Does motor behavior early in development have the same signatures of habituation, dishabituation, and Spencer-Thompson dishabituation known from infant perception and cognition? And do these signatures explain the choice preferences in A not B motor decision tasks? We provide new empirical evidence that gives an affirmative answer to the first question together with a unified neural dynamic model that gives an affirmative answer to the second question.In the perceptual and cognitive domains, habituation is the weakening of an orientation response to (...) a stimulus over perceptual experience. Switching to a novel stimulus leads to dishabituation, the re-establishment of the orientation response. In Spencer-Thompson dishabituation, the renewed orientation response transfers to the original stimulus. The change in orientation responses over perceptual experience explains infants' behavior in preferential looking tasks: Familiarity preference early during exposure and novelty preference late during exposure. In the motor domain, perseveration in the A not B task could be interpreted as a form of familiarity preference. There are hints that this preference reverses after enough experience with the familiar movement. We provide a unified account for habituation and patterns of preferential selection in which neural dynamic fields generate perceptual or motor representations. The build-up of activation in excitatory fields leads to familiarity preference, the build-up of activation in inhibitory fields leads to novelty preference. We show that the model accounts for the new experimental evidence for motor habituation, but is also compatible with earlier accounts for perceptual habituation and motor perseveration. We discuss how excitatory and inhibitory memory traces may regulate exploration and exploitation for both orientation to objects and motor behaviors. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage collectif porte sur la place qu’occupent les femmes dans différentes parties de l’Empire romain d’Orient hellénophone. Il résulte de trois rencontres scientifiques organisées dans le cadre du programme GRECS d’ANIHMA entre 2012 et 2014. Comme l’explique Sophie Lalanne dans son introduction, le volume ne reflète que partiellement le contenu de ces rencontres ; l’éditrice formule d’ailleurs des réflexions intéressantes sur la place de l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans le domain...

Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent papers, the (...) Non-Akrasia Constraint has been called into question. The goal of this paper is to defend it... for the most part. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims (...) seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. (shrink)

Believing rationally is epistemically valuable, or so we tend to think. It’s something we strive for in our own beliefs, and we criticize others for falling short of it. We theorize about rationality, in part, because we want to be rational. But why? I argue that how we answer this question depends on how permissive our theory of rationality is. Impermissive and extremely permissive views can give good answers; moderately permissive views cannot.

Sophie Grace Chappell develops a picture of what philosophical ethics can be like, once set aside from the idealising and reductive pressures of conventional moral theory. Her question is 'How are we to know what to do?', and the answer she defends is 'By developing our moral imaginations'.

Epistemologists often assume that rationality bears an important connection to the truth. In this paper I examine the implications of this commitment for permissivism: if rationality is a guide to the truth, can it also allow some leeway in how we should respond to our evidence? I first discuss a particular strategy for connecting permissive rationality and the truth, developed in a recent paper by Miriam Schoenfield. I argue that this limited truth-connection is unsatisfying, and the version of permissivism that (...) supports it faces serious challenges; so, for mainstream permissivism, the truth problem is still unsolved. I then discuss a strategy available to impermissivists, according to which rationality bears a quite strong connection to truth. I argue that this second strategy is successful. (shrink)

Should citizens have equal say regarding the running of society? Following the principles of democracy, and most of political philosophy: yes (at least at a fundamental level, thus allowing for representatives and the like). Indeed, comparing the main alternative seemingly supports this intuition. Epistocracy would instead give power just to the most epistemically competent. Yet testing citizens’ political and economic knowledge looks apt to disproportionately disempower marginalised groups, making the position seem like a nonstarter and democracy the clear winner. Nevertheless, (...) this paper argues against giving citizens equal say, or at least, it offers the strongest possible motivation for this position. In particular, I introduce the progressive case for epistocracy, and what I term standpoint epistocracy. This account refigures the relevant notion of political competence such that it is not the most privileged classes who would most likely constitute our epistocracy, but rather, the least. The resulting picture considerably improves on traditional versions of epistocracy and also democracy. (shrink)

