Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not (...) all, of the justification of a belief. I show that the 'no defeater' view is too strong. I also offer reasons for thinking that the 'full defeater' view is similarly mistaken. (shrink)

Why do 'maladies of the soul' such as hysteria, anxiety disorders, or depression wax and wane over time? Through a study of the history of psychiatry, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen provocatively argues that most mental illnesses are not, in fact, diseases but the product of varying expectations shared and negotiated by therapists and patients. With a series of fascinating historical vignettes, stretching from Freud's creation of false memories of sexual abuse in his early hysterical patients to today's promotion and marketing of (...) depression by drug companies, Making Minds and Madness offers a powerful critique of all the theories, such as psychoanalysis and biomedical psychiatry, that claim to discover facts about the human psyche while, in reality, producing them. Borch-Jacobsen proposes such objectivizing approaches should be abandoned in favor of a constructionist and relativist psychology that recognizes the artifactual and interactive character of psychic productions instead of attempting to deny or control it. (shrink)

Changes in knowledge production, increasing interaction between government, universities and industry, and changes in labor markets for doctoral degree holders are forces that have spurred a debate about the organization of doctoral education and the competencies graduates need to master to work as scientists and researchers in a triple helix research context. Recent policy also has supported a redefinition of researcher training with increasing focus on broader skills and relevance for careers outside the university sector. Consequently, it is pertinent to (...) investigate current changes in doctoral education and researcher training. Particularly further knowledge about university–industry collaboration as a context for researcher training is required. With this in mind, this study provides empirical illustrations of how research training carried out in collaborative research contexts is experienced by doctoral students, and offers some insight into antecedent and process factors that are central in shaping PhD students’ research and training experience in collaborative research contexts. Based on the empirical data and a review of existing literature, suggestions for further research are made. (shrink)

$\eta $ -representations are a way of coding sets in computable linear orders that were first introduced by Fellner in his thesis. Limitwise monotonic functions have been used to characterize the sets with $\eta $ -representations, and give characterizations for several variations of $\eta $ -representations. The one exception is the class of sets with strong $\eta $ -representations, the only class where the order type of the representation is unique.We introduce the notion of a connected approximation of a set, (...) a variation on $\Sigma ^0_2$ approximations. We use connected approximations to give a characterization of the many-one degrees of sets with strong $\eta $ -representations as well new characterizations of the variations of $\eta $ -representations with known characterizations. (shrink)

Artikkelen drøfter hvordan vi bør forstå kravet om likhet for loven i Grl. § 98. Vi spør hvorvidt en appell til likhet for loven har selvstendig normativ funksjon, og eventuelt hvorfor og hva som kreves for at likhetskravets skal realiseres. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i et behov for avklaring av disse spørsmålene, da verken forarbeidene til grunnlovsrevisjonen i 2014 eller etterfølgende rettsvitenskapelig litteratur, i særlig grad avklarer hva likhet for loven betyr. Vi utvikler en teori om at likhetsprinsippet i § 98 (...) er et grunnprinsipp for retten som fastlegger begrunnelsesbyrden ved utformingen av lov og annen regulering, og ved rettsanvendelsen. Likhetsprinsippet innebærer at likebehandling krever i seg selv ingen begrunnelse, mens ulikebehandling må kunne begrunnes i henhold til kravene i andre ledd. De to leddene i paragrafen er derfor etter vårt syn uatskillelige: Første ledd stadfester hva som er utgangspunktet, mens andre ledd presiserer hva som ikke regnes som relevante begrunnelser for ulikhet. Likhetskravet er dermed ikke et krav om likt utfall, men et krav om likeverdighet, som vi hevder er en konstitutiv verdi for verdien av politisk rettferdighet. Den forståelsen av likhetskravet i § 98 som vi utvikler, knytter første og andre ledd i § 98 sammen, og åpner for at også første ledd kan bli mer aktivt brukt av domstolene. (shrink)

Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity and Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew represent the issues of sociality and dissent in strikingly similar terms and articulate a common social vision. Both writers strive to harmonize social unity with inward liberty. Hooker seeks not only to refute the non-conformity of his Puritan opponents, but to reconcile them, in both heart and mind, to the social order to which they belong. Similarly, Petruchio convincingly demonstrates to Katherine that the common good and (...) her own personal happiness substantially coincide in the reciprocity and communion of marriage. (shrink)

In this article we introduce an argument developed in Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani (2006). We attempt to draw some consequences from several decades of work in Freud history. We argue that such work has had the cumulative effect of showing up the legendary nature of Freud's epistemology, and has demonstrated the direct linkages between his interpretive procedures and rewriting of history. The Freud legend was by no means a supplementary accessory which accompanied substantive advances, akin to the legend of Newton's (...) apple: rather, it was constitutive of the very identity of psychoanalysis, and enabled its differentiation from rival psychologies and psychotherapies, and promoted the claim that it formed the only viable science of mind and the most advanced form of psychotherapy. Historical research enables one to grasp the legendary nature of Freud's achievement. (shrink)

