Background: Organ donation and transplantation have made it possible to both save life and to improve the quality of life for a large number of patients. In the last years there has been an increasing gap between the number of patients who need organs and organs available for transplantation, and the focus worldwide has been on how to meet the organ shortage. This also rises some ethical challenges. Objective: The objective of this study was to explore healthcare professionals' experience of (...) ethics related to care and interaction with critically ill patients with severe brain injuries and their families. Research design: A hermeneutic phenomenological approach was used to explore the participants' experiences. Methods for collecting data were a combination of participant observations and in-depth interviews. Participants and research context: Two ICUs in a Norwegian university hospital were recruited for data collection. A total of 12 cases were observed, and 32 of the healthcare professionals involved were interviewed. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Regional Committee for Research Ethics. Permission to the study in the ICUs was obtained from the Chief Physician in the two ICUs respectively. The right of the participants was ensured by written, voluntary, and informed consent. Findings: From the thematic analysis, a structure of the participants' experiences emerged as a process. While the patients' condition was clarified through phases of prognostic ambiguity, gradual clarification and prognostic certainty, interaction with the families was characterized by ambiguity that involved withholding. The prognostic process had a great impact on how the healthcare professionals interacted with the family. The interaction challenged the participants' caring values in various ways and captured an important structure in their experiences of the ethical interaction with the patients' families. These challenges distinguish caring for families in donation situations from caring for relatives of critically ill patients in general. Discussion: In the discussion we have illuminated how professional ethics may be threatened by more pragmatic and utilitarian arguments contained in regulations and transplant act. Conclusion: Ethical questions should be discussed more both in educations of healthcare professionals and in clinical practice. (shrink)

The effect of uniform lighting on face identity processing is little understood, despite its potential influence on our ability to recognize faces. Here, we investigated how changes in uniform lighting level affected face identification performance during face memory tests. Observers were tasked with learning a series of faces, followed by a memory test where observers judged whether the faces presented were studied before or novel. Face stimuli were presented under uniform bright or dim illuminations, and lighting across the face learning (...) and the memory test sessions could be the same or different. This led to four experimental conditions: Bright/Dim ; Bright/Bright; Dim/Bright; and Dim/Dim. Our results revealed that incongruent lighting levels across sessions significantly reduced sensitivity to faces and introduced conservative biases compared to congruent lighting levels. No significant differences in performance were detected between the congruent lighting conditions and between the incongruent lighting conditions. Thus, incongruent lighting deteriorated performance in face identification. These findings implied that the level of uniform lighting should be considered in an illumination-specific face representation and potential applications such as eyewitness testimony. (shrink)

reto de un jurista que urge a la razón individual de cada lector para que éste verifique por sí mismo la falacia de las modas ideológicas en las que puede hallarse eventual e inconscientemente inmerso. El autor ha pretendido hacer un libro «sensato», es decir, de sentido común o «buen juicio», que es una manera de sabiduría llana y común; todo lo contrario de la sensacional originalidad que suele estragar al público de nuestros días. Aunque quizás ocurra hoy que lo (...) sensato resulte ser excepcional y nuevo, es lo más conforme al auténtico estilo de un jurista, que, por su profesión, nunca busca destacar por su singularidad, sino por la conveniente edificación crítica del derecho fundado sobre una tradición respetable. Como hay un arte de ser sencillo, hay también un arte de ser sensato, y a esa «sagesse» aspira precisamente el autor. I. Naturaleza. II. Verdad. III. Patrimonio. IV. Potestad. V. Persona. VI. Matrimonio. VII. Servicio. Índice tópico. Referencias bibliográficas complementarias. (shrink)

E. Gellner, influenciado por las reflexiones de C.P. Snow sobre las dos culturas, puso en relación la crisis del humanismo, provocada en su opinión por las profundas transformaciones que impuso la sociedad industrial, con las teorías del conocimiento clásicas y el posterior giro lingüístico de la filosofía y la consiguiente crisis de la misma que a su entender tal giro comportaba. Nuestro propósito es reflexionar sobre el estatuto que habría que conceder a la filosofía de compartir el diagnóstico gellneriano.

