Evo-Devo exhibits a plurality of scientific “cultures” of practice and theory. When are the cultures acting—individually or collectively—in ways that actually move research forward, empirically, theoretically, and ethically? When do they become imperialistic, in the sense of excluding and subordinating other cultures? This chapter identifies six cultures – three /styles/ (mathematical modeling, mechanism, and history) and three /paradigms/ (adaptationism, structuralism, and cladism). The key assumptions standing behind, under, or within each of these cultures are explored. Characterizing the internal structure of (...) the cultures is necessary for understanding how they collaborate or compete, and how they are fragmented or integrated, in the rich interdisciplinary /trading zone/ (Galison 1997) of Evo-Devo. Evo-Devo is an important example of how science can progress through a radical plurality of perspectives and cultures. (shrink)

Map making and, ultimately, _map thinking_ is ubiquitous across literature, cosmology, mathematics, psychology, and genetics. We partition, summarize, organize, and clarify our world via spatialized representations. Our maps and, more generally, our representations seduce and persuade; they build and destroy. They are the ultimate record of empires and of our evolving comprehension of our world. This book is about the promises and perils of map thinking. Maps are purpose-driven abstractions, discarding detail to highlight only particular features of a territory. By (...) preserving certain features at the expense of others, they can be used to reinforce a privileged position. -/- _When Maps Become the World_ shows us how the scientific theories, models, and concepts we use to intervene in the world function as maps, and explores the consequences of this, both good and bad. We increasingly understand the world around us in terms of models, to the extent that we often take the models for reality. Winther explains how in time, our historical representations in science, in cartography, and in our stories about ourselves replace individual memories and become dominant social narratives—they become reality, and they can remake the world. -/- Available on The University of Chicago Press website, etc. (shrink)

I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space, I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration. In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these (...) criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change. I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism. Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension. (shrink)

Empowerment and user participation represents an ideal of power with a strong position in the health sector. In this article we use text analysis to investigate notions of power in a program plan for health workers focusing on empowerment. Issues addressed include: How are relationships of power between users and helpers described in the program plan? Which notions of user participation are embedded in the plan? The analysis is based on Foucault’s idea that power which is made subject to attempts (...) of redistribution will re-emerge in other forms. How this happens, and with what consequences, is our analytical concern. The analysis is contrasted with ‘snapshots’ from everyday life in a nursing home. The program plan communicates empowerment as a democracy-building instrument that the users need. It is a tool for providing expert assistance to the user’s self-help. User participation is made into a tool which is external to the user him-/herself. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the plan’s image of empowerment presupposes an ‘élite user’ able to articulate personal needs and desires. This is not very applicable to the most vulnerable user groups, who thereby may end up in an even weaker position. By way of conclusion, we argue that an exchange of undesirable dominating paternalism for a desirable empowerment will not abolish power, but may result in more covert and subtle forms of power that are less open to criticism. The paper offers insights that will facilitate reflections on the premises for practising empowerment-oriented health care. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technological successes, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories. Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, and continue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics, biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabit comparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climate science, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic Information Science (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, help supply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions. Moving from their (...) knowledge-producing representational functions to their interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. -/- This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these views answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the best characterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehension of the core structure of a scientific theory? How are these three views ultimately related? (shrink)

History has demonstrated the necessity of protecting research participants. Research ethics are based on a concept of asymmetry of power, viewing the researcher as powerful and potentially dangerous and establishing ethics committees as external agencies in the field of research. We argue in favour of expanding this perspective on relationships of power to encompass the ethics committees as one among several actors that exert power and that act in a relational interplay with researchers and participants. We employ Michel Foucault’s ideas (...) of power as an omnipresent force which is dynamic and unstable, as well as the notion that knowledge and power are inextricably intertwined. The article discusses how research ethics committees may affect academic freedom. In addition it is pointed out that research participants could be harmed — not only by unfortunate research practices, but also by being subjected to the protective efforts of ethics monitoring bodies. (shrink)

