This article examines gender imbalance in philosophy using statistical analysis of philosophy professionals and students in Spain. It is the only study on an international scope that provides complete, real data of an entire national system. This analysis shows that among teaching and research personnel, women make up 25% of the total, among full professors they represent 12%, and the glass-ceiling index in the field is the same as that in engineering. For the study, I resorted to a normalization of (...) indicators to allow for international comparisons, which I have done using the reports and analyses available in other countries. In the second part of the article, I use the Spanish data to test some recent hypotheses on gender imbalance in philosophy. The data does not confirm the theory of Neven Sesardic and Rafael de Clercq, which attributes the imbalance to differences in cognitive abilities. However, the data does partially confirm the study by Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor, and Valerie Tiberius regarding the dissuasive effect of introductory courses in philosophy, as well as that by Sarah Leslie and her colleagues on the field-specific abilities belief hypothesis. (shrink)

What is well-being? This is one of humanity's oldest and deepest questions; Valerie Tiberius offers a fresh answer. She argues that our lives go well to the extent that we succeed in what matters to us emotionally, reflectively, and over the long term. So when we want to help others achieve well-being, we should pay attention to their values.

Social problems such as racism, sexism, and inequality are often cited as structural rather than individual in nature. What does it mean to invoke a social structural explanation, and how do such explanations relate to individualistic ones? This article explores recent philosophical debates concerning the nature and usages of social structural explanation. I distinguish between two central kinds of social structural explanation: those that are autonomous from psychology, and those that are not. This distinction will help clarify the explanatory power (...) that each type of SSE has, points of convergence with methodological traditions such as critical theory and rational choice theory, and the difficulties that each type of SSE faces. (shrink)

We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...) to reconsider their answers. As we predicted, answers consistent with a matching heuristic were made more quickly than other answers, were given higher FOR ratings, and received less subsequent analysis as measured by rethinking time and the probability of changing answers. These data suggest that reasoning biases may be compelling because they are fluently generated; this is turn creates a strong FOR, which acts as a signal that further analysis is not necessary. (shrink)

This article uses social dominance theory (SDT) to explore the dynamic and systemic nature of the initiation and maintenance of organizational corruption. Rooted in the definition of organizational corruption as misuse of power or position for personal or organizational gain, this work suggests that organizational corruption is driven by the individual and institutional tendency to structure societies as group-based social hierarchies. SDT describes a series of factors and processes across multiple levels of analysis that systemically contribute to the initiation and (...) maintenance of social hierarchies and associated power inequalities, favoritism, and discrimination. I posit that the same factors and processes also contribute to individuals’ lower awareness of the misuse of power and position within the social hierarchies, leading to the initiation and maintenance of organizational corruption. Specifically, individuals high in social dominance orientation, believing that they belong to superior groups, are likely to be less aware of corruption because of their feeling of entitlement to greater power and their desire to maintain dominance even if that requires exploiting others. Members of subordinate groups are also likely to have lower awareness of corruption if they show more favoritism toward dominant group members to enhance their sense of worth and preserve social order. Institutions contribute to lower awareness of corruption by developing and enforcing structures, norms, and practices that promote informational ambiguity and maximize focus on dominance and promotion. Dynamic coordination among individuals and institutions is ensured through the processes of person-environment fit and legitimizing beliefs, ideologies, or rationalizations. (shrink)

In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the (...) Argument Evaluation Task (AET) and a Law of Large Numbers (LLN) task in order to test the similarity of the phenomena concerned. Our findings provide little support for the idea that belief bias on formal and informal reasoning is a unitary phenomenon. First, there was no correlation across individuals in the extent of belief bias shown on the three tasks. Second, evidence for belief by strength interaction was observed only on AET and under conditions not required for the comparable finding on syllogistic reasoning. Finally, we found that while conclusion believability strongly influenced assessments of arguments strength, it had a relatively weak influence on the verbal justifications offered on the two informal reasoning tasks. (shrink)

