The fifth volume of Richard Rorty's "Philosophical papers" published by Cambridge University Press, consists of the works which American philosopher wrote at the very dawn of his career in 1960s and early 1970s. In these essays Rorty addresses issues of transcendental argumentation, the internalism/externalism controversy, mind-body dualism and psychophysical monism, semantic truth, reference and justification. Supplemented by Daniel Dennett's Foreword, the book gives an excellent idea of Rorty's «analytical» writings and his evolution from eliminative materialism to pragmatism.

The study of Kant’s anthropology, proposed by Viktor Kozlovskyi in its original and thorough monograph, is an entirely new interpretation of Kant’s answer to the fundamental question “What is man?”. On the basis of the philosopher’s heritage and taking into account the large body of research lit-erature, Kozlovskyi reconstructs five conceptual “human models” in Kant’s anthropological discourse. However, this study contains a number of problematic statements and conclusions. I argue first, that there is some inconsistency between Kant’s understanding of the (...) concept of “anthropology” and Ko-zlovskyi’s explanation. Second, the model of man as intelligible being, made explicit through the con-cepts of “freedom” and “spontaneity”, is a justified construction within the limits of criticism, but not quite correct with regard to the place and function of “anthropology” in it. Third, we can see a disso-nance between Kozlovskyi’s explanation of the constellations as “chronotopes-events” and interpreta-tion of this concept by Dieter Henrich’s school, where the methodology of “research constellations” was used to elucidate the early phase of German idealism. However, this leads to the cardinal question of how far this methodology is applicable for the analysis of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

One of the most powerful tendencies of the World scientific thought development of XIX – the first half of XX century was analysing all sorts of knowledge, accumulated by mankind in the form of universal synthetic system combining science, religion and philosophy into the Universal Sphere of Knowledge that gives the humanity the possibility to achieve a new deeper level of understanding the reality. By the founder of the Classical Russian Systematic School of Philosophy (according to me – A.Sh.) V.S. (...) Soloviev - for the first time in history - the Idea of the Universal Sphere of Knowledge which is depicted by the Greek term ΘεωΣοφιαwas descriptively defined. The followers of V.S. Soloviev’s school in the middle of XIX – the beginning of XX century worked out many aspects of the Concept of Ontological Synthesis of dispersed Spheres of knowledge, among which the Philosophy is an important and homogeneous part of synthesis of Science and Theology. This Spheres of Knowledge look different and it was aggravated in the course of historically developed separation of their methods, spheres ofexperience and types of thinking. Nevertheless to find the new ways to reach the new level of knowledge for the mankind they must be concentrated on the investigation of the Absolute Elements of the World : Truly-Existing [Λογος] (suprasystematic Element) in its real manifestation. The main (or the basic) method of knowledge is the inner experience of mystic origin. The findings of Russian Philosophers are confirmed by the studies of scientific methods which made it possible to achieve great staggering discoveries and inventions which will for a long time remain mysterious for the majority of human beings. (shrink)

The article continues the series of works devoted to the problem of methodological substantiation of the subject of philosophical anthropology, and thereby its substantiation as a strict science. The conversation is based on search materials carried out in the German classics of the ХХ century. The first article was devoted to the experience of E. Husserl. This article is devoted to the M. Scheler’s search. The author thus relies not so much on the published and very fragmentary works of M. (...) Scheler as on the drafts of the philosopher, his diaries, lying without the application for a long time. It turns out that M. Scheler did not so much build philosophical anthropology as a positive science, but rather understood it more as a methodological science, that is, as reflexive, in which a certain search method is built, precisely because a person acts not so much as an object or subject but as constantly open problem, the one that overcomes itself, its own measure. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, empirical researchers have become increasingly interested in explaining the formation of “basic” aesthetic judgments, i.e. simple judgments of sensory preferability and the pleasure that seems to accompany them. To that end, Reber et al. have recently defended a “processing-fluency” view, which identifies aesthetic pleasure with one’s ability to easily process an object’s perceptual properties (e.g. Reber 2012 ). While the processing-fluency theory is certainly an improvement over its competitors, it is currently vulnerable to several serious (...) criticisms. In what follows, I aim to provide a more holistic, explanatorily robust, model of the processing-fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure by incorporating what the view neglects: the crucial role of perceptual disfluency, interest, and the underlying values that drive aesthetic appraisal. (shrink)

