These past presents which consist of the present of a promise, whose opening toward the present to come is not that of an expectation or an anticipation but that of commitment.This article addresses Thomas Pynchon's examination in Vineland of utopian desire that gives rise to an incomplete and flawed solidarity of those fractured, victimized, hurt, and rejected by American history. Such community is the only guarantee against fascist tendencies that have permeated American politics, culture, and thinking about the future. While (...) I claim that Vineland as a historical novel belongs to the category of cryptomimetic writing, which is best suited to do justice to America's haunted history, I believe that the emergence of... (shrink)

What duties do people have in the face of noncompliance of others with their duties? The paper defends the duty to take up the slack when slack taking is necessary to assist those in dire need. This duty has been criticized by J. L. Cohen, Liam Murphy and, more recently, David Miller. The duty is defended against arguments that appeal to the structure of the duty to aid, fair shares, responsibility, counterintuitiveness, and perverse consequences. The paper considers the implications of (...) the duty for the case of aiding refugees. (shrink)

The dead are among us. We are reminded of their names through the books we read, the hoovers we buy, the sandwiches we consume, the tarmac we travel on, the wellingtons we wear, or, frequently, the buildings we visit. Even if we settled on the criteria for being worthy of commemoration, what should we do about the fact that there seem to be so many people who would likely meet them? Commemoration is a form of attention giving, and attention is (...) a scarce resource. It is scarce even if it could be permissibly commanded at will. It is even more scarce when commanding attention may violate someone's freedom to decide for themselves where to bestow it. I will argue that when it comes to public commemorative attention, there are duties that fall on us all to remember the now dead victims of injustice. I will also offer reasons for why such duties would normally mean that we need to prioritize the remembrance of the victims of injustice ahead of remembrance that might be owed to those who had expectations of being remembered or even took steps by donations to secure such remembrance. (shrink)

John Rawls tells at the start of A Theory of Justice that his theory is intentionally constrained in two ways: it is ideal and focuses on the justice of the basic structure of society. This chapter begins by evaluating Rawls's claim that ideal theory sets the target of reform for nonideal theory, whose task it is to work out what to do “under less happy conditions.” It states that it is unclear just when ideal theory can inform the priorities of (...) nonideal theory. The chapter also presents discussions on whether the ideal theory is utopian and concessive to human nature. Even the kind of nonideal theory that delivers concrete action‐guidance for “us” remains unhelpfully ideal if it does so merely in the form of policies or institutional arrangements. (shrink)

In Utopophobia Estlund offers a prominent version of a conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility. The incentives account preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible. Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. If we accept that ought implies feasible, then we (...) should reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. But we can still recognise normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own. (shrink)

We prove that any 1-closed (see def 1.1) model of the Π 2 consequences of PA satisfies ¬Cons PA which gives a proof of the second Godel incompleteness theorem without the use of the Godel diagonal lemma. We prove a few other theorems by the same method.

The two main questions addressed in the chapter are “What is the point of (good) nonideal theory?” and “Can (good) nonideal theory be done in isolation from ideal theory?” To address them, I distinguish between different types of nonideal theory and locate nonideal theory vis‐à‐vis ideal theory as well as realism and applied philosophy. I argue that nonideal theory is useful but some of its versions need to concede that they are defeatist. I also argue that nonideal theory builds on (...) ideal theory, though not in all the ways suggested by defenders of ideal theory. (shrink)

Preview: /Zofia Rosińska interviewed by Mikołaj Sławkowski-Rode/ MSR: Your book Po śladach. Doświadczenie modlitewne w ujęciu filozofii kultury [After the Traces. The Experience of Prayer in the Perspective of Philosophy of Culture] has an unusual format for an academic work. Apart from an overview and discussion of various conceptions and examples of prayer you have added an annex containing eight interviews with various people as well as five testimonials concerning the experience of prayer – some very intimate. What was (...) the motivation for choosing such a format and how did you select the texts comprising the annex? ZR: My book is not a cultural study or a work of theology, psychology, or psychiatry, although it touches the boundaries of all these disciplines. What I mean here is that it takes up topics and utilizes the categories specific to these fields. My book is a book about the human being and it is written from the perspective of philosophy of culture. You say that the format of my book is not typical for an academic work, because of the decision to include the annex containing conversations with people who pray and with others who reject it. This is true. However my book necessitates this minor structural difference. The goal of the book was to discern and understand various forms of prayer present in our culture: from set prayers through poetry, painting and music to activities like work. I call this ‘ontological prayer’. Unfortunately I could not include painting and music in this work. (shrink)

We prove that the Gödel incompleteness theorem holds for a weak arithmetic T = IΔ0 + Ω2 in the form where Cons H (T) is an arithmetic formula expressing the consistency of T with respect to the Herbrand notion of provability.