The present study examines the representation of Arabic and Hebrew in Covarrubias’s Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española from a comparative perspective. Analyzing the lexicographer’s ideological and meta-linguistic discourse, I reconstruct his postulates regarding the respective histories of Arabic and Hebrew, their interrelationship, and place in the history of Spanish. In light of these postulates, and taking into account the lexicographer’s access to knowledge, sources, and informants, I examine some of his etymological practices, focusing on his attempts to use (...) grammatical and lexical knowledge of Hebrew to illuminate Arabic etymologies of Spanish words. Combining the ideological and technical levels of the text, I reflect on the interplay of knowledge and ignorance in Covarrubias’s treatment of Semitic languages. (shrink)

A partir de la constatación de la inflación lingüística del vocablo "experiencia" y de la imposibilidad-necesidad de una experiencia extrasensigle, estas páginas se aproximan a la realidad de la experiencia desde el tipo de conocimiento que procura -la intuición- y desde la metamorfosis del ego que suscita -construcción de una biografía-. Se muestra, de igual modo, cómo libertad y destino coinciden en la experiencia de sí mismo, y cómo las nupcias entre experiencia y lenguaje son indisolubles. Por último, teniendo en (...) cuenta lo que ha supuesto la introducción de la categoría "experiencia" en las ciencias teológicas, se apuntan los pilares de la experiencia cristiana y la experiencia de la gracia, haciendo ver cómo las actitudes del distanciamiento y de la inmersión son imprescindibles para poder hablar, en rigor, de una experiencia espiritual. (shrink)

Menéndez y Pelayo. -- Juan Maragall. -- Juan Luis Vives. -- San Juan de la Cruz. -- Ricardo León.

This study explores the perceptions of Norwegian nurses who have received assisted dying requests from terminally ill patients. Assisted dying is illegal in Norway, while in some countries, it is an option. Nurses caring for terminally ill patients may experience ethical challenges by receiving requests for euthanasia and assisted suicide. We applied a qualitative research design with a phenomenological hermeneutic approach using open individual interviews. A total of 15 registered nurses employed in pulmonary and oncology wards of three university hospitals (...) and home care in one municipality were recruited. Four themes emerged from the analysis: (1) unprepared for the request; (2) meeting direct, indirect, and nonverbal requests; (3) working in a gray zone, and (4) feeling alone and powerless. The study found that nurses were unsure how to handle such requests due to professional uncertainty about assisted dying. Working in an environment where the topic is taboo made nurses morally uncertain, and some perceived this as moral distress. The hospital chaplain played a significant role in providing support to these nurses. (shrink)

This paper analyses Cartesian ethics and politics. It defends that Descartes's position in these areas coincides with his metaphysical and physical conceptions, searching a difficult equilibrium between individualism and altruism, quiet life and social commitment.

La crisis del historicismo.--Es idealista Ortega y Gasset?--Sistemática contra problemática.

La présente étude entend tracer et analyser le déploiement de « la Vérité de l’Etre » afin de montrer en quoi celui-ci est indissociable, pour Heidegger, de ce qu’il appelle, dans un passage tardif des Cahiers Noirs, l’« auto-annihilation ( Selbstvernichtung ) » du judaïsme. Nous montrerons en quoi et pourquoi, chez Heidegger, l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre », en se déployant elle-même, produit aussi un antijudaïsme, indissociable d’un antisémitisme, sans précédent dans l’histoire de la philosophie (...) occidentale. En effet, le judaïsme, pour Heidegger, se voit brutalement exproprié de toute possibilité d’être, et, par conséquent, demeure résolument forclos de l’« Histoire » gréco-allemande de la « Vérité de l’Etre » pour ne séjourner que dans l’« inessentielle » machination et exploitation « indéterminée » du monde. Il nous appartiendra de souligner, depuis le « dispositif » heideggérien de la « Vérité de l’Etre » – un dispositif, contrairement à ce qu’en dit Heidegger, dès plus technique – en quoi le judaïsme se voit condamné à son « auto-annihilation ». C’est ainsi que l’antijudaïsme de Heidegger, inséparable d’un antisémitisme catégorique, est à comprendre depuis sa pensée philosophique elle-même. Ce qui exige de nous une relecture dès plus vigilante, dès plus intransigeante et un questionnement critique circonstancié de cette œuvre et du rapport qu’elle détermine entre l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre » et l’« auto-annihilation » du judaïsme. Ainsi, à aucun moment ne s’agira-t-il, pour nous, de rejeter purement et simplement la pensée philosophique de Heidegger. Car, c’est aussi par une relecture critique de cette même pensée, par une confrontation incessante envers ce qui s’y cache dans ses plis les plus obscurs et douteux, que peuvent aussi se révéler d’inédites possibilités de repenser notre tradition philosophique tout entière en l’ouvrant vers une tout autre histoire de la philosophie – tout autre que celle qui se sera consacrée et déterminée dans et par le « dispositif » heideggérien. (shrink)

