PART ONE I 'Alternative' in 'Alternative logic There are many systems of logic — many-valued systems and modal systems for instance - which are non-standard ...

The Covid‐19 pandemic has exposed four myths in bioethics. First, the flood of bioethics publications on how to allocate scarce resources in crisis conditions has assumed authorities would declare the onset of crisis standards of care, yet few have done so. This leaves guidelines in limbo and patients unprotected. Second, the pandemic's realities have exploded traditional boundaries between clinical, research, and public health ethics, requiring bioethics to face the interdigitation of learning, doing, and allocating. Third, without empirical research, the success (...) or failure of ethics guidelines remains unknown, demonstrating that crafting ethics guidance is only the start. And fourth, the pandemic's glaring health inequities require new commitment to learn from communities facing extraordinary challenges. Without that new learning, bioethics methods cannot succeed. The pandemic is a wake‐up call, and bioethics must rise to the challenge. (shrink)

Grodzinsky examines Broca's aphasia in terms of some specific grammatical deficits. However, his grammatical models offer no way to characterize the distinctions he observes. Rather than grammatical deficits, his patients seem to have intact grammars but defective modules of parsing and production.

It is a widespread view that affective and emotional responses to many works of literature are often components of an appreciation of literature that is richer than it would be without them. In this paper, I raise three points designed to show that Lamarque does not give emotional and other affective responses their due. First, I propose that he does not sufficiently distinguish emotion and imagination from concerns about knowledge and truth. Second, he does not sufficiently distinguish appreciation, and the (...) role of emotions within it, from criticism. And third, there is a conflation of accounts of the value of individual works with accounts of the value of having literature as an institution around. (shrink)

After explaining why, after dealing with post‐modernist confusions about truth in various books and articles from the mid‐1990s to, most recently, 2014 (§1), Haack returns to the topic of truth. She begins (§2) with some thoughts about the claim that concern for truth is on the decline, and perhaps at a new low; a claim that, sadly, may well be true. Then (§3) she looks at some of the many forms that carelessness with the truth may take, and shows that, (...) so far from revealing that the concept of truth is seriously problematic or that there is no such thing as objective truth, it simply makes no sense to say that lies, half‐truths, etc., are ubiquitous unless there is such a thing as truth, and a legitimate truth‐concept. After that, (§4) she argues that, of course, there is such a thing as objective truth, and a robust truth‐concept. And finally, (§5) she suggests some ways to fight against the rising tide of unconcern for truth—and gives her answer to the (trick) question in her subtitle. (shrink)

To explain the causal relation between institutional rules and people’s actions and expectations, Searle relies upon his concept of the Background, the thesis that intentional states function only given a background of capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional phenomena. Any sentence, for instance, only acquires truth conditions or other conditions of satisfaction against a background of capacities, dispositions, know-how, etc. that are not themselves part of the content of the sentence. The Background also structures expectations. La Rouchefoucauld said, (...) for instance, that few people would fall in love if they had never read about it. (shrink)

Susan Hekman believes we are witnessing an intellectual sea change. The main features of this change are found in dichotomies between language and reality, discourse and materiality. Hekman proposes that it is possible to find a more intimate connection between these pairs, one that does not privilege one over the other. By grounding her work in feminist thought and employing analytic philosophy, scientific theory, and linguistic theory, Hekman shows how language and reality can be understood as an indissoluble unit. (...) In this broadly synthetic work, she offers a new interpretation of questions of science, modernism, postmodernism, and feminism so as to build knowledge of reality and extend how we deal with nature and our increasingly diverse experiences of it. (shrink)

A defendant’s failure to show remorse is one of the most powerful factors in criminal sentencing, including capital sentencing. Yet there is currently no evidence that remorse can be accurately evaluated in a courtroom. Conversely there is evidence that race and other impermissible factors create hurdles to evaluating remorse. There is thus an urgent need for studies about whether and how remorse can be accurately evaluated. Moreover, there is little evidence that remorse is correlated with future law-abiding behavior or other (...) legitimate penal purposes, and, in fact, there is evidence that remorse is often conflated with shame, which is correlated with increased future criminality. More accurate information on the nature and evaluation of remorse can be used to reform the criminal justice system. (shrink)

