Results for 'Time Bias'

986 found
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  1.  10
    Művészet és tér: Hamvas Béla-konferencia balatonfüred, 2014. március 21-22.Krisztián Tóbiás, László Cserép & István Nádler (eds.) - 2014 - Balatonfüred: Balatonfüred Városért Közalapítvány.
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  2.  41
    Social bias, not time bias.Preston Greene - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):100-121.
    People seem to have pure time preferences about trade-offs concerning their own pleasures and pains, and such preferences contribute to estimates of people's individual time discount rate. Do pure time preferences also matter to interpersonal welfare trade-offs, including those concerning the welfare of future generations? Most importantly, should the intergenerational time discount rate include a pure time preference? Descriptivists claim that the intergenerational discount rate should reflect actual people's revealed preferences, and thus it should include (...)
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  3. Against Time Bias.Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970.
    Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we (...)
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  4. Time Bias and Altruism.Leora Urim Sung - forthcoming - Mind:fzae045.
    We are typically near-future biased, prioritising our present and near-future interests over our own distant-future interests. This bias can be directed at others as well, prioritising their present and near-future interests over their distant-future interests. I here argue that, given these biases, and given a plausible limit on the extent to which we can permissibly prioritise our present interests over the present interests of strangers, we are morally required to prioritise the present interests of strangers over our distant-future interests. (...)
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  5. The normative status of time bias: an empirically led investigation.Kristie Miller - 2025 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This book empirically investigates the nature of time biases. Many philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to prefer a life that is overall worse to one that is overall better, as long the badness of that life lies in the past rather than the future. These philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to be time biased. Time biased individuals differently value the wellbeing of their various selves in virtue of where those selves are located in (...)
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  6.  70
    Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense.Julian Bacharach - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the standard way of finessing this question, the asymmetry of (...)
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  7.  21
    Against Time Bias.Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970,.
  8.  27
    2 Time- Bias and the Metaphysics of Time.Caspar Hare - 2003 - In On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 9-18.
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  9.  31
    Rationality and time bias.Abelard Podgorski - 2024 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    We often care not only about what happens to us, but when it happens to us. We prefer that good experiences happen sooner, rather than later, and that our suffering lies in our past, rather than our future. Common sense suggests that some ways of caring about time are rational, and others are not, but it is surprisingly challenging to provide justifying explanations for these tendencies. This Element is an opinionated, nontechnical-guided tour through the main philosophical issues about the (...)
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  10. Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time.Caspar Hare - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):350-373.
    This is about the metaphysics of the self and ethical egoism. It can serve as a preview for my manuscript-in-progress below.
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  11. ‘Pure’ Time Preferences Are Irrelevant to the Debate over Time Bias: A Plea for Zero Time Discounting as the Normative Standard.Preston Greene - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):254-265.
    I find much to like in Craig Callender's [2022] arguments for the rational permissibility of non-exponential time discounting when these arguments are viewed in a conditional form: viz., if one thinks that time discounting is rationally permissible, as the social scientist does, then one should think that non-exponential time discounting is too. However, time neutralists believe that time discounting is rationally impermissible, and thus they take zero time discounting to be the normative standard. The (...)
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  12. A puzzle about other-directed time-bias.Caspar Hare - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):269 – 277.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
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  13. Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.
    In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also (...)
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  14. Moving ego versus moving time: investigating the shared source of future-bias and near-bias.Sam Baron, Brigitte C. Everett, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Hannah Tierney & Jordan Veng Thang Oh - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-33.
    It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We (...)
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  15. Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly (...)
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  16. Is future bias a manifestation of the temporal value asymmetry?Eugene Caruso, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that (...)
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  17. What Time-travel Teaches Us About Future-Bias.Kristie Miller - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (38):38.
    Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased (Sullivan (2018:58); Parfit (1984:173) and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) is at least rationally permissible (Prior (1959), Hare (2007; 2008), (...)
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  18. Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):148-163.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for (...)
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  19. Future Bias and Presentism.Sayid Bnefsi - 2020 - In Per Hasle, David Jakobsen & Peter Ohstrom, The Metaphysics of Time: Themes on Prior. Aalborg University Press. pp. 281-297.
    Future-biased agents care not only about what experiences they have, but also when they have them. Many believe that A-theories of time justify future bias. Although presentism is an A-theory of time, some argue that it nevertheless negates the justification for future bias. Here, I claim that the alleged discrepancy between presentism and future bias is a special case of the cross-time relations problem. To resolve the discrepancy, I propose an account of future (...) as a preference for certain tensed truths properly relativized to the present. (shrink)
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  20. The Rationality of Near Bias toward both Future and Past Events.Preston Greene, Alex Holcombe, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):905-922.
