In this paper we articulate and diagnose a previously unrecognized problem for theories of entitlement, what we call the Claims Conundrum. It applies to all entitlements that are originally generated by some claim-generating action, such as laboring, promising, or contract-signing. The Conundrum is spurred by the very plausible thought that a later claim to the object to which one is entitled is a function of whether that original claim-generating action is attributable to one. This is further assumed to depend on (...) one’s being identical to the person who performed the claim-generating action. But the right theory of personal identity for grounding these later claims proves quite elusive. In demonstrating both the Claims Conundrum and diagnosing its source, we begin with its instantiation in John Locke’s theories of personal identity and initial acquisition, and then we gradually expand its net to include both Lockean and non-Lockean theories of both, moving ultimately to show that this is a problem for most entitlements generally. We then diagnose the source of the trouble, showing that a basic assumption about the link between attributability and identity that most people take to be obvious is in fact false, clearing a path for future investigation into this overlooked but serious problem’s resolution. (shrink)

Thousands of people will suffer and die this year because we do not donate enough substances of human origin, including blood plasma. To solve this, some recommend that we allow commercial organizations to assist in collecting these and that we permit donor compensation as a tool to encourage donations. Many object to these proposals, including for semiotic or expressive reasons. But insofar as these objections rely on meanings and these meanings are social constructs, we can revise the meaning of these (...) practices to avoid commodification. Revision may work in principle, but in practice some complain that changing meanings may be too difficult or practically infeasible. This essay attempts to show that this is not so in a wide range of cases and uses the case of commercial compensated blood plasma collection as an illustration. Getting people to conceive of this practice not as payment for blood plasma but as compensation for the time, effort, and inconvenience associated with the giving of plasma is practically feasible and preferable to prohibition. (shrink)

Jacob Sparks critiques our recent work on commodification by arguing that purchasing love indicates one has defective preferences. We argue A) it is possible to purchase these things without having defective preferences, B) Sparks has not shown that acting such defective preferences is morally wrong, C) that Sparks’ misunderstands the Brennan–Jaworski Thesis, and so has not produced a counterexample to it, and finally D) that when we examine the processes by which love is gifted, it is unclear whether these (...) processes should be preferred. (shrink)

The collection presents a variety of promising new directions in Royce scholarship from an international group of scholars, including historical reinterpretations, explorations of Royce's ethics of loyalty and religious philosophy, and contemporary applications of his ideas in psychology, the problem of reference, neo-pragmatism, and literary aesthetics.

From a physical point of view, the no-boundary Hartle-Hawking model put forward in 1983 was an attempt to demonstrate that the incorporation of quantum effects into the general theory of relativity would solve the problem of singularities that make the theory of relativity incomplete. This was achieved by imposing the so called “no-boundary conditions” whereby the Universe could emerge with non-zero probability from a non-existing state. Stephen Hawking quickly turned this result into a metaphysical claim that physical laws explained away (...) the necessity of the Divine intervention at the origin of the Universe. This paper offers an inquiry into the line of arguments presented by Hawking and Mlodinow in their book The Grand Design and supported with the claim that the yet unknown versionof the superstring theory, the M-theory, is an ultimate theory of the Universe. The upshot of the paper is that although the argument in the Grand Design relies on the newer achievements of physics embedded in the controversial multi-verse setting, it does not escape the question of the origin of the most general laws of physics that bring the Universe into existence. (shrink)

It is a historical truism that every thinker who made any impact on the field of philosophy also received his or her fair share of criticism, and it would therefore be surprising if Richard Rorty, at one time “the most quoted American philosopher,” did not. But to merely say that he did would be an understatement. For Rorty happened to belong to the exclusive club of thinkers whose reception consists mostly of attacks. To be fair, throughout his career, he held (...) academic positions at America’s... (shrink)

G.E.M. Anscombe znalazła w Etyce nikomachejskiej Arystotelesa pewną niekonsekwencję: Arystoteles zdaje się twierdzić, że cokolwiek wynika z namysłu, jest wyborem, i że słaby wolą może się skutecznie namyślać, ale i że — z drugiej strony — on nie wybiera. Anscombe znajduje rozwiązanie tej sprzeczności: Arystoteles powinien był, jej zdaniem, zaznaczyć, że by z namysłu wynikał wybór, to, ze względu na co się namyślamy, musiałby sam być przedmiotem uprzedniego wyboru. Badam to rozwiązanie i znajduję jego słabe strony, jak niebezpieczeństwo nieskończonego regresu, (...) trudność prześledzenia genealogii wyborów i nieosiągalność pierwotnego celu. Pomimo to próbuję je ulepszyć, poddając pod dyskusję, czy tego rodzaju pierwotne wybory, jakich wymaga rozwiązanie Anscombe, nie są jednak czasem naprawdę podejmowane i czy ich cele nie są rozkładalne na takie, które można realistycznie mieć nadzieję osiągnąć. (shrink)