A scientific explanatory project, part-whole explanation, and a kind of science, part-whole science are premised on identifying, investigating, and using parts and wholes. In the biological sciences, mechanistic, structuralist, and historical explanations are part-whole explanations. Each expresses different norms, explananda, and aims. Each is associated with a distinct partitioning frame for abstracting kinds of parts. These three explanatory projects can be complemented in order to provide an integrative vision of the whole system, as is shown for a detailed case study: (...) the tetrapod limb. My diagnosis of part-whole explanation in the biological sciences as well as in other domains exploring evolved, complex, and integrated systems (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) cross-cuts standard philosophical categories of explanation: causal explanation and explanation as unification. Part-whole explanation is itself one essential aspect of part-whole science. (shrink)

Gegen von Wright und andere Anhänger nicht-kausaler Handlungserklärungen hat Davidson argumentiert, daß Handlungen nicht nur als sinnvolles Verhalten konzeptuell verstanden, sondern auch durch singulare Ursachen als ihre „wahren” Motive erklärt werden. Dem entspricht auch der von Perry und anderen nachgewiesene indexikalische Charakter eines jeden Handlungsbewußtseins. Da jedoch ein singuläres Handlungsbewußtsein auch zukunfisgerichtet ist, hat das entsprechende, indexikalische Motiv keine von der erst zu realisierenden Handlung unabhängige Existenz. Die Handlung wird eher als eine „Wirkung von der Zukunft” verstanden, und so haben (...) die Anti-Kausalisten recht, daß bei Handlungserklärungen nicht auf Humesche Ursachen hingewiesen wird. (shrink)

One of the reasons why GMOs have met public resistance in the past is that they are perceived as “unnatural”. The basis for this claim has, in part, to do with crossing species boundaries, which is considered morally objectionable. The emergence of CRISPR is sometimes argued to be an ethical game-changer in this regard since it does not require the insertion of foreign genes. Based on an empirical bioethics study including individual interviews and focus groups with laypeople and other stakeholders, (...) this article analyses the normative role of appeals to naturalness in discussions about the moral acceptability of using CRISPR in salmon farming. It discusses two dimensions of naturalness found in the material– living by species-specific nature and being unaffected by humans– and argues that these dimensions put down criteria for the application of CRISPR that lead to a conflict between our moral duties towards the farmed salmon and those we hold towards the wild salmon as a threatened species. It also points to a paradox which is likely to gain traction with further climate change and biodiversity loss, namely that while nature, understood as that which is unaffected by humans, is presented as an ideal, conserving nature in its pristine state may rely on technology and human intervention. (shrink)

The genome editing technology CRISPR is described as a technological game-changer because of its flexibility and precision, and as an ethical game-changer due to its ability to engineer traits in living organisms without crossing species, avoiding a significant objection to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In salmon farming, applications of CRISPR in breeding hold the promise of handling environmental and fish welfare challenges yet require social acceptance. Adopting an empirical bioethics framework, this stakeholder interview study shows that respecting species borders is (...) important, but not decisive, for acceptance among Norwegian stakeholders. The main objections are based on moral reflections about technology use and outcomes. These reflections combine principles and pragmatic deliberations of moral costs and benefits, suggesting that CRISPR applications with environmentally and ethically significant benefits can be socially acceptable. This indicates that the game-changing potential of CRISPR relies on the characteristics of the editing and the context in which the application takes place. (shrink)

The dangers of character reification for cladistic inference are explored. The identification and analysis of characters always involves theory-laden abstraction—there is no theory-free “view from nowhere.” Given theory-ladenness, and given a real world with actual objects and processes, how can we separate robustly real biological characters from uncritically reified characters? One way to avoid reification is through the employment of objectivity criteria that give us good methods for identifying robust primary homology statements. I identify six such criteria and explore each (...) with examples. Ultimately, it is important to minimize character reification, because poor character analysis leads to dismal cladograms, even when proper phylogenetic analysis is employed. Given the deep and systemic problems associated with character reification, it is ironic that philosophers have focused almost entirely on phylogenetic analysis and neglected character analysis. (shrink)