While most scholars focus on the advantages of forgiveness, the negative effects of hasty forgiveness have been largely neglected in the literature. In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer could be morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong. Following Aristotle’s view of emotion, and, in particular, his notion of virtuous anger, I shall claim that appropriate, righteous anger is instrumental for justice, and, as a result, inappropriate, or imprudent forgiveness (...) could be an impediment to justice, or even a license for the continuation of injustice. (shrink)

Many later thinkers in the Islamic world pick up on, and further expand, the idea of intuition (ḥads) as they react to Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). Focusing on figures from the twelfth–thirteenth century, in this paper we will focus especially on the following points of debate: (1) Avicenna’s idea that intuition is distingiushed from normal (discursive) thought by lacking ‘motion’, (2) The question of how and why different individuals differ in the extent of their intuition, (3) The role of intuitive thought (...) in grounding knowledge: is intuition needed every time a certain item of knowledge is grasped for the first time, and hence without a teacher; and further, is intuition needed as an ultimate justification for all non-intuitive knowledge? (shrink)

By examining an exemplar sample of mental health nursing educational policies and related legislation, in this article, we trace the discursive production of madness as an “othered” identity category. We engage in a critical discourse analysis of mental health nursing education in Canada, drawing on provincial and federal policies and legislation as the main sources of data. Theoretically framed by critical posthumanism and mad studies, this article outlines how the mad subjectivity becomes decontextualized out of its identity‐based understanding and recontextualized (...) as an inferior category of “the human,” circulating within discourses of pedagogy, economics, law, and psychiatry. The article maps the intertextual nexus of the discourse of mental health nursing education, making visible the complex, the arbitrary, and the sometimes‐contradictory nature of the discipline's grappling with identity‐based mental health concepts. We close with several implications for nursing policy, education, and practice. (shrink)

Political theorists are increasingly drawn to the recovery of anticolonial thinkers as global figures. Frantz Fanon is largely excluded from these discussions because of his presumed commitment to the nation-state and its territorialist assumptions. This essay claims, by contrast, that Fanon’s writings reveal an alternative way of thinking about worldmaking, less as a question of political and economic institution-building spearheaded by leaders than as a multiscalar project that permeates the production of the built environment and the creation of selves. I (...) show how Fanon challenges the dichotomy between the global and the national by seeking to transform not just the national scale in relation to the international, but also the corporeal, urban, rural, and regional scales of an imperially configured world. In order to read Fanon as a scalar thinker and to highlight aspects of his thought that have been relatively neglected, I draw on concepts from geography, and specifically scalar analysis, which, I demonstrate, allows political theorists to develop a richer understanding of the operations of power in colonial contexts and how they can be restructured to inaugurate more liberated ways of being human. (shrink)

We present the true stages machinery and illustrate its applications to descriptive set theory. We use this machinery to provide new proofs of the Hausdorff–Kuratowski and Wadge theorems on the structure of $\mathbf {\Delta }^0_\xi $, Louveau and Saint Raymond’s separation theorem, and Louveau’s separation theorem.