There is currently a stalemate over the correct approach to legal liability. To take a prominent example, it remains a point of contention whether land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers. Many of those who insist that land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers maintain this for purely economic or pragmatic reasons. In contrast, those on the other side frequently defend their view on the grounds that, in such trespass cases, owners are not morally (...) responsible for the injuries. We maintain that the best way forward for all parties in this debate is to recognize the existence of “morally responsible liability ”—of cases where owners qua owners are morally responsible for damages caused by their property. Once this is recognized, the debate can be framed in terms of whether there are economic or pragmatic reasons for legal liability to diverge from morally responsible liability. Unfortunately, there is no good account of morally responsible liability in the literature. Taking lessons from the failings of the few extant accounts, we draw on the work of A. M. Honoré and Jeremy Waldron to develop an account of our own. We argue that owners are morally responsible for damages caused by their property when and because their taking ownership of something leads to increased risk to others. We explain how and why such increases in risk come about, and how our account captures our intuitions concerning various cases, including those concerning injuries to trespassers. (shrink)

Contemporary physics is in a great need of a unified theoretical framework allowing for a comprehensive physical description of particles and interactions. One of the leading candidates for such a framework, the superstring theory, has recently provoked immense critics due to the lack of its experimental verification (L. Smolin, R. Penrose). The survey of the specificity of the unification mechanisms that are operative within the superstring theory shows that, in comparison with such a successful paradigm as that of the general (...) theory of relativity, the unification model of the theory does not follow the strict relation between the formalism and a unifying physical idea. The critical analysis of the superstring theory, presented by Lee Smolin in his book The Trouble with Physics, offers a detailed re-evaluation of theory's physical foundations but remains insensitive to issues of methodological, ontological and epistemological import. In particular, Smolin seems to be aware of the lack of the background independence as well as the need to compactify extra space-time dimensions that are hoped to be alleviated in the future M-theory. He treats purely mathematical criteria such as that of renormalizability on an equal footing with the physical interpretation of the theory. Such a methodological disarray leads to Smolin's biased estimate of the true drawbacks of the superstring theory. (shrink)

Tekst stanowi próbę pomyślenia instytucji stanu wyjątkowego w ramach logiki monistycznej, która by nie naruszała podstaw demokracji liberalnej: jako instrumentu prawnego do zwalczenia zagrożenia, przed którym stoi państwo, przy użyciu narzędzi z porządku norm sprzed wystąpienia sytuacji ekstraordynaryjnej. Autor analizuje trzy możliwości takiej logiki, wywodząc ją z koncepcji m. in. libertarianizmu Roberta Nozicka, instytucjonalizmu Nomi Claire Lazar czy liberalnego realizmu Jeremy’ego Waldrona i aplikując do zapisów Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.

Le Maitre de Claville należy do tradycji moralistycznej klasycyzmu francuskiego i stara się podołać niebagatelnemu zadaniu stworzenia portretu człowieka godnego, honnete homme’a. Usiłując zdefiniować pojęcie cnoty, odwołuje się do własnego smaku estetycznego, subiektywnych emocji radości, zachwytu i rozkoszy wynikających z obcowania z pięknem. Z dużą dowolnością wybiera to, co sam uważa za najdoskonalsze z antyku, Biblii i w najnowszych prądach myślowych swego czasu: m.in. racjonalizmu. Połączenie tych trzech elementow nie jest łatwe. W jego rozważaniach ujawnia się wysiłek moralisty starającego się (...) nadać swej koncepcji kształt logicznie uporządkowanej doktryny, z elementow swobodnie wybranych, nie zawsze ze sobą zgodnych. (shrink)

Joel M. Cohen , pp. 475- 484) claims that Lambek’s categorial grammars are equivalent in a certain natural sense to those of Bar-Hillel, Gaifman, and Shamir. Unfortunately, it turns out that Cohen’s proof is based on a false lemma. Thus the equivalence of both kinds of grammars is still an open problem although there is much evidence in its favor. This paper yields a counterexample to Cohen’s lemma.

