Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, popularized by Patanjali and Bhartruhari will be scientifically analyzed. Sphota Vada, proposed and nurtured by the Sanskrit grammarians will be interpreted from modern physics and communication engineering points of view. Insight about the theory of language and modes of language acquisition and communication available in the Brahma Kanda of Vakyapadeeyam will be translated into modern computational terms. A flowchart of language processing in humans will be given. A gross model of human language acquisition, comprehension and communication process forming (...) the basis to develop software for relevant mind-machine modeling will be presented. The implications of such a model to artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences will be discussed. The essentiality and necessity of a physics, communication engineering , biophysical and biochemical insight as both complementary and supplementary to using mathematical and computational methods in delineating the theory of Sanskrit language is put forward. Natural language comprehension as distinct and different from natural language processing is pointed out. (shrink)

Patrick Hopkins has claimed that SM is compatible with feminist principles. I argue that his account relies on both mistaken analogies and an untenable account of the allegedly changed meaning of SM scenes.

It is a commonplace of long standing that one should be “authentic” or—in expressions which may have an approximately similar meaning—that one should be “true to oneself” or that one should “lead a life of one’s own”. Duty and morality aside, this command to be “authentic” leads the prudentially-minded reader to ask, “Why? Why should I be authentic, or true to myself, or lead a life of my own? Will I, of necessity, be horribly unhappy if I am not authentic? (...) Is not an inauthentic, but happy life, at least a conceptual possibility? And, if I can be happy though inauthentic, then why should I strive toward authenticity, especially since the psychological literature on this subject makes much of the considerable pain involved in this process?” It is not self-evidently clear, from the prudential point of view, why authenticity is desirable. (shrink)

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

Study of the philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian philosopher and fundamentals of Hindu philosophy.

Vāda, the classical name for the act of discussion/debate in the Indian tradition, forms the basis of every conversation undertaken to reach correct knowledge. The paper explores the Indian tradition of Vāda and its subcategories with the intention of highlighting the all-encompassing and holistic nature of this Indian tool of cultural studies in both theory and praxis. It checks into its evolution through contemporary times, wherein it has lost its essence to accommodate the corrupted interests of modern individuals as well (...) as leaders and debaters. Through the analysis of various examples, the paper endeavours to establish Vāda as a comprehensive way to attain correct knowledge. Examples from day-to-day life as well as the historic-literary world help to explicitly comprehend these tools that have been used for establishing the nearest truth from ancient times in India. These tools are potent to all aspects of research across spatial-temporal limits as they are innate and immutable to all disciplines of knowledge and education. (shrink)

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of paśyantī, pratibhā, sphoţa and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus (...) the identification of sphoţa and jāti as well as of paśyantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhartŗhari. (shrink)

Study on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar in Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari.

According to Bhartrhari, these are the three levels of language through which ... necessarily identified with language, since these levels of language, ...

This article discusses the unique practice of many philosophers in classical India to write on several philosophical and religious systems, each time adopting a sympathetic point of view for a different tradition. The article describes the development of this phenomenon in the context of interreligious debates between Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmins in the course of three distinct historical periods, transitioning from pluralism about views to pluralism about philosophical systems and culminating in the ideal of _sarva-tantra-sva-tantra_, a polyvocal philosopher and a (...) polymath. Contrary to such approaches as nihilism, agnosticism, skepticism, and dogmatism, pluralism about views and systems was an attempt to justify the acceptance of several competing schools of thought. The article demonstrates that varieties of pluralism about views and systems played a role in forming and broadening philosophical alliances to defeat religious rivals, but also enhanced the scholarly reputation of erudite thinkers capable of “proving and refuting any system by will.”. (shrink)

Indepth analization of three states of Consciousness in spiritual life.

In a rare book published in Trivandrum (1927), entitled Sphoṭasiddhiḥ Bharatamiśrapranītā , we find an interesting argument in defense of sphoṭa -theory, based on āgamic quotations, especially RV X, 71, 4 (the stanza where the poet describes his own activity in perceiving the essence of Speech as like a beloved woman naked). The main idea is that the numerous word sphoṭas , as an atemporal multiplicity, free from any sensuous quality, were the objects of the Ṛṣis’ primordial intuition. So the (...) internal diversity of the Veda is not a mere subjective convention in order to adapt the highest truth to limited human minds. The absolute brahman has an objective cosmogonical power of which the temporal mutiplicity is only the very last result. There is also an intermediate ideal multiplicity, which the Veda, as eternal and transcending the guru-śiṣya transmission, consists in. (shrink)

This article examines the emergence of the Nyāya distinction between vāda and jalpa as didactic-scientific and agonistic-sophistical forms of debate, respectively. Looking at the relevant sutras in Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra (NS 1.2.1-3) in light of the earlier discussion of the types of debate in Caraka Saṃhitā 8, the article argues that certain ambiguities and obscurities in the former text can be explained on the hypothesis that the early Nyāya presupposed an agonistic understanding of vāda similar to what we find in Caraka.

