Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. In that (...) case, why posit 'big-G' Grounding in addition to the 'small-g' grounding relations already in the metaphysician's toolkit? The best reasons for doing so stem from the Unity argument, according to which the further posit of Grounding is motivated as an apt unifier of the specific relations, and the Priority argument, according to which Grounding is needed in order to fix the direction of priority of the specific relations. I previously considered versions of these arguments, and argued that they did not succeed; in two papers, however, Jonathan Schaffer aims to develop a better version of the Unity argument, and offers certain objections to my reasons for rejecting the Priority argument. Here I consider these new arguments for Grounding. (shrink)

A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity problem.First, facts which are grounded are unified by the obtaining of theirgrounds. (...) Second, many ungrounded facts are such that they must obtainif their non-factual constituents exist (e.g. if the property $F$nessis essential to a particular, $a$, then if $a$ exists the fact that$a$ is $F$ must obtain). In this way the obtaining of these facts isexplained by the essence of some of their constituents. I alsoaddress the possibility of facts which are brutely unified(i.e. neither grounded nor essentially unified), and compare theaccount I offer with some of the main alternatives. (shrink)

Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In (...) this paper, I present several concerns which suggest that the structural equation model does not transfer as smoothly from the case of causation to the case of grounding as Schaffer would have us believe. If it can in fact be shown that significant differences surface in how the formalism in question applies to the two types of phenomena in question, Schaffer’s attempt at establishing an analogy between grounding and causation has thereby been weakened and, as a result, the application of the Unity Hypothesis to the case of grounding once again stands in need of justification. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to raise a few questions about Bayne s mereological account of the unity of consciousness. In Section 1, I raise a few clarificatory questions about the account and the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. In Sections 2 and 3, I offer an alternative view of unity of consciousness and contrast it with Bayne's view. I call this view the connectivity account. These sections prepare the ground for the main question of this (...) article: why should we prefer Bayne's mereological view to the connectivity view? (shrink)

The paper is an attempt at a definition of a common ground with its immanent potency as the founding force of various forms of the world common to all people. Its first part gives a brief outline of the conceptions of this common ground in the history of European thinking, such as Plato's case. Cusanus' community or joined unity and Whitehead's creativity. The second part derives from these conceptual schemes, reflecting on the domain of potency as the dynamics of (...) being and the ground of the original continuum, as the ultimate determination, in which the founding force of social forms of being has its roots. (shrink)

Synonyms Cognitive universals; Human nature; Human universals Definition The “psychic unity” idea denotes the existence of a set of psychological and cognitive capacities universally shared by human beings and grounded in biological equality.

Some authors argue that phenomenal unity can be grounded in the attentional structure of consciousness, which endows conscious states with at least a foreground and a background. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of part of a conscious state comprises a content aspect and a structural aspect. This view presents the concern that such a structure does not bring about phenomenal unity, but phenomenal segregation, since the background is separated from the foreground. I argue that attention can still lead to (...) a form of phenomenal unity that connects the foreground with the background. Experiencing oneself as controlling the focus of attention can, at least occasionally, bring about an experienced connection between the attentional foreground and the attentional background of a conscious experience. (shrink)

Priest’s 2014 theory of unity and identity, based on a paraconsistent logic, has a wide range of applications. In this paper, I apply his theory to some puzzles concerning mereology and topology. These puzzles suggest that the classical mereotopology needs to be revised. I compare and contrast the Priest-inspired solution with another, based on classical logic, that requires the co-location of boundaries. I suggest that the co-location view should be preferred on abductive grounds.

Here is a problem at the heart of the metaphysics of the natural world: How, if at all, can a unity undergo change? This problem incorporates two questions. First, in virtue of what is a thing a genuine unity? And second, the issue that’s more obvious in the formulation of the question: how, if at all, can such a unity undergo change? There are two basic approaches to this problem present in Newton’s physics. The more familiar grounds (...) unity and change in space and time, the second in the laws of nature. The latter approach is set out in this paper. I argue that a law-constitutive approach to the entities that are the subject-matter of Newton’s physics offers a principle of unity for things, be they simple or composite, and for the parts of composites, such that we also gain an account of what it is for a genuine unity to undergo change in its properties whilst retaining its numerical identity. I end by arguing that the law-constitutive approach favors endurantism over perdurantism. This paper is intended as an example of a particular approach to the relationship between metaphysics and philosophy of physics, according to which, as a philosopher, one engages with physics as a part of the history of philosophy, beginning with our deepest philosophical questions and using the development of physics read as a contribution to natural philosophy to explore how these questions are transformed, re-worked, addressed, and sometimes rendered non-questions. (shrink)