For the given logical calculus we investigate the proportion of the number of true formulas of a certain length n to the number of all formulas of such length. We are especially interested in asymptotic behavior of this fraction when n tends to infinity. If the limit exists it is represented by a real number between 0 and 1 which we may call the density of truth for the investigated logic. In this paper we apply this approach to the intuitionistic (...) logic of one variable with implication and negation. The result is obtained by reducing the problem to the same one of Dummett's intermediate linear logic of one variable (see [2]). Actually, this paper shows the exact density of intuitionistic logic and demonstrates that it covers a substantial part (more than 93%) of classical prepositional calculus. Despite using strictly mathematical means to solve all discussed problems, this paper in fact, may have a philosophical impact on understanding how much the phenomenon of truth is sporadic or frequent in random mathematics sentences. (shrink)

What’s special about human rights? For Rowan Cruft human rights are special because they capture the importance of the good of the right-holder. But his account struggles with explaining the existence of global socioeconomic human rights. I argue that such rights exist and show how we should revise Cruft’s account to accommodate this.

A crucial question for egalitarians, and theorists of distributive justice in general, is whether people can be held responsible for disadvantages they bring upon themselves. One response to this question states that it would be inegalitarian to hold people responsible on the basis of their actions if their actions are not ultimately under their control and reflect instead the good or bad luck the agent had in being the type of person who happens to act in a given way. I (...) argue that even if we accept that there is something inegalitarian about holding people responsible on the basis of actions they did not ultimately control, the alternative (that is, not holding people responsible) is even more inegalitarian. Therefore, egalitarians, including so-called luck egalitarians, can and should hold people responsible on the basis of their actions, even if people lack free will and their actions are ultimately a matter of luck. Key Words: responsibility • egalitarianism • luck egalitarianism • fairness • distributive justice. (shrink)

Following wars, what requirements, if any, of remembrance do we – those who live in peacetime – have? On whom do they fall? Who must be remembered? How should they be remembered? Fabre offers us an account of remembrance that answers some of those questions and provides a helpful framework for working through the others. It is philosophically nuanced as well as attuned to the complexity of war and informed by actual commemorative practices. In this article, however, I expand Fabre's (...) list of desiderata that a good account of war remembrance must meet. I argue that Fabre's account needs to be refined and, at least in one respect, revised in light of these new desiderata. (shrink)

How should the fact that a given policy offers people choice bear on policy selection? Should we favour choice-granting policies even if choices lead to harmful outcomes, and even if the causal thesis is true and people are not fully in control of how they choose? T.M. Scanlon and Alex Voorhoeve have tried to locate the significance of choice in the value or potential value that it has for choice-bearers. I show that this leaves them vulnerable to a general dilemma: (...) either they can explain the significance of choice by supposing the causal thesis is false, or they cannot explain it when faced with certain policy cases. I argue that we should locate the significance of choice in the fact that having a choice means being in a position to treat others as they are due or not. My view can be summed up in a slogan: ask not only what choice can do for you; ask what having the choice means you can do to others. (shrink)

Confirmant notamment les analyses de Pascale Casanova dans La République des lettres , Zofia Bobowicz, traductrice et actuellement conseillère éditoriale aux éditions Noir et Blanc, explique dans cet entretien les difficultés de réception rencontrées par la littérature de l'Europe centrale en France, alors qu'il en va tout autrement dans d'autres pays. Connaissant depuis un quart de siècle l'univers éditorial français de l'intérieur, Zofia Bobowicz souligne le rôle joué par la critique littéraire et la conjoncture politique ou culturelle du (...) moment dans la diffusion de cette littérature, et, par voie de conséquence, dans sa traduction.Confirming such analyzes Pascale Casanova in The Republic of Letters , Zofia Bobowicz, translator and editorial consultant currently published by Black and White, explains in this interview the difficulties encountered by receiving the literature of Central Europe France, while it is quite different in other countries. Knowing the past quarter century French publishing world from the inside, Zofia Bobowicz emphasizes the role played by literary criticism and the political and cultural moment in the dissemination of this literature, and, consequently, in its translation. (shrink)

In this paper we construct a continuum of logics, extensions of the modal logic T2 = KTB ⊕ □2p → □3p, which are non-compact and hence Kripke incomplete.

