The idea and use of the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics has spawned much debate in environmental ethics/axiology. Although for many, it seems fundamental and necessary for formulating an ethic for environmental protection, it seems to confuse and even undermine such efforts. ' Intrinsic value ' is, I argue, a concept born in the Western intellectual tradition for purposes of insulating and isolating those to whom intrinsic value can be attributed from one another and their environmental context. This (...) is especially true from the Modern period onward. When used as a basis for determining moral considerability, these Modern foundations engender contradictory and self-defeating ways of thinking about the individual/ecosystem relationship. As a result, formulations of moral sensibilities and principles become self-defeating and, vis-à-vis the ecological context, incoherent. On the critique of this Modern residue, an alternative axiological framework is built, using Anthony Weston's idea of interdepending values as a preparation for a more ecologically coherent approach to environmental protection. This approach is dialectical and attempts to formulate an ecological foundation for moral considerability. (shrink)

法は危機をこえてどう変容するのか!法的議論の分裂、立憲主義の錯綜、正統性のゆらぎ―法が危機にあるいま、従来の支配的見解を根本的に問い、オルタナティヴ理論を提示する。.

ALBERT SHALOM PROPOSES that a framework for understanding mind and personal identity more adequate than either idealistic or traditional materialistic frameworks can be found in a quasi-materialist theory. In The Body/mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity he criticizes most formulations of the materialist thesis, yet maintains that the physical has in a sense to be taken as ontologically primary. His is a dialectical concept of matter: a concept related to two types of time, linear and what he (...) calls "quasi-nonlinear time." The formulations of the notions of time and of the physical develop through his criticisms and what he calls "the elaboration of those basic conditions without which it would be impossible, in my view, to even conceive of an ultimately convincing theory of what we call 'the person'." The elaboration turns out to imply physicalism, but an ontologically opaque physicalism. This opacity is based on an analysis of physical existence per se as incomprehensible. (shrink)

Attempts to come to grip with what appears to be the autonomy of nature have developed into several schools of thought. Among the most influential of these schools is the ecosystem integrity approach to environmental ethics, management and policy. The philosophical arm of the approach has been spearheaded by Laura Westra and her work in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics. The emphasis that this school places on pristine wilderness to model ecosystem integrity and the arguments Westra devises to justify the (...) application of what she calls the “principle of integrity,” although clear in its goal and object of inquiry, could very well retrench dualistic thinking of the sort that environmental thinkers have been trying to undermine. More importantly, I argue that Westra misses an important implication for the way in which ecosystem integrity could be used to help develop an ethic not so confined by problems of justification in attaching values to facts and descriptions to prescriptions. (shrink)

The intent of this thesis is to unravel some of the tangles which are encountered when one tries to define and explain freedom. There are actually two main arguments. The first is that freedom is to be defined relatively to the attaining of integration within oneself and with the world. The second is that a metaphysical framework significantly different from that which is typically used in debates regarding the possibility of freedom must be found, if an appropriate explanation of freedom (...) is to be given. The purpose is not to take sides with any of the dominant theories. Rather, it is to point towards what I consider to be a more fruitful way of understanding freedom. ;The thesis has a dominantly negative tone, since it is, for the most part, a criticism of the more popular views on freedom. It is argued that most definitions are one-sided or unintelligible and that most debates on freedom are based on inappropriate assumptions about the nature of personal power and about the sorts of conditions that are necessary for freedom to be possible. ;Despite its predominantly critical component, the thesis has a constructive component as well. The attempt is made to construct a definition for freedom. The definition, in a sense, announces itself as the process of eliminating and refining the popular definitions proceeds. Further, as explanations are eliminated and refined, one can begin to understand what sort of framework is needed in order to give an adequate account of freedom. In the end, I propose that freedom is to be defined as the attainment of an integrated personality and of a harmony with the world. Moreover, freedom can be explained only by using a modified concept of causality and of the self as having substance-like qualities. (shrink)

In a fascinating paper, “Ask the Philosopher,” Dimitrios Dentsoras shows how philosophers were once integrally engaged in society as agents of practical advice on how to govern and indeed on how to live. Over the centuries, beginning in Roman times, this social role has diminished to a point where professional philosophers are largely socially irrelevant. What has changed? This paper outlines an argument that identifies a central contribution to its own demise that professional philosophy itself has made. That contribution has (...) to do with how philosophical critique is conceived and operates. Philosophical teaching and publishing focus is on undermining opposing positions, or on eliminating opposition, rather than seeking deeper and genuine understanding. Examining certain elements of this eliminative function presents a possibility of seeing a renewal of philosophy’s previous functions of truth-seeking and accessing the Good. (shrink)