    In recent years, a disagreement has erupted between two camps of philosophers about the rationality of bias toward the near and bias toward the future. According to the traditional hybrid view, near bias is rationally impermissible, while future bias is either rationally permissible or obligatory. Time neutralists, meanwhile, argue that the hybrid view is untenable. They claim that those who reject near bias should reject both biases and embrace time neutrality. To date, experimental (...)
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  21. Future Bias and Regret.Sayid Bnefsi - 2023 - In David Jakobsen, Peter Øhrstrøm & Per Hasle, Logic and Philosophy of Time: The History and Philosophy of Tense-Logic. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. pp. 1-13.
    The rationality of future bias figures crucially in various metaphysical and ethical arguments (Prior 1959; Parfit 1984; Fischer 2019). Recently, however, philosophers have raised several arguments to the effect that future bias is irrational (Dougherty 2011; Suhler and Callender 2012; Greene and Sullivan 2015). Particularly, Greene and Sullivan (2015) claim that future bias is irrational because future bias leads to two kinds of irrational planning behaviors in agents who also seek to avoid regret. In this paper, (...)
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  22. Can we turn people into pain pumps?: On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:1-32.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will (...)
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  23. Bias towards the future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):1–11.
    All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such preferences rationally permissible, or are they, as time-neutralists (...)
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  24.  77
    Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings.Edward J. N. Stupple, Linden J. Ball & Daniel Ellis - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (1):54 - 77.
    (2013). Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 54-77. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.735622.
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  25. Is present-bias a distinctive psychological kind?Natalja Deng, Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Lee-Tory & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Present-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive events to be located in the present rather than the non-present, and for negative events to be located in the non-present rather than the present. Very little attention has been given to present-bias in the contemporary literature on time biases. This may be because it is often assumed that present-bias is not a distinctive psychological kind; that what explains people’s being present-biased is just what explains them (...)
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  26. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy.Nick Bostrom - 2002 - New York: Routledge.
    _Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes: (...)
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  27. There’s No Time Like the Present: Present-Bias, Temporal Attitudes and Temporal Ontology.Natalja Deng, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    This paper investigates the connection between temporal attitudes (attitudes characterised by a concern (or lack thereof) about future and past events), beliefs about temporal ontology (beliefs about the existence of future and past events) and temporal preferences (preferences regarding where in time events are located). Our aim is to probe the connection between these preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, in order to better evaluate the normative status of these preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that there is a three-way association between (...)
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  28. Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:548-560.
    In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then (...)
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  29. Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.
    Recent philosophy has paid considerable attention to the way our biases are liable to encroach upon our cognitive lives, diminishing our capacity to know and unjustly denigrating the knowledge of others. The extent of the bias, and the range of domains to which it applies, has struck some as so great as to license talk of a new form of skepticism. I argue that these depressing consequences are real and, in some ways, even more intractable than has previously been (...)
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  30.  55
    Future-bias and intuition shifts between moments and lifetimes.Anh-Quân Nguyen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Proponents of temporal neutrality have challenged the intuitive appeal of future-bias: The intuitive appeal of future-bias is limited to a set of isolated cases that involve only hedonic and self-regarding goods and harms. They suggest that we should treat future-bias as irrational in self-regarding hedonic cases too, or at least not treat the intuitive appeal as evidence for future-bias's permissibility, since hedonic and non-hedonic cases are relevantly similar. This paper defends the rationality of future-bias against (...)
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  31. Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy.Jules Holroyd & Jennifer Saul - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (2):71-102.
    This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases and (...)
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  32.  46
    Progress bias versus status quo bias in the ethics of emerging science and technology.Bjørn Hofmann - 2019 - Bioethics 34 (3):252-263.
    How should we handle ethical issues related to emerging science and technology in a rational way? This is a crucial issue in our time. On the one hand, there is great optimism with respect to technology. On the other, there is pessimism. As both perspectives are based on scarce evidence, they may appear speculative and irrational. Against the pessimistic perspective to emerging technology, it has been forcefully argued that there is a status quo bias (SQB) fuelling irrational attitudes (...)
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  33. Why future-bias isn't rationally evaluable.Callie K. Phillips - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):573-596.
    Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have future-biased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a new conception of future-bias (...)
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  34.  56
    Retrieval bias and the response relative frequency effect in choice reaction time.Harold L. Hawkins, Kenneth Snippel, Joelle Pressen, Stephen MacKay & Dennis Todd - 1974 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (5):910.
  35. What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?Todd Karhu - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):876-889.
    A person is biased toward the future when she prefers, other things being equal, bad events to be in her past rather than her future or good ones to be in her future rather than her past. In this paper, I explain why both critics and defenders of future bias have failed to consider the best version of the view. I distinguish external time from personal time, and show that future bias is best construed in terms (...)
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  36.  29
    Attention bias and the relation of perception lag to simple reaction time.A. J. Sanford - 1974 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (3):443.