____Remembering Anna O.__ offers a devastating examination of the very foundations of psychoanalytic theory and practice, which was born with the publication of Breuer and Freud's ____Studies on Hysteria__ in 1895. Breuer described the case of Anna O., a young woman afflicted with a severe hysteria whom he had cured of her symptoms by having her recount under hypnosis the traumatic events that precipitated her illness. Drawing on the most recent Freud scholarship and on long-secret documents, Borch-Jacobsen demonstrates, however, (...) that Anna O. was never cured by Breuer's "talking cure" and that both Breuer and Freud knowingly falsified the historical record. Borch-Jacobsen points out the numerous inconsistencies in Breuer's account that suggests that Anna O.'s symptoms were simulated to meet Breuer's theoretical expectations and that her famed "reminiscences" were in fact fictitious memories induced by Breuer in the course of a hypnotic treatment. (shrink)

"An astutely argued and elegantly written (and translated) book on the philosophical genealogy and logical implications of the work of Jacques Lacan."Choice.

Consider two people who disagree about some important claim (e.g. the future moral and political consequences of current U.S. economic policy are X). They each believe the other person is in possession of relevant evidence, is roughly equally competent to evaluate that evidence, etc. From the epistemic point of view, how should such recognized disagreement affect their doxastic attitude toward the original claim? Recent research on the epistemology of disagreement has converged upon three general ways of answering this question. The (...) focus of this article is twofold: first, we summarize and give a brief evaluation of the main accounts of the epistemic significance of disagreement; then, we look at what these accounts suggest about how to epistemically assess both inter-religious and intra-religious disagreements. A final section offers recommendations for further research. (shrink)

Text in French. On distingue dans la philosophie politique moderne une préoccupation particulière, á savoir le conflit entre individu et état. Quelle philosophie morale pourrait trancher entre ces deux concepts? Qu'on donne á chacun le droit á la contestation, et l'on voit se dresser immédiatement le spectre de l'anarchie. Si nous refusons ce droit, la souveraineté de l'état peut sans conteste tourner au despotisme. Avec sa théorie de la souveraineté, Jean Bodin joue un rôle clé dans l'histoire de ce dilemme. (...) Le rapport entre sa théorie du droit naturel et celle de la souveraineté est au centre des recherches presentées dans cette étude portant en particulier sur son ouvrage La République de 1576. (shrink)

This article uses the idea of resilience as a point of departure for analysing some contemporary challenges to the climate justice movement posed by social-ecological sciences. Climate justice activists are increasingly rallying for a system-change, demanding fundamental changes to political bureaucracy and the economy, which would put ecology, biodiversity and climate change first for all future political decisions. Since the concept of resilience has taken up a central role in recent developments in ecological sciences, it has also become part of (...) the activist debate. The article’s main argument is that the scientific framework behind resilience is not politically neutral and that this framework tends to weaken the activist’s demands for a just transition and place more emphasis on technical and bureaucratic processes. (shrink)

Scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain met in Geneva in 1958 and 1959 to create the technical basis for monitoring a future nuclear test ban treaty. Despite their scientific veneer, these meetings were politically motivated and the scientists tried to forward U.S. or Soviet objectives through their technical discussions. Seismographic data was a cornerstone of the proposed monitoring regime, but when the discussions became political, so too did the instruments that produced the scientific data. Thus, seismographs became diplomatic (...) objects used to support or challenge foreign policy objectives. After the collapse of the scientific meetings, the US distributed seismographs as diplomatic gifts to create a worldwide, U.S.-controlled nuclear-detection network in 1960. To exploit data from the network without supporting U.S. policy objectives, the USSR in 1961 proposed to exchange U.S. seismographs for Soviet ones, as two objects of equal value. That allowed each superpower to access the other's technology without creating bonds of mutual obligations. However, this type of inverted, object-based diplomacy also gave scientists from international scientific organisations or small, non-nuclear nations like Denmark a way to engage in nuclear diplomacy. When Danish scientists offered to create a connection station between the U.S. and Soviet seismic networks, they did so in full agreement with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to strengthen their policy of nuclear disarmament independently of U.S. objectives. (shrink)

In my “Plantinga Untouched,” I argued that James Beilby’s recent objection to Plantinga’s EAAN was unsuccessful. Beilby has sincereplied that a naturalist can grant the Inscrutability Thesis and yet be alethically rational in hoping for a high P(R/N and future developments of E) and, therefore, needn’t accept the alethic defeater for R. I argue that this is impossible, since a naturalist cannot consistently grant that thesis and meet Beilby’s own criteria for alethic hope. Consequently, Plantinga is (still) right in maintaining (...) that the naturalist who grants that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable has a defeater for R. (shrink)

