We study behind-the-scenes investor activism promoting environmental, social, and governance improvements by means of a proprietary dataset of a large international, socially responsible activist fund. We examine the activist’s target selection, forms of engagement, impact on ESG performance, drivers of success, and effects on the targets’ operations and value creation. Target firms are typically large and visible, perform well, and have high liquidity and low ESG performance. Engagement induces ESG rating adjustments: firms with poor ex ante ESG ratings experience a (...) ratings increase after complying with the activist’s demands, whereas firms with high ex ante ESG ratings experience a ratings decrease following the revelation of their ESG problems. Activism that is focused on environmental and social issues is more likely to succeed if targets are ESG-sensitive. Successful engagements boost targets’ sales. Risk-adjusted excess stock returns of successful engagements outperform those of unsuccessful engagements by 2.7%. Results are especially strong for firms with low ex ante ESG scores. Specifically, targeted firms in the lowest ex ante ESG quartile outperform matched peers by 7.5% in the year after the end of the engagement. Our results thus suggest that the activism regarding corporate social responsibility generally improves ESG practices and corporate sales and is profitable to the activist. Taken together, we provide direct evidence that ethical investing and strong financial performance, both from the activist’s and the targeted firm’s perspective, can go hand-in-hand together. (shrink)

A piliscsabai Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem oktatója, Hankovszky Tamás (két kivételtől eltekintve) az utóbbi évtizedben megjelent publikációiból állította össze tanulmánykötetét. A filozófiai, teológiai és irodalmi ihletésű írásokat mindenekelőtt "az Istennel való találkozás" keresztény hite fűzi egybe, és persze a filozófiatörténész szerző preferenciái (Pilinszky, Camus, Mauriacimon Weil, Dosztojevszkij). "Minden találkozás olyan partnereket követel, akik szabadon megnyílnak egymásnak, de nem oldódnak fel egymásban, akik a másik közelségére vágynak, mégis megőrzik a köztük lévő távolságot, mert a dialógust keresik, és a dialógus lételeme (...) a különbözőség. Ám az ember csak azért különbözik a másik embertől és Istentől, hogy kapcsolatba léphessenek" - olvasható az ismertetőben. Mivel Hankovszky professzor a találkozásban és a párbeszédben látja az élet értelmét és végső célját, a kötet kívül áll azon a misztikát is felölelő monista hagyományon, amely az Istennel való minél teljesebb egyesülésre, Isten és ember egységére törekszik, és a vele való párbeszédet, a kölcsönös megszólítást pusztán a cél felé vezető út első lépésének tekinti. Azonban éppen azért áll kívül ezen az ősi és tiszteletreméltó hagyományon, hogy dialógust folytasson vele, és így teljesebben érthesse meg Isten és ember viszonyát, valamint megtalálja benne a földi lét, a művészet és a kultúra igazi helyét. A szakkönyvtárak anyagába ajánlható kötetet rövidítés- és irodalomjegyzék, valamint az esszék és tanulmányok első megjelenési helyeinek listája teszi teljessé. (shrink)

Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention (...) to the central role of rationality, the conceptual connections, and the essential evaluative content inherent in folk psychological ascriptions. As a conclusion I propose that a fictionalist account of the discourse would fit its characteristics better than a factualist-realist interpretation. (shrink)

(1996). The emergence of the global culture and the global moral system: The global bio‐social system as the reference system of the human rights. World Futures: Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 47-51.