Chapter 20 David Kovacs’ “Essence, Grounding, and Explanation” sets out four different ways in which essence might be taken to relate to the notion of grounding or metaphysical explanation, i.e., the type of connection that is often expressed by means of non-causal “in virtue of” or “because”-claims: (i) Unity: essence and grounding belong to a unified set of explanatory concepts; (ii) Supplementation: essence and grounding both contribute in their own way to a distinctive type of (...) explanation; (iii) Independence: essence is a sui generis notion with no straightforward conceptual links to grounding; and (iv) Irrelevance: essence is not an explanatory notion at all and therefore should not be viewed as connected to explanatory notions like grounding. As Kovacs brings out in the chapter, a wide variety of attitudes are represented in the literature even among philosophers who are sympathetic to the recent “hyperintensional” turn in metaphysics when it comes to the question of how the notions of essence and grounding interact with one another. (shrink)

This paper considers various senses of the notion of identity and describes the strongest sense of the term—what it labels “absolute identity.” Absolute identity combines monistic identity of all in all as one substance with the absence of internal differentiation. The paper explores the possibility of absolute identity along three lines—linguistic, mental, and ontological. It determines that though there are serious difficulties, linguistic and mental, involved with positing absolute identity the possibility of its coming to be real cannot be ruled (...) out. Finally, on grounds of its lack of coherence-functionality absolute identity is rejected as an adequate conception of the world. The paper closes with a discussion of the ramifications of the denial of absolute identity. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental (...) parts’ can be given a rather innocuous meaning by being conceived of as the expression of conceptual distinctions grounded in similarity and contrast relations between total mental phenomena. (shrink)

This article examines the cultural ways in which traditional Judaism understands the relationship between an individual and Divinity. The article shows that this understanding has deep gendered dimensions. Grounded in feminist critiques of theology, as well as in Jewish studies and cultural studies, the article shows that the conceptualization of God-person relationship, in both Orthodox and Kaballic Jewish streams, is based on a hierarchical division to three different spaces. These spaces are: Mitzvah, Grace, and Desire or Will. The Mitzvah is (...) perceived to be the highest space and is represented as 'manly'. The intermediate space-Grace-is represented as a 'good woman' or as 'mother'. This space is characterized by a sacred yearning, as well as by lack of stability and continuity, paralysis, and even death. The lowest space is the space of Desire and personal will, which is culturally represented by a child or a whore-woman. This space is characterized by an attitude of disregard, resistance and fear. The article demonstrates how this cultural division of Divinity in to three, contradicts the declared Jewish position that God/divinity is 'One, Sole and Unique', and points at the inherent need of genderless conceptualization of Divinity in Judaism. (shrink)

Part I -- Scientific Composition and the New Mechanism. - 1. Laura Franklin-Hall: New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints. - 2. Kenneth Aizawa: Compositional Explanation: Dimensioned Realization, New Mechanism, and Ground. - 3. Jens Harbecke: Is Mechanistic Constitution a Version of Material Constitution?. - 4. Derk Pereboom: Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental. Part II -- Grounding, Science, and Verticality in Nature. - 5. Jonathan Schaffer: Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson. - 6. Jessica (...) Wilson: The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding. - 7. Carl Gillett: The Metaphysics of Nature, Science, and the Rules of Engagement. - 8. Andrew Melnyk: Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism. - 9. Alyssa Ney: Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense. (shrink)

