Sie sind so verschieden, dass man sie nur unter der Kategorie ihrer ungewöhnlichen Grösse zusammenbringen kann: Hegel und Nietzsche.... Sie stimmen darin überein, dass Sokrates den Kern des griechischen Wesens verneint, ...

Sokrates hat als Figur in der kaiserzeitlichen Philosophie nicht zuletzt auch bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum eine Rolle gespielt. Dass dies auch für Aspekte der praktischen Ethik gilt, die mit seinem Namen verbunden werden, ist mit Blick auf die wachsende Jenseitsorientierung der kaiserzeitlichen, platonisch dominierten Philosophie bestritten worden. Michael Erler zeigt, dass die von Sokrates im Gorgias als 'wahre Politik' bezeichnete praktische Anwendung philosophischer Methoden gleichwohl auch im späteren Platonismus eine Rolle spielte und als Hilfestellung für das (...) Leben im Diesseits letztlich der Befreiung der Seele für das Jenseits diente."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Sokrates und die alte Kirche" verfügbar.

Автор ярким и доступным языком описывает жизнь Сократа и его философское мировоззрение, а также на основе источников путем логических рассуждений опровергает многие ошибочные представления об этом философе. Для историков и широкого круга читателей.

Zajímavě psaná odborná studie podrobným rozborem dochovaných svědectví o řeckém filosofu dokládá, že Sokrates "tak, jak žil a žije v obecném podvědomí, je vlastně postavou neskutečnou, nehistorickou, legendárně zidealizovanou", a že hlavní zásluhu na sokratovských legendách má jeho žák Plato.

This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one’s own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought (...) from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard’s reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness. (shrink)

Phaidon diyaloğunda Sokrates, dostlarıyla birlikte ruhun ölümsüzlüğü üzerine konuştuktan sonra, Kebes’in itirazı üzerine ona doğru dönerek hakikati arayış yolculuğunda kendi hayat hikayesi ve tecrübesini paylaşır. Kebes’e göre ruhun bu dünyadan önce var olması, sonrasında da varlığını sürdüreceği anlamına gelmez. Ayrıca ona göre bedenden bedene dolaşan ruh, bu dolaşımla yok olup gider ve bu nedenle ölümsüzlük diye bir şeyden bahsedilemez. Bu bağlamda Sokrates, ruhun ölümsüzlüğüne ilişkin Kebes’in itirazını ele almanın zorluğuna işaret eder ve bu meselede oluş ve bozuluşun nedeninin (...) araştırılması gerektiğini ifade eder. Bu noktada Sokrates gençlik yıllarında kendisinin de “neden” arayışı içerisinde olduğundan ve Anaksagoras başta olmak üzere doğa araştırmacılarından etkilendiğinden bahseder. Öte yandan Sokrates doğal neden arayışındaki umutlarının da boşa çıktığını belirtir. Bu umut yitiminden sonra Sokrates ‘logoi’a sığınma’ olarak belirttiği “ikinci yolculuğa” (deuteros plous) çıkar. Oluş dünyasına tabi her şeyin kendisine göre gerçekleştiği ilkesel nedeni doğanın içinde arayan düşünürlerin çelişkilerini fark eden genç Sokrates’in, fiziki dünyadan metafiziğe doğru seyreden yolculuğu bu yazının konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Ayrıca bu yazının amacı, ruhun ölümsüzlüğü gibi bir meselede, Sokrates’in kendi hayat hikayesini paylaşmasının gerekçesini araştırmak ve buradan hareketle Kebes’in itirazına yönelik Sokratik arayışın izlerini sürmektir. (shrink)

45~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 text" , and an element of "oralism" remains in all of Plato's written works. Nonetheless, Robb's "speculations" on the Platonic dialogues are certainly worth reading. Robb is quite aware that his book stirs up controversial issues, and some of these are briefly stated and discussed in his concluding chapter, "Homer, the Alphabet, and the Progress of Greek Literacy and Paideia." And yet in the very notions of "literacy" and "progress," some (...) weaknesses in Robb's work can be found. For example, as W. V. Harris observed in his Ancient Literacy , 3ft., there is no single definition of literacy or orality, and although Robb cites Harris's book , he takes no special account of it in attempting to define or characterize what he means by "orality" and "literacy." And in his zeal to provide a survey of the influence of alphabetic literacy on Plato, Robb perhaps oversimplifies the tension that existed between the spoken and written work in the ancient world. Much of Greek "literature" remains the product of literate, slave- owning, and well-educated authors, written for their peers. Robb suggests as much in his discussion of mousild and sunousia , and one might desire a "sociology" of ancient Athens, for example, in which economic status and.. (shrink)

In den platonischen Werken scheint die historische Figur des Sokrates besonders im Frühwerk omnipräsent. Die Dialogfigur Sokrates führt bei Platon die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sophisten. Einzelne Figuren der Sophistik, darunter Protagoras von Abdera, Gorgias von Leontinoi und Prodikos von Keos spielen dabei eine besonders prominente Rolle. Hinzu kommen als Vertreter der Sophistik u. a. Kallikles, Thrasymachos, Hippias, Kritias, Antiphon. Vor allem die frühe platonische Ethik steht ganz im Zeichen der Auseinandersetzung mit dem sophistischen Angriff auf die konventionelle Moralvorstellung (...) sowie mit dem Anspruch der Sophisten, Tugenden lehren zu können. (shrink)

The modern term >fascination fascination force divided self< allow to indicate them as prototypical descriptions of fascination. References to Plato by Marsilio Ficin and Friedrich Nietzsche expose the importance of Socrates in the conceptual history of fascination.

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

The analysis focuses on the passage of Gorgias (506c–507c) in which Plato’s Socrates is having a dialog with himself. Socrates is talking to someone who, better than any other partner of discussion, is capable to discern the truth; this is an extraordinary way of expressing philosophical views by Plato. It suggests that in this passage Plato is considering questions which are of a primary importance. There are also other signs, both in the structure of the text and in the comments (...) made by Socrates regarding the form of discussion, which confirm that in this passage we deal with the most important matters. The analyzed passage refers to justice. First, Plato is summarizing views on justice of soul which were developed in the earlier parts of Gorgias. Then he is talking about justice of deeds as consisting in doing what is fitting as regards men. It is an addition to the earlier discussion and therefore the expression of this view can be recognized as the important reason why Socrates’ dialog with himself was constructed. Attention is paid to a certain gap in the argumentation. At the first glance it is not clear why the thesis that justice of soul is based on order and harmony of its elements justifies the thesis that justice of deeds consists in doing what is fitting as regards men. This gap can be filled in by the so-called Plato’s unwritten teaching on the good in itself. According to this teaching the good in itself is the one (the unity) which from its very nature gives existence and life by doing what is fitting as being advantageous to something. Order and harmony in the soul is the basis of its unity and therefore of its similarity to the good in itself and of the similarity of soul’s activity to the way the good is acting. Acting justly, doing what is fitting, in the sense of being advantageous to others, is the best thing a man or a woman can do, it is something which fulfills and makes him or her happy. Wisdom and — generally speaking — knowledge is clearly regarded as a means and not the aim in itself. An individual, and not an abstract idea, is the primary object of the activity which fulfills a rational being. (shrink)