Artificial Culture" is an examination of the articulation, construction, and representation of "the artificial" in contemporary popular cultural texts, especially science fiction films and novels. The book argues that today we live in an artificial culture due to the deep and inextricable relationship between people, our bodies, and technology at large. While the artificial is often imagined as outside of the natural order and thus also beyond the realm of humanity, paradoxically, artificial concepts are simultaneously produced and constructed by human (...) ideas and labor. The artificial can thus act as a boundary point against which we as a culture can measure what it means to be human. Science fiction feature films and novels, and other related media, frequently and provocatively deploy ideas of the artificial in ways which the lines between people, our bodies, spaces and culture more broadly blur and, at times, dissolve. Building on the rich foundational work on the figures of the cyborg and posthuman, this book situates the artificial in similar terms, but from a nevertheless distinctly different viewpoint. After examining ideas of the artificial as deployed in film, novels and other digital contexts, this study concludes that we are now part of an artificial culture entailing a matrix which, rather than separating minds and bodies, or humanity and the digital, reinforces the symbiotic connection between identities, bodies, and technologies. "--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

filozofiatortenet vallasfilozofia filozofiai antropologia Franciaorszag 17. szazad.

The theory of consciousness proposed by O'Brien & Opie is open to the Sorites paradox, for it defines a consciousness system internally in terms of computationally relevant units which add up to consciousness only if sufficient in number. The Sorites effect applies on the assumed level of features.

Gyorgy Tamas works in the philosophy of logic, that difficult interdisciplin ary region wherein the notion of categories is both basic and subtle. To understand ways of thinking, to understand patterns of whatever is real, to recognize what is possible and to reject the nonsensical and the impossible is to comprehend the categories. This was a in thought and in fact, recurring motive of European thought from the earliest self-aware beginnings, and Tamas knows that history well, as his critical respect (...) demonstrates. Ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers appear in this book, set forth in their own words; and likewise we see that Tamas has built upon the historians and commentators, upon the pioneering historical investigation of the categories by Trendelenburg a century ago and by Bochenski in our days. Tamas has two principal goals here: to investigate the logic, which is to say the structure and the relations, of the philosophical categories; and to set forth the logic of thought which may then be based upon the critically established system of categories obtained by that investigation. Ancillary but of striking value is his style of historical relevance which enables the reader to engage in a discussion that is both analytically sharp and developmentally insightful. Furthermore, Tamas draws upon his contem porary colleagues with similar critical respect: Lukasiewicz, Quine, Patzig, Menne, Tavanets and others. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology comprises a wide area of theories and researches. One area focuses on the universal and comprehensive mechanisms of selection which can be utilized to interpret cultural phenomena. Memetic selection, epidemiology of representations, naturalistic approach to culture, and evolutionary epistemology use various principles and methods to explain the origin and spread of the cultural traits. Csaba Pléh, one of the representatives of Darwinian approach to social sciences, has made an effort to integrate these theoretical frameworks. He emphasizes the continuity (...) among biological evolution, hominid development, and cultural differentiation and change. Indeed, understanding mental, behavioral, and material commonalities shared across individuals or groups of individuals requires a multi-level explanation at different types and levels of evolutionary processes that are based on the same organizational principles but also imply quite distinctive procedures for acquiring, interpreting and using information derived from the social world. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct the central concept of the young Lukács’s and Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, as they present it in their writings in the early decades of the twentieth century. I argue that this concept, namely Weltanschauung, is used to refer to some conceptually unstructured totality of feelings, which they take to be a condition of possibility of intellectual production, and this understanding is contrasted to an alternative construal of the term that presents it as logically structured, quasi-theoretical (...) background knowledge. This concept has Kantian reminiscences: it is a condition of possibility of intellectual production in general. The young Mannheim and Lukács rely on ‘Weltanschauung’ so understood as a phenomenon mediating between the facts of society and individual intellectual production and reception: it is seen as being conditioned by sociological facts and therefore as a historical and sociological category through which, and therefore indirectly, society enters into intellectual production. (shrink)

Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Jaegwon Kim put forward two models of higher-level causal explanation. Advocates of both versions are inclined to draw the conclusion that the models don't differ substantially. I argue, on the contrary, that there are relevant metaphysical differences between Jackson and Pettit's notion of programme explanation on the one hand, and Kim's idea of supervenient causation on the other. These can be traced back to underlying differences between the contents of their physicalisms.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