This paper will examine a claim that nursing is united by its moral stance. The claim is that there are moral constraints on nurses' actions as people practising nursing and that they are in some way different from both what for now can be called standard morality and also different from the person's own moral views who also happens to be a nurse, hence the defining and unifying factor for nursing. I will begin by situating the claim within the broader (...) area about the need for a definition to state features that are essential to all and only members of its class. This will highlight the fact that there are two distinct types of definition used by authors seeking to find a unity for nursing. One type of definition has to do with goals or purposes given to nursing and the other with ends discovered as nursing. But even if there are ends waiting to be discovered a particular practical concern is how we can have knowledge of them. I will suggest that knowledge by intuition is plausible but that as things currently stand in moral epistemology it will not provide the unifying ground for nursing. Then I will argue that in the latter approach to definition a certain account of human nature has been advanced in order to provide features that are there to be discovered and so not dependent on human beings for the definition or classification. However, such an attempt to define nursing cannot do what is wanted. Rather than the account of human nature grounding morality and doing so for nursing, the account of human nature itself relies upon a prior account of morality. Because of this it loses its supposed ground of unity for the profession. Nursing is not united by its moral stance especially if this is understood in a strong sense as unique moral stance, but as things currently stand in moral epistemology this is not necessarily a bad thing for practitioners or patients. (shrink)

Paul Tillich noted the emergence of science by “demythologization” from its original unity with religion in antiquity. Demythologization can lead to conflict with accepted paradigms and therefore requires the “courage to create,” as exemplified by Galileo. Tillich's “God above God” as the ground of creativity and courage can, in this new millennium, enable religion to be reconciled with science. Religion is a source of the “courage to create,” which is essential for progress in scientific knowledge. Religion and science working (...) together as complementary dimensions of the human spirit can lead us into a wider world and greater wisdom. Reconciliation and reunion characterize the New Being and Creation. (shrink)

I am grateful for the responses from Serife Tekin and James Phillips to my paper (Lumsden 2013), for they allow me to clarify my position. Tekin (2013) accurately characterizes me as attempting to salvage the value of narrative theory without accepting the more stringent demands that have been required or implied, notably the necessity for personhood of a whole life narrative. She notes that I attempt to provide an alternative view of the unity of a person, to the degree (...) that there is that unity, by seeing a self as a bundle of narrative threads. She acknowledges my suggestion that the bundling involves connections at both conscious and unconscious levels. She says we are left with a problem, the .. (shrink)

Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced? I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. The largest part of the paper will be concerned with an objection from Ian Phillips . The objection is interesting in so far as it is an argument from (...) introspection. If it worked, it would give us a priori, non-empirical grounds for thinking that a cluster of views about temporal perception are wrong, or worse, impossible. I will argue, however, that the objection fails. Towards the end, I briefly explore the view that we have no introspective access at all to the duration of our experiences. I suggest that such a view may well be supported by some considerations about the phenomenal continuity of consciousness. (shrink)

A great challenge of the twenty-first century is the danger of conflict between persons, peoples, and cultures, among and within societies. In _A Common Human Ground_, Claes Ryn explores the nature of this problem and sets forth a theory about what is necessary for peaceful relations to be possible. Many in the Western world trust in “democracy,” “capitalism,” “liberal tolerance,” “scientific progress,” or “general enlightenment” to handle this problem. Although each of these, properly defined, may contribute toward alleviating disputes, Ryn (...) argues that the problem is much more complex and demanding than is usually recognized. He reasons that, most fundamentally, good relations among individuals and nations have moral and cultural preconditions. What can predispose them to mutual respect and peace? One Western philosophical tradition, for which Plato set the pattern, maintains that the only way to genuine unity is for historical diversity to yield to universality. The implication of this view for a multicultural world would be a peace that requires that cultural distinctiveness be effaced as far as possible and replaced with a universal culture. A very different Western philosophical tradition denies the existence of universality altogether. It is represented today by postmodernist multiculturalism—a view that leaves unanswered the question as to how conflict between diverse groups might be averted. Ryn questions both of these traditions, arguing for the potential union of universality and particularity. He contends that the two need not be enemies, but in fact need each other. Cultivating individual and national particularities is potentially compatible with strengthening and enriching our common humanity. This volume embraces the notion of universality, while at the same time historicizing it. Using wide-ranging examples, Ryn presents a firmly sustained and systematic argument centering on this central issue. His approach is interdisciplinary, discussing not only political ideas, but also fiction, drama, and other arts. Scholarly and philosophical, but not specialized, this book will appeal to general readers as well as intellectuals. (shrink)