Epiphanies is a philosophical exploration of epiphanies, peak experiences, 'wow moments', or ecstasies as they are sometimes called. What are epiphanies, and why do so many people so frequently experience them? Are they just transient phenomena in our brains, or are they the revelations of objective value that they very often seem to be? What do they tell us about the world, and about ourselves? How, if at all, do epiphanies fit in with our moral systems and our theories of (...) how to live? And how do epiphanic experiences fit in with the rest of our lives? These are Sophie Grace Chappell's questions in this ground-breaking new study of an area of inquiry that has always been right under our noses, but remains surprisingly under-explored in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify (...) certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy. (shrink)

William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue that epistemic consequentialism (...) doesn’t allow for this kind of permissivism and goes on to argue that this reveals a deep disanalogy between decision theory and the formally similar epistemic utility theory. This raises the question whether epistemic utility theory is a genuinely consequentialist theory at all. (shrink)

It is time to re-examine the French Revolution as a political resource. The historiography has so far ignored the question of popular sovereignty and emancipation; instead the Revolution has been vilified as a matrix of totalitarianisms by the liberals and as an ethnocentric phenomenon by postcolonial studies. This book examines why.

Historienne, Sophie Wahnich est chargée de recherche au Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Labyrinthe a souhaité la rencontrer car sa pratique déplace les cadres ordinaires de son métier. Jeu temporel tout d’abord : spécialiste de la Révolution française, elle ne s’interdit jamais de confronter son savoir à des enjeux contemporains, qu’il s’agisse des guerres du début du xxe siècle, de celles de l’ex-Yougoslavie ou des formes de revendications les plus récentes. Jeu ensuite avec le...

We debate whether permissivism is true. We start off by assuming an accuracy-oriented framework, and then discuss metaepistemological questions about how our epistemic evaluations promote accuracy.

Hume's project, in Book 3 of the Treatise, of showing that virtue and vice are discerned by feeling, not reason, is notorious for its contradictions. Armies of Humean scholars have fought valiantly, ingeniously, but unsuccessfully, to resolve them, and in the first half of Hume's Morality, Cohon shows herself an admirably doughty follower in their footsteps. The second half concerns Hume's division between natural and artificial virtues. We learn how self-interest is redirected, and moral sentiment strengthened to provide artificial virtues (...) with the motives they lack naturally, so as to enable them to facilitate impersonal co-operation, though a particular virtuous act may benefit no-one. The author explains why .. (shrink)

This book develops a unique phenomenology of plurality by introducing Hannah Arendt’s work into current debates taking place in the phenomenological tradition. Loidolt offers a systematic treatment of plurality that unites the fields of phenomenology, political theory, social ontology, and Arendt studies to offer new perspectives on key concepts such as intersubjectivity, selfhood, personhood, sociality, community, and conceptions of the "we." _Phenomenology of Plurality_ is an in-depth, phenomenological analysis of Arendt that represents a viable third way between the "modernist" and (...) "postmodernist" camps in Arendt scholarship. It also introduces a number of political and ethical insights that can be drawn from a phenomenology of plurality. This book will appeal to scholars interested in the topics of plurality and intersubjectivity within phenomenology, existentialism, political philosophy, ethics, and feminist philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...) we have our attitudes. (shrink)

There are many conflicting attitudes to technological progress: some people are fearful that robots will soon take over, even perhaps making ethical decisions for us, whilst others enthusiastically embrace a future largely run for us by them. Still others insist that we cannot predict the long term outcome of present technological developments. In this paper I shall be concerned with the impact of the new technology on medicine, and with one particularly agonizing ethical dilemma to which it has already given (...) rise. (shrink)