A map is not its territory. Taking a map too seriously may lead to pernicious reification: map and world are conflated. As one family of cases of such reification, I focus on maps exuding the omphalos syndrome, whereby a centred location on the map is taken to be the world navel of, for instance, an empire. I build on themes from my book _When Maps Become the World_, in which I analogize scientific theories to maps, and develop the tools of (...) assumption archaeology and integration platforms. Here I argue that excavating assumptions helps fill cartographic silences, showing the limitations of perspectives often at war. Furthermore, integrating perspectives permits resisting imperial central or master images. A worthwhile future project would be a repository of world-navel maps, critically annotated with cultural context and imperial information. Mutual understanding may result from such an integration platform, perhaps implemented online or in a museum. (shrink)

A. W. F. Edwards is one of the most influential mathematical geneticists in the history of the discipline. One of the last students of R. A. Fisher, Edwards pioneered the statistical analysis of phylogeny in collaboration with L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, and helped establish Fisher's concept of likelihood as a standard of statistical and scientific inference. In this book, edited by philosopher of science Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Edwards's key papers are assembled alongside commentaries by leading scientists, discussing Edwards's influence on (...) their own research and on thinking in their field overall. In an extensive interview with Winther, Edwards offers his thoughts on his contributions, their legacy, and the context in which they emerged. This book is a resource both for anyone interested in the history and philosophy of genetics, statistics, and science, and for scientists seeking to develop new algorithmic and statistical methods for understanding the genetic relationships between and among species both extant and extinct. (shrink)

Despite a growing interest in research on spiritual formation, prior studies have not discussed the role of leadership in the formation of Christian character. This article seeks to fill this void by addressing how 1 Thessalonians in general, and 2:1–12 in particular, show Paul's goal and method of leadership for community formation. Written as a letter of friendship to a persecuted church, Paul draws attention to his prior visit in the city as a plumb line for Christian behavior and leadership. (...) As such, the letter contributes to the resocialization of Paul's recent converts, stressing the relationship with himself as well as with each other amidst a hostile environment. The study concludes that Paul's leadership is Christocentric in nature, having modeling, adaptability, and relationships as central components. (shrink)

Gene editing technologies such as CRISPR hold the promise to solve many of the challenges in industrial salmon farming. However, for the technology to be taken into use, it has to be deemed socially and morally acceptable. Whereas older gene modification technologies have been met with much public resistance, there are hopes that CRISPR might change the debate, since it does not require inserting genes from other organisms and can therefore be considered less invasive and more natural. Though the concept (...) of naturalness is contested, it is frequently appealed to in science communication and explanations of why the public should be more inclined to accept CRISPR-edited organisms than GMOs. Farmed salmon is a good case for considering our intuitions about naturalness, since it is a recently domesticated species, far removed from its cousin in the wild. The study presented here consists of 19 interviews with stakeholders and 4 focus groups with consumers. A major finding is that the concept of naturalness is not considered crucial when it comes to determining the acceptability of using CRISPR on farmed salmon; what is significant is rather whether its use is consistent with a respectful treatment of them. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on how the Corona pandemic might influence human understanding of our position of being in the world. In the first part of the paper, we present how a pandemic can be under- stood in relation to our society and our educational system. Then, we will present problems and questions highlighted by the pandemic and the kind of transformations needed to address these problems. The core ele- ments that require transformation are the understanding (...) of the essence of man or the human condition, the understanding of what caring for nature and even a pandemic means, and how to measure human action and values. (shrink)

In his ‘pains and Places’ (Philosophy 78, 2003), John Hyman is right that pains are not located in their causes or effects but in the hurting limbs. However, his position may be consonant with Wittgensteinian expressivism or the view that consciousness is the locus of pain: In producing its own parts, a living organism ‘autopoietically’ sustains itself as an activity functionally present in its limbs. It thus supplies the biological basis for pain consciousness as something wholly present in organs that (...) hurt. (Published Online October 13 2005). (shrink)

The ocean terrain spanning the globe is vast and complex—far from an immense flat plain of mud. To map these depths accurately and wisely, we must understand how cartographic abstraction and generalization work both in analog cartography and digital GIS. This chapter explores abstraction practices such as selection and exaggeration with respect to mapping the oceans, showing significant continuity in such practices across cartography and contemporary GIS. The role of measurement and abstraction—as well as of political and economic power, and (...) sexual and personal bias—in these sciences is illustrated by the biographies of Marie Tharp and Bruce Heezen, whose mapping of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge precipitated a paradigm shift in geology. (shrink)