Similar to ongoing discussions about the existence of Filipino philosophy, questions remain whether there is indeed a Filipino philosophy of education or not. Several scholars have sought an authentic Filipino philosophy of education that is untouched by colonization, while others have acknowledged that foreign influence cannot be taken away from the different aspects of being Filipino including their philosophy of education. Additionally, some scholars have criticized the coloniality that is evident in the nation-state’s perspectives on education, whereas others have recognized (...) the contributions of Western thoughts in shaping the discourse on Philippine education. The general education curriculum recently mandated by the Commission on Higher Education of the Philippines for undergraduate students, for instance, displays these opposing views. Its emphasis on progressive education and social reconstruction clearly shows the pervading influence of John Dewey on Philippine education. Such articulations on the purpose of Philippine higher education by the nation-state, on the one hand, can be construed as ‘un-Filipino.’ On the other hand, they can mean ‘Filipinization’ of the Philippine higher education, which involves appropriating Deweyan philosophy of education to suit the local context and to render the curriculum more responsive to the needs of the Filipino people amidst a rapidly globalizing world. Both viewpoints are relevant in offering a nuanced understanding of the Filipino philosophy of education. The former challenges us to reflect on what constitutes the Filipino identity, whereas the latter urges us to unravel the vestige of coloniality in the prescribed curriculum to bring out its ‘Filipino-ness.’. (shrink)

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...) areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is the Theory of Enactive Perception? Noë's Evidence for Enactive Perception The Case against Enactive Perception: Paralysis Conclusion.

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be soft on sin, that she (...) has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the real hard work it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well. (shrink)

Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have (...) reasons to act as if they can be rationally resolved even if they are deep. Fogelin's analysis is thus of limited value as regards the practical moral demand of addressing concrete moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Feminists continue to express concerns over the legalization of physician-assisted death. Some worry that women are more likely than men to request PAD due to societal stereotypes and the pressures put on women to be self-sacrificing. Others worry that women will have their requests ignored more often than men because women’s voices are traditionally silenced or disregarded in western culture. Rather than join in the above argument of speculating which way women may be marginalized, I accept PAD as potentially dangerous (...) and offer a solution in order to avoid the risks of injustice associated with PAD. I reframe the concerns as epistemological worries, and ultimately, I turn to Benjamin McMyler’s virtue epistemology as a way to avoid testimonial injustice in requests for life hastening medication, suggesting that the injustice comes from a narrow and individualistic perception of knowledge, and injustice can be avoided if we understand testimonial knowledge to be both cognitive and social. (shrink)

We elaborate on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which we introduced recently. The main hypothesis of this new interpretation is that quantum particles are entities interacting with matter conceptually, which means that pieces of matter function as interfaces for the conceptual content carried by the quantum particles. We explain how our interpretation was inspired by our earlier analysis of non-locality as non-spatiality and a specific interpretation of quantum potentiality, which we illustrate by means of the example of two interconnected (...) vessels of water. We show by means of this example that philosophical realism is not in contradiction with the recent findings with respect to Leggett’s inequalities and their violations. We explain our recent work on using the quantum formalism to model human concepts and their combinations and how this has given rise to the foundational ideas of our new quantum interpretation. We analyze the equivalence of meaning in the realm of human concepts and coherence in the realm of quantum particles, and how the duality of abstract and concrete leads naturally to a Heisenberg uncertainty relation. We illustrate the role played by interference and entanglement and show how the new interpretation explains the problems related to identity and individuality in quantum mechanics. We put forward a possible scenario for the emergence of the reality of macroscopic objects. (shrink)

Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception: -/- 1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it. -/- 2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain (...) experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing—per impossible—what it would take to properly capture one’s experience. -/- I demonstrate the usefulness of the two kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments. (shrink)

