The real distinction between mind and body -- Is conceivability a guide to possibility? -- Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts -- Coulda, woulda, shoulda -- No fool's cold : notes on illusions of possibility -- Beyond rigidification : the importance of being really actual -- How in the world? -- Mental causation -- Singling out properties -- Wide causation -- Causal relevance : mental, moral, and epistemic.

Geoengineering – roughly “the intentional manipulation of the planetary systems at a global scale” (Keith 2000) – to combat climate change is often introduced as a “plan B”: an alternative solution in case “plan A”, reducing emissions, fails. This framing is typically deployed as part of an argument that research and development is necessary in case robust conventional mitigation is not forthcoming, or proves insufficient to prevent dangerous climate impacts. Since coming to prominence with the release of the Royal Society (...) report in 2009 (Shepherd et al. 2009, v), the Plan B framing has proved popular with scientists, in policy circles, and in the news media (see Nerlich and Jaspal 2012; Luokkanen, Huttunen, and Hilden 2014). Though sometimes used to refer to geoengineering as a whole, it is associated particularly strongly with stratospheric sulfate injection (SSI) techniques. Consequently, these will be our focus here. We argue that the plan B framing is particularly ill-suited to the integrative assessment of options within climate policy, because it oversimplifies a complex issue in a misleading and deceptive way. For instance, it highlights extreme positions, presents SSI as an alternative independent from mainstream policies, ignores the multiplicity of options available, and neglects threats of morally indecent SSI in a context of ongoing political inertia. We are particularly concerned about the way ‘Plan B’ risks conveying an implicit hyper-optimism about SSI, and so obscures the need for ethical standards. (shrink)

Corporate social reporting, while not mandatory in most countries, has been adopted by many large companies around the world and there are now a variety of competing global standards for non-financial reporting, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the UN Global Compact. However, while some companies (e. g., Henkel, BHP, Johnson and Johnson) have a long standing tradition in reporting non-financial information, other companies provide only limited information, or in some cases, no information at all. Previous studies have suggested (...) that there are, country and industry-specific, differences in the extent of CSR reports (e. g., Kolk et al.: 2001, Business Strategy and the Environment 10, 15-28; Kolk: 2005, Management International Review 45, 145-166; Maignan and Ralston: 2002, Journal of International Business Studies 33(3), 497-514). However, findings are inconclusive or contradictory and it is often difficult to compare previous studies owing to the idiosyncratic methods used in each study (Graafland et al.: 2004, Journal of Business Ethics 53, 137-152). Furthermore, previous studies have relied mainly on simple measures, such as word counts and page counts of reports, to compare the extent of reporting that may not capture significant differences in the content of the reports. In this article, we seek to overcome some of these deficiencies by using textual analysis software and a more robust statistical method to more objectively and reliably compare the CSR reports of firms in different industries and countries. We examine a sample of leading companies in four countries (US, UK, Australia, and Germany) and test whether or not membership of the Global Compact makes a difference to CSR reporting and is overcoming industry and country specific factors that limit standardization. We conclude that GlobalCompact membership is having an effect only in certain areas of CSR reporting, related to the environment and workers, and that businesses from different countries vary significantly in the extent to which they promote CSR and the CSR issues that they choose to emphasize in their reports. These country differences are argued to be related to the different institutional arrangements in each country. (shrink)

According totransmissiontheories of testimony, a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony can be supported by the speaker's justification for what she says. The most powerful objection to transmission theories is Jennifer Lackey'spersistent believercase. I argue that important features about the epistemology of testimony reveal how transmission theories can account for Lackey's case. Specifically, I argue that transmission theorists should hold that transmission happens only if a listener believes a speaker's testimony based on the presumption that the speaker has justification for (...) what she says. If this does not happen in thepersistent believercase, then the case is no counterexample to transmission. If this does happen in thepersistent believercase, then there is an available framework for rejecting the idea that the listener's belief is in fact justified. (shrink)

According to some theories of testimonial knowledge, testimony can allow you, as a knowing speaker, to transmit your knowledge to me. A question in the epistemology of testimony concerns whether or not the acquisition of testimonial knowledge depends on the speaker's testimony being sincere. In this paper, I outline two notions of sincerity and argue that, construed in a certain way, transmission theorists should endorse the claim that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge requires sincerity.