This study investigated the relationships between selected emotional aspects of mental ill-health and mental well-health experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. The theoretical model of the study was based on Martin Seligman’s positive psychology and PERMA theory and Paul Wong’s Existential Positive Psychology 2.0 Theory, which postulates that negative experiences contribute to well-being and personal growth. The static approach was complemented by exploring the mediating role of psychological flexibility in the relationship between negative emotions and well-being. The data were collected during (...) the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic from 277 participants, aged M = 33.83, SD = 12.77. The results confirmed that negative emotions correlated negatively with various domains of well-being, except for accomplishment. Moreover, negative emotions were related to the general well-being through psychological flexibility in that higher depression, anxiety, and stress were associated with lower psychological flexibility, which decreased general well-being. Finally, negative emotions were shown to be beneficial, having an adaptive effect that allows individuals to maintain their ability to cope with the situation, reach goals, and fulfill daily duties and responsibilities despite critical, stressful situation that limit their psychological flexibility. This observation confirmed the positive potential of negative aspects of life postulated within Existential Positive Psychology. (shrink)

Here eight outstanding scholars from the U.S. and Europe reflect upon the issues. They are Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Ralph McInerny, Robert Spamann, Servais Pinckaers, Wojciech Giertych, Ignacio Carrasco de Paula, Carlo Cafarra, and John M. Haas. Anyone interested in the advancement of human, moral, and spiritual values will welcome this clarifying book.

The translation of the Bible into Turkish as a whole was made in Istanbul in 1665-1666 by Wojciech Bobowski (Ali Ufki Bey), who was of Polish origin, spoke 17 different languages, later became a Muslim, served in the Ottoman palace for many years. Among the languages he could speak were mainly Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Polish, English, French, Italian, Arabic, Turkish. He is also known as Albert Bobowski and Albertus Bobovius in European sources. The translation was planned by a group (...) of Dutch Protestants, while Dutch ambassador Levinus Warner followed the work in Istanbul. The translation texts were checked and sent immediately to the Netherlands for printing, but could be printed in Paris in 1827 due to the adverse condition. In this edition, M. Jean Daniel Kieffer has revised some on Ali Ufki Bey's translation. This translation, with some changes and corrections in the Arabic alphabet (Ottoman) in 1878, 1885, 1886, 1901was printed in Latin alphabet in 1941.The style and language properties of the 1941 edition made it difficult to understand the Bible, so it was reprinted in 2001 with the more contemporary words under the name Kutsal Kitap (Yeni Çeviri).The background of the Turkish translations of the Bible, the contributions of the Bible Society (English and Foreign Bible Society) to these studies, the change of the words used in the translations, the translation of Wojciech Bobowski used as the source text and the follow-up of this translation process are important. Because the original text of the translations of the Bible in Turkish is based on the translation of Wojciech Bobowski. (shrink)

Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski have recently developed an argument against semiotic objections to markets. They argue that all such semiotic arguments are unsound because they fail to recognize that the meaning of market transactions is a contingent socially-constructed fact. They attribute this type of argument to Debra Satz. This paper argues both that Brennan and Jaworski are mistaken to attribute this particular semiotic objection to Satz and that they are mistaken to attribute to her a semiotic (...) objection of this type. It then argues that Brennan and Jaworski have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Satz’s project. It concludes by defending Satz against Brennan and Jaworski’s charge that one of her criticisms of markets is based on an equivocation. (shrink)

In a recent series or books and articles Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski (writing both together and separately) have developed criticisms of what they term “semiotic” arguments. They hold that these arguments are widely used both to criticize markets in certain goods, to defend democracy, and criticize epistocracy. Their work on semiotics is now widely (and approvingly) cited. In this paper I argue that there is no reason to believe that any defenders of democracy or critics of epistocracy (...) have offered semiotic arguments for their positions. I then explain how the operation of academic incentives has led to this being overlooked by both Brennan and Jaworski and their critics. I conclude with suggestions for how to revise peer review so that such errors are less likely to be made in the future. (shrink)

Christopher Freiman, Jason Brennan, and Peter M. Jaworski have recently defended markets in votes. While their views differ in several respects they all believe that the primary justificatory burden lies not with those who defend markets in votes but with those who oppose them. Yet while the burden of proof should typically rest with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods this does not hold for the debate over markets in votes. Votes are crucially different from other (...) goods in that for a market in them to exist, it is not enough that it be legalized; it must also be provided with institutional support so that the buyer of a vote would know that it has been cast as she wished. Defenders of markets in votes must thus provide positive arguments for the view that markets in votes should be institutionally facilitated—they cannot simply try to shift the burden of proof onto those who oppose them. This is bad news for those who defend the legalization of vote-buying, for none of the positive arguments that Freiman has offered in favor of the legalization of this type of vote-buying are sound. (shrink)

Recenzja książek: M. Heller, Wierzę, żeby rozumieć: w osobistej rozmowie o życiowych wyborach; rozmawiają Wojciech Bonowicz, Bartosz Brożek, Zbigniew Liana, Znak, Kraków 2016 oraz Heller M. Brotti G., Bóg i nauka: moje dwie drogi do jednego celu; Michał Heller w rozmowie z Giulio Brottim, tłum. Ewa Nicewicz-Staszowska, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013.

