Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.

This article provides a simple decision theoretic model in which elements of the world successively enter the decision maker’s scope and the state space expands over time, which is intended to be the closest correspondence to the standard subjective expected utility theory. We propose a dynamic consistency condition that after any expansion of the scope, the preference ranking should remain unchanged over acts to which the expansion is irrelevant. Together with other natural axioms, it characterizes a model in which the (...) decision maker’s belief extends over time in order that the marginal distribution of the new belief induced over the old state space coincides with the old belief. It is extended to encompass both expansion of scope and learning events, and we characterize the model with an additional property that the decision maker’s belief updating follows Bayes’ rule when she learns events. (shrink)

The Body at the Limits of Representation. The Theory of the Body and Painting in Merleau-PontyIn Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty quotes a phrase from Valéry: “the painter brings his body with him.” He interprets the corporeal experience of the artist, not only as the center of a perceptual orientation or kinesthesis, but also as the inspiration for poets and for painters. In this sense, one can place his theory of body not only within the problematic of the phenomenological constitution of (...) the perceived object, but also in the context of the deconstruction of representation or in the genealogy of “de-representation” (Lyotard). By following Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the works of Cézanne and Klee, we are going to see how his theory of the experience of body and the formation of their works of art meet up in his consideration of the reversibility of the visible and the invisible. When Merleau-Ponty quotes Valéry’s phrase “the painter brings his body with him,” the body of the artist is no longer “subject-body” perceiving the world in a prosaic way; rather, the body is implicated in the anonymous vision at the source from which the painter’s expression emerges. Just as nature is recounted through the poet, it has the faculty of seeing itself through the painter. In the “Methods of Natural Research,” Klee says “the resonance surpasses all the optical foundations between myself and that which opposes me,” “the united anti-optic way of the root going out of the earth, which looks at me from down below all the way up to my eyes” and of the “united non-optic way of the universe come from above.” He demonstrates that this non-optic resonance, rather than a mirror and a black screen separating the light, allows the eye to be seen as a point of junction of non-optical things and thereby it constitutes a part of the circle created by the new nature of works (eine neue Natürlichkeit des Werkes). Following what is particular to Merleau-Ponty’s thought in which the body is conceived as a principle of de-representation, one sees, by means of his intention of assessing modern artistic creation as the deconstruction of classical ontology, the overcoming of the ontology of the object. In conclusion, we note that the theory of body and of painting in Merleau-Ponty brings to light the limit of the possibility of representation in modern art, by emphasizing especially the non-perception or the transcendence that one can discern in the perceptual field. By interrogating the body of the painter and the poet, that is, the poetic body or the body as symbolism, prior to its being diverted into being a result of the brain and of the libido where the body is no longer the body visible in the world, by doing this, Merleau-Ponty has found a way of placing the body beyond representation. Poièsis is no longer mimèsis in the banal sense of imitation, and the poetic body is not the representational body. But, he has found a way of placing it still in Visibility, as if there were a hinge in this border between the visible and the invisible, in this border between representation and de-representation, a border that one cannot definitively overcome by structuring it as a dichotomy. (De-representation, but the visible. Therefore the possibility of visible de-representation in the artistic creation, in poièsis.) This hinge, which denies us an alternation, is the body, the flesh, which is the condition of thought as ontological interrogation: an ontological interrogation in the age of ir-representation, in the age of the impossibility of representation (Vorstellung) and of poem (Dichtung), in the age of crowds where the image appears as one of my fellow creatures just like the shadow cast by existence.Il corpo ai limiti della rappresentazione. La teoria del corpo e della pittura di Merleau-PontyNe L’occhio e lo spirito Merleau-Ponty cita una frase di Valéry: “il pittore si dà con il suo corpo”. Egli interpreta l’esperienza corporea dell’artista non solo come il centro di un orientamento percettivo o cinestesico, ma anche come motivo d’ispirazione per poeti e per pittori. In questo senso, si può collocare la sua teoria del corpo non solo all’interno della problematica della costituzione fenomenologica dell’oggetto percepito, ma anche nel contesto della decostruzione della rappresentazione o nella genealogia della “derappresentazione” (Lyotard). Seguendo l’interpretazione merleaupontiana delle opere di Cézanne e di Klee, vedremo come la sua teoria dell’esperienza del corpo e la formazione delle loro opere d’arte convergano nella considerazione della reversibilità del visibilee dell’invisibile. Quando Merleau-Ponty cita la frase di Valéry “il pittore si dà con il suo corpo”, il corpo dell’artista non è più un corpo soggettivo che percepisce il mondo in modo prosaico; il corpo è piuttosto implicato nella visione anonima dell’origine dalla quale emerge l’espressione del pittore. In Wege des Naturstudiums, Klee afferma che “la risonanza sorpassa tutti i fondamenti ottici tra me e ciò che mi si oppone”. Egli dimostra che questa risonanza non-ottica, piuttosto che essere uno specchio o uno schermo nero che separa la luce, permette di vedere l’occhio come un punto di giunzione di cose non ottiche e ciò costituisce una parte del circolo creato dalla nuova natura delle opere (eine neue Natürlichkeit des Werkes). Seguendo la particolarità del pensiero merleaupontiano, secondo il quale il corpo è concepito come un principio di de-rappresentazione, si nota, in virtù della sua intenzione di interpretare la creazione nell’arte moderna come la decostruzione dell’ontologia classica, il superamento dell’ontologia oggettivistica. In conclusione, osserviamo come la teoria del corpo e della pittura di Merleau-Ponty chiarisca i limiti della possibilità della rappresentazione nell’arte moderna, enfatizzando l’impercezione o la trascendenza che si può distinguere nel campo percettivo. Interrogando il corpo del pittore e del poeta – il corpo poetico o il corpo come simbolismo, a monte del suo porsi come risultato della mente o della libido, là dove il corpo non è ancora corpo visibile nel mondo – Merleau-Ponty ha trovato il mondo di collocare il corpo al di là della rappresentazione. Poièsis non è più mimesis nel senso banale d’imitazione, e il corpo poetico non è il corpo rappresentativo. Egli ha trovato il modo di posizionare il corpo nella Visibilità, come se esistesse un punto di rovesciamento situato sul confi ne tra visibile ed invisibile, ovvero sul confine tra rappresentazione e de-rappresentazione: un confine che non si può definitivamente superare se lo si continua a strutturare come dicotomia. Questo punto, che ci nega un’alternativa, è il corpo, la carne, che è condizione del pensiero come interrogazione ontologica: un’interrogazione ontologica nell’era dell’ir-rappresentazione, nell’era dell’impossibilità di rappresentare (Vorstellung) o di creare poemi (Dichtung), nell’era delle masse, in cui l’immagine appare come uno dei miei simili, come l’ombra proiettata dall’esistenza. (shrink)