One hundred and three participants solved conflict and non-conflict versions of four reasoning tasks using a two-response procedure: a base rate task, a causal reasoning task, a denominator neglect task, and a categorical syllogisms task. Participants were asked to give their first, intuitive answer, to make a Feeling of Rightness judgment, and then were given as much time as needed to rethink their answer. They also completed a standardized measure of IQ and the actively open-minded thinking questionnaire. The FORs of (...) both high- and low-capacity reasoners were responsive to conflict, such that FORs were lower for conflict relative to non-conflict problems. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, high-capacity reasoners made a greater distinction between conflict and non-conflict items on measures of Type 2 thinking, namely, rethinking time and probability of changing answers. In contrast to the quality hypothesis, however, this rethinking time did not advantage the ability of the high-capacity group to produce normative answers, except for the base rate task. Indeed, we observed that the correlation between capacity and the probability of normative answers emerged at the initial response, rather than after rethinking. (shrink)

To what extent should we focus on implicit bias in order to eradicate persistent social injustice? Structural prioritizers argue that we should focus less on individual minds than on unjust social structures, while equal prioritizers think that both are equally important. This article introduces the framework of transactive memory into the debate to defend the equal priority view. The transactive memory framework helps us see how structure can emerge from individual interactions as an irreducibly social product. If this is right, (...) then debiasing interventions are structural interventions. One upshot is that the utility of the individual versus structural distinction is not apparent for the purposes of intervention. (shrink)

Whether it is to be maximized or promoted as the object of a duty of beneficence, well-being is a vitally important notion in ethical theory. Well-being is a value, but to play the role it has often been assigned by ethical theory it must also be something we can measure and compare. It is a normative concept, then, but it also seems to have empirical content. Historically, philosophical conceptions of well-being have been responsive to the paired demands for normative and (...) empirical adequacy. However, recent work has yet to pay serious attention to the burgeoning field of well-being research in empirical psychology. This might be because the research is new and unknown, or it might be due to uncertainty about how a philosophical investigation would take such research into account. This chapter offers solutions to both of these problems. It provides an overview of well-being research in empirical psychology. It then uses this overview as part of an argument for an empirical informed account of well-being that we call the Value-Based Life Satisfaction Account. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that what we ought to do collectively does not imply anything about what each of us ought to do individually. According to this line of reasoning, if cooperating will make no difference to an outcome, then you are not morally required to do it. And if cooperating will be personally costly to you as well, this is an even stronger reason to not do it. However, this reasoning results in a self-defeating, yet entirely predictable outcome. If (...) everyone is rational, no one will cooperate, resulting in an aggregate outcome that is devastating for everyone. This dismal analysis explains why climate change and other collective action problems are so difficult to ameliorate. The goal of this paper is to provide a different, exploratory framework for thinking about individual reasons for action in collective action problems. I argue that the concept of commitment gives us a new perspective on collective action problems. Once we take the structure of commitment into account, this activates requirements of diachronic rationality that give individuals instrumental reasons to cooperate in collective action problems. (shrink)

Well-being in the broadest sense is what we have when we are living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us. In philosophy, well-being has been an important topic of inquiry for millennia. In psychology, well-being as a topic has been gathering steam very recently and this research is now at a stage that warrants the attention of philosophers. The most popular theories of well-being in the two fields are similar enough to suggest the possibility of interdisciplinary (...) collaboration. In this essay I provide an overview of three of the main questions that arise from psychologists’ work on well-being, and highlight areas that invite philosophical input. Those questions center on the nature, measurement, and moral significance of well-being. I also argue that the life-satisfaction theory is particularly well suited to meet the various demands on a theory of well-being. (shrink)

Background Disclosure of obtaining informed consent from patients (ICP) and research ethics committee (REC) approval in published reports is sometimes omitted. To date, no disclosure data are available on surgical research. Objective Our aim was to assess whether REC approval and ICP were documented in surgical trials. Study design Overall, 657 randomised trials, published between 2005 and 2010 in 10 international journals, were included. We collected the report rate of REC approval and ICP and contacted the corresponding author when ethical (...) information was lacking. Results Among the 657 randomised controlled trials (RCT), 576 (87.7%) stated that an REC had approved the research, and 606 (92.2%) stated that ICP had been requested. Furthermore, 28 RCTs (4.3%) reported neither REC nor ICP. Conclusions The phase III randomised surgical trials that were analysed were shown to have respected fundamental ethical principles in approximately 90% of the cases examines. (shrink)