Is mental illness an object of knowledge? The history of psychiatry teaches us to doubt it, by emphasizing the infinitely variable and fluctuating character of psychiatric entities. Mental illness is not simply ‘out there’, waiting to be described and theorized by psychiatrists; it interacts with psychiatric theories, clinical entities waxing and waning in accordance with diagnostic fashions, institutional practices and methods of treatment. This should be a warning to psychiatrists and therapists: their intervention is part of the ‘etiological equation’ of (...) the syndromes that they claim to observe from the outside. But this should also be a warning to historians of psychiatry, who can no longer be content with writing the history of ready-made syndromes and psychiatric theories. They must, if they want to remain faithful to their improbable ‘object’, study the complex interactions from which those syndromes and those theories emerge, somewhere between the doctors, the patients and the society that surrounds them. In short, they must study the making of psychiatric history, and understand that they participate in it. (shrink)

In this article, Zygmunt Bauman's deep-seated utopian sensibilities are dissected and discussed. It is shown how Bauman already early on in his career took a keen interest in the topic of utopia and how he throughout the years has continued to pursue the idea of utopia - its perversions and possibilities. The article suggests that Bauman is basically an ‘ambivalent utopian’ - that he, on the one hand, regards utopianism as an important and ineradicable constant in the human-being-in-the-world, something creating (...) the hopeful possibility for a better world and a brighter future, but also that he, on the other hand, is concerned with attempts to turn utopia into a ‘project’ or a ‘concrete reality’. Bauman's utopian ambivalence owes perhaps as much to the inherently two-sided nature of utopian ideas as to his own personal experiences throughout his life in the 20th century. (shrink)

Depuis leur origine, la théorie et la pratique psychanalytique suscitent des questions et des oppositions. Dans ce débat très animé, un philosophe, dont les travaux sur l'histoire de la psychanalyse sont reconnus, et un psychanalyste ouvert sur l'épistémologie abordent, sans concessions et de façon approfondie, les principaux points de la polémique. Au lecteur de former sa propre opinion.

This volume explores the emotions that are intricately woven into the texture of everyday life and experience. A contribution to the literature on the sociology of emotions, it focuses on the role of emotions as being integral to daily life, broadening our understanding by examining both ¿core¿ emotions and those that are often overlooked or omitted from more conventional studies. Bringing together theoretical and empirical studies from scholars across a range of subjects, including sociology, psychology, cultural studies, history, politics and (...) cognitive science, this international collection centres on the ¿everyday-ness¿ of emotional experience. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the conceptual history of subjective rights. The subjective right is generally understood as an individual right in contradistinction to the system of legal rules, which are named the ‘objective right.’ These notions have enjoyed immense popularity among Continental legal scholars and historians. This article gives an explanation of how the terms “subjective” and “objective” right came into usage in Germany, and it shows how these terms were elaborated within a metaphysical context. This paper suggests (...) that the origin of this terminology is to be found in the philosophy of Christian Wolff and in particular in that of one of his pupils, Joachim Georg Darjes. The notion of a subjective right thus has its origin in an intellectualistic and perfectionist philosophy, where rights in a primary sense are at the same time conceived as duties. (shrink)

The book analyses the yoga teaching of Hariharānanda Āraṇya (1869-1947) and the Kāpil Maṭh tradition, its origin, history and contemporary manifestations, and this tradition's connection to the expansion of yoga and the Yogasūtra in modern Hinduism.

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prakṛti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts the word prakṛti is used in various ways. Prakṛti does not always (...) refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prakṛti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhāṣya and criticises some translation practices. (shrink)

In my "Plantinga Untouched: A Response to Beilby on the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (Philosophia Christi 7:1 [2005], pp. 157-67), I argue that James Beilby's (2003) objection to Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (EAAN) is unsuccessful. Along the way, I argue that the move to grant Plantinga's 'inscrutability thesis' - namely, that the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism and evolutionary theory [P(R/N&E)], is low or inscrutable - presents significant problems for the one who accepts N&E.

How did psychoanalysis attain its prominent cultural position? How did it eclipse rival psychologies and psychotherapies, such that it became natural to bracket Freud with Copernicus and Darwin? Why did Freud 'triumph' to such a degree that we hardly remember his rivals? This book reconstructs the early controversies around psychoanalysis and shows that rather than demonstrating its superiority, Freud and his followers rescripted history. This legend-making was not an incidental addition to psychoanalytic theory but formed its core. Letting the primary (...) material speak for itself, this history demonstrates the extraordinary apparatus by which this would-be science of psychoanalysis installed itself in contemporary societies. Beyond psychoanalysis, it opens up the history of the constitution of the modern psychological sciences and psychotherapies, how they furnished the ideas which we have of ourselves and how these became solidified into indisputable 'facts'. (shrink)