Increasingly, nurses conduct scientific inquiry into complex health‐care problems by collaborating on teams with researchers from other highly specialized fields. As cross‐disciplinary research proliferates and becomes institutionalized globally, researchers will increasingly encounter the need to integrate their particular research perspectives within inquiries without sacrificing the potential contributions of their discipline‐specific expertise. The work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984) offers the necessary philosophical grounding. Here, I defend a role for philosophy in cross‐disciplinary research and present selected ideas in Lonergan's (...) work. These include: (1) a dynamic, normative pattern that each inquirer operates uniquely also forms the common core, or unity, in knowing; (2) the possibility of cross‐disciplinary knowledge development is dependent on each researcher's consciousness of her or his attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibleness; and (3) shifts in researchers' viewpoints, or horizons, facilitate their collaborative inquiry and their grasp of the unity in knowing. The desire to know, shared by team members, drives their inquiry. Lonergan's stance is consistent with nursing values because it respects, but does not unconditionally privilege, any researcher or discipline. Arguments support a claim that Lonergan's perspective is well suited to guide nurse researchers participating on cross‐disciplinary health research teams. (shrink)

Propositions represent the entities from which they are formed. This fact has puzzled philosophers and some have put forward radical proposals in order to explain it. This paper develops a primitivist account of the representational properties of propositions that centers on the operation of application. As we will see, this theory wins out over its competitors on grounds of strength, systematicity and unifying power.

Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...) distinction between mere aggregates and genuine unities, and the purported inability of subjects to constitute a unity. In response, I first argue that it may not be incumbent upon the panpsychist to explain how microphenomenal properties could constitute a unity in the way that Coleman supposes. I then argue that even if such a burden does fall on the panpsychist, it is far from clear that a plurality subjects cannot constitute such a unity. Finally, I argue that if one adopts a functionalist account of macrosubjects, as Coleman does, there is little reason to think that a plurality of subjects could not constitute a macrosubject. In these ways, I argue that the force of the combination problem does not turn on whether microphenomenal properties require minds or subjects that have them. (shrink)

I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise—the symmetry of the stress tensor—that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem (...) would not arise if he had kept his early theory of matter as made of mass points, or “physical monads.”. (shrink)

Although Habermas's sophisticated conception of constitutional patriotism successfully avoids the charge of trying to ground patriotism in a set of principles that is too thin and abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging, his optimism regarding the prospect in modern pluralist societies of building a genuinely shared political culture is misplaced. The march of modernization as rationalization is neither as relentless nor as inevitable as Habermas assumes. Hence the rational consensus on liberal constitutional principles that is to (...) provide the basis for a shared political culture remains elusive. However, while Habermas's solution to the `solidarity gap' that confronts many contemporary liberal democracies remains problematic, he is right to point to the importance of a shared identity that is strong enough to turn strangers into fellow citizens. The challenges that cultural diversity and value pluralism pose for contemporary states cannot be resolved via a procedural approach that focuses solely on political legitimacy. Yet the difficulties that surround Habermas's conception of `constitutional patriotism' suggest modern states will struggle to build a collective political identity that can generate a genuine sense of solidarity. If this is so, modern pluralist states face a more profound challenge than writers such as Habermas assume. (shrink)

After a brief survey of arguments for a unitary particle theory of matter, offered by the writer in previous publications, the following new items are discussed. (1) The wave part of the dual aspect of matter, resting on the translation formula λ=h/p, is not covariant in the nonrelativistic domain. And relativistically, it is untenable not only on methodological grounds, but because it leads to obvious contradictions to elementary experience, e.g., in the equilibrium between a material oscillator and radiation. (2) The (...) photon story as usually presented is rectified historically and factually. (3) The previous derivation by the writer of quantum mechanical theory from a nonquantal background is supplemented, in order to be conclusive, by the postulate that the general probability relation is to become the ordinary addition law in the average. (4) Quotations from the writings of prominant dualists, intended by the latter to support their ideology, disclose a fantastic disarray of pseudophilosophical standpoints which can be cleared up only by repudiating the alleged dual nature of matter and of light and by ceasing to constantly mix up the contrast between particles and fields with that between particles and waves, and by returning to a strictly unitary aspect. (shrink)