The rise of private standards, including those involving multi-stakeholder processes, raises questions about whose interests are served and the kind of power that is exerted to maintain these interests. This paper critically examines the battle for ideas—the way competing factions assert their own narratives about value chain relations, the role of standards and related multi-stakeholder processes. Drawing on empirical research on the horticulture and floriculture value chains linking Kenya and the United Kingdom, the analysis explores the framing of sustainability issues, (...) especially around labor issues and good agricultural practice, and the choice of response with respect to private standards and multi-stakeholder initiatives since the late 1990s. We identify four competing narratives currently in play: a dominant global sourcing narrative, a pragmatic development narrative, a broader development narrative and a narrative we term potentially transformative. This last narrative is currently emerging through the unpacking of narratives in relation to the framing of sustainability problems and solutions, and in terms of legislative, executive and judicial governance. The paper contributes to emerging understanding of power in value chains, moving beyond material power to a consideration of how ideational power is exerted and resisted. (shrink)

Valérie Chevassus-Marchionni | : Après une étude de la notion de symptôme en psychanalyse chez Freud et chez Lacan, la paresse est envisagée précisément comme un symptôme. Mais quel peut être le sens de ce symptôme? Quelle est la nature du désir inconscient qui préside à son apparition? Après avoir considéré plusieurs causalités et élaboré quelques interprétations possibles, nous nous intéressons au cas particulier du personnage d’Oblomov dans le roman éponyme d’Ivan Gontcharov. Si la paresse d’Oblomov a un sens qu’il (...) est possible de déterminer à l’aide des outils de la psychanalyse, il est intéressant aussi de ne pas en chercher à tout prix la signification et de l’envisager davantage comme un sinthome au sens lacanien du terme : Oblomov ferait usage de sa paresse comme d’une véritable création visant à contourner son mal-être et à lui permettre de s’accommoder à sa manière des souffrances générées par son existence et sa sensibilité. En conclusion est présenté succinctement le cas de Svevo qui donne de la paresse une illustration bien différente. | : A study of the notion of symptom in psychoanalysis in Freud’s and Lacan’s work shows that laziness can be regarded exactly as a symptom. But what can be the significance of this symptom? What is the nature of the unconscious desire which presides over its appearance? Having considered several causalities and developed some possible interpretations, we’re concerned with the particular case of the character of Oblomov in Ivan Gontcharov’s eponym novel. If Oblomov’s laziness has a significance which it is possible to determine by means of the tools of psychoanalysis, it is also interesting not to look at all costs for the meaning and to envisage it more as a sinthome in the Lacanian sense of the term : Oblomov would make use of his laziness as a real creation to bypass his ill-being and to adapt, in his own way, to the sufferings generated by his existence and sensitivity. In conclusion is briefly presented the case of Svevo which gives of the laziness a very different illustration. (shrink)

Valérie Chevassus-Marchionni, Raymond Lemieux et François Nault.

The notion of social mechanisms has experienced an increasing use in the social sciences as an alternative explanatory framework to the logic of co-variation present in multivariate analyses, emphasizing the causal explanation of social phenomena over their mere description. This paper seeks two goals. In the one hand, summarise recent literature on social mechanisms in order to clarify their meanings, different modes of use and their contribution to empirical research. In the other hand, we will shed some light onto the (...) relation between social mechanisms and the micro-macro problem in social sciences. We argue that the search for social mechanisms and reductionism in social sciences correspond to two interrelated but analytically distinguishable questions: while the first one seeks to define intermediary processes and causal connections between causes and effects, the second question asks for the different levels of reality in which the relation between initial conditions and effects shall be understood. Following Daniel Little´s methodological localism, we will suggest that social mechanisms can well take place at the supra-individual level, and that the reduction of social phenomena to their micro-foundations is not a methodological prescription, but rather depends on the state of art of specific fields of inquiry. La noción de mecanismos sociales ha experimentado un uso creciente en ciencias sociales. Estos se han consolidado como un marco explicativo alternativo a la lógica de co-variación propia del análisis multivariado, enfatizando además la explicación causal de los fenómenos sociales por sobre su mera descripción. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos. Primero, sistematizar la reciente literatura sobre mecanismos sociales, con el fin de clarificar sus significados, modos de uso y aporte a la investigación empírica. Y segundo, entregaremos luces a la relación entre mecanismos sociales y el problema de la relación macro-micro en ciencias sociales. Sostendremos la idea de que la búsqueda de mecanismos sociales y el reduccionismo en ciencias sociales corresponden a dos preguntas relacionadas pero analíticamente distinguibles: mientras la primera busca definir procesos intermedios y conexiones causales entre condiciones iniciales y efectos, la segunda se pregunta por los distintos niveles de la realidad en los cuales la relación entre condiciones iniciales y efectos deben ser entendidos. Siguiendo el localismo metodológico de Daniel Little, sugeriremos que los mecanismos sociales pueden bien operar a niveles supra-individuales, y que la reducción de fenómenos sociales a interacciones individuales no es una prescripción metodológica, sino que se desprende del estado del arte de campos de investigación específicos. (shrink)

