This paper presents a dual intention model (DIM) of demonstrations as actions to show the agentive nature of demonstrations. According to the DIM, demonstrations are complex actions that contain as components at least three elements: an abductive intention, a deictic intention, and a basic ostensive act of indication. This paper unpacks these three components and discusses their roles from the viewpoint of the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language. It also shows how the DIM applies in selected practical (...) examples and explains the merits of the model in the context of other views on demonstrations and demonstratives. (shrink)

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind (...) this book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory. (shrink)

Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxiology (theory of efcient action), and the so called “planning theory of intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two proposals helps to remove aws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also shows the way, in which we can enrich (...) the idea of plans in the frame-work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can improve our understanding of planning when confronted with infuentialcontemporary accounts. (shrink)

The structure of this paper is as follows. My starting point is psychological flexibility (henceforth, PF) as it has been presented in psychology. Here I offer a synthetic view which embraces the most crucial aspects of flexibility, and describes its functional roles and underlying mechanisms. Secondly, I move my attention onto the field of current action theory and discuss two elementary concepts we commonly use when describing our actions: intention and desire. Of course, there are many “theories of desire” and (...) there is no point in trying (nor even the option) to discuss all of them under one heading. To show where the question of PF sneaks into the scene of action theory, I explore the idea of the resistance of desire, as proposed by Timo Airaksinen. The second concept to investigate at this stage is intention. As in the previous case, it is plain that there are plenty of accounts of intentions and there are many roles they play in the phenomenology of action. For the purposes of this paper, we need only something that can be interpreted as an approach to PF. Such an approach can be found in the idea of stability of intention or a plan, discussed famously by Michael Bratman. According to my interpretation, these two ideas, resistance of desire and stability of intention, allow to initially understand some important aspects of PF in action theory. To get a slightly more comprehensive view – and to supplement the outcomes gained on the grounds of the analyses of these two accounts – I introduce, in the third step, the concept of plasticity which comes from the so-called praxiology proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (Lvov-Warsaw School). I try to show how this concept is still feasible and how it may enrich current philosophical accounts of agential flexibility. The strategy behind this stage of the paper is to enrich the Bratmanian approach to psychological stability. The last part of the paper contains some remarks on the philosophical outcome of the interdisciplinary approach to PF. (shrink)

The paper is an introductory essay to the Polish translation of M.E. Bratman's paper The Fecundity of Planning Agency. Instead of summarizing the main drifts of Bratman's work, the author tries to show a few important parallels between his approach to action theory and the so-called praxiology proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbinski. It occurs that there are important similarities between their approaches both to specific problems in action theory and to the general question how to understood agency. A brief presentation (...) of these similarities gives two central results. Firstly, it allows to interpret Bratman as a kind of praxiologist, and, secondly, it shows that praxiological thinking proposed by Kotarbinski is still a vital perspective in contemporary action theory. (shrink)

"This is a full original version of Makowski's work on Aristotelian dunamis (shortened & revised version has been previously published as "Metaphysics of Practical Philosophy" paper). The author presents the Aristotelian conception of capacity/potentiality (dunamis) – one of the most important in Aristotle’s metaphysics. A closer inspection allows to draw conclusion, that the concept of capacity is an important link between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (metaphysics on the one side, and practical – ethical, rhetorical, political – skills, on the other). (...) A picture of the connection between theory and practice is based on the most important parts of Metaphysics (books delta and theta), it relates metaphysical definitions to an essential element of Aristotelian practical philosophy – the concept of virtue (aretê). In the practical works of Aristotle, we can find different definitions of aretê: in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines aretê using the notion of disposition (hexis), but in Rhetoric he formulates a definition based on the concept of capacity. Distinctive analysis of this inconsistency shows the significance of capacity in The Stagirite’s philosophy.". (shrink)

Wychodząc od pojęcia i cech propagandy, autor omawia technikę multiplikacji, stosowaną w manipulacji językowej, mającej miejsce w języku polityki i propagandy. Jednocześnie zwraca uwagę na różne płaszczyzny i aspekty multiplikacji, od powtarzania poszczególnych leksemów, przez ustandaryzowane i utrwalone stałe schematy i kolokacje, rytualizacje, polityczne frazeologizmy, aż po multiplikację całych motywów w oparciu o pola synonimiczne.

