In our view, however, notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, RSs may effectively help users to navigate an otherwise overwhelming landscape. Our perspective, therefore, is not to be intended as a bulwark to protect the _status quo_ but as an invitation to carefully weigh these aspects in the design of ethically oriented RSs. (shrink)

In political theory it goes without saying that the constitution of government raises a claim for legitimacy. With the constitution of the people, however, it is different. It is often dismissed as a historical question. The conviction is that since the people cannot decide on its own composition the boundaries of democracy must be determined by other factors, such as the contingent forces of history. This article critically assesses this view. It argues that like the constitution of government, the constitution (...) of the people raises a claim for legitimacy. The failure to see this is what makes many theorists run into the arms of history. They submit the legitimacy of the people to the arbitrary and asymmetrical forces of the present. (shrink)

How should we adjust our beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than ourselves, such as experts and other epistemic superiors? In this paper, I develop and defend a deference model of epistemic authority. The paper attempts to resolve the debate between the preemption view and the total evidence view of epistemic authority by taking an accuracy-first approach to the issue of how we should respond to authoritative and expert testimony. I argue (...) that when we look at the debate through the lens of accuracy, it becomes clear that matters are more complicated than either the preemption view or the total evidence view are able to account for. Consequently, a deference model, outlined within a credence-based framework, does a better job of capturing the relevant phenomena, and explaining how we should update our beliefs in response to epistemically authoritative testimony. (shrink)

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called (...) hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...) belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

This article presents the development, validation and application of an instrument to measure everyday moral distress in different health care settings. The concept of moral distress has been discussed and developed over 20 years. A few instruments have been developed to measure it, predominantly in nursing. The instrument presented here consists of two factors: level of moral distress, and tolerance/openness towards moral dilemmas. It was tested in four medical departments and three pharmacies, where 259 staff members completed a questionnaire. The (...) two factors were found to be reliable. Differences in levels of moral distress were found between pharmacies and clinical departments, and between the youngest and oldest age groups; departmental staff and the youngest group experienced higher levels of moral distress. Departments reported less tolerance/openness towards moral dilemmas than pharmacies. The instrument needs to be tested further, but its strengths are the focus on everyday ethical dilemmas and its usefulness in different health care settings. (shrink)

Nos proponemos estudiar las objeciones de Cavendish hacia la filosofía experimental desde una perspectiva no dicotómica para mostrar que, lejos de establecer un enfrentamiento entre la filosofía contemplativa y la experimental, la razón y la sensación, o la naturaleza y el arte, la autora plantea una cooperación organizada entre estos aspectos. La postura de Cavendish puede comprenderse adecuadamente si se tiene en cuenta que su epistemología se arraiga en su metafísica, en la que los grados de la materia y los (...) distintos seres vivos que conforman el universo ocupan un lugar determinado y cumplen cierta función conformando una totalidad orgánica y armónica. (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. -/- La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)