Despite renewed interest in work, philosophers have largely ignored self-employment. This neglect is surprising, not just because self-employment was central to classic philosophizing about work, but also given that half of the global workforce today, including one in seven workers in OECD countries, are self-employed. We start off by offering a definition of self-employment, one that accounts for its various forms while avoiding misclassifying dependent self-employed workers as independent contractors, and by mapping the barriers to becoming and remaining self-employed (section (...) 2). We then examine five arguments why governments ought to promote self-employment, despite the forgone opportunities to promote employee work instead that this often entails (sections 3-7): the argument from job creation, the argument from job satisfaction, the argument from independence, the argument from occupational freedom, and the argument from subsistence under non-ideal circumstances. Some of these are unconvincing, we argue, but others are not. Although the strength of the latter arguments hangs on various context-dependent conditions, such that they need to be carefully weighed against considerations of efficiency and equality, they nonetheless offer compelling pro tanto reasons to promote, and not just to protect, self-employment. (shrink)

Background: Several authors have focused on the aesthetics of nursing care from diverse perspectives; however, there are few studies about the sublime and the beautiful in nursing. Aim: To identify beautiful and sublime moments in the context of the aesthetics of nursing care. Methods: A theoretical reflection has been contemplated about sublime and beautiful values in the context of the aesthetics of nursing care from the cultural history perspective. For that purpose, a revision of this issue has been completed. The (...) terms ‘beautiful’ and ‘sublime’ have been analysed to identify the characteristics of both in the context of nursing care. Ethical consideration: We have followed all ethical requirements regarding the sources, conducting research and authorship. There is no conflict of interest in this paper. Results: With aesthetic knowledge, the nurse expresses the artistic nature of nursing care by appreciating the act of caring for individuals. The sublime is a complex phenomenon, since apparently contrary feelings are interwoven. Nursing care is an art with an anthropological object-subject on which the ‘artist’ applies their prior knowledge and skills. Feelings and emotions that develop during the clinical nursing practice – especially at times sublime and beautiful, aesthetic – constitute experiences which are professionally significant. (shrink)

Prudential value is the good for a person. It is often identified with well-being, so that well-being is not one prudential value among many, but instead the most general category of prudential value. This chapter considers the main theories of well-being—including eudaimonism, desire satisfactionism, and hedonism—in light of two main theoretical desiderata: subject-relativity and normativity. A good theory of well-being ought to explain how its conception of well-being is good for the person whose well-being it is. A good theory should (...) also explain what it is about well-being as conceived by the theory that gives us reasons to pursue and promote it. (shrink)

Trust and Governance asks several important questions: Is trust really essential to good governance, or are strong laws more important? What leads people either to trust or to distrust government, and what makes officials decide to be trustworthy? Can too much trust render the public vulnerable to government corruption, and if so what safeguards are necessary? In approaching these questions, the contributors draw upon an abundance of resources to offer different perspectives on the role of trust in government. Enriched by (...) perspectives from political science, sociology, psychology, economics, history, and philosophy, Trust and Governance opens a new dialogue on the role of trust in the vital relationship between citizenry and government. (shrink)

Comparando la presencia teórica ante la inteligencia con el papel de la presencia intelectual en el actuar práctico se descubre la importancia y el valor del pasado histórico. Eso permite establecer el sentido de lo histórico en el hombre.

Alejandro Tomasini ha indicado, muy lúcidamente, la necesidad de pensar los problemas filosóficos en lengua castellana. Más aún, ha sugerido que es posible tratar los problemas propios de la filosofía analítica por medio de la lengua castellana y que, por otra parte, es necesario en nuestro continente pensar los problemas y enfrentarlos analíticamente. Independientemente de su alcance teórico, el mérito del libro que presentamos, Lecturas analíticas: una introducción a temas y problemas de la filosofía analítica, apunta a esa dirección.