The publication is a commented translation and study of the work “Pakṣilasvāmin’s Introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam” by a prominent Austrian indologist and intercultural philosopher G.R.F. Oberhammer. The author examines the background of Oberhammer’s research, gives a brief information about the school of Nyāya and focuses on how Oberhammer demonstrates the history of Nyāya and its becoming aware of itself as a philosophical system based on the short text of Pakṣilasvāmin (Vātsyāyana) introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam. In his article, Oberhammer answers the (...) question why such heterogeneous parts as elements of the theory of argumentation borrowed from the ancient tradition of Vāda (the theory of debate), logic and epistemology, cosmology and the doctrine of the soul and its liberation from the bonds of saṁsāra (soteriology) were combined into the harmonious philosophical system of Nyāya and how this happened during the development of the school due to its becoming aware of itself as a method of searching for truth (and what this truth is from the point of view of Nyāya), how this was helped by creative borrowing from another philosophical school – Yoga. The publication is prefaced by a brief history of the Viennese oriental and indological school, to which Oberhammer belongs. (shrink)

_Contemporary discussions of self and consciousness have for some time incorporated Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the existence and nature of self (Ram-Prasad 2012). The ideal of responsibly_ _incorporating this dialogue raises an interpretive dilemma: on the one hand, we should eschew the simplistic picture of a “sterile contest” in which all Hindu schools are committed to the doctrine of the self (ātmavāda) and all Buddhists are invariantly committed to denying its existence (2012: 3). To treat Hindu ātmavādins as monolithically opposed to (...) Buddhist no-self theorists without attending to disagreements within the two camps would be to woefully underrepresent the complexity of the terrain at hand. Yet, we should not forget that what we are dealing with is still a structured debate of some sort. I propose that two Jaina “disambiguation strategies” (Balcerowicz 2017)—the theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda) and the theory of sevenfold predication (syād-vāda), also called the sevenfold formula (__sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__)—can together facilitate a re-imaginative reconstruction of Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the self as something other than a two-sided battle or an arbitrary cluster of views. Following superimposition of the __sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__ onto what I temporarily term “the debate,” wherein each figure (bha__ṅ__ga)__ is understood as indexed in part by a specific viewpoint (naya) or a set thereof, we find a dynamic description of an indeterminate phenomenon, embracing affirmation and negation of the “self” (ātman) without antecedent commitment to the substantive existence of the referent of the term. This exercise in working with Jaina tools has implications for broader methodological concerns facing cross-cultural philosophical projects, and bears on how we might fruitfully re-imagine otherwise stymied contemporary debates. _. (shrink)

기원후 7세기경에 아디셰샤가 쓴????빠라마르타 사라????(이하, PS)는 제설혼합주의의 표본 에 해당하는????바가바드 기따????를 계승하면서도 독자적인 특징을 가지는 제설혼합주의를 제 시한 문헌이다. 20세기 초반부터 21세기 초반까지 상당수의 연구자들은 PS의 사상적 정 체성을 제설혼합주의와 관련하여 다양하게 검토했고, 그 결과 PS는 대체로 ‘상크야, 아 드바이따 베단따, 베다-아베다 베단따, 바이슈나바 유신론’이라는 4가지 힌두교 사상들 의 일부나 전부가 혼합된 문헌으로 간주되었다. PS의 연구자들은 거의 예외 없이 4가지 사상들 가운데 어느 하나가 중심이 되는 ‘단일 중심적 제설혼합주의’의 견지에서 PS를 분석했다. 그러나 PS의 시대에 애당초 제설혼합 주의가 하나의 장르로서 존재했고 (...) PS가 그 제설혼합주의를 바탕으로 특정 주제마다 여러 사상들을 혼합시켰을 가능성이 크기 때문에, PS는 ‘다중심적 제설혼합주의’를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 더 나아가, PS는 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’(sarva-ātma-vāda, 모든 것이 아뜨 만이라는 이론)를 통해 이 세상의 모든 사상을 일거에 통합하고자 하기 때문에, PS는 ‘사 르바-아뜨마-바다’를 특징으로 하는 제설혼합주의를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 이로부터 PS에서 구축되는 것은 ‘독자적인 제설혼합주의 이론’과 ‘제설혼합주의적 구원론’이다. 그런데 PS의 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’는 보편주의의 전략을 통해 일원론적 또는 일신론 적 기획을 도모하는 까닭에 오히려 다중심적 제설혼합주의로부터 암시되는 다원적이고 다 가치적인 혼합이라는 장점을 잃어버릴 수 있다. PS의 예시처럼 제설혼합주의에서 다중심성을 더 강조할 것이냐 아니면 보편성을 더 강조할 것이냐 하는 것은 현재의 힌두교 사상이 당면한 중요한 문제이기도 하다. (shrink)