The author encourages the Church to conceptualize children-at-risk as whole, complex humans, who actively participate in their own development and experience multi-directional influences within the contexts of families, communities, cultures, and histories. This view of children requires an expanded understanding of the whole gospel moving past children-at-risk as subjects of evangelism and advocacy. Children are seen as vulnerable agents of God, participants in their own development, and co-participants with the Church in the missio Dei. Using a hermeneutic of inclusion, a (...) model of integral mission ‘to, for, and with’ children-at-risk is offered. (shrink)

Households around the world have shifted structurally from a breadwinner/homemaker model to dual-income earning arrangements. What this trend means for marital power has been a contested issue among scholars. Most studies suggest that household power is determined by a complex interplay between each spouse's economic contributions to the household and existing gender norms. Few scholars, however, have examined how this interplay is worked out under particular political-economic conditions. Responding to the dearth of research on the developing world in this area, (...) the author examines a community in Costa Rica where neo-liberal economic restructuring has led to an increase in women's informal work and a decrease in men's income-earning power. Drawing from ethnographic and interview data on married life in Costa Rica, the author analyzes the effect that these trends have on marital power and the division of household labor. The author argues that changing economic circumstances may blur the traditional gender boundaries in Costa Rican households but they do not necessarily erase them. (shrink)

Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.

By definitively establishing that racism has broad implications for how the entire field of philosophy is practiced -- and by whom -- this powerful and ...

In this paper, we review two seemingly unrelated debates. In business ethics, the argument is about values: are they universal or emergent? In entrepreneurship, it is about opportunities – are they discovered or constructed? In reality, these debates are similar as they both overlook contingency. We draw insight from pragmatism to define contingency as possibility without necessity. We analyze real-life narratives and show how entrepreneurship and ethics emerge from our discussion as parallel streams of thought.

Susan Haack; IX*—Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic Framework, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 143–158, https://.

This essay examines the implications for modernist studies of using the term after in After Modernism to suggest three meanings: after assuming an end-date for modernism based on linear periodizati...

The extremely well-known holiday television special Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer is deconstructed to expose an underlying philosophical paradigm towards people, especially children, with disabilities that is mechanistic and utilitarian. This paradigm includes a static and over-determined view of any disability a person may have, and can be erroneously supported by a philosophy of “radical freedom.” Examples of this philosophy of disability as applied to the K-12 realm of special education are also provided, showing how the lessons learned from the (...) children’s movie are mirrored in the static conceptualization of the notion of disability in the general society and educational system. (shrink)

In 1885, Holloway Sanatorium, an asylum for the ‘mentally afflicted of the middle classes’ opened in Egham, Surrey, 20 miles outside London. Until 1910, photographs of about a third of the patients—both those ‘Certified Lunatic by Inquisition’ and the ‘Voluntary Boarders’ who admitted themselves—were pasted into the asylum's case books. This paper analyses the photographs that were included in the very first of these, when there was a great uncertainty as to how to represent these patients, or whether to represent (...) them at all. The photographs are unlike any other institutional images of the period, and raise critical questions about the imagined incompatibility between documentary photography and personal agency. (shrink)

THE PRESENT paper grows out of a previous paper of mine called "Fallibilism and Necessity." That paper was primarily concerned with an issue raised by Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics: whether it is possible to hold that our mathematical beliefs are fallible, while at the same time maintaining that mathematical truths are necessary. My conclusion was that fallibilism and necessity are, in fact, perfectly compatible, once one has correctly formulated what fallibilism is: the point became clear as soon as I realized (...) that fallibilism is a thesis about our liability to error, and not a thesis about the modal status of what we believe. This conclusion prompted the train of thought that resulted in the present paper: If fallibilism has to be conceived as a thesis primarily about cognitive agents and their liability to error, a fallibilist epistemology must allow a suitably central place to the knowing subject. Now Popper, of course, is a fallibilist; and yet he criticizes "traditional epistemology" for its preoccupation with the individual who knows or believes, and urges, instead, the claims of an "epistemology without a knowing subject." So I thought it would be worthwhile to try to work out a somewhat more developed account of the role of the knowing subject in a fallibilist epistemology, and to go about this, in the first instance, by comparing and contrasting what I believe to be the most fruitful approach with that favored by Popper. (shrink)