The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...) is separation. I first contend that separation is such a radical procedure as to render the post-separation person different from the pre-separation one. Therefore, it is not possible to benefit the pre-separation twin by the act of separation. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of the tendency in bioethics to regard ethical challenges as rivalry between individuals competing for scarce resources. (shrink)

Like many of his contemporaries, Hegel considered Spinoza a modern reviver of ancient Eleatic monism, in whose system “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void”. This characterization of Spinoza as denying the reality of the world of finite things had a lasting influence on the perception of Spinoza in the two centuries that followed. In this article, I take these claims of Hegel to task and evaluate their validity. Although Hegel’s official argument for the unreality of (...) modes in Spinoza’s system will turn out to be unsound, I do believe there is one crucial line in Spinoza’s system – Spinoza’s rather weak and functional conception of individuality – which provides some support for Hegel’s reading of Spinoza. (shrink)

We claim that, as it stands, the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett approach to quantum theory is conceptually incoherent. This charge is based upon the approach’s reliance upon decoherence arguments that conflict with its own fundamental precepts regarding probabilistic reasoning in two respects. This conceptual conflict obtains even if the decoherence arguments deployed are aimed merely towards the establishment of certain ‘emergent’ or ‘robust’ structures within the wave function: To be relevant to physical science notions such as robustness must be empirically grounded, and, on (...) our analysis, this grounding can only plausibly be done in precisely the probabilistic terms that lead to conceptual conflict. Thus, the incoherence problems presented necessitate either the provision of a new, non-probabilistic empirical grounding for the notions of robustness and emergence in the context of decoherence, or the abandonment of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett programme for quantum theory. (shrink)

I found the JCS issue on Machine Consciousness, Volume 10, No. 4-5 , frustrating and alienating. There seems to be a consensus building that consciousness is accessible to scientific scrutiny, so much so that it is already understood well enough to be modeled and even synthesized. I'm not so sure. It could be instead that the vocabulary of consciousness is being subtly redefined to be amenable to scientific investigation and explicit modeling. Such semantic revisionism is confusing and often misleading. Whatever (...) else consciousness is, it is at least a certain quality of life apparent from personal reflection. Introspection is, after all, the only way we know that consciousness even exists. Scientific and technical redefinitions that fail to account for its phenomenal quality are at best incomplete. In my view, all but one of the ten articles in the JCS volume on Machine Consciousness commit various degrees of Protean distortion. (shrink)

Maintaining plural values is important when there is no conclusive principle by which the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. Value-articulating institutions predicated upon such principles have a low pluralistic potential. In response to the failures of stated-preference approaches to economic valuation, new perspectives have been developed to capture plural values. Three broad approaches are identified. The first, functional diversifi-cation, seeks to encompass the multiple qualities of the object of valuation, whereas positional modification enforces a particular mode of (...) thinking on the subject. Both entail a prior judgement of values and benefit from a reduction in the range of values. Eventually, therefore, both approaches collapse pluralism to a problem that can be tackled. The third approach, structural reconstruction, has greater pluralistic potential, recognising that the more diverse and uncertain the object of valuation, the more compelling it is. (shrink)

Here presented are three singular, philosophical perspectives on the Delhi student protests which took place in 2019 and 2020, before the coronavirus pandemic. The writers hail from India, England...

Judges and juries often make factual decisions even if the facts are disputed and there is no clear-cut evidence available. Despite this common state of uncertainty, verdicts are thought of as having clear winners and losers––either the plaintiff wins and receives a full remedy, or the defendant wins and the plaintiff gets nothing. In private disputes, factfinders base their binary factual determinations on the preponderance of the evidence. There are, however, several doctrines that allow for partial remedy, discounted by the (...) probability that the facts support the plaintiff’s case, given the available evidence (proportional liability). This Article offers a general theory for proportional liability in private law. It identifies three types of factual uncertainty—mutual uncertainty, unilateral uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty—and shows that legal economists should support proportional liability when the state of uncertainty is shared by the parties and the court (mutual uncertainty), and they should adopt an all-or-nothing rule whenever the information is observable but unverifiable (institutional uncertainty). In cases where one party holds private information (unilateral uncertainty), proportional liability is sometimes, but not always, superior to an all-or-nothing rule. (shrink)