Molecular and biochemical analysis of the biogenesis of peroxisomes has made rapid progress in recent years. Research on the mechanism of targeting of peroxisomal proteins has revealed that many, but not all, peroxisomal proteins have a conserved tripeptide motif in their carboxy‐terminal portions which is required for entry into peroxisomes; the topogenic signal mechanism thus differs in these instances from those employed in mitochondria and endoplasmic reticulum. Other factors involved in peroxisome biogenesis are also coming to light.

In current debates on "constitutional" and "republican" patriotisms, the relationship between religion and patriotism is underappreciated while alternative forms of patriotism in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy have escaped scholarly attention. The present essay explores "another" patriotism in wartime Japan by comparing and contrasting the patriotism of two Protestant thinkers: Tsukamoto Toraji and Yanaihara Tadao. A close analysis of Yanaihara's patriotism in particular shows that there was an alternative form of patriotism which, from a Christian perspective, combated militaristic nationalism which (...) was anchored in State Shinto, thereby suggesting a significant link between religion and patriotism. (shrink)

Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)

This article contributes to the critical engagement with luck egalitarianism by advancing two arguments. Firstly, it questions the cogency of the dichotomies – e.g., luck/choice, person/circumstance, agency/structure – and the accompanying moral ideal of pure voluntarism. This makes it difficult for luck egalitarianism to dissect appropriately the inequalities embedded in social relations, such as social networks and involuntary associations, in which voluntariness and contingency as well as agency and structure are intertwined. Secondly, it suggests that the relational approach, which has (...) been developed, inter alia, in the empirical study of inequality, provides a morally and practically adequate perspective on egalitarian justice. The relational approach achieves this by converging upon those in‐between social relations that are irreducible to the macro‐level structure and to micro‐level agency. Moreover, a relationally sensitive perspective on inequality can adeptly respond to the difficulties that luck‐egalitarian theories encounter. (shrink)

Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy (...) of Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects. Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds or about Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may at first appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeed possible. Another category of object similar to that of a possible object is the category of a fictional object. Although initially attractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objects should not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoretical usefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validation of two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic. (shrink)

闇斎門下の個性豊かな諸家の事跡を通して、垂加神道の史的展開を検討すると共に、『日本書紀』神代巻の解釈に見える思想の根幹を明らかにする。.

