McCarthy and Howard (2023) develop an ethical case for supported decision-making in medical contexts, mainly building upon the republican ideal of non-domination. Their theoretical inquiry is of mu...

In a world undergoing rapid change, the effective use of strategic alliances is important for a company to gain a competitive advantage. While previous research has mentioned the importance of understanding the authority and responsibilities of a successful alliance manager, few studies have investigated this topic using systematically gathered real-world data. This study aims to determine the kind of authority and responsibilities an alliance manager has in successful sustainability alliance projects. These generally require cooperation with players in heterogeneous sectors. An (...) analytical framework was developed to examine sustainability alliance cases. Findings reveal that alliance managers at companies with excellent sustainability performance operate in an environment in which psychological safety is ensured. This enables them to autonomously develop emergent activities inside and outside the organization and have greater influence over alliance projects than the authority granted to them. This study suggests that it is essential for an organization to have a management philosophy based on sustainability as a standard for making value judgments. The communication of this philosophy contributes to the psychological safety of staff and thus their initiative taking in boundary spanning. (shrink)

Welfare subjectivists face a dilemma. On the one hand, traditional subjectivist theories—such as the desire-fulfillment theory—are too permissive to account for the well-being of typical mature human beings. On the other hand, more “refined” theories—such as the life-satisfaction theory—are too restrictive to account for the well-being of various welfare subjects, including newborns, those with profound cognitive impairments, or non-human animals. This paper examines a class of welfare subjectivism that addresses this dilemma with sensitivity to the diversity in welfare subjects. First, (...) the most-sophisticated-attitude view (MSA) is introduced. MSA holds that an object, x, is good for a subject, S, in proportion to the strength of S’s pro-attitude towards x if and only if the pro-attitude at issue is S’s most sophisticated type. Typically, the well-being of typical mature human beings is assessed in terms of one’s authentic whole-life satisfaction, whereas that of human newborns is assessed in terms of something less sophisticated such as pleasure. MSA offers the rationale for this difference based on an underexplored version of perfectionism: procedural perfectionism. Next, provided that MSA may involve an implausibly strong claim, this paper examines two moderate variations of MSA that accept the partial relevance of less sophisticated types of valenced attitude. Finally, it is illustrated how MSA and its variations have plausible implications regarding the well-being of enhanced or dis-enhanced people. (shrink)

dai 1-kan. Hō no kihon riron -- dai 2-5-kan. Hōshisō no rekishiteki tenkai -- dai 6-8-kan. Gendai jitteihō no kihon mondai.

The construct of Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) has drawn much attention in the study of business ethics for over two decades. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has made a significant contribution to the literature as an easy-to-administer CMD instrument, and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), an alternative scale, has also been used widely especially in Europe. The two scales differ in their approaches to measuring CMD, focusing on stage preference (DIT) and stage consistency (MJT), yet empirical comparisons have been scarce. (...) The present research empirically compares the two scales in terms of their correspondence with ethical ideology as a reference scale, and it demonstrates a clear distinction between the DIT and the MJT. Although they both aim to measure CMD, their dissimilar approaches lead to distinctly different implications. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 67-70.

Sewall Wright and Gustave Malécot developed important theories of isolation by distance. Wright’s theory was statistical and Malécot’s probabilistic. Because of this mathematical difference, they were not clear about the relationship between their theories. In this paper, I make two points to clarify this relationship. First, I argue that Wright’s theory concerns what I call ecological isolation by distance , whereas Malécot’s concerns what I call genetic isolation by distance . Second, I suggest that if Wright’s theory is interpreted appropriately, (...) a previously unnoticed connection between the two theories emerges. †To contact the author, please write to: Yoichi Ishida, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In contrast to temporal asymmetry stressed in process philosophy, symmetry prevails in Mahayana Buddhism and East Asian philosophy formed under its influence. The paper clarifies the meaning of symmetry from the perspectives of Kitaro Nishida and Dogen, it explores similar or overlapping ideas in Whitehead’s philosophy oforganism, and it suggests that the differences among them are much smaller than commonly believed.

What is the morally significant feature of discrimination? All of the following seem plausible – (i) discrimination is a kind of wrongdoing and it wrongs discriminatees, which is a matter of intrapersonal morality; (ii) in view of cases of indirect discrimination, significant normative features of discrimination are best captured in a discriminatee‐focused, or harm‐based, way; and (iii) discrimination, as an act‐type, necessarily involves interpersonal comparison. The first task of this article is to address which of intra‐ or interpersonal comparison is (...) relevant to philosophical questions concerning discrimination. I submit that each of them has a place in the theory of discrimination; while interpersonal comparison is relevant in determining whether a differentiating act counts as discrimination, intrapersonal comparison is relevant in assessing whether it is morally wrong. The second task is to develop further a harm‐based answer to the latter question. My final proposal is as follows: discrimination is pro tanto morally wrong to the extent that it makes the discriminatees worse off than they would be were it not for the discrimination at issue, where one's well‐being is understood in terms of what one endorses in one's optimum form. (shrink)