Is the notion of grounding arguably prevalent throughout moral philosophy the same as that found in metaphysics? Selim Berker has argued it is. This, he claims, has a ‘surprising’ consequence: many central claims in normative ethics become claims within both normative ethics and meta-ethics. I argue that whatever important consequences the unity of grounding may have for moral philosophy, it does not, pace Berker, entail anything significant regarding the relationship between normative ethics and meta-ethics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dominus Deus Noster Deus Unus Est:Aquinas on Divine UnityArchbishop Rowan Williams"The Lord our God is one LORD," says the Shema (Deut 6:4), echoed by Christians and Muslims alike. "We believe in one God," the Nicene Creed announces; and the Shahada's "There is no deity but God" affirms the same. But at first sight, Christian theology looks like the outlier here, as St. Thomas obliquely acknowledges when, early in his (...) discussion of the Trinity (Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 30, a. 1, obj. 1 and ad 1), he quotes Boethius: "That [alone] is truly one in which there is no numeration" (obj. 3). If there is a plurality of relation in God, there is something that can be enumerated, says Thomas. This objection is duly met by distinguishing between "absolute" plurality and the mutually definitory relations of the Trinitarian life which rule out any "composition" in God. But, for this fully to make sense, we must return to Thomas's explicit discussion of divine unity (ST I, q. 11). The present essay attempts a brief examination of how divine unity is understood in this quaestio, in the hope of clarifying an aspect of Aquinas's Trinitarian thought, and also of suggesting ways of developing an implicit theme of some significance for contemporary theology.It is still a textbook commonplace that "Western" Trinitarian theology begins from the divine unity and treats the distinction of the divine persons only in the light of this prior reality. The eloquent polemic of Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky has played a major role in canonizing this supposed opposition. He writes, for example, that Western Trinitarianism treats the relationships of the divine hypostases as "a system of relationships within the one essence: something logically posterior to the essence," with [End Page 555] the distinguishing "relations of origin" (originary fatherhood, generatedness, procession) as "more or less swallowed up in the nature or essence."1 Examples could be multiplied, from Lossky and many others, and from Western theologians influenced by this characterization.2 The very structure of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, with the quaestiones de Deo uno preceding those de Trinitate, is sometimes adduced in support of this analysis of the ambiguities and inadequacies of Thomist Trinitarianism, and of a general Western resistance to the radical personalism of authentic patristic theology.But, polemic apart, what is Aquinas actually saying in his treatment of divine unity, primarily in ST I, q. 11? The four articles of the quaestio deal with whether saying that something is "one" actually tells us anything beyond the postulation of something as a coherent subject/substance; with whether unity and plurality are simply opposed and incompatible notions; with whether it is right to say that God is one, and if so, whether he is maxime unus, one in a unique and unsurpassable sense. Basic to his argument, as we shall see, is something touched on briefly in ST I, q. 30, a. 1, where his response (ad 3) to the Boethian formulation associates divine unity with simplicity—that is, with non-composition:3 affirming the divine unity is, crucially, denying the applicability of certain kinds of discourse in theology. But, as we shall see, part of the abiding importance of Aquinas's discussion is, perhaps unexpectedly, to open the door to a new ontological perspective in which laying out the difference between different senses of "unity" allows for the development of a more systematically relational metaphysics. Related to this is the distinction drawn (especially in ad 2 of [End Page 556] a. 3) between "mathematical" and "metaphysical" unity; one of the problems with a good deal of modern criticism of Western Trinitarianism is a failure to reckon with the diversity of ways in which "unus est" might be used, and St. Thomas is in fact abundantly clear about the senses that must be ruled out in theology—including any sense that would oppose an "individual" essence to "multiple" hypostases, as if the divine essence were itself a sort of numerically identified individual.The ground for this is laid in the first article. If we say that something is "one," we are surely offering a determination of it, specifying one way of... (shrink)