This paper investigates the role that universities play in supporting social entrepreneurs (SEs) across their ecosystem. Adopting the resource-based view (RBV) approach, we argue that universities attract, mobilize, and deploy multiple resources that benefit SEs through four main mechanisms (i.e., teaching, research, outreach, and the development of partnerships). We use a qualitative approach of 62 semi-structured interviews and 8 focus groups in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. Our contribution shows that employing different resources and engaging in supportive activities of universities towards (...) SEs facilitate the development of university capabilities, such as an increased reputation, development of leadership skills for students and staff, and wider access to ecosystem resources that support other university activities related to teaching, research, and community outreach. The role that partnerships play in the development of these capabilities is fundamental, thanks to the different strategic alliances and mobilization of resources between universities and other actors while supporting SEs. This study contributes to our understanding of the role universities can play to intensify the nature of supportive ecosystems for SEs. This contribution is relevant not only to academics but also to practitioners, as this will shed light on the building, development, and scaling of a supportive ecosystem for SEs. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe (...) a constructivist methodology for defending an account of wisdom and outline its main features. This gives us enough to see what wise judgment constructivism would look like, why it might be an attractive theory, and how it is different from other versions of constructivism. (shrink)

Some theories of well-being in philosophy and in psychology define people’s well-being in psychological terms. According to these theories, living well is getting what you want, feeling satisfied, experiencing pleasure, or the like. Other theories take well-being to be something that is not defined by our psychology: for example, they define well-being in terms of objective values or the perfection of our human nature. These two approaches present us with a trade-off: The more we define well-being in terms of people’s (...) psychology, the less ideal it seems and the less it looks like something of real value that could be an important aim of human life. On the other hand, the more we define well-being in terms of objective features of the world that do not have to do with people’s psychological states, the less it looks like something that each of us has a reason to promote. In this paper I argue that we can take a middle path between these two approaches if we hold that well-being is an ideal but an ideal that is rooted in our psychology. The middle path that I propose is one that puts what people value at the center of the theory of well-being. In the second half of the paper I consider how the value-based theory I describe should be applied to real life situations. (shrink)

Acknowledgements -- Some notes on terminology -- Introduction -- Early feminist thought -- Liberalism and beyond : mainstream feminism in the nineteenth century -- The contribution of Marx and Engels -- The vote and after : mainstream feminism in the United States and Britain from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War -- Left-wing feminism in Britain and the United States -- Marxist feminism in Germany and Russia -- Feminism after the second World War -- Liberalism and beyond (...) : feminism and equal rights from the 1960s -- Radical feminism and the concept of patriarchy -- Radical feminism : patriarchy in private and public life -- Marxist and socialist feminism from the 1960s -- Theoretical developments : postmodern feminisms and beyond -- Theoretical developments : postcolonial feminism, black feminism and intersectionality -- Western feminist theory in the twenty first century : developments in liberal and socialist thought -- Western feminism in the twenty first century: continuities, challenges and change -- Conclusions: feminist political theory today -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise. In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me, arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is (...) not something that further discussion or argumentation can overcome. In the final section, I outline one view of scientific explanation and conclude that the source of conflict really turns on a difference in the rules each side has adopted in playing the game. (shrink)

Here we study two connexive logics based on one of the conditionals introduced by Church in [4] and on some negations defined through falsity constants in the sense of Ackermann in [1].

The question of how to reason well is an important normative question,one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstracttopic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative questionthat I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an importantkind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certainvirtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue thatstability makes reasoners reason better. Further,I suggest at the end of the (...) paper that an account of virtues thatconduce to good reasoning might go a long way toward answering someof the traditional questions about the principles ofpractical reason. (shrink)

There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular (...) "middle ground" reply in which mental phenomena are claimed to be "as real as" other higher level properties. It argues that this solution fails to answer epistemological difficulties surrounding how to chose the appropriate factors in an explanation. A more sophisticated understanding of scientific theorizing and of the relation between ontology and explanation give us a framework in which we can determine when we should refer to mental states as being the causally efficacious agents for some behavior. (shrink)