There are many gene families that are specific to multicellular animals. These have either diverged from ancestral genes that are shared with fungi and/or plants or evolved from an ancestral gene unique to animals. The evolution of gene families involved in cell–cell communication and developmental control has been studied to establish whether the number of member genes increased dramatically immediately prior to or in concert with the Cambrian explosion. A molecular phylogeny‐based analysis of several animal‐specific gene families has revealed that (...) gene diversification by duplication occurred during two active periods interrupted by a long intervening quiescent period. Intriguingly, the Cambrian explosion is situated in the silent period, indicating that there is no direct link between the first burst of gene diversification and the Cambrian explosion itself. The importance of gene recruitment as a possible molecular mechanism for morphological diversity, and its possible role for the Cambrian explosion, are discussed. BioEssays 23:1018–1027, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

The paper explores the logical strength of Isbell's zig‐zag theorem using the framework of reverse mathematics. Working in, we show that is equivalent to Isbell's zig‐zag theorem for countable monoids: If B is a monoid extension of A, then is dominated by A if and only if b has a zig‐zag over A. Our proof of Isbell's zig‐zag theorem avoids use of strong comprehension axioms common in traditional proofs. We also analyze the strength of theorems concerning binary relations.

We explore the understanding of conscious states in terms of spatio-temporal dynamics through modelling a mobile agent. Conscious states are associated with an agent's spontaneous and deterministic fluctuation between attachment to and detachment from the surroundings. It is because of this fluctuating nature, we argue, that an agent can perceive structure in the world. Perception requires a conscious state in physical devices. This is a central concern of this paper, and we examine it by simulating a mobile agent equipped with (...) an interconnected Fitz-Hugh-Nagumo (FHN) neuron network with delayed signal transmissions. The agent can move around a space by sensing the environment pattern through the input neurons and computing the motor outputs via the FHN network. The agent shows a variety of motion styles and a spontaneous selection of motion styles responding to the surroundings. Such a phenomenon is named embodied chaotic itinerancy (ECI), as an extension of chaotic itinerant dynamics, which is known to be a typical dynamic with a high degree of freedom. We take this selective mode of response to be significant, particularly those interacting with spatial pattern, as an inevitable property of conscious states. (shrink)

It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is (...) widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 – 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 – 40). For the second argument, replace ‘F’ with ‘does not exist’. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.. (shrink)

Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible (...) worls. I do so by generalizing Lewis' own idea that restrictions on quantification come and go with the pragmatic wind and relativizing possible worlds as shifting domains of discourse. I then suggest a way to soften the infamous incredulous stare. (shrink)

Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one.

Inspired by Rick Grush's emulation theory, we reinterpreted a series of our neuroimaging experiments which were intended to examine the representations of complex movement, modality-specific imagery, and supramodal imagery. The emulation theory can explain motor and cognitive activities observed in cortical motor areas, through the speculation that caudal areas relate to motor-specific imagery and rostral areas embrace an emulator for amodal imagery.

In recent decades, Asian subsidiaries of Japanese manufacturing multi-national enterprises (MNEs) have faced heightened competitions from local firms to underscore the strategic importance of developing competent “host country nationals” (HCNs) to overcome their liability of foreignness. In addition, in recent literature on global MNEs, the importance of “boundary spanners” (BSs) has been pointed out in facilitating knowledge sharing across intra-organizational boundaries. Given these discussions, this study focuses on an interesting contingent relationship in the role of BSs observed in author’s interviews. (...) i.e., In cases of “bad BSs,” “knowledge appropriation” can take place where newly promoted HCNs would monopolize their knowledge and information, and the mitigating processes of notion gap problem in grey areas management are heavily stagnated. Whereas in cases of “good BSs,” “knowledge sharing” would take place where newly promoted HCNs would be willing to share them with other members, and the mitigating processes of the notion gap problem are steadily progressed. The study proposes a framework illustrating conditions under which HCNs choose knowledge sharing over appropriation. The analysis identifies two key factors influencing this choice: dependence on personal skills and prospects for growth opportunities. The findings suggest a dynamic relationship where knowledge sharing leads to effective control and efficient knowledge transfer, fostering virtuous cycles, while knowledge appropriation results in inefficiencies, creating vicious cycles. The study calls for further research on dynamic aspects of this contingent relationship and suggests practical strategies for shifting from knowledge appropriation to sharing, thereby enhancing organizational performance in foreign subsidiaries. (shrink)

1. Ronri to gengo -- 2-3. Imi to yōsō -- 4. Shinri to imi.

Abstract When the Meiji government allowed Christianity to be proclaimed in Japan in 1873, there aroused heated controversy about how to deal with religion including Christianity. Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential thinker and opinion?leader among Japanese intellectuals in those days, participated in the controversy and wrote more than 80 articles concerning religion. At first, he took a critical standpoint against Christianity from the Utilitarian viewpoint. Then he changed his viewpoint of religion and came to admit a Unitarian Christianity for a (...) little while. But he gradually came to be familiar with Pure Land Buddhism and developed his original phibsophy of religion in his later years. In this article I trace the process of change in Fukuzawa's religious viewpoint and clarify his philosophy of religion in his later years, by examining his writings in chronological order. (shrink)

江戸時代の儒学者・宗教者である山崎闇斎の思想を、心理学・文化人類学・現代哲学等を取り入れた学際的なアプローチで解明する。.