An evolutionary theory of socialization suggests that children from father-absent families will mature earlier, and form less-stable pair bonds, compared with those from father-present families. Using a sample of about 1,000 persons the recent study focuses on elements of father-absent children’s behavior that could be better explained by a Darwinian approach than by rival social science theories. As a result of their enhanced interest in male competition, father-absent boys were found to engage in rule-breaking behavior more intensively than father-present boys. (...) Compared with father-present children, adolescents from widowed households (both boys and girls) showed a higher intensity of various kinds of noncompliant behavior, which can be linked to their earlier maturation. School attendance, age at marriage, and marital success proved to be influenced by the children’s early family experiences, governed by adapted evolutionary strategies. Father-absent daughters conceived more children than those whose fathers were present during their childhood. As evolutionary theory predicts, reproductive behavior of individuals from divorced households differed from that of individuals who grew up in widowed households. Finally, the strong correlation found between spontaneous abortion/stillbirths and family arrangement indicates that father absence has certain direct impacts on the neurohormonal processes of child development. (shrink)

What are mental states? When we talk about people’s beliefs or desires, are we talking about what is happening inside their heads? If so, might cognitive science show that we are wrong? Might it turn out that mental states do not exist? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these longstanding questions about the mind. Its core idea is that mental states are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we are not formulating hypotheses about people’s inner machinery. Instead, (...) we simply talk "as if" people had certain inner states, such as beliefs or desires, in order to make sense of their behaviour. This is the first book dedicated to exploring mental fictionalism. Featuring contributions from established authors as well as up-and-coming scholars in this burgeoning field, the book reveals the exciting potential of a fictionalist approach to the mind, as well as the challenges it faces. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on foundational debates in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics in the field, such as embodied cognition and mental representation. Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations essential reading for advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals alike. (shrink)

It is common wisdom in intellectual history that eighteenth-century science of man evolved under the aegis of Newton. It is also frequently suggested that David Hume, one of the most influential practitioners of this kind of inquiry, aspired to be the Newton of the moral sciences. Usually this goes hand in hand with a more or less explicit reading of Hume’s theory of human nature as written in an idiom of particulate inert matter and active forces acting on it, i.e. (...) essentially that of Newton’s Principia. Hume’s outlook on the mental world is thus frequently described in terms of conceptual atoms whose association is compared to interparticulate attractions analogous with Newtonian forces in general, and gravity in particular. In the present paper I argue that Hume’s theory can indeed be understood in Newton’s wake, but not in the context of the Principa’s reception but that of the Opticks, which exerted a more significant influence on natural inquiry in eighteenth-century Scotland. I intend to show that Hume speaks a language and represents an outlook on human matters convergent with “philosophical chemistry” in Scotland at that time, and particularly to his later friend and physician William Cullen. (shrink)

The input data to grammar learning algorithms often consist of overt forms that do not contain full structural descriptions. This lack of information may contribute to the failure of learning. Past work on Optimality Theory introduced Robust Interpretive Parsing (RIP) as a partial solution to this problem. We generalize RIP and suggest replacing the winner candidate with a weighted mean violation of the potential winner candidates. A Boltzmann distribution is introduced on the winner set, and the distribution’s parameter $T$ is (...) gradually decreased. Finally, we show that GRIP, the Generalized Robust Interpretive Parsing Algorithm significantly improves the learning success rate in a model with standard constraints for metrical stress assignment. (shrink)

To establish Optimality Theory as a framework in anthropology, or as a general model of higher human cognition, researchers have to demonstrate OT is convincing in a number of ways. This commentary summarizes some of them including factorial typologies, exact formulation of candidate sets and constraints, and computational plausibility.