Contents: The Communist Party and the politics of cultural change in postwar Italy, 1945-50 / Stephen Gundle -- Writing and the real world : Italian narrative in the period of reconstruction / Michael Caesar -- The making and unmaking of Neorealism in postwar Italy / David Forgacs -- The place of Neorealism in Italian cinema from 1945 to 1954 / Christopher Wagstaff -- Tradition and social change in the French and Italian cinemas of the reconstruction / Pierre Sorlin -- (...) Humanism and national unity : the ideological reconstruction of France / Michael Kelly -- Les Lettres Franca̜ises and the failure of the French postwar "Renaissance" / Nicholas Hewitt -- The reconstruction of culture : Peuple et Culture and the popular education movement / Brian Rigby. The chameleon rearguard of cultural tradition : the case of Jacques Laurent / Colin Nettelbeck -- German literature in 1945 : liberation for a new beginning / Helmut Peitsch -- Continuity or change? : aspects of West German writing after 1945 / Keith Bullivant -- West German theatre in the period of reconstruction / Ursula Fries. (shrink)

According to a natural view of instrumental normativity, if you ought to do φ, and doing ψ is a necessary means for you to do φ, then you ought to do ψ. In “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle,” Benjamin Kiesewetter defends this principle against certain actualist-inspired counterexamples. In this article I argue that Kiesewetter’s defense of the transmission principle fails. His arguments rely on certain principles—Joint Satisfiability and Reason Transmission—which we should not accept in the unqualified forms (...) needed to establish his conclusion. (shrink)

The sciences aim to get at the truth about the nature of the world. Do the humanities have a similar goal—namely, to get at the truth about things like novels, paintings, and historical events? I consider a few different ways in which the humanities aim at the truth about their objects, in the process giving rise to epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. Two works in the humanities are used as test cases: the historian Tyler Stovall’sParis Noir (1996) and (...) the musicologist Susan McClary’s article, ‘The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year’ (1987). (shrink)

I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar "hole argument" raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look like: for interesting theories, a harmless (...) bit of infinitary logic puts in an appearance. (shrink)

Interested persons upon learning of the title of the present book, ask what it is all about. I customarily give them a few minutes of explanation, only to be greeted at the end by a perfectly blank stare. I wish a candid camera could have witnessed all these performances. Put end to end they would make for an hour of the most hilarious entertainment. ... Evidently the problem has about it an elusiveness which puts it beyond the reach of most, (...) and the plain man can hardly be blamed for failing to come to grips with it. But what of the professional philosopher? I find myself scandalized by the complete ignorance of most with respect to the very concrete entity of their own nervous systems, and of the Mind/Brain problem along with it. In God's name, how can you approach the great questions of the Cosmos, of the nature of Being and Reality if you haven't first formed a clear idea of what's inside and what's outside, and what part your own Brain plays in supporting your ruminations? (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of ‘expert’ health care practitioner in the context of critical thinking and health care education where scientific rather than philosophical inquiry has been the dominant mode of thought. A number of factors have forced are appraisal in this respect: the challenge brought about by the identification of complex ethical issues in clinical situations; medicine's `solving' of many of the simple health problems; the recognition that uncertainty is a common and perhaps innate feature of clinical practice; (...) debate about the concepts of illness and disease; plus insights from psychology,sociology and medical anthropology. Together these have prompted alternative ways of thinking which have the aim of identifying the best rather than the right decision (where best equates to good and right equates to correct in the sense of true or approved). It is argued that phronesis adds a necessary corrective dimension to modern Western medicine's over-emphasis on techne and is one of the factors that differentiates novice from expert practitioner. However, this attracts certain conflicts of interest: phronesis can only be gained and assessed from experience of praxis; agencies with legitimate interests in medicine such as government and professional registering bodies require more substantive criteria. (shrink)

Kirshner may be right that domestic politics does matter, but he does not tell us how to understand domestic politics. How are we, for instance, to understand domestic cohesion? How are we to understand national purpose? More important, what is the impact of nuclear weapons? Do these weapons obliterate all past information about power? Are nuclear weapons all that matter? Is it possible to fight a limited nuclear war? Is North Korea as strong as the United States? Such questions have (...) been around since the 1950s. Kirshner does not help us to answer them. (shrink)

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...) in compound sentences. The standard view cannot account for this fact. I sketch out a speech-act theoretic framework that can. But in accepting this alternative framework we are giving up on the whole idea of an autonomous semantics. (shrink)

