L’articolo studia la funzione del riferimento all’ordine nelle due definizioni della legge eterna proposte da Agostino rispettivamente nel libro I del _ De libero arbitrio _ e nel libro XXII del _ Contra Faustum Manichaeum _. La prima definizione pone come giusto il massimo grado di ordine in ogni cosa, mentre la seconda pone come obbligatoria la conservazione dell’ordine naturale e come vietata la sua perturbazione. Pur non essendo identiche, le due definizioni sono coerenti e concordano nell’attribuire alla nozione (...) di ordine un ruolo regolativo in ambito giuridico e morale, che non cristallizza le norme particolari esistenti ma, al contrario, spinge ad adattarle alla variabilità delle situazioni effettive. _ The article examines the function of the reference to order in the two definitions of the eternal law proposed by Augustine in Book I of _ De libero arbitrio _ and Book XXII of _ Contra Faustum Manichaeum _. The first definition posits the highest degree of order in everything as just, while the second posits the preservation of the natural order as obligatory and its disruption as forbidden. Although not identical, the two definitions are consistent and agree in attributing to the concept of order a regulatory role in the legal and moral spheres, which does not crystallise the existing, particular norms but, on the contrary, urges their adaptation to the variability of actual situations. _. (shrink)

In everyday reasoning - just as in science and art - knowledge is acquired more by "doing" than with long analyses. What do we "do" when we discover something new? How can we define and explore the pattern of this reasoning, traditionally called "synthetic"? Following in the steps of classic pragmatists, especially C.S. Pierce, Giovanni Maddalena's Philosophy of Gesture revolutionizes the pattern of synthesis through the ideas of change and continuity and proposes "gesture" as a new tool for synthesis. (...) Defining gesture as an action with a beginning and an end that carries on a meaning, Maddalena explains that it is a dense blending of all kinds of phenomena - feelings and vague ideas, actual actions, habits of actions - and of signs - icons, indexes, and symbols. When the blending of phenomena and signs is densest, the gesture is "complete," and its power of introducing something new in knowledge is at its highest level. Examples of complete gestures are religious liturgies, public and private rites, public and private actions that establish an identity, artistic performances, and hypothesizing experiments. A departure from a traditional Kantian framework for understanding the nature and function of reason, The Philosophy of Gesture proposes an approach that is more attuned with our ordinary way of reasoning and of apprehending new knowledge. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Molecular Medicine: Foundational Issues in Theory and Practice_ aims at a systematic investigation of a number of foundational issues in the field of molecular medicine. The volume is organized around four broad modules focusing, respectively, on the following key aspects: What are the nature, scope, and limits of molecular medicine? How does it provide explanations? How does it represent and model phenomena of interest? How does it infer new knowledge from data and experiments? The essays collected here, authored (...) by prominent scientists and philosophers of science, focus on a handful of mainstream topics in the philosophical literature, such as _causation_, _explanation_, _modeling_, and _scientific inference_. These previously unpublished contributions shed new light on these traditional topics by integrating them with problems, methods, and results from three prominent areas of contemporary biomedical science: _basic research_, _translational_ and _clinical research_, and _clinical practice_. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...) that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a ‘vague object’: it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn’t make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things (...) as “It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro”. After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation—multiple reference—capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects. (shrink)

In our paper, we propose a relativisticand metaphysically neutral identity criterionfor biological entities. We start from thecriterion of genidentity proposed by K. Lewinand H. Reichenbach. Then we enrich it to renderit more philosophical powerful and so capableof dealing with the real transformations thatoccur in the extremely variegated biologicalworld.

I. Introduction Can phenomenology and pragmatism, two early twentieth century theories, be alive today and furnish a valid possibility in our philosophical landscape? Moreover, can they work together? The operation does not seem impossible since Peirce himself held a phenomenology, which is an indispensable part of his never-finished system; James’s psychology is often a phenomenology, and Husserl recognized James as an interesting author because of his phenomenological insights. However, the...

Martin-Löf Type Theory is both an important and practical formalization and a focus for a charismatic view of the foundations of mathematics. Per Martin-Löf's work has been of huge significance in the fields of logic and the foundations of mathematics, and has important applications in areas such as computing science and linguistics. This volume celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the subject, and is an invaluable record both of areas of currentactivity and of the early development of the (...) subject. Also published for the first time is one of Per Martin-Löf's earliest papers. (shrink)

Esse artigo visa demonstrar como o psicanalista francês Jacques Lacan delineou e reformulou o conceito freudiano de pulsão de morte no interior dos três registros da experiência humana. Dito isso, iremos inicialmente compreender de forma geral como o conceito de pulsão de morte aparece na obra lacaniana, de maneira a demonstrarmos como ela é reformulada pelo autor francês. Depois, iremos delinear como esse conceito aparece no interior dos registros do Imaginário, Simbólico e Real; desse modo, estaremos envoltos com o Estágio (...) do Espelho desenvolvido por Lacan no decorrer dos anos 1930 e 1940, a teoria do significante fundada por nosso autor mais atentamente nos anos 1950 e por último o registro do Real, o qual foi introduzido com mais atenção a partir dos anos 1960 em diante. (shrink)

The author investigates the origin and development of the concept of liberty and its special meaning in the Republican tradition of political thought. The origin of the Western concept of liberty lies in ancient Greece, in the opposition between liberty and slavery conceived after the liberation of Athens from tyranny and the victory over the Persian empire. The author then investigates the Republican notion of liberty that originates in ancient Rome and reaches its peak with Cicero. This conception of liberty (...) emphasizes self-government and partecipation in common deliberation and runs through Western political thought up to Rousseau, Tocqueville and the authors of the Federalist Papers. (shrink)

This article investigates the nature of entangled correlations in algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT). We define a notion of local disentanglement, expressing the possibility of destroying entanglement by means of local operations. Contrary to the case of ordinary quantum mechanics, local disentanglement cannot be achieved in general in relativistic quantum field theory. However, we show that if the split property holds, there exists a local operation that can destroy entanglement between spacelike-separated quantum field systems.

We discuss the meaning of “being alive” and “being dead.” Our primary aim is to pave the way for a sound and accurate ethical debate concerning these two concepts. In particular, we analyze a metabolic approach and a genetic one and discuss the reasons for their failure to constitute a good starting point for successive debates. We argue that any ethical or social discussion of topics involving life and death must introduce cultural constructs such as, on the one hand, the (...) concept of clinical death and, on the other hand, the concept of existence. We argue that these two cultural constructs, although consistent with biomedical knowledge, cannot be ontologically grounded in it. To conclude, we apply our findings to the case of human embryos. (shrink)

“ >. Das hiess doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst,sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben.”.

The centrally-planned Soviet command economy was one of the twentieth century’s most radical and complex economic, political and social experiments. Its establishment did not coincide with the onset of Soviet power across the former Russian Empire in 1917-1918, but instead resulted from fifteen years of shifts, readjustments and breaks, and through experiments with both quasi-socialist market economics and centralised administrative command practices. The present article surveys the conflictual relationship between Soviet planning and Marxism in this period. It demonstrates how the (...) Stalinist command economy contradicted much of the theory and practice that the Bolsheviks themselves had thought ought to characterise the new economic system. (shrink)