In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...) latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of pl... (shrink)

Graph polynomials are graph parameters invariant under graph isomorphisms which take values in a polynomial ring with a fixed finite number of indeterminates. We study graph polynomials from a model theoretic point of view. In this paper we distinguish between the graph theoretic (semantic) and the algebraic (syntactic) meaning of graph polynomials. Graph polynomials appear in the literature either as generating functions, as generalized chromatic polynomials, or as polynomials derived via determinants of adjacency or Laplacian matrices. We show that these (...) forms are mutually incomparable, and propose a unified framework based on definability in Second Order Logic. We show that this comprises virtually all examples of graph polynomials with a fixed finite set of indeterminates. Finally we show that the location of zeros and stability of graph polynomials is not a semantic property. The paper emphasizes a model theoretic view. It gives a unified exposition of classical results in algebraic combinatorics together with new and some of our previously obtained results scattered in the graph theoretic literature. (shrink)

"Traditional interpretations of Kantian idea of autonomy – based on the classical texts such as Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten – stress basically one point: action is autonomous only when an agent obeys the law. In this paper, the author tries to introduce an interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy, which covers a wider perspective, resulting in the idea of “radical autonomy”. Re-reading classical texts of Kant in connection with Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (...) and Tugendlehre I try to show, that Kant’s conception of autonomy also allows for acting, that is not determined by the law (i.e. categorical imperative). Roughly, to be radically autonomous you do not have to be necessarily moral (there are other conditions that make your autonomy valid). This paper adopts reasons of „historicistic enlightment” (Schnädelbach), which is rather contrary to the general anti-historicistic context of Kant’s philosophy. Although this approach seems to be against the Kantian „metaphysical hipotheque” (e.g.: pure Faktum der Vernunft, absolute justification/Grundlegung of morality), it provides a (re)interpretation that allows to defend the broadened idea of autonomy. And this ‘radical autonomy’ shows some explanatory attractiveness of Kant’s ethical theory in the contemporary critical horizon of historicism. ". (shrink)

La pensée (onto-topologie) heideggerienne de l’être et du lieu est comprise dans un premier temps à partir du couple formé par Hestia et Hermès, en procédant à une critique – celle des interprétations (Adorno, Badiou, Cassin) qui ramènent Heidegger à des nostalgies provinciales et réactionnaires, et à un déplacement – à l’opposition de l’enracinement provincial et de l’errance citadine se substitue celle entre le foyer (Hestia) et la mobilité (Hermès). Ceci permet dans un second temps d’établir une correspondance entre l’atopie (...) existentielle de Martin, et l’ontologie philosophique de Heidegger. Heidegger n’est pas ce provincial englué dans l’épaisseur du lieu, et son ontologie ne saurait nous mener par la parole, dite « maison de l’être », dans la vacance bucolique de la Lichtung. L’œuvre comme la vie de Martin Heidegger sont en réalité marquées du sceau de l’atopie et de l’errance au-dessus de l’abîme. (shrink)

This article argues that such large-scale cases of crowd behavior as the Mexican Wave ( La Ola) constitute forms of shared intentionality which cannot be explained solely with the use of the standard intentionalistic ontology. It claims that such unique forms of collective intentionality require a hybrid explanatory lens in which an account of shared goals, intentions, and other propositional attitudes is combined with an account of the motor psychology of collective agents. The paper describes in detail the intentionalistic ontology (...) of La Ola and discusses the conditions of cooperation it meets. The discussion allows the author to defend the view that large-scale collective intentionality can be based on automaticity to a significant degree: to properly understand such phenomena like La Ola, the idea of probabilistically interpreted decisions and propensities to act should give way to the automatic aspects of behavior. This paves the way for future studies in the philosophy of action to fully recognize the role of automatic performances at the level of collective actions just as they do for individual actions. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Among different types of autonomy of ethics, semantic autonomy seems to be the most interesting. It is a thesis about irreducibility of meaning of ethical terms to some other types of discourse. The paper proposes an argument for the semantic autonomy of ethics, based on a detailed interpretation of the Open Question Argument by G.E. Moore, and followed up by the reading of Philippa Foot's argument about weak objectivity of evaluative meaning of ethical terms. The result of investigation gives the (...) two-fold picture of modern understanding of morality: irrevisability of moral demands as attempted by any theoretical armchair endeavors, which are external to the moral practice, and democratic intersubjectivity of moral discourse. (shrink)