This paper argues that the grammarians Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa did innovate in the realm of grammatical philosophy, without however admitting or perhaps even knowing it. Their most important innovation is the reinterpretation of the sphoṭa. For reasons linked to new developments in sentence interpretation (śābdabodha), in their hands the sphoṭa became a semantic rather that an ontological entity.

Melinda Vadas rejects my claim that there are morally relevant differences between simulations of unjust events and actual unjust events on the ground that I overlook the connection between simulations and that which they simulate. I argue that this purported moral connection can only be understood as either the result of a necessary psychological disposition or as a "magical," metaphysical attachment, neither of which is defensible or satisfactory.

AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In Advaitavedānta, the (...) world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

Nathmal Tatia, one of the leading Jaina scholars of our time, provides us with the first systematic and in-depth study of the great problems dealt with in Jaina philosophy. It begins with the basic Jaina worldview of non-absolutism (anekanta-vada), and deals next with Jaina epistemology.Three major topics are then studied in great detail, with full reference to the Jaina scriptures. These are: the problem of avidya in the various Indian schools; the Jaina doctrine of karman; and Jaina yoga. This latter (...) includes an important study of Haribhadra's comparative studies in yoga. Tatia hashere given us a first-rate advanced level study of Jaina philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...) Chakrabarti invites a reply "so that," as he says, "I may know why immaculate perception is needed by Nyāya after all." The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by Nyāya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as "perception of an entity as qualified." Here I follow Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of "New Logic," Navya Nyāya. Gaṅgeśa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental Tattvacintāmaṇi (Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2Now, first of all, I want to follow Gaṅgeśa's ground rules. The Naiyāyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). Gaṅgeśa's reflections are vāda—and the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vāda, vāda being "inquiries among friends"—directed to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriate—for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out Gaṅgeśa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to Gaṅgeśa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a Naiyāyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearances—in fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater Naiyāyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom [End Page 104] of Nyāya in contrast to revealing a deficiency, as he appears to be doing here. He does this to make us think broadly about Nyāya in a contemporary context. And at the end I join him in making some very general comments about Nyāya's realism. First, Gaṅgeśa's argument and a rebuttal of Chakrabarti's seven reasons from Gaṅgeśa's point of view.There is no direct, apperceptive evidence for nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa; rather, it is posited by force of the following inference as the first step of a two-step argument. "The perceptual cognition, 'A cow' (for example), is generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing), like an inference." The second step takes a person's first perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (or pakṣa) such that the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point... (shrink)

The comprehensive nature of information and insight available in the Upanishads, the Indian philosophical systems like the Advaita Philosophy, Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, Sphota Vaada and the Shaddarsanas, in relation to the idea of human consciousness, mind and its functions, cognitive science and scheme of human cognition and communication are presented. All this is highlighted with vivid classification of conscious-, cognitive-, functional- states of mind; by differentiating cognition as a combination of cognitive agent, cognizing element, cognized element; formation; form and structure of (...) cognition, instruments and means of cognition, validity of cognition and the nature of energy/matter which facilitates and also is the medium of cognition- cognizing process; and also as the container and content of cognition. The human communication process which is just the reverse of cognizing process is also presented with necessary description and detail. The sameness of cognitive / communicative process during language acquisition and communication processes and the modes of language acquisition and communication are also given. The hardware and software of human cognition, language acquisition and communication as envisaged in Indian spiritual and philosophical expressions are given. In the light of the information and insight obtained as above, the axioms for human cognition / communication are formed, framed and presented. A brain-wave frequency modulation / demodulation model of human cognition, communication and language acquisition and communication process based on Upanishadic expressions, Shaddarsanas and Sabdabrahma Siddhhanta is defined and discussed here. The use of these theories and models and axioms in mind-machine modelling and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence will be put forward and highlighted. (shrink)