We prove that the standard cut is definable in each existentially closed model ofIΔ0+ exp by a (parameter free) П1–formula. This definition is optimal with respect to quantifier complexity and allows us to improve some previously known results on existentially closed models of fragments of arithmetic.

We formulate a Π1 sentence τ which is a version of the Tableau consistency of GlΔ0. The sentence τ is true and is provable in GlΔ0 + exp. We construct a model M of GlΔ0+Ω1+τ+BGs1 which has no proper end-extension to a model of GlΔ0+Ω1+τ. Also we prove that GlΔ0+Ω1+τ is not Π1 conservative over GlΔ0+τ.

Halldén complete modal logics are defined semantically. They have a nice characterization as they are determined by homogeneous Kripke frames.

Individuals in dating and marital relationships experience various transgressions that require forgiveness (e.g., hurtful communication, mistrust, lies, or infidelity). This study examines forgiveness-granting strategies in the context of forgiveness tendency, relationship length, commitment, satisfaction, and relational consequences to better understand relationship dynamics. 649 individuals (532 dating, 117 married), aged 18–65 (M = 26.00, SD = 8.82) participated. The sample included 517 women (79.7 %) and 132 men (20.3 %). Participants described a forgiven transgression and completed questionnaires, including the Multidimensional Forgiveness-Granting (...) Scale (MFGS), Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (TRIM-18), Relationship Assessment Scale (RAS), and the commitment subscale from the Investment Model Scale. One open-ended question (types of forgiven transgressions) was analyzed consensually. Quantitative data were analyzed using correlational analysis, regression analysis, and t-tests. The most common transgression was infidelity. A linear regression analysis showed that the strongest positive predictor of relationship satisfaction was the tendency to forgive one’s partner. Nonverbal displays positively predicted relationship strengthening, while the discussion strategy predicted relationship deterioration negatively. These findings emphasize the importance of how forgiveness is communicated and may inform interventions to enhance romantic relationships. (shrink)

Is there a duty to do more than one’s fair share of solving collective problems? If there is, can those who do less than their fair share coerce others to do more? These questions arise urgently in relation to the problem of refugee protection. The fact that various states host refugees to a dramatically different extent is due to a range of factors but the most prominent one is that, on the whole, states devote their differential capabilities to the aim (...) of not hosting them. When some states fail to host – or otherwise assist – as many refugees as they should, must other states do more than their fair share in order to solve the problem of providing refugees with an appropriate place to live? I examine what I call the conservative, moderate and responsive answers to this question. I defend the responsive view and argue that there is a duty to do more than one’s fair share here and that such a duty is always enforceable. (shrink)

We prove that: • if there is a model of I∆₀ + ¬ exp with cofinal Σ₁-definable elements and a Σ₁ truth definition for Σ₁ sentences, then I∆₀ + ¬ exp +¬BΣ₁ is consistent, • there is a model of I∆₀ Ω₁ + ¬ exp with cofinal Σ₁-definable elements, both a Σ₂ and a ∏₂ truth definition for Σ₁ sentences, and for each n > 2, a Σ n truth definition for Σ n sentences. The latter result is obtained by (...) constructing a model with a recursive truth-preserving translation of Σ₁ sentences into boolean combinations of $\exists \sum {\begin{array}{*{20}{c}} h \\ 0 \\ \end{array} } $ sentences. We also present an old but previously unpublished proof of the consistency of I∆₀ + ¬ exp + ¬BΣ₁ under the assumption that the size parameter in Lessan's ∆₀ universal formula is optimal. We then discuss a possible reason why proving the consistency of I∆₀ + ¬ exp + ¬BΣ₁ unconditionally has turned out to be so difficult. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic approach for obtaining results from the area of quantitative investigations in logic and type theory. We investigate the proportion between tautologies (inhabited types) of a given length n against the number of all formulas (types) of length n. We investigate an asymptotic behavior of this fraction. Furthermore, we characterize the relation between number of premises of implicational formula (type) and the asymptotic probability of finding such formula among the all ones. We also deal with a (...) distribution of these asymptotic probabilities. Using the same approach we also prove that the probability that randomly chosen fourth order type (or type of the order not greater than 4), which admits decidable lambda definability problem, is zero. (shrink)