I want to thank all of those who have commented on my article in the Journal of Medical Ethics.1 The commentaries address a wide cross-section of the issues raised in my article. I have organised my responses thematically.The state of playAllen Buchanan's scepticism2 about moral statuses higher than personhood derives, in part, from our apparent inability to describe them. We seem to have little difficulty in imagining what it might be to have scientific understanding far beyond that of any human (...) scientist. By contrast, it is exceedingly difficult to describe moral statuses superior to that of any person. Boosting cognitive capacities seems to result in cognitively superior persons—not post-persons . I offer an explanation of our moral myopia.2 We are necessarily clueless in respect of moral statuses superior to our own. If mice understood practical reasons sufficiently well to truly understand why persons have a moral status superior to their own then they would be capable of the feats of practical reason constitutive of personhood—they would be persons. Our cluelessness about post-persons is compatible both with their possible existence and with their necessary non-existence. I propose an inductive argument for the existence of statuses superior to personhood. The observed existence of many moral statuses up to and including persons provides moderately strong inductive support for the possibility of post-persons.Who do we trust to make decisions about higher moral statuses?What precisely does the inductive argument predict? If my diagnosis of our moral myopia about post-personhood is correct, then mere persons cannot really understand what properties of post-persons give them a superior status. They will be able to infer their existence indirectly by an appeal to the predicted judgments of beings who lack our cognitive limitations. Wasserman3 questions my suggestion that we should defer to the sincere moral judgments of …. (shrink)

I want to discuss a view of punishment which stresses its ‘expressive’ character and seeks in that its justification. While I shall label this view ‘expressionism’, I should warn that most theorists who express an ‘expressionist’ view do not present it as an exhaustive account, but rather claim to be highlighting an aspect that tends to be neglected within the rationalist framework common to retributivism and utilitarianism. Among contemporary writings I shall focus on Joel Feinberg's article, ‘The Expressive Function of (...) Punishment’ in The Monist 49, No. 4 . While I accept that ‘expression’ usefully sums up much of what underlies punitive practices, I shall urge that the term conceals a variety of more or less amalgamated ingredients which need to be disentangled for critical inspection. I shall argue that under those aspects, punishment's justification continues to be elusive. I do not imagine that these arguments will deter my more punitive colleagues from continuing to seek such justification, but I hope they will search elsewhere. Feinberg writes: Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties. (shrink)

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

"Aristotle was a systematic writer who often cross-referred to the definitions of terms given elsewhere in his work. Book 5 of the Metaphysics is important because it consists of definitions of the main uses of key terms in Aristotle's philosophy, and it is extremely valuable to have a commentary on this important text by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading commentator of his school. Alexander provides a detailed commentary on all of the thirty terms analysed in Book 5, weighing alternative interpretations (...) of what Aristotle says one against another, defending Peripatetic views against actual and possible criticisms, and attempting to integrate what is said in Book 5 into the context of the Metaphysics as a whole."--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)

It’s been argued with some justice by commentators from Walter Kaufmann to Thomas Hurka that Nietzsche’s positive ethical position is best understood as a variety of virtue theory – in particular, as a brand of perfectionism. For Nietzsche, value flows from character. Less attention has been paid, however, to the details of the virtues he identifies for himself and his type. This neglect, along with Nietzsche’s frequent irony and non-standard usage, has obscured the fact that almost all the virtues he (...) praises are intellectual rather than moral. The vices he most despises include dogmatism, intellectual partisanship, faith, boredom, the need for certainty, and pity. The virtues he most appreciates include curiosity, honesty, skepticism, creativity, the historical sense, intellectual courage, and intellectual fastidiousness. These tables of values place Nietzsche squarely among so-called responsibilist virtue epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code and Linda Zagzebski, who emphasize that knowledge is infused with desire and affect. I argue that curiosity construed as the specification of the will to power in the domain of epistemology is a cardinal Nietzschean virtue, and that the others – especially intellectual courage and honesty – are presupposed by curiosity. Thus, Nietzsche turns out to accept his own peculiar brand of the thesis of the unity of virtue. (shrink)