A correlation between Indian linguaphilosophy and Western philosophy of language is possible with regard to the question of meaning – one of the main issues of any linguo-philosophical teaching. The Indian philosophical tradition, represented by orthodox schools, the main of which is the so-called mīmāṃsā, was guided by the authority of sa­cred scripture – the Vedas, and through critical argumentation was engaged in under­standing and interpreting their content, and therefore unique linguo-philosophical ideas were formed. This work presents the ideas of (...) mīmāṃsā, the general picture of which can be formulated as follows: 1) the doctrine joins the theory of the non-human origin of lan­guage as opposed to the theory of convention; 2) a transcendental approach to language is defended, where the eternal, a priori connection of words and meanings is affirmed, which is the opposite of the naturalistic view; 3) an activity-based approach to the mean­ing of statements/sentences is formulated, which is due to the categorical pair sādhya-sid­dha, i.e. “subject to implementation – realized”, in other words, the logic of process-re­sult, founded in the philosophical teaching of mīmāṃsā, and opposed to the logic of sub­ject-predicate, based on the pair of concepts dharma-dharmin, on which other representa­tives of Indian philosophical thought build their teachings. The work also draws parallels between the mīmāṃsā tradition and the ancient Indian linguistic tradition – vyākaraṇa, which allows us to clarify the nature of the linguo-philosophical ideas of the former, and also describes the theories of the meaning of sentences of the medieval mīmāṃsā – an­vitābhidhāna-vāda and abhihitānvaya-vāda. The linguistic philosophy of the mīmāṃsā tradition, and, in particular, the advocacy of a non-naturalistic attitude to language and an activity-based or even pragmatic approach to the interpretation of sentences is unique both for the history of Indian philosophy and from the point of view of the Western tradi­tion of philosophy of language. (shrink)

L’abbandono heideggeriano dell’atteggiamento teoreticistico è condotto a partire dalla centralità dell’esperienza significativa propria dell’esserci in quanto storico. La critica alla problematica filosofica dell’a-priori è condotta proprio in nome dell’idea che l’origine dei significati vada ricercata nella storicità dell’esserci. Significatività del mondo e temporalità dell’esserci, come due facce della stessa medaglia, caratterizzano la trascendenza dell’esserci quale apertura alle possibilità del progettare, in un modo che differisce radicalmente dal soggettivismo trascendentale e dall’ipotesi di a-priori conoscitivi e valoriali. Il saggio segue un tale (...) processo di storicizzazione, mostrando che la posizione heideggeriana non implica un ingenuo relativismo, ma riporta l’origine dei significati al loro contesto di senso, inteso come espressione della vita stessa e delle risorse fondative della sua temporalità. (shrink)

The present work is an anthology of Kumarila Bhatta's works the Slokavarttika and the tantravarttika which deal with such subjects as the nature of the Atman the nature of the Dharma the nature of the Sabda the self Validity of the veda the concept of Sphota the nature of the svarga, generality, Individuality, negation, sunyata, Vijnanavada, Apohavada etc. according to Mimamsa shcool. A reader can derive a fair knowledge of the tenets of the Mimamsakas on different subjects. Besides the author (...) has supplied a short history of the Purvamimamsa in addition to details about Kumarila Bhatta Sabarasvamin Mandana Misra and other important writers of the sastra in the elaborate Introduction. (shrink)

Sguardo d'insieme -- Armonia delle sfere celesti : Hildegard von Bingen, symphonia -- Il tempo di Dio : Johann Sebastian Bach, Cantata Gottes Zeit -- Trasmutazioni : Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Die Zauberflöte -- "Questo bacio vada al mondo intero" : Ludwig van Beethoven, An die Freude -- Viaggio d'inverno : Franz Schubert, Winterreise -- Inni all notte : Richard Wagner, Tristan und Isolde -- L'ultimo rito : Richard Wagner, Parsifal -- Azzurre solitudini : Gustav Mahler, Terza sinfonia -- Universi sonori (...) : Gustav Mahler, Ottava sinfonia -- Orizzonti perduti : Gustav Mahler, Das Lied von der Erde -- Labirinti : Richard Strauss, Also sprach Zarathustra -- Cortei di ombre : Richard Strauss, Metamorphosen -- La terza via : Omaggio a Francesco d'Avalos. (shrink)