This paper introduces the reconstitutor as a comprehensive unit of heredity within the context of evolutionary research. A reconstitutor is the structure resulting from a set of relationships between different elements or processes that are actively involved in the recreation of a specific phenotypic variant in each generation regardless of the biomolecular basis of the elements or whether they stand in a continuous line of ancestry. Firstly, we justify the necessity of introducing the reconstitutor by showing the limitations of other (...) evolutionary conceptions of the unit of heredity, such as the replicator, the reproducer, and the Darwinian individual. We argue that these conceptions are based on the requirement of lineage formation, which we argue to be unnecessary for the existence of evolutionary heredity. In the second part, we introduce the reconstitutor, which we base on the concept of Stability of Traits, and illustrate how it covers cases of hereditary phenomena not covered by the previous accounts. Secondly, we illustrate how the reconstitutor could serve as a platform to rethink ecological inheritance and other forms of inheritance that have been recently introduced under the song/singer model of evolution. (shrink)

Moral distress is reported to be a critical force contributing to intensifying rates of anxiety, depression and burnout experienced by healthcare workers. In this paper, we examine the moral dilemmas and ensuing distress personally and collectively experienced by healthcare workers while caring for patients during the pandemic. Data are drawn from free-text responses from a cross-sectional national online survey of Australian healthcare workers about the patient care challenges they faced. Three themes were derived from qualitative content analysis that illuminated the (...) ways in which moral dilemmas and distress were relationally experienced by healthcare workers: (1) the moral ambiguity of how to care well for patients amid a rapidly changing work environment; (2) the distress of witnessing suffering shared between healthcare workers and patients; and (3) the distress of performing new forms of invisible work in the absence of institutional recognition. These findings reveal that moral distress was a strongly shared experience. Findings advance understandings of moral distress as a relational experience, collectively felt, constituted, and experienced by healthcare workers. Considering how to harness collective solidarity in effectively responding to moral distress experienced across the frontline healthcare workforce is critical. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

This paper introduces and motivates the claim that we possess doxastic agent’s awareness. I argue that this is a form of agentive awareness concerning our belief states that we enjoy in virtue of deliberating and judging. Namely, we experience these activities as those of making up our mind and keeping it made up regarding our beliefs. Following related work in the philosophy of action, I understand this awareness as a form of conscious experience which can then ground our self-ascriptions. As (...) such, this enables me to also propose a new account of self-knowledge of belief and the way in which deliberating and concluding that p can warrant us in self-ascribing the belief that p (i.e., employing the so-called ‘transparency method’). Philosophers often appeal to our arguably agentive relation to our beliefs in explaining this. I, though, I extend work in the philosophy of action in a way that is surprisingly flatfooted way given that belief is a state and not an action. (shrink)

Zadra, Desjardins, and Marcotte tested several predictions derived from the Threat Simulation Theory of dreaming in a large sample of recurrent dreams. In response to these findings, Valli and Revonsuo presented a commentary outlining alternate conceptualizations and explanations for the results obtained. We argue that many points raised by Valli and Revonsuo do not accurately reflect our main findings and at times present a biased assessment of the data. In this article, we provide necessary clarifications and responses to each one (...) of their main points of discussion. (shrink)

La demande d’asile impose différentes formes de temporalités, avec lesquelles les travailleurs sociaux doivent composer pour accompagner les personnes qui s’engagent dans cette procédure. Quand passé, présent et futur s’imbriquent dans les exigences institutionnelles et les critères d’obtention d’une protection, ces professionnels doivent s’approprier et enseigner les impératifs d’actualisation de la crainte et des sentiments aux personnes accompagnées. Mais au quotidien, c’est sur le temps d’attente et ses impacts sur la vie des demandeurs d’asile que ces acteurs du social se (...) doivent de travailler. Rendre son utilité au présent, qui est stagnant et incertain, remettre en activité quand le désœuvrement s’installe, donner la possibilité aux requérants d’être plus que des demandeurs et d’entrer dans un processus de réaffirmation identitaire. Cependant, le temps et son prolongement peuvent aussi être une stratégie à part entière, que certains travailleurs sociaux exploitent pour venir en aide à ceux qui ont été déboutés de l’asile. (shrink)

Cette étude, lauréate du prix Mnémosyne 2010, est issue du travail de recherche accompli par Anaïs Dufour dans le cadre de son master soutenu la même année à l’université de Rouen. En examinant la façon dont les femmes de la noblesse normande ont exercé le pouvoir seigneurial à la charnière des xvie et xviie siècles, l’auteure comble un vide historiographique et donne ici un nouvel exemple de l’importance et de la variété des pouvoirs féminins au temps de la première modernité. (...) Laissant de cô... (shrink)