This article begins by taking issue with Husserl’s claims on the inseparability of fact and essence. It is shown that factuality and essence are independent from each other, although not epistemologically separable. Turning to Aristotle and Averroes, it examines the claim that in order to have become aware of necessity as necessity one would have to have been aware of contingency. Establishing a difference between the world of necessary existence and the world of contingent existence as two realms of truth, (...) the article then asks: what implications follow concerning the existence of the world from the fact that a relationship of two realms of truth is known as an essent when one of the terms of the relationship is a term which refers to the contingent world? Further, is it of any significance that the idea of necessary essence itself might not be noticeable if it were not for the fact that it could be contrasted with the kind of truth that could be otherwise? It is shown that it may be possible, apart from the possibility of ‘false contingency’, to think of essence without contingency, but that this possibility is not knowable to the philosopher due to the fact that the world in which the philosopher lives already includes and is apparently inseparable from contingent existence. The article then shifts attention to the necessary existence of consciousness, and to the claim that the necessary cognition that is the state of consciousness is the most basic (and indubitable) starting point of the philosophic scaffolding, a starting point which has been mistakenly ignored by contemporary Western philosophy. It is claimed that it is the philosopher’s task to populate the list of necessarily known truths which begins with Descartes’ claim that a consciousness exists and that that is an indubitable claim. Some examples are given, and the claim is advanced that an infinite number of certain truths can be generated, so long as the right starting point is chosen. (shrink)

Discusses the function of action in Malraux's third and most famous novel.

In a famous text Descartes has written this:Whenever the thought of God's supreme power occurs to me, I cannot help feeling that he might easily, if he so wished, make me go wrong even in what I think I see most clearly with my mind's eye. On the other hand, whenever I turn to the matters themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I burst out: ‘let who will deceive me, he can (...) never bring it about that I should be nothing at the time of thinking that I am something, nor that it be true that I never existed if it is true that I exist now; nor even that two and three together make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see manifest contradiction’. (shrink)

L’accueil dans les services de soin de personnes issues de la migration est un enjeu de santé mentale et éthique et relève d’une réflexion sur la prise en compte de leur vulnérabilité, a fortiori quand des enjeux de parentalité s’en mêlent. Cet article est un témoignage de l’équipe de pédopsychiatrie de Caen qui a adapté ses dispositifs de soins pour mieux accueillir ces publics spécifiques que sont les familles migrantes. Après un rappel sur les notions de migration, de culture et (...) de périnatalité en contexte migratoire, les deux dispositifs seront présentés et explicités au regard de leur fondation théorique qu’est la clinique transculturelle. (shrink)

In his analysis of “the essential tension between tradition and innovation” Thomas S. Kuhn focused on the apparent paradox that, on the one hand, normal research is a highly convergent activity based upon a settled consensus, but, on the other hand, the ultimate effect of this tradition-bound work has invariably been to change the tradition. Kuhn argued that, on the one hand, without the possibility of divergent thought, fundamental innovation would be precluded. On the other hand, without a strong emphasis (...) on convergent thought, science would become a mess created by continuous theory changes and scientific progress would again be precluded. On Kuhn’s view, both convergent and divergent thought are therefore equally necessary for the progress of science. In this paper, I shall argue that a similar fundamental tension exists between the demands we see for novel insights of an interdisciplinary nature and the need for established intellectual doctrines founded in the classical disciplines. First, I shall revisit Kuhn’s analysis of the essential tension between tradition and innovation. Next, I shall argue that the tension inherent in interdisciplinary research between, on the one hand, intellectual independence and critical scrutiny and, on the other hand, epistemic dependence and trust is a complement to Kuhn’s essential tension within mono-disciplinary science between convergent and divergent thought. (shrink)

In response to Leroy Little Bear's description of the Blackfoot identity as rooted in place, the article articulates an ecological conception of value based in European thought that can be in close dialogue with the telling aboriginal phrase “I am the environment.” While important similarities are noted, especially the convergence of aboriginal and ecological conceptions of value on a critique of the assessment of value by commodity price, the difficulty of rooting value in Being within the European tradition contrasts with (...) the continuity of human, animal, and cosmic intelligence in aboriginal thought. (shrink)