The dinoflagellates, a diverse sister group of the malaria parasites, are the major agents causing harmful algal blooms and are also the symbiotic algae of corals. Dinoflagellate nuclei differ significantly from other eukaryotic nuclei by having extranuclear spindles, no nucleosomes and enormous genomes in liquid crystal states. These cytological characteristics were related to the acquisition of prokaryotic genes during evolution (hence Mesokaryotes), which may also account for the biochemical diversity and the relatively slow growth rates of dinoflagellates. The fact that (...) the proliferation of many dinoflagellates is sensitive to turbulence may be due to the physiological requirements of the genome's liquid crystal states. Mechanical stress and anti‐microtubule drugs induce cell cycle arrest mainly in G1, implicating a role for the permanent cortical microtubular cytoskeleton in mechanotransduction. The cell cycles of photosynthetic dinoflagellates are also gated by the circadian rhythm, with cell division occurring mainly at the end of the dark phase. Cell growth and the biosynthesis of many toxins occur during the light phase, corresponding to G1 in the cell cycle. The dinoflagellates also embody several options for coupling cell cycle progression to cell growth, enabling them to make the best use of available resources and possibly preparing them for a symbiotic existence. BioEssays 27:730–740, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on a major aspect of the later Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking – his discussion of the idea of thinking as a process or an activity. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remarks, apart from some concerning the methodology and conception of philosophy, are grammatical remarks, meaning that they describe the use of the word “thinking” and can be agreed to by every competent speaker. I thus show that Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking is a grammatical one, and (...) hence that there is no inconsistency between his conception of philosophy and his philosophical practice. In the process of doing so, I shall also review previous studies on this topic and point out their deficiencies. (shrink)

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. & Dehaene, S. . Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15, 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. . Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, (...) 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. & Eastwood, J.D. . Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception. (shrink)

“Why did God create the World?” is one of the traditional questions of theology. In the twentieth century this question was rephrased in a secularized manner as “Why is there something rather than nothing?” While creation - at least in its traditional, temporal, sense - has little place in Spinoza’s system, a variant of the same questions puts Spinoza’s system under significant pressure. According to Spinoza, God, or the substance, has infinitely many modes. This infinity of modes follow from the (...) essence of God. If we ask: “Why must God have modes?,” we seem to be trapped in a real catch. On the one hand, Spinoza’s commitment to thoroughgoing rationalism demands that there must be a reason for the existence of the radical plurality of modes. On the other hand, the asymmetric dependence of modes on the substance seems to imply that the substance does not need the modes, and that it can exist without the modes. But if the substance does not need the modes, then why are there modes at all? Furthermore, Spinoza cannot explain the existence of modes as an arbitrary act of grace on God’s side since Spinoza’s God does not act arbitrarily. Surprisingly, this problem has hardly been addressed in the existing literature on Spinoza’s metaphysics, and it is my primary aim here to draw attention to this problem. In the first part of the paper I will present and explain the problem of justifying the existence of infinite plurality modes in Spinoza’s system. In the second part of the paper I consider the radical solution to the problem according to which modes do not really exist, and show that this solution must be rejected upon consideration. In the third and final part of the paper I will suggest my own solution according to which the essence of God is active and it is this feature of God’s essence which requires the flow of modes from God’s essence. I also suggest that Spinoza considered radical infinity and radical unity to be roughly the same, and that the absolute infinity of what follow from God’s essence is grounded in the absolute infinity of God’s essence itself. (shrink)

IntroductionHigh healthcare costs make illness precarious for both patients and their families’ economic situation. Despite the recent focus on the interconnection between health and financial risk at the systemic level, the ethical conflict between concerns for potential health benefits and financial risk protection at the household level in a low-income setting is less understood.MethodsUsing a seven-step ethical analysis, we examine a real-life dilemma faced by families and health workers at the micro level in Ethiopia and analyse the acceptability of limiting (...) treatment for an ill newborn to protect against financial risk. We assess available evidence and ethical issues at stake and discuss the dilemma with respect to three priority setting criteria: health maximisation, priority to the worse-off and financial risk protection.ResultsGiving priority to health maximisation and extra priority to the worse-off suggests, in this particular case, that limiting treatment is not acceptable even if the total well-being gain from reduced financial risk is taken into account. Our conclusion depends on the facts of the case and the relative weight assigned to these criteria. However, there are problematic aspects with the premise of this dilemma. The most affected parties—the newborn, family members and health worker—cannot make free choices about whether to limit treatment or not, and we thereby accept deprivations of people’s substantive freedoms.ConclusionIn settings where healthcare is financed largely out-of-pocket, families and health workers face tragic trade-offs. As countries move towards universal health coverage, financial risk protection for high-priority services is necessary to promote fairness, improve health and reduce poverty. (shrink)