Robert M. Adams has recently and controversially discussed the question whether Leibniz’s conception of God was ever Spinozistic. His affirmative answer has been opposed by Christia Mercer but supported by the present author. In this paper the debate is briefly sketched as a preliminary to the presentation of a new middle position, one that incorporates elements of both of the opposing interpretations. Along the way, the paper discusses Leibniz’s interesting treatment of God as the one and the all, as both (...) the unity and the multiplicity in the world, and as the key to universal harmony. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses how being and unity are related in the metaphysical systems of Aristotle and Plotinus. I suggest that Aristotle's metaphysical position contrasts with what I call the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy, a general trend in Platonism to place being in a dependent relationship to unity, and particular things in a dependent relationship to being. Aristotle, by contrast, sees being and unity as dependent on particulars. Understanding Aristotle against the backdrop of the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy is of (...) some assistance in understanding his critique of Plato, and his own position in the Metaphysics regarding substance, cosmology and first principles. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is substance par excellence , and stands as an exemplary cause for the First Moved Mover, guaranteeing the motion necessary for the generation of other particulars, but it does not provide them with being and unity. This is because being and unity are dependent on, and logically posterior to, particulars. I also examine some of the difficulties in Aristotle's system which Plotinus takes up in the Enneads . Plotinus, in trying to remain true to his understanding Platonism, rejects Aristotelianism, and posits instead, a revised version of the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy. In addition to examining Plotinus, critique of Aristotle, I examine some of Plotinus, other influences. These include Parmenides, Plato, Albinus and Numenius, in order to provide some grounding in understanding Plotinus' own philosophy. I conclude with an examination of Plotinus' metaphysics that shows its consistency with the general direction of Platonism, if in a different, hypostatic system. Plotinus I first principle, the One, is a synergy of negative and positive theology, grounded in the belief that being and thinking are extensionally the same in his second principle, Nous. That being and thinking are multiple necessitates the positing of a principle of unity which is "[Special characters omitted.] ," (beyond being) a phrase which Plotinus takes over from Plato's Republic in the service of his own philosophy. (shrink)

In order to provide context and ground for a future assessment of the manifold overlap and possible differences between the Humanistic Management Project and the Weltethos Project, this article offers a comprehensive assessment of the history, arguments, and relevance of the Weltethos Project as applied to economics and business. A literature review of foundational documents on “Weltethos” and “Weltethos for business” outlines essential elements and arguments from two main Weltethos Project pioneers. It first recounts how its founder, the theologian Hans (...) Küng, has launched a fruitful academic and public discourse spanning almost three decades since 1990, including the presentation of the Manifesto for a Global Economic Ethic by world leaders at a joint event with the UN Global Compact at the UN headquarters in New York in 2009, calling for business to serve human dignity. Then, the agenda of Claus Dierksmeier, Küng’s academic successor and a philosopher with foundational contributions to the Humanistic Management Project, is assessed both in regard to Weltethos motifs and Humanistic Management arguments, spanning from Dierksmeier’s conception of qualitative freedom as the foundation of unity in diversity to his effort to reframe economic theory and ethics, the inclusive and innovative practices of Humanistic Management, and to the capability approach. The article ends by highlighting how these two different approaches to Weltethos commitments converge in their care for human dignity, the idea of globally responsible freedom, and the capacity for dialogue as a learning process for creative change leadership. (shrink)

This is the first book in which contemporary scientists and mystics share with us-in their own words-their views on space, time, matter, energy, life, consciousness, creation and on our place in the scheme of things. The book is also the story of an American philosopher who-with these dialogues-ventures into ground-breaking territory, and of her search in America, Europe, India and Nepal for people whose work is at the center of our understanding of reality.