À travers une vision gestaltiste, déjà à l’oeuvre dans la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cet article essaie de montrer que toutes les difficultés propres à l’interprétation de la problématique du rapport à autrui, notamment celle concernant le fait de ne pouvoir jamais avoir un accès complet à autrui, peuvent être surmontées ou, du moins, peuvent être mises en discussion. Toute la question est de savoir si ce rapport est basé sur une constitution mutuelle, une constitution réductible à ceux qui le (...) constituent, moi ou autrui, ou si ce rapport va au-delà, étant plus et autre chose que les sujets qui entrent en relation, puisqu’il est lui-même quelque chose d’irréductible. Ni réductibilité à moi, comme chez Husserl, ni réductibilité à autrui, celui totalement autre, comme chez Levinas, mais une irréductibilité conciliante de ce rapport qui, en tant que forme, dépend des éléments qui le constituent et, néanmoins, est autre chose qu’eux et leur demeure irréductible.Through a Gestaltist vision, already present in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, this article attempts to show that all difficulties inherent in the interpretation of the problems concerning the relationship to the Other, especially the fact that we can never have complete access to the Other, can be overcome, or at least, put into discussion. The most important question is to know whether this relationship is based on a mutual constitution, one that is reducible to its terms, self or Other, or if this relationship goes beyond its subjects and is something irreducible in itself. This relationship is not reducible to the self, as in Husserl’s work, nor is it reducible to the Other, as something completely Other, as in Levinas, but is a relationship of reconciliatory irreducibility which, while entirely dependent on its constitutive elements, is nevertheless something else irreducible to both.Attraverso una visione gestaltista, già all’opera nella filosofi a di Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cercheremo qui di mostrare come tutte le difficoltà tipiche della problematica del rapporto all’altro, specie quella relativa al fatto che non possiamo mai avere un accesso completo all’altro, possano essere superate o almeno rimesse in questione. L’intero problema dipende da un’opzione di fondo: se cioè tale rapporto sia basato su una reciproca costituzione, ovvero su una costituzione riducibile a coloro che lo costituiscono, cioè l’io e l’altro; o se tale rapporto vada al di là, sia qualcosa di più, o di diverso, rispetto ai soggetti che entrano in rapporto, essendo il rapporto stesso qualcosa di irriducibile. Né riducibilità a me, dunque, come in Husserl, né riducibilità all’Altro, come in Levinas, ma conciliante irriducibilità del rapporto in quanto forma, che pur dipendendo dagli elementi che la costituiscono è altro dagli elementi stessi. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive exposition of Vedanta Desika`s Satadusani, a polemical classic of Visistadvaita Vedanta, devoted to the criticism of the doctrines of Advaita Vedanta. The thought-provoking arguments found in the Sixty-six Vedas of the original text are brought together, analysed and discussed in a systematic manner under eight broad headings: Pramanas Perception; Consciousness; Individual self; Brahman; Universe; Avidya; Sadhana and Mukti.In presenting the dialectics of Vedanta Desika in a vigorous and scholastic form the author deals with numerous issues (...) that the Vadas raise--epistemological, ontological, religious, and ethical. Thought the issues are many, each discussing a specific problem, they are ultimately directed to refute the central doctrine of Advaita, viz., that Brahman which is pure consciousness devoid of all determinations, constitutes the sole Reality and every thing else is illusory. While carefully tracing the fundamental differences between the two systems of Vedanta, he points out that the differences are mostly due to the difference in the stand-points they adopt.Faithfully conforming to the original in letter and spirit, this work will serve as a useful introduction to the study of the Sribhasya of Ramanuja. A distincy contribution to the study of classical Hindu thought, this book should be of interest to students of Philosophy in general and Vedanta in particular. (shrink)

È possibile che, perlomeno in alcuni casi, la parzialità in epistemologia vada promossa? Per ‘parzialità epistemica’ intendiamo la volontà di non venire meno alle proprie tesi anche laddove sembrasse che esse siano contraddette dall’evidenza. Tale parzialità ovviamente contraddice quanto è invece solitamente dato per scontato, ossia la disposizione – che chiamiamo ‘imparzialità epistemica’ – ad accettare qualsivoglia tesi, non importa se irriconciliabile con le proprie opinioni, purché essa sia adeguatamente supportata dall’evidenza. Qui si intende argomentare che, sulla scia di Tommaso (...) d’Aquino, e perlomeno in alcuni casi riguardanti la vita di fede e la religione, la parzialità epistemica andrebbe promossa. Si intende mostrare che da ciò deriverebbe una posizione più ampia di quella che invece emerge dall’assunzione dell’imparzialità epistemica; inoltre, alcuni problemi, che quest’ultima comporta, verrebbero risolti. (shrink)