The Gödel–Dummett logic and Łukasiewicz one are two main many-valued logics used by the fuzzy logic community. Our goal is a quantitative comparison of these two. In this paper, we will mostly consider the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic as well as the 3-valued Łukasiewicz one. We shall concentrate on their implicational-negation fragments which are limited to formulas formed with a fixed finite number of variables. First, we investigate the proportion of the number of true formulas of a certain length n to (...) the number of all formulas of such length built with exactly one variable. Then, we investigate such proportion for satisfiable formulas. Second, we generalise our investigation on formulas written with k≥1 variables. The primary goal of the paper is the research on the asymptotic behaviour of these fractions when the length n tends to infinity. If such limits exists, they are real numbers between 0 and 1, which are called the density of truth or the density of SAT. To compare the density of truth and the density of satisfiable formulas for both fragments of 3-valued Gödel–Dummett's and Łukasiewicz's logics we use the powerful theory of analytic combinatorics. This paper is a natural continuation of the previous brief conference note by Kostrzycka and Zaionc (Citation2020) as well as enriched with some previous results from Kostrzycka and Zaionc (Citation2003). In the conference note we computed analytically the density of truth and the density of SAT (with a determined precision) for 3-valued Łukasiewicz's logic restricted to a language with only one variable. In Kostrzycka and Zaionc (Citation2003) we computed the same values for exactly the same fragment of the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic. This paper answers the more general questions of the existence of density of truth and density of SAT for both many-valued logics with an arbitrary finite number of variables. Therefore this paper gives an an interesting picture of two main families of finite-valued fuzzy logics problems treated quantitatively. This picture is taken from the perspective of classical logic. It shows that unexpectedly there is quantitatively a little distance between these two approaches. (shrink)

The Craig interpolation property and interpolation property for deducibility are considered for special kind of normal extensions of the Brouwer logic.

Preview: “Taste” is among those philosophical categories that are the most difficult to fully characterize. Reflection on taste, on the experience and concept of taste, flourished in modern times. It went through its history from dynamic development in the seventeenth century and theoretical career in the eighteenth century. One gets the impression that “taste” became the central category of philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century, interest in taste diminished significantly. Considerations of taste were closely integrated (...) into the general philosophical attitudes of thinkers of the period. They generated disputes that form the canvas of later considerations that are already less emotional. The social transformations that we have been observing in the last few decades are forcing a renewed interest in the category of taste. At the same time, it is a colloquial category, commonly used. It is present if not in every European dictionary, then in most. In some languages it also has numerous synonyms that provide clues as to how various psycho-social states are expressed through these terms. Most often they are limited to the physiological sense of taste and are linked to cuisine, customs, recipes, and health. Taste, however, cannot just be confined to physiology – although the importance of the social functioning of taste understood in this way cannot be denied. (shrink)

We define a special family of Brouwerian logics determined by linearly ordered frames. Then we prove that all logics of this family have the finite model property and are Kripke complete.

Can states permissibly enforce mandatory participation in the provision of public goods? Usual justifications of state action here appeal to the fact that such goods are very good for people. Arthur Ripstein argues that states can compel provision of public goods, but that the best explanation of this is grounded, not in the costs and benefits of the provision to the compelled parties, but in the parties’ moral status as independent agents. I argue that Ripstein’s alternative account poses more problems (...) than it solves. Our best hope in grounding mandatory cooperation is to do so with reference to the duties that we have to serve people’s interests, including interests in autonomy, welfare, and being respected on account of one’s moral status. (shrink)

We show that for each n ≥ 1, if T2n does not prove the weak pigeonhole principle for Σbn functions, then the collection scheme B Σ1 is not finitely axiomatizable over T2n. The same result holds with Sn2 in place of T 2n.

For a fixed q  ℕ and a given Σ1 definition φ(d,x), where d is a parameter, we construct a model M of 1 Δ0 + ¬ exp and a non standard d  M such that in M either φ has no witness smaller than d or phgr; is equivalent to a formula ϕ(d,x) having no more than q alternations of blocks of quantifiers.