Non-invasive prenatal testing is an emerging form of prenatal genetic testing that provides information about the genetic constitution of a foetus without the risk of pregnancy loss as a direct result of the test procedure. As with other prenatal tests, information from NIPT can help to make a decision about termination of pregnancy, plan contingencies for birth or prepare parents to raise a child with a genetic condition. NIPT can also be used by women and couples to test purely ‘for (...) information’. Here, no particular action is envisaged following the test; it is motivated entirely by an interest in the result. The fact that NIPT can be performed without posing a risk to the pregnancy could give rise to an increase in such requests. In this paper, we examine the ethical aspects of using NIPT ‘purely for information’, including the competing interests of the prospective parents and the future child, and the acceptability of testing for ‘frivolous’ reasons. Drawing on several clinical scenarios, we claim that arguments about testing children for genetic conditions are relevant to this debate. In addition, we raise ethical concerns over the potential for objectification of the child. We conclude that, in most cases, using NIPT to test for adult-onset conditions, carrier status or non-serious traits presenting in childhood would be unacceptable. (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that some health professionals believe consent procedures for the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) should become less rigorous than those currently used for invasive prenatal testing. In this paper, we consider the importance of informed consent and informed choice procedures for protecting autonomy in those prenatal tests which will give rise to a definitive result. We consider whether there is anything special about NIPD that could sanction a change to consent procedures for prenatal diagnosis or (...) otherwise render informed decision-making less important. We accept the claim that the absence of risk of miscarriage to some extent lessens the gravity of the decision to test compared with invasive methods of testing. However, we also claim that the definitive nature of the information received, and the fact that the information can lead to decisions of great significance, makes NIPD an important choice. This choice should only be made by means of a rigorous and appropriately supported decision-making process (assuming that this is what the pregnant woman wants). We conclude that, on balance, consent procedures for NIPD should mirror those for invasive testing, albeit without the need to emphasise procedure-related risk. (shrink)

Semmelweis’ discovery of the etiology of childbed fever has long attracted the attention of historians of medicine and biographers. In recent years it has also become of increasing interest to philosophers. In this paper I discuss the interpretation of Semmelweis’ methodology from the viewpoint of the inference to the best explanation and argue that Popperian methodology is better at capturing the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. Furthermore, I criticize the attempts to explain the failure of Semmelweis to have his (...) discovery accepted on the basis of the Kuhnian concept of paradigms, and warn that this view may endorse dogmatism as the norm The Kuhnian position also raises the problem of the authoritarian nature of scientific institutions which defend a paradigm against unorthodox, rebellious views, such as in the case of Semmelweis. Popperian philosophy is seen as a challenge to promote a link between an open society and open science with its main aim being to cherish a free critical spirit. (shrink)

Recent scientific advances mean the widespread introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) for chromosomal aneuploidies may be close at hand, raising the question of how NIPD should be introduced as part of antenatal care pathways for pregnant women. In this paper, the authors examine the ethical implications of three hypothetical models for using NIPD for aneuploidy in state-funded healthcare systems and assess which model is ethically preferable. In comparing the models, the authors consider their respective timings; how each model would (...) fit with current screening and diagnostic tests offered to pregnant women; the implications of offering NIPD at different stages of pregnancy; and the potential for each model to support reproductive autonomy and informed decision-making. The authors conclude by favouring a model that would be offered at 11–13 weeks gestation, alongside existing combined screening, provided that this is accompanied by measures to maximise informed decision-making, for example, provision of adequate pretest and post-test counselling. (shrink)

This paper presents the link between Arthur N. Prior and logicians that belonged to the Lvov-Warsaw School. Although certain members of the Lvov-Warsaw School influenced Prior’s views, the amount and the form of the impact are still under discussion. Prior also cooperated with some of them in the development of his systems of logic. This paper focuses on four main areas in which Prior admitted adopting ideas from the Lvov-Warsaw School: systems of propositional logic, the history of logic, modal and (...) temporal logic and ontology. Prior’s published works as well as his correspondence, which is stored in Prior’s Nachlass, are used to describe the influence. (shrink)

Two main tendencies in postmodernism can be identified, neither providing much scope for developing a postmodern philosophy of science. According to the first, the world is fragmented into a plurality of autonomous local discourses, implying that any advice to scientists can be given only from within science and not from philosophers who stand outside ( above') science. According to the second, the meaning of signs is fundamentally elusive (poststructuralism and deconstruction). A deconstructive philosophy of science might be conceived of as (...) experimenting with scientific texts, but in that case the label philosophy' becomes a mere matter of convention. (shrink)

The meaning of academy given in Athens in antiquity is connected with the aim of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education. This text explains the journal's conceptual roots with methodological distinctions. Both the role of the phenomenological approach and key persons are mentioned.

Theology and Philosophy of Education is a journal dedicated to education. However, in what respect does it deal with education? What is the situation of current education? What is the main role of the school today? All articles from the first issue of the third volume of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education are presented.