Objective To explore attitudes towards conscientious objections among medical students in the UK. Methods Medical students at St George's University of London, Cardiff University, King's College London and Leeds University were emailed a link to an anonymous online questionnaire, hosted by an online survey company. The questionnaire contained nine questions. A total of 733 medical students responded. Results Nearly half of the students in this survey stated that they believed in the right of doctors to conscientiously object to any procedure. (...) Demand for the right to conscientiously object is greater in Muslim medical students when compared with other groups of religious medical students. Discussion Abortion continues to be a contentious issue among medical students and this may contribute to the looming crisis in abortion services over the coming years. This project sheds some light on how future doctors view some of their ethical rights and obligations. Using empirical evidence, it reveals that conscientious objection is an issue in the UK medical student body today. These data could help anticipate problems that may arise when these medical students qualify and practise medicine in the community. Conclusion Clearer guidance is needed for medical students about the issue of conscientious objection at medical school. (shrink)

This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental (...) states. In contrast to both assumptions, this paper argues that believing for a reason is (at least) very nearly self-intimating: necessarily, if a subject believes that q for the reason that p, then, provided relevant conceptual and rational capacities, she is in a position to form a justified true belief that she believes that q for the reason that p. We should think this on the basis of the role that believing for a reason plays from the subjects’ perspective, and in particular, the way in which it intellegises one’s belief. (shrink)

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically (...) true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians. (shrink)

Objectives: The N2b is an event-related potential component thought to index higher-order executive function. While the impact of concussion on executive functioning is frequently discussed in the literature, limited research has been done on the role of N2b in evaluating executive functioning in patients with concussion. The aims of this review are to consolidate an understanding of the cognitive functions reflected by the N2b and to account for discrepancies in literature findings regarding the N2b and concussion.Methods: A scoping review was (...) conducted on studies that used the N2b to measure cognitive functioning in healthy control populations, as well as in people with concussions.Results: Sixty-six articles that met inclusion criteria demonstrated that the N2b effectively represents stimulus-response conflict management, response selection, and response inhibition. However, the 19 included articles investigating head injury found widely varied results: some studies found the amplitude of the N2b to be increased in the concussion group, while others found it to be decreased or unchanged.Conclusion: Based on the available evidence, differences in the amplitude of the N2b have been linked to response selection, conflict, and inhibition deficits in concussion. However, due to large variations in methodology across studies, findings about the directionality of this effect remain inconclusive. The results of this review suggest that future research should be conducted with greater standardization and consistency. (shrink)

Institution caractéristique d'une Cappadoce peu urbanisée, les chorévêques (ou ' évêques des campagnes ') sont attestés pour l'essentiel aux IVe et Ve siècles. C'est leur place dans le gouvernement de l'Église nouvellement impériale que nous avons examinée pour montrer que, loin de témoigner d'une première évangélisation et prise en charge par l'Église de ces communautés rurales d'Asie Mineure, leur importance au IVe siècle, puis leur effacement au siècle suivant signalent en fait la mise sous tutelle de ces mêmes communautés et (...) de leur organisation ecclésiastique par la hiérarchie épiscopale, conformément au principe d'accommodement. Cette conclusion invalide l'idée, encore récemment énoncée, que les campagnes dans leur ensemble ont été christianisées tardivement, et postérieurement aux cités. (shrink)

The phenomenon of life — yours, or mine always — is given to be seen or to be understood in its cohesion and in its proper identity through a narrative “montage”. This is the hypothesis which this article explores in trying to determine if the narrative montage refers to a “staged coup”, as Artaud suggests, or if instead it is not, following the very different analysis by Ricoeur, a plot in which the character, entangled in his or her own experiences, (...) fights against the scattering of the self, or again, as according to Schapp, if each person is not simply involved in his or her own stories as well as in those of others, with no other means of reaching himself or herself than through such tangles. (shrink)