La thèse de l’« inexistence intentionnelle » formulée par Brentano a été traditionnellement interprétée comme une théorie de la « relation intentionnelle », autrement dit de la relation entre l’acte mental et son « objet immanent » ou « intentionnel », c’est-à-dire interne à la conscience. Se fondant sur la lecture du fameux passage sur l’intentionnalité de la Psychologie du point de vue empirique , le présent article démontre que l’interprétation ontologique de la théorie de l’intentionnalité du premier Brentano est (...) insoutenable, toute dominante qu’elle est. Pour ce faire, nous partirons des sources de la pensée de Brentano, en particulier de la théorie de la perception et des relatifs d’Aristote, pour rejeter la conception de l’objet immanent ou intentionnel comme entité immanente à la conscience et mettre en évidence la continuité qui existe entre la première conception de Brentano de l’intentionnalité et la seconde, consécutive à ce qu’on définit comme le tournant réiste de sa pensée.Brentano’s thesis of “intentional inexistence” has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of “intentional relationships”, i.e., of the relation between a mental act and its “immanent” or “intentional object”, within consciousness. Starting from the famous passage on intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , the present paper shows that the dominant ontological interpretation of Brentano’s former theory of intentionality is untenable. Proceeding from the sources of Brentano’s thought, in particular from Aristotle’s theory of perception and of relatives, the conception of the immanent or intentional object as an immanent entity to consciousness is rejected. Instead, the continuity between Brentano’s former conception of intentionality and the subsequent one, following the so-called reistic turning-point in his thought, is highlighted. (shrink)

This special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the (...) Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question. These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology, as Helmuth Plessner has explored it, vindicates its relative priority towards ethics, because it can set out the anthropological prerequisites for considering the moral subject as the embodied person. This claim, however, is still an open question. Walter Schulz has argued that the prevalence of science in contemporary life brings ethics to the fore and forces philosophical anthropology to an auxiliary exploration of ‘leading figures of thehuman’. Jürgen Habermas endorses Plessner’s exploration of the issue of the body, in (...) order to oppose biotechnological naturalism. Thus, he enlarges his discourse on ethics through the ethics of the human species by defining the moral agent as the embodied person. Nevertheless, philosophical anthropology is a broader theoretical endeavour that cannot be reduced to ethics. (shrink)

A Philosophy of Mitzvot by Rabbi Dr. Gersion Appel sets forth the Hinnukh's objectives and his approach to revealing the religious and ethical meaning of the mitzvot. In his wide-ranging study, the author presents a comprehensive view of Jewish philosophy as developed by the Hinnukh and the classical Jewish philosophers. The Hinnukh emerges in this study as a great educator and moral and religious guide, and his classic work as a treasure-trove of Jewish knowledge, religious inspiration, and brilliant insight in (...) the molding of human character. (shrink)

Using Steel's recent result that assuming AD, in L[R] below Θ, κ is regular $\operatorname{iff} \kappa$ is measurable, we mimic below Θ certain earlier results of Gitik. In particular, we construct via forcing a model in which all uncountable cardinals below Θ are singular and a model in which the only regular uncountable cardinal below Θ is ℵ 1.

We give a new proof using iterated Prikry forcing of Magidor's theorem that it is consistent to assume that the least strongly compact cardinal is the least supercompact cardinal.

Say that κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}’s measurability is destructible if there exists a κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. It then follows that A1={δ<κ∣δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \{\delta < \kappa \mid \delta}$$\end{document} is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, δ is not δ+ strongly compact, and δ’s measurability is destructible when forcing with partial orderings having rank below λδ} is unbounded (...) in κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. On the other hand, under the same hypotheses, A2={δ<κ∣δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{2} = \{\delta < \kappa \mid \delta}$$\end{document} is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, δ is not δ+ strongly compact, and δ′s measurability is indestructible when forcing with either Add or Add} is unbounded in κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document} as well. The large cardinal hypothesis on λ is necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two distinct models in which either A1=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \emptyset}$$\end{document} or A2=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{2} = \emptyset}$$\end{document}. In each of these models, both of which have restricted large cardinal structures above κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}, every measurable cardinal δ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is δ+ strongly compact, and there is an indestructibly supercompact cardinal κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. In the model in which A1=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \emptyset}$$\end{document}, every measurable cardinal δ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is <λδ strongly compact and has its <λδ strong compactness indestructible when forcing with δ-directed closed partial orderings having rank below λδ. The choice of the least beth fixed point above δ is arbitrary, and other values of λδ are also possible. (shrink)