Each thing is fundamental. Not only is no thing any more or less real than any other, but no thing is prior to another in any robust ontological sense. Thus, no thing can explain the very existence of another, nor account for how another is what it is. I reach this surprising conclusion by undermining two important positions in contemporary metaphysics: hylomorphism and hierarchical views employing so-called building relations, such as grounding. The paper has three main parts. First, I observe (...) hylomorphism is alleged by its proponents to solve various philosophical problems. However, I demonstrate, in light of a compelling account of explanation, that these problems are actually demands to explain what cannot be but inexplicable. Second, I show how my argument against hylomorphism illuminates an account of the essence of a thing, thereby providing insight into what it is to exist. This indicates what a thing, in the most general sense, must be and a correlative account of the structure in reality. Third, I argue that this account of structure is incompatible not only with hylomorphism, but also with any hierarchical view of reality. Although hylomorphism and the latter views are quite different, representing distinct philosophical traditions, I maintain they share untenable accounts of structure and fundamentality and so should be rejected on the same grounds. (shrink)

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...) Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported... (shrink)

The general concept of mental disorder specified in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is definitional in character: a mental disorder might be identified with a harmful dysfunction. The manual also contains the explicit claim that each individual mental disorder should meet the requirements posed by the definition. The aim of this article is two-fold. First, we shall analyze the definition of the superordinate concept of mental disorder to better understand what necessary criteria actually (...) characterize such a concept. Second, we shall consider the concepts of some individual mental disorders and show that they are in tension with the definition of the superordinate concept, taking pyromania and narcissistic personality disorder as case studies. Our main point is that an unexplained and not-operationalized dysfunction requirement that is included in the general definition, while being systematically violated by the diagnostic criteria of specific mental disorders, is a logical error. Then, either we unpack and operationalize the dysfunction requirement, and include explicit diagnostic criteria that can actually meet it, or we simply drop it. (shrink)

W artykule rekonstruuję podstawowe zręby tzw. przeżywaniowej koncepcji świadomości, której współtwórcami byli m.in. Roman Ingarden, Antoni B. Stępień, Karol Wojtyła i Wojciech Chudy. Niektóre istotne elementy tej koncepcji zawierają się również w poglądach Arystotelesa, Tomasza z Akwinu, Kartezjusza, Kanta, Brentano, Husserla i Bergsona. Według koncepcji przeżywaniowej, zwanej także refleksywną, główną cechą świadomości jest jej zdolność do samoujawniania się sobie - zdolność do samoprzenikania, samoprzezroczystości lub - jak powie G. Ryle - fosforoscencji. Dzięki niej przeżycia świadome kierują się nie tylko (...) w stronę przedmiotów wobec nich transcendentnych, aleteż w stronę samych siebie. W związku z tym, w ślad za Husserlem, można mówić o „drugiej intencjonalności” strumienia świadomości oraz o wielu różnych odmianach samoświadomości. Spośród różnych odmian samoświadomości specjalnego znaczenia nabierają jednak te, które mają charakter zdecydowanie nieprzedmiotowy, nietematyczny, nieaktowy i nierefleksyjny, jak np. Husserlowska świadomość retencjonalno-protencjonalna, Ingardenowskie przeżywanie czy, wcześniej, refleksja in actu exercito u św. Tomasza i scholastyków, ego cogito u Descartesa, apercepcja transcendentalna u Kanta, intellektuelle Anschauung u Fichtego, inneres Bewusstsein u Brentana i intuicja u Bergsona. Wydaje się, że zdolność świadomości do samoprzenikania i samoujawniania się sobie stanowi jedną z najbardziej kluczowych jej cech, a jednocześnie jej cechę najbardziej specyficzną i dystynktywną. (shrink)

Frontiers in Belief Revision is a unique collection of leading edge research in Belief Revision. It contains the latest innovative ideas of highly respected and pioneering experts in the area, including Isaac Levi, Krister Segerberg, Sven Ove Hansson, Didier Dubois, and Henri Prade. The book addresses foundational issues of inductive reasoning and minimal change, generalizations of the standard belief revision theories, strategies for iterated revisions, probabilistic beliefs, multiagent environments and a variety of data structures and mechanisms for implementations. This book (...) is suitable for students and researchers interested in knowledge representation and in the state of the art of the theory and practice of belief revision. (shrink)