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

We hypothesise that the sarcolemma of an actively growing myofibre has different properties to the sarcolemma of a mature adult myofibre. Such fundamentally different properties have clinical consequences for the onset, and potential therapeutic targets, of various skeletal muscle diseases that first manifest either during childhood (e.g. Duchenne muscular dystrophy, DMD) or after cessation of the main growth phase (e.g. dysferlinopathies). These characteristics are also relevant to the selection of both tissue culture and in vivo models employed to study such (...) myopathies and the molecular regulation of adult myofibres. During growth, multinucleated myofibres increase enormously in size and volume with dramatic increases in length (up to ∼600 mm). This is in striking contrast with most mononucleated cells such as fibroblasts, that remain at a relatively small size (∼10–20 µm diameter). The consequences of a dynamic, expanding sarcolemma during growth, compared with that of an adult myofibre of a fixed length, are discussed with respect to various aspects of muscle biology. (shrink)

Cora Diamond’s discussions of the ethics of our treatment of animals offer a critique of conceptions of morality which regard our ethical responses as founded on reasons which ought to be reasons for anyone. Diamond takes issue with accounts of our treatment of animals based on their possession of capacities which are shared with us. She offers instead a concept of the moral life, as a form of life—inherited, shared and negotiated—only within which can moral reasons count as reasons at (...) all. Our fellow creatures have some share in this life, but one that must be recognized as partial and problematic.In this discussion, we offer an account which is consistent with Diamond’s general perspective. But one which also offers a more generous account of ways in which the discoveries of the ethological sciences dynamically reshape the place of animals in our shared moral life. (shrink)

Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environ- mental Aesthetics. Edited by ARNOLD BERLEANT . Ashgate. 2002. pp. 192. C ONSISTING of twelve chapters, and an extended introduction, this volume provides a leading-edge anthology of reflections on environmental aesthetics.

Must We Mean What We Play? INTRODUCTION It was Sir Thomas Beecham who said,'The English do not care for music-but they love the noise it makes.'Sir Thomas was, of course, given to making acerbic swipes but this one has always seemed to me to have.

ED455370 - Lifelong Learning, Equity and Inclusion. Proceedings [of the] UACE Conference (Cambridge, England, March 29-31, 1999).

The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 2010 Nagoya Protocol brought about a breakthrough in global policy making. They combined a concern for the environment with a commitment to resolving longstanding human injustices regarding access to, and use of biological resources. In particular, the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities was no longer going to be exploited without fair benefit sharing. Yet, for 25 years after the adoption of the CBD, there were no major benefit sharing agreements that led (...) to significant funding streams for indigenous communities. This changed with the signing of the Rooibos Benefit Sharing Agreement in South Africa, described in this paper. As the authors report, the Rooibos Agreement is a superlative in two respects. It is the biggest benefit sharing agreement between industry and indigenous peoples to date. It is also the first industry-wide agreement to be formed in accordance with biodiversity legislation. This article is a co-production between traditional knowledge holders, the lawyer who represented their interests, the Co-Chair of the Nagoya Protocol negotiations, and an ethicist who analyzed the major challenges of this historic agreement. With no precedent in the benefit sharing world, the agreement stands as a concrete example of the ‘art of the possible.’ Although the rooibos case is unique in a number of aspects, the experience offers many transferable insights, including: patience; incrementalism; honesty; trust; genuine dialogue; strong legal support; a shared recognition that a fair, win-win deal is possible; government leadership; and unity amongst indigenous peoples. Such ingredients of success can apply well beyond southern Africa. (shrink)

Although clinicians and researchers working in the field of autism are generally not concerned with philosophical categories of kinds, a model for understanding the nature of autism is important for guiding research and clinical practice. Contemporary research in the field of autism is guided by the depiction of autism as a scientific object that can be identified with systematic neuroscientific investigation. This image of autism is compatible with a permissive account of natural kinds: the mechanistic property cluster (MPC) account of (...) natural kinds, recently proposed as the model for understanding psychiatric disorders. Despite the heterogeneity, multicausality and fuzzy boundaries that complicate autism research, a permissive account of natural kinds (MPC kinds) provides prescriptive guidance for the investigation of objective causal mechanisms that should inform nosologists in their attempt to carve autism’s boundaries at its natural joints. However, this essay will argue that a mechanistic model of autism is limited since it disregards the way in which autism relates to ideas about what kind of behavior is abnormal. As historical studies and definitions of autism show, normative issues concerning disability, impairment and societal needs have been and still are inextricably linked to how we recognize and understand autism. The current search for autism’s unity in neurobiological mechanisms ignores the values, social norms and various perspectives on mental pathology that play a significant role in 'the thing called autism’. Autism research needs to engage with these issues in order to achieve more success in the effort to become clinically valuable. (shrink)