The past few decades have seen a turn to the empirical in applied ethics. This article makes two contributions to debates on this turn: one with regard to methodology and the other with regard to scope. First, it considers empirical bioethics, which arose out of a protest against abstract theorizing in moral philosophy and a call for more sensitivity to lived experience. Though by now an established field, methodological discussions are still centred around the question of how empirical research can (...) inform normative analysis. This article proposes an answer to this question that is based on Iris Murdoch’s criticism of the fact/value distinction and Cora Diamond’s concept of reflective empiricism. Second, the discussion takes as a point of departure a study on genome-edited farmed salmon that uses qualitative research interviews and focus groups. Although there are several animal ethics studies based in empirical data, there are few works on the methodological challenges raised by empirical ethics in this area. The article contributes to these discussions by arguing that reflective empiricism can constitute a methodological approach to animal ethics. (shrink)

‚Erfahrung ist eine verstandene Wahrnehmung‘ Die hier vorgeschlagene Kant-Interpretation stellt eine nicht-repräsentationalistische Version seiner Theorie der raumzeitlichen Erkenntnis dar. So befindet sie sich nicht nur im Gegensatz zu herkömmlichen Lesarten deutlich mentalistischer Prägung, sondern opponiert im allgemeinen gegen repräsentationalistische Auslegungen des Verhältnisses zwischen Wahrnehmung und Wissen. Wie sehr man sich dabei auf ein interpretatorisches Minenfeld hinaus bewegen kann – davon zeugt das folgende Schlusswort einer Lexikon-Eintragung zu Kantischen und anderen Varianten des Idealismus: „In the end, the only argument for idealism (...) of any form is to be found in the representative theory of perception, and that theory is false“. Formulierungen wie diese sind in verschiedenen Traditionen der Interpretation tief verwurzelt und können nicht ohne weiteres als extreme Einzeläusserungen abgetan werden – um so weniger, als repräsentationalistische oder auch mentalistische Lesarten der theoretischen Philosophie Kants immer noch einen wichtigen Trend darstellen. (shrink)

Gegen von Wright und andere Anhänger nicht-kausaler Handlungserklärungen hat Davidson argumentiert, daß Handlungen nicht nur als sinnvolles Verhalten konzeptuell verstanden, sondern auch durch singulare Ursachen als ihre „wahren” Motive erklärt werden. Dem entspricht auch der von Perry und anderen nachgewiesene indexikalische Charakter eines jeden Handlungsbewußtseins. Da jedoch ein singuläres Handlungsbewußtsein auch zukunfisgerichtet ist, hat das entsprechende, indexikalische Motiv keine von der erst zu realisierenden Handlung unabhängige Existenz. Die Handlung wird eher als eine „Wirkung von der Zukunft” verstanden, und so haben (...) die Anti-Kausalisten recht, daß bei Handlungserklärungen nicht auf Humesche Ursachen hingewiesen wird. (shrink)

The ontology of race is replete with moral, political, and scientific implications. This book chapter surveys proposals about the reality of race, distinguishing among three levels of analysis: biogenomic, biological, and social. The relatively homogeneous structure of human genetic variation casts doubt upon the practice of postulating distinct biogenomic races that might be mapped onto socially recognized race categories.

It is illegitimate to read any ontology about "race" off of biological theory or data. Indeed, the technical meaning of "genetic variation" is fluid, and there is no single theoretical agreed-upon criterion for defining and distinguishing populations (or groups or clusters) given a particular set of genetic variation data. Thus, by analyzing three formal senses of "genetic variation"—diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity—we argue that the use of biological theory for making epistemic claims about "race" can only seem plausible when it relies (...) on the user’s own assumptions about race; the move from biological measures to claims about “race” inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification. We also excavate assumptions in the history of the technical discourse over the concept of "race" (e.g., Livingstone's and Dobzhansky's 1962 exchange, Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin 1972, as well as contemporary discussions of cladistic "race", and "races" as clusters). We show that claims about the existence (or non-existence) of "race" are underdetermined by biological facts, methods, and theories. Biological theory does not force the concept of "race" upon us; our social discourse, social ontology, and social expectations do. We become prisoners of our abstractions at our own hands, and at our own expense. (shrink)