If κ < λ are such that κ is a strong cardinal whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing and λ is weakly compact, then we show thatA = {δ < κ | δ is a non-weakly compact Mahlo cardinal which reflects stationary sets}must be unbounded in κ. This phenomenon, however, need not occur in a universe with relatively few large cardinals. In particular, we show how to construct a model where no cardinal is supercompact up to a (...) Mahlo cardinal in which the least supercompact cardinal κ is also the least strongly compact cardinal, κ 's strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing, κ 's supercompactness is indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ, and δ is Mahlo and reflects stationary sets iff δ is weakly compact. In this model, no strong cardinal δ < κ is indestructible under δ -strategically closed forcing. It therefore follows that it is relatively consistent for the least strong cardinal κ whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which also has its supercompactness indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ. (shrink)

Suppose λ > κ is measurable. We show that if κ is either indestructibly supercompact or indestructibly strong, then A = {δ < κ | δ is measurable, yet δ is neither δ + strongly compact nor a limit of measurable cardinals} must be unbounded in κ. The large cardinal hypothesis on λ is necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two models in which ${A = \emptyset}$ . The first of these contains a supercompact cardinal κ and (...) is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s supercompactness is indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ is δ + strongly compact. The second of these contains a strong cardinal κ and is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s strongness is indestructible under < κ-strategically closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. The model from the first of our forcing constructions is used to show that it is consistent, relative to a supercompact cardinal, for the least cardinal κ which is both strong and has its strongness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which has its supercompactness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing. It further follows as a corollary of the first of our forcing constructions that it is possible to build a model containing a supercompact cardinal κ in which no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ is indestructibly supercompact, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is δ + strongly compact. (shrink)

This article explores what enables a space to become festive. We start by reviewing how the festive has been deeply connected with play, to the point of being considered a type of play, or more generally, a type of interaction. What enables the festive is the ability to interact with the substance on which participants feast. The question we will then explore in more detail is: given a subject matter from which to build a festive occasion or space, how do (...) we go about making it happen? How do we model the festive space? It is impossible to show that there is only one way of going about enacting the festive. For this reason, it is more productive to propose a model of how to achieve such task. The model that emerges in this article proposes that dismembering the festive substance, in a participatory way, facilitates its enactment. We then examine two cases of festive enactment in different mediums: the textual feast of Julio Cortázar’s novel Hopscotch that turns the printed page into a festive space, and the making of festive theatre, including the creation of the festive play Fire ’Scapes. (shrink)