  37.  53
    Attentional bias toward low-intensity stimuli: An explanation for the intensity dissociation between reaction time and temporal order judgment?Piotr Jaskowski & Rolf Verleger - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):435-456.
    If two stimuli need different times to be processed, this difference should in principle be reflected both by response times (RT) and by judgments of their temporal order (TOJ). However, several dissociations have been reported between RT and TOJ, e.g., RT is more affected than TOJ when stimulus intensity decreases. One account for these dissociations is to assume differences in the allocation of attention induced by the two tasks. To test this hypothesis, different distributions of attention were induced in the (...)
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  38.  45
    Time course of attentional bias to emotional scenes in anxiety: Gaze direction and duration.Manuel G. Calvo & Pedro Avero - 2005 - Cognition and Emotion 19 (3):433-451.
  39.  6
    Attentional bias towards task-irrelevant threatening faces reduces working memory updating efficiency in social anxiety: evidence from the n-back task combining with eye-tracking.Chi-Wen Liang - forthcoming - Cognition and Emotion.
    Anxiety can impair the central executive functioning in working memory (WM). Further, the adverse effect of anxiety on the central executive would be greater when threat-related distractors are present. This study investigated the effect of task-irrelevant emotional faces on WM updating in social anxiety. Forty-one socially anxious (SA) and thirty-nine non-anxious (NA) participants completed an emotional face interference n-back task coupled with eye movement recording. The results showed that, in the 2-back task, SA participants had longer reaction times in the (...)
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  40.  39
    Reaction time as a function of perceptual bias, response bias, and stimulus discriminability.Howard B. Orenstein - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 86 (1):38.
  41.  18
    Memory, anticipation, and future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Shen Pan & Rasmus Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximized when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...)
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  42.  88
    How reaction time measures elucidate the matching bias and the way negations are processed.Jérôme Prado & Ira A. Noveck - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):309 – 328.
    Matching bias refers to the non-normative performance that occurs when elements mentioned in a rule do not correspond with those in a test item. One aim of the present work is to capture matching bias via reaction times as participants carry out truth-table evaluation tasks. Experiment 1 requires participants to verify conditional rules, and Experiment 2 to falsify them as the paradigm employs four types of conditional sentences that systematically rotate negatives in the antecedent and consequent; and presents (...)
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  43. Cognitive bias in rats is not influenced by oxytocin.Molly C. McGuire, Keith L. Williams, Lisa L. M. Welling & Jennifer Vonk - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:152615.
    The effect of oxytocin on cognitive bias was investigated in rats in a modified conditioned place preference (CPP) paradigm. Fifteen male rats were trained to discriminate between two different cue combinations, one paired with palatable foods (reward training), and the other paired with unpalatable food (aversive training). Next, their reactions to two ambiguous cue combinations were evaluated and their latency to contact the goal pot recorded. Rats were injected with either oxytocin (OT) or saline with the prediction that rats (...)
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  44.  44
    Interpretation Bias in Test Anxiety: The Time Course of Predictive Inferences.Manuel G. Calvo, Michael W. Eysenck & M. Dolores Castillo - 1997 - Cognition and Emotion 11 (1):43-64.
  45.  36
    Conversational Time Travel: Evidence of a Retrospective Bias in Real Life Conversations.Burcu Demiray, Matthias R. Mehl & Mike Martin - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  46.  46
    The time course of attentional bias to cues of threat and safety.Lisette J. Schmidt, Artem V. Belopolsky & Jan Theeuwes - 2017 - Cognition and Emotion 31 (5).
  47. Gender Bias in Stem Hiring: Implicit In-Group Gender Favoritism Among Men Managers.Enav Friedmann & Dorit Efrat-Treister - 2023 - Gender and Society 37 (1):32-64.
    Women’s underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) is related to the hierarchical social structure of gender relations in these fields. However, interventions to increase women’s participation have focused primarily on women’s interests rather than on STEM managers’ hiring practices. In this research, we examine STEM hiring practices, explore the implicit bias in criteria used by STEM managers, and suggest possible corrective solutions. Using an experimental design with 213 men and women STEM managers, we show that when evaluating (...)
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  48. On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):181-194.
    Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias (...)
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  49. Memory, Anticipation, and Future Bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Shen Pan & Rasmus Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximised when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...)
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  50.  30
    Interpretation bias and social anxiety: does interpretation bias mediate the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses?Junwen Chen, Kirby Milne, Janet Dayman & Eva Kemps - 2018 - Cognition and Emotion 33 (4):630-645.
    ABSTRACTTwo studies aimed to examine whether high socially anxious individuals are more likely to negatively interpret ambiguous social scenarios and facial expressions compared to low socially anxious individuals. We also examined whether interpretation bias serves as a mediator of the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses, in particular current state anxiety, bodily sensations, and perceived probability and cost of negative evaluation pertaining to a speech task. Study 1 used ambiguous social scenarios and Study 2 used ambiguous (...)
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