The lack of metaphysical grounding of environmental values, and impatience towards the enterprise of seeking such grounding, result in a superficial and wrongheaded view of anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism is best understood as a limiting condition, a point from which we can begin to reformulate an understanding of ourselves, our values, and our relation to the environment. It is not principally a starting point for the existence of values, as is assumed under traditional theories of anthropocentrism. To demonstrate and elaborate on this (...) position, the paper focuses on environmental values and how we traditionally assume them to be formed and legitimated. A critique of the analyses of two prominent figures in the field of environmental ethics, Bryan Norton and Eugene Hargrove, serves as the backdrop against which an alternative view is formed. This alternative is metaphysically grounded in an ecologically informed analysis of valuational activity. Against the tradition, the argument establishes two main points: 1) that attempts to ground environmental values on human preferences, agreements, traditions, or culturally driven commitments are liable to legitimate contrary values; and 2) that an ecologically driven analysis of values shows that valuations of the environment are not fundamentally conferred onto it by human beings. Positively, the paper attempts to show that our inclusion as members of the ecological community makes our valuational activity an integral and transformational element within more comprehensive ecological processes. As such, our moral commitment to the environment must be radically reshaped in order adequately to incorporate this renewed understanding. (shrink)

The confusion that persists over Aboriginal claim in North America calls for close examination. The paper begins by sorting out various versions of ‘ Aboriginal right’and some of the main factors that govern its use. Confusion is analysed as the result of conflating different frames of reference which determine different sets of expectations by Aboriginal and government representatives.To appreciate the significance of this conflation, it is helpful if not necessary to view the move to use the concept ‘ Aboriginal right’as (...) a strategic rather than a legally substantive one. Understanding the move in this way helps to explain why it is that definitions remain elusive. The effect of using the concept has indeed been to enable Aboriginals finally and effectively to table their claim. However, the strategy has its cost. Using the language of the courts places Aboriginal negotiators at a disadvantage, since that language is ineluctably tied to European social and legal sensibilities that militate against understanding Aboriginal claim.If, in the end, we understand that the move to use the language of the courts has been conciliatory, we can better recognise the nature of Aboriginal claim. We can begin to understand that it involves a complex web of responsibilities and commitments, most of which have either been forgotten or perverted to suit government agendas. We can begin to see that it has to do with restoring a relationship of mutual respect and protection. (shrink)

揺れ動く国民国家の概念、秩序形成にともなう差別などの考察を通して、規範と価値原理のヴィジョンを描く。.

The studies on the cAMP‐requiring mutants and their suppressors in the yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, revealed that cAMP‐dependent protein phosphorylation is involved in the G1 phase of the cell cycle, in conjugation, and in the post‐meiotic stage of sporulation, and that inhibition of cAMP‐dependent protein phosphorylation is required to induce meiotic division.

暴走する世界と迷走する日本への反時代的「檄」。実践と原理を結ぶ、40年間の知の行路、その「回顧的総括」と、「未来への提言」。.

The relationship between ethics and economics in the modern age is typically viewed as external. This view is usually articulated in the notion that for economic relations to be ethical, an ethic must be imposed. Otherwise, economic relations are amoral. I try to show how the relationship is actually best explained by adopting an explanatory framework of inter-dependent arising, according to which the emergence and development of both ethical and economic relations is a matter of mutual determination. Ethical values emerge (...) in the course of developing economic relations and, in turn, direct or at least implicate economic relations. The consequences of such a view, however, are that exchange values inform moral concepts and moral concepts help frame economic ones. I offer an argument that starts with a description of an historical relationship between two disparate cultures. The interactions between these cultures were determined initially by trade and then military interests. These interests eventually underwent pressure to evolve into legal and even religiously informed arrangements that necessarily involved certain moral values. Using a presupposition analysis, I show how this evolution was no accident and did not depend on some agent imposing the moral values onto the relationship. Rather, those values arose as a matter of course. In conclusion, the paper advances the idea that, since the relationship between ethics and economics is internal, the ethics of economic relations needs to be formulated more in terms of understanding what economic relations are fundamentally designed to achieve. (shrink)

LTP is thought to be an experimental model for studying the cellular mechanism of learning and memory. Shors & Matzel review some contradictory data concerning the linkage between LTP and memory and suggest that LTP does not underlie learning and memory. LTP is a cellular and synaptic process and cannot be a memory mechanism. In fact, it is a cellular information storage mechanism.

圧倒的な崩壊を前に、思想家はある独特な行動に乗りだした。林達夫を〈編集者〉として描き直した力作。.