Artykuł omawia postać Jerzego Grobickiego, który służył jako oficer armii cesarsko-królewskiej i został pułkownikiem Wojska Polskiego w II RP. Brał udział w I i II wojnie światowej, a po wojnie wyemigrował do Kanady.

The paper contains a critical analysis of pluripropositionalism (or: multiple proposition approach), the view defended in recent years by authors such as Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta and John Perry.

dr Tadeusz Adam Ożóg, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

This volume addresses foundational issues of context-dependence and indexicality, which are at the center of the current debate within the philosophy of language. Topics include the scope of context-dependency, the nature of content and the character of input data of cognitive processes relevant for the interpretation of utterances. There's also coverage of the role of beliefs and intentions as contextual factors, as well as the validity of arguments in context-sensitive languages. The contributions consider foundational issues regarding context-sensitivity from three different, (...) yet related, perspectives on the phenomenon of context-dependence: representational, structural, and functional. The contributors not only address the representational, structural and/or functional problems separately but also study their mutual connections, thus furthering the debate and bringing competing approaches closer to unification and consensus. This text appeals to students and researchers within the field. This is a very useful collection of essays devoted to the roles of context in the study of language. Its essays provide a useful overview of the current debates on this topic, and they put forth novel contributions that will undoubtedly be of relevance for the development of all areas in philosophy and linguistics interested in the notion of context. Stefano Predelli Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. (shrink)

The problem of evil is a metaphysical problem bound up with the conditions of human existence. The radical evil of fascism and communism, according to Józef Tischner, opens up the possibility that we live in the time of a modern Manichaeism, understood as having two faces: nihilism and pessimism. The possibility of thinking of such a modem form of Manichaeism necessarily calls for a new inquiry into the question of evil. For Tischner, evil, like good, is not an object, but (...) something in which man participates, and for this reason it cannot be objectified and defined. One can only ask how it appears. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the interpretation of one of the most important passages in modern Anglophon philosophy: III.1.3 of Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. The author considers the problem of its meaning at an angle of the standard interpretation, which can be summed up in a dictum: ‘no ought from is’ (so called “Hume’s Guillotine”). The author outlines four possible approaches to this putative meaning of the Treatise passage and weighs arguments for them. The investigation, based mainly (...) on the strategies by Arthur Prior, Charles Pigden and John Searle, allows to defend two approaches regarding Hume’s putative proposal of is/ought gap: /1/ the idea of logical autonomy of moral discourse, making strong rationality of deduction from is to (non-trivial) ought invalid, together with /2/ the possibility of weak rational (justified) inference from is to ought. However, the comparison of these two accounts with the guts of Humean philosophy as such (critical skepticism, fallibilism, ethical noncognitivism) makes the author prone to give a priority to the latter. (shrink)

This volume explores two traditions in practical philosophy: action theory, which concerns the nature of motivation for human action, and praxiology, the study of human action. By bringing different perspectives together, the volume strives to contribute to the international debate on theories of reasons for action as a philosophy of action. The volume consists of three main parts. The first part, “Reasons for Action," bridges the gap between reasons for action theories and praxiology. The second part of the volume, titled (...) “Theories of Action," explores philosophical approaches to action. Finally, in the third part, “Applications," the contributors show several ways of applying praxiological ways of thinking and acting to the problems of reflection assessment, solving action incompleteness, and knowledge management. The ultimate goal of this volume is to broaden the scientific view of action: to establish a perspective on action that is permeated by moral theories on the one hand, and accounts focused on efficiency and economy of action on the other hand. (shrink)