In this paper I challenge the widely held view which associates Hume’s philosophy with mechanical philosophies of nature and particularly with Newton. This view presents Hume’s account of the human mind as passive receiver of impressions which bring into motion, from the outside, a mental machinery whose functioning is described in terms of mechanical causal principles. Instead, I propose an interpretation which suggests that for Hume the human mind is composed of faculties that can be characterized by their active contribution (...) which frequently results in qualitative change. This anatomy of the mind is explored from a physiological perspective focused on the normal functioning and interaction of the mind’s various organs. While pursuing this enterprise, I suggest that Hume’s outlook is closer to eighteenth-century “philosophical chemistry” and vitalistic physiology than to the heritage of mechanical philosophies. (shrink)

In his famous clarification Kant claimed that philosophy of Fichte is „nothing more or less than mere logic". In contrast with this interpretation Fichte from the beginning agreed with Kant and Reinhold on the fact that philosophy and logic are different from each other moreover the classical principles of logic can not be the principles of philosophy as well. However according to Fichte Reinhold did not succeed in explaining the relationship between philosophy and logic sufficiently. Hence Fichte proceeding from the (...) detailed critique of Reinhold laid in Review of Aenesidemus gives a new concept for the principles of both logic and philosophy. Accordingly in Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge he building upon this idea chooses such principle of the logic that possesses material validity and special content to be the absolutely primordial axiom of the science of knowledge. As we have seen the differences from the logic conception of Kant and Reinhold we can conceive better the meaning of the sentence from Fichte: “Everything to which the proposition ‘A = A’ is applicable, has reality, insofar as that proposition is applicable to it.” – This is one of the sentences dragged away from the context could provoked Kant’s ire reasonably.In seiner berühmten Erklärung äußerte Kant, die Wissenschaftslehre sei „nichts mehr oder weniger als bloße Logik“. Dieser Meinung widerspricht Fichtes Selbstinterpretation, weil er von Anfang an mit Kant und Reinhold darin einig war, dass sich Philosophie und Logik voneinander unterscheiden, und die klassischen Prinzipien der Logik nicht als Grundsätze der Philosophie gelten können. Nach seiner Auffassung gelingt es allerdings Reinhold nicht, das Verhältnis von Logik und Philosophie befriedigend zu klären. Ausgehend von einer gründlichen Kritik an Reinhold in der Rezension des Aenesidemus führt Fichte eine neue Konzeption vom Verhältnis der Grundsätze der Logik und der Philosophie ein. In der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre wählt er einen mit realer Gültigkeit und besonderem Inhalt ausgestatteten Grundsatz der Logik zum absolut ersten Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre. Betrachtet man die Veränderungen der Kantschen und Reinholdschen Logikauffassung, wird es verständlicher, wenn Fichte schreibt: „Alles, worauf der Satz A = A anwendbar ist, hat, inwiefern derselbe darauf anwendbar ist, Realität“–einer von vielen Sätzen, die aus dem Kontext herausgenommen mit Fug und Recht Kants Missfallen ausgelöst haben könnten. (shrink)

According to Fichte’s early science of knowledge, man is a free and independent being who becomes somebody not through the power of nature, by developing his innate skills and abilities, or through external influence, but by his own power. Since the essence of human beings is I-hood, the individual, having defeated the not-I or nature living in him, has to strive towards the absolute I, which is nothing else but the being created by himself. This process is Bildung, the details (...) of which are elaborated in Fichte’s philosophy of education, whereby he opposes his point of view to Rousseau. Although Fichte emphasizes the activity of the student, he sees the assistance of an educator as indispensable. The role of the educator can be apprehended from the foundations of the science of knowledge. Thus, in order to be able to posit ourselves as free beings we require another being who summons us. ‘The summons to engage in free self-activity is what we call upbringing.’. (shrink)

For Jerry Fodor, Hume’sTreatise of Human Natureis “the foundational document of cognitive science” whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor’s lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume’s science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor’s understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and (...) much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume’s science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor’s contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide. (shrink)