Series Copy Oxford's celebrated Very Short Introductions series offers concise and original introductions to a wide range of subjects--from Islam to Sociology, Politics to Classics, Literary Theory to History, and Archaeology to the Bible. Each volume provides trenchant and provocative--yet always balanced and complete--discussions of the central issues in a given discipline or field. Every Very Short Introduction gives a readable evolution of the subject in question, demonstrating how the subject developed in its own right and how it influenced society. (...) Whatever the area of study one deems important or appealing, whatever topic fascinates the general reader, the Very Short Introduction series has a handy and affordable guide that will likely prove indispensable. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour but de situer la discussion sur l'égalité économique dans le contexte existentiel qui lui est approprié. Interprétant le système économique non seulement comme un système de production et de distribution, mais aussi comme un lieu où s'opère une certaine forme de « colmatage existentiel » individuel, nous étudions les rouages enfouis du système économique qui pourraient expliquer pourquoi les arguments classiques d'incitation, souvent invoqués par la théorie économique égalitariste, peuvent cacher des obstacles puissants à l'égalité. Nous (...) mettons en question les approches des incitations développées par G. A. Cohen et Philippe Van Parijs et nous avançons une approche existentielle inspirée notamment de Norman O. Brown et de Ernest Becker, selon qui l' économie peut aisément devenir le lieu du déni de la corporéité et de la mortalité. L'égalité économique, dès lors, ne peut être atteinte pleinement qu'en couplant la philosophie politique avec l'analyse existentielle et spirituelle des conditions d'assumption individuelle du corps mortel. This study seeks to locate the discussion on economic equality within an appropriate existential context. Seeing the economic system not only as a system of production and distribution, but also as the locus where a certain form of individual « existential containment » is taking place, we study those buried underpinnings of the economic system which could explain why classical incentive arguments often used by economists might hide powerful obstacles to equality. The approaches to incentives proposed by G. A. Cohen and Philippe Van Parijs are discussed and questioned, and an alternative approach is suggested, inspired partially by Norman O. Brown and Ernest Becker, for whom the economy can easily become the locus of a denial of corporeity and mortality. Thus, economic equality can be fully attained only by coupling political philosophy with the existential and spiritual analysis of the conditions under which individuals can accept their mortal body. (shrink)

Enracinée dans la prière, fondée sur la Bible seule, centrée sur le Christ, et insistant sur la lutte contre le Malin, sur l'engagement éthique et sur la proximité du Royaume de Dieu, la théologie de Martin Luther, soutenue par le courage et l'humour d'un écrivain hors du commun, rencontre maintes préoccupations théologiques actuelles ; mais elle interpelle aussi des théologies souvent embarrassées par le sola scriptura et le solus Christus, promptes à faire de l'homme une victime et limitant l'eschatologie à (...) l'avènement du Christ dans l'intériorité du croyant. De la théologie contemporaine, elle peut apprendre que toute exégèse est située, que l'assertion n'est pas le seul registre du discours théologique, que le dialogue religieux ne se réduit pas à l'anathème et que l'action de Dieu dans l'histoire n'est pas univoque. Martin Luther's theology is rooted in prayer, founded only on the Bible, and centred on Christ ; it lays stress on the struggle against the Devil, on moral commitment, and on the proximity of God's Kingdom ; it is kept up by the courage and humour of an extraordinary writer. As such, it meets with many modern theological preoccupations, but it also challenges theologies that are often embarrassed by the sola scriptura and the solus Christus, theologies that are ready to victimize man and limit eschatology to the coming of Christ into the believer's inner self. From contemporaneous theology it can learn that each exegesis has its context, that doing theology does not only consist of uttering statements, that the religious dialogue does not confine itself to the anathema, and that God's acts in history are not univocal. (shrink)

This paper presents criticisms of the method for moral and political philosophy known as ?reflective equilibrium? (RE), or in its fuller form ?wide reflective equilibrium? (WRE). This negative purpose has an ulterior positive aim: to set off, by favourable contrast, an alternative approach based on analogical argument as an instrument of an evolving (liberal) tradition. WRE derives from John Rawls but has been broadly endorsed. Though a meta?theory, it involves a certain way of construing liberalism. This essay's target is in (...) key part that construal. It seeks an approach to moral?political philosophy, and to liberalism in particular, that is at once rationally grounded and contextually oriented, and provides for explanation as well as justification. WRE fails on all counts, plus others. Section I presents WRE and suggests the alternative. Section II presents the critique of WRE, partly drawing on established criticisms and partly presenting new ones. Section III opposes the application suggested for WRE by (surprisingly) a critic of Rawls, M. Sandel. The preferability of the analogical alternative is demonstrated throughout. (shrink)