Augustine and his practical advices on education and teaching. – Based on De doctrina christiana, Augustine is presented as a teacher, an educator of other educators and teachers, namely speakers in the Church in his time. The paper starts with the question of whether Augustine’s distinction between enjoyment and utility and Augustine’s principles of exegetical work and preaching can be inspirational for educators today. The text aims to show Augustine’s conception of the education of fundamental values and thus present suggestions (...) for educators. (shrink)

The paper analyses empirical research results comparing the impact of the medium (traditional, paper-based vs. screen-based) on the reading process and text comprehension. It focuses on two analytical approaches—the first looks at the construction of cognitive maps of texts and the other the material aspects of the medium – which enable readers to orientate themselves and to explore and interpret the text more comprehensively. The paper discusses differences in how readers approach textual meaning according to experience of using digital technologies, (...) the text, and reader experience and abilities. It concludes by arguing that strengthening these individual experiences and abilities is key to effective inference of textual meaning. (shrink)

The main aim of our paper is to identify the potential limits of Socratic dialogue in moral education. These limits will be identified using a) the original ancient writings preserving several versions of Socrates’ dialogue, and b) modern writing on the Socrates’ dialogue in moral education. We will determine whether these limits are to be found in the writing of Plato or Xenophon, or rather in the problems and paradoxes of this type of education. We assume that a historical exploration (...) of the original Socratic philosophy will help us to more easily identify the limits and problems in moral education. However, our intention is not to reject the Socratic dialogue as such, but merely to point out some of the potentially controversial aspects of its use in moral education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Against the Spirit of Foundations: Postmodernism and David Hume1 Zuzana Parusnikova Introduction David Hume lived at the very dawn ofthe modern age and belonged to the Scottish Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is often conceived of as the essence of modernity, thus standing in firm opposition to postmodernism. According to postmodernists, the Enlightenmentideal of a universal liberating rationality and the principle of universally shared norms ofhumanism have not only lost (...) their vigour and appeal, but have proved to be oppressive and downright authoritarian. The project of the Enlightenment should thus be abandoned. And yet, despite the fact that Hume chronologically belonged to modernity, I find striking similarities between his views and postmodernism. Over the years there have been many, typically modern, efforts to find some unity and to grasp the essence of Hume's philosophy, to provide some general interpretative angle by which it can appear as a consistent philosophical system. I want to argue that such an approach is neither necessary nor desirable because it deprives Hume's philosophy of its most appealing feature—his acceptance of and tolerance towards the irreconcilability of its sceptical and natural elements. There is no need to force Hume to fit neatly under any traditional philosophical label.2 The permanent inconsistency in his 'system' resulting from his firm anti-foundationalist attitude is not a defect but instead makes his philosophy far more intriguing. The disunity which can be found in Hume's texts is also the feature bringing him close to postmodernism. Postmodernism is a fuzzy area, difficult to approach let alone to define. It deliberately avoids defining itself and could even be seen as "the characteristic of a universe where there are no more definitions possible." 3 Postmodernism is not a homogeneous stage of thinking following after modernism (as the prefix 'post' misleadingly suggests), but rather deconstructs modernity without offering a new and coherent alternative. Therefore, paradoxically, while deconstructing we have to use thevocabularywhichis being deconstructed and cannotcompletely avoid the ' logos ofthe definition'. This feature is reflected in what Derrida calls 'writing under erasure': we write and erase at the same time—since our language is constructed upon the modern logocentrism, we have no choice but to Volume XLX Number 1 ZUZANA PARUSNIKOVA use it. As a result, interpreting the meaning of texts, although authoritarian in its original intention, reveals the illusory character of any ultimate interpretation. Texts are viewed as mysterious and confusinglabyrinths,bycontrasttothemodernobsession aboutclarity, precision, consistency and the possibility of decoding the exact, fundamental message they convey. Philosophy is no longer conceived ofas a questfor foundations, and philosophical texts are looked at from a new perspective: they are rather 'misread', 'misinterpreted' or read on the margins' in order to paralyse the oppressive interpretations seeking some foundational interpretative principle and imposing compulsory norms ofunderstanding.4 Hume's philosophy has suffered extensive abuse of this foundationalist kind. With rare exceptions (for example, Richard Popkin), most interpreters have tried to eliminate the inconsistencies and contradictions in his writings and to pigeon-hole him victoriously. But Hume has given them a hard time indeed. The reason he has been such a poser is, in my opinion, that he—like postmodernists—does not offer any foundationalist perspective. In fact, their firm antifoundationalism makes allies ofhim and postmodernists. Anti-foundationalism For postmodernism, philosophy ceases to enjoy its traditional privilege of being a foundationalist discipline in either a metaphysical or an epistemological sense. Philosophy does not reveal any hidden depths, any deeper truths. It does not provide any unique insights guiding us beyond the immense diversity ofthe world towards its essential unity (metaphysics), nor does itprovide anyepistemological clue tothe world. Philosophy is denied the function of an epistemological police organizing the world into a well-arranged, easily-surveyed picture. For postmodernists, this modern "