In a beautiful recent essay, the philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains the reasons for his departure from evangelical Christianity, the religious culture in which he was brought up. Sinnot-Armstrong contrasts the interpretive methods used by good philosophers and fundamentalist believers: Good philosophers face objections and uncertainties. They follow where arguments lead, even when their conclusions are surprising and disturbing. Intellectual honesty is also required of scholars who interpret philosophical texts. If I had distorted Kant’s view to make him reach a conclusion (...) that I preferred, then my philosophy professor would have failed me. The contrast with religious reasoning is stark. My Christian friends seemed happy to hide serious problems in the Bible and in their arguments. They preferred comfort to intellectual honesty. I couldn’t. To what extent can we, historians of philosophy, claim the virtue of intellectual honesty? Speaking frankly, I do not find the practice criticized by Sinnot-Armstrong’s philosophy professor rare or unusual at all. We very frequently distort the views of past philosophers in order to reach the conclusions we prefer. We just call it “Charitable Interpretation.” In this essay, I discuss and criticize the logic behind so-called charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy. This phenomenon is ubiquitous and is not at all restricted to a particular philosophical strand or ideology. Analytic philosophers and post-modernists, Marxists, liberals, secularists, and fundamentalists, we all engage in the very same domestication project. Even more disturbing than the sheer ideological pervasiveness of this phenomenon is the fact that, on many occasions, superb philosophers and historians take part in this fairly childish endeavor. In the first part of this essay, I discuss the general logic of charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy, mostly by addressing discussions in metaphysics and epistemology. In the second part, I focus on the somewhat less noticed use of charitable interpretations in the study of political philosophy, and point out the quintessential role ideology plays in these discussions. In both parts, I concentrate mostly on the interpretation of Spinoza’s thought. I do so not because I have special fondness for Spinoza (“guilty as charged,” I admit), but because Spinoza is such a beast (and may I add, an enchanting beast) and attracts a disproportionate share of the domestication efforts from historians and philosophers of all creeds and persuasions. In the third and final part of the paper, I will begin to outline an alternative methodology, which suggests that past philosophers can be most relevant to our current philosophical discussion, to the extent that they provide us with well-motivated challenges to our common-sense beliefs. Such challenges have the invaluable virtue of being able to undermine our most fundamental and secure beliefs, and force us to engage with the most fundamental questions. What more can we expect from good philosophy? (shrink)

This compilation brings together 20 essays of Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852-1934), the neuroscientist par excellence and 1906 Nobel Laureate in Medicine, on topics beyond neuroanatomy, most appearing in English for the first time. The annotated collection makes available in one handy volume Cajal's ideas on psychology, art and education, still current and still relevant, derived from his books La Psicología de los Artistas, Charlas de Café, El Mundo Visto a los Ochenta Años, Pensamientos Pedagógicos and Escritos Inéditos. An acute (...) observer of the intellectual and social scene of the avant-garde, Cajal emerged in 20th-century Spain in a further role as a philosopher and educator. The contents bespeak Cajal's inquiry into the varieties of human experience and shed new light on the breadth of his genius, imagination and passion, helping us to rethink what we thought we already understood about Don Santiago's own mind. (shrink)

BY EXPLORING THE ONGOING CONTROVERSY WHETHER TEACHER-LED recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools is constitutional, this paper demonstrates how and why Christians have much to gain from reverting the pledge to its pre-1954 text. I expose critical weaknesses in recent strategies to retain the contested words "under God" in the pledge employed by litigants, amici curiae, several Supreme Court justices, and other interested parties. I additionally interrogate the prominent place the American flag holds in public life and (...) question whether such preoccupation rises to the level of fetishism or even idolatry. Finally, I conclude that pacifists and others who are critical of America's expanding military empire have good reason to reject the Pledge of Allegiance entirely, whether or not the nation is described as being "under God.". (shrink)