JeeLoo Liu makes two main arguments in her insightful essay “The metaphysical as the ethical.” First, against claims made by Wing-tsit Chan and others, she demonstrates that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics is not a problematic form of subjective idealism but in fact “aligns with commonsense realism.” Second, against both Chan and Chen Lai, she maintains that Wang does not commit a problematic conflation of fact and value. Instead, Liu shows that Wang can be read along lines very similar to contemporary pragmatist (...) metaphysics, which itself resists a hard distinction between fact and value. This essay offers a range of clarifications and cautions against the background of general agreement and ends with a question about how far we can really push the parallel between Wang and pragmatism. (shrink)

A variety of arguments have been advanced that deliberation should be at the center of any good political regime in which there is popular self-government. Deliberation is to be the basis for lawmaking, that is, for the making of the collectivity's binding decisions. Thus, John Rawls says, “[O]f course, actual constitutions should be designed as far as possible to make the same determinations as the ideal legislative procedure.” This procedure, in turn, is defined as having laws that result from “rational (...) legislators … who are conscientious, trying to follow the principles of justice as their standard.” These legislators “are not to take a narrow or group-interested standpoint.” Joshua Cohen broadly agrees with Rawls and characterizes Rawls's view as one that argues for a democratic politics that is built around public deliberation. Cohen says that “an ideal pluralist scheme, in which democratic politics consists of fair bargaining among groups each of which pursues its particular or sectional interest, is unsuited to a just society.” John Dryzek shares these views and comments that the “essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought … in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision.” Others have argued along similar lines, including James Bohman, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, David Gauthier, and Jurgen Habermas. (shrink)

This was one of SCSS President Stephen M. Krason’s “Neither Left nor Right, but Catholic” columns that appear monthly in Crisis and The Wanderer. In it, he discusses how the current oppressive actions directed against those who oppose or dissent on religious grounds to various aspects of the sexual revolution—such as the agenda of the homosexualist movement—are in line with the oppressive actions directed against those who opposed blatant sexual immorality by politically powerful figures at earlier historical times, such (...) as King Henry VIII in England. Effectively, sexual immorality has at times in history paved the way for political tyranny and reshaped nations. (shrink)

This was one of SCSS president and Franciscan University of Steubenville professor Stephen M. Krason’s “Neither Left Nor Right, but Catholic” columns that appeared initially in Crisismagazine.com on May 1, 2013. It argues why the U.S. criminal justice system is in a state of crisis. It argues that what seem to be ideologically-oriented critiques of the problems of the system actually have their basis in traditional Christian thinking.

The natural history museum is a place where the line between "high" and "low" culture effectively vanishes--where our awe of nature, our taste for the bizarre, and our thirst for knowledge all blend happily together. But as Stephen Asma shows in Stuffed Animals and Pickled Heads, there is more going on in these great institutions than just smart fun. Asma takes us on a wide-ranging tour of natural history museums in New York and Chicago, London and Paris, interviewing curators, (...) scientists, and exhibit designers, and providing a wealth of fascinating observations. We learn how the first museums were little more than high-toned side shows, with such garish exhibits as the pickled head of Peter the Great's lover. In contrast, today's museums are hot-beds of serious science, funding major research in such fields as anthropology and archaeology. "Rich in detail, lucid explanation, telling anecdotes, and fascinating characters.... Asma has rendered a fascinating and credible account of how natural history museums are conceived and presented. It's the kind of book that will not only engage a wide and diverse readership, but it should, best of all, send them flocking to see how we look at nature and ourselves in those fabulous legacies of the curiosity cabinet."--The Boston Herald. (shrink)

David Malament has recently responded to David Albert's argument that classical electrodynamics is not time-reversal invariant by introducing a novel conception of time reversal, which supports the conventional view that under time reversal the magnetic field changes sign but the electric field remains unchanged. I will argue here that Malament's transformation has both passive and active versions. I will claim that the passive version is not relevant to Albert's argument, and the active version does not lead to the conventional transformation.

In this essay, I find much to admire and little to disagree with in Shu-Shan L ee ’s use of James Scott’s “public transcript” framework to excavate a theory of political obligation that applies to common people in premodern China. I offer some ways to further explore the implications of Lee’s analysis, in part by connecting Lee’s essay to related work on the obligations of elites. I then build on Lee’s own suggestions of connections to contemporary empirical attitudes and contemporary (...) normative views, asking in what ways Lee’s account of public obligation might be able to make room for the idea that the people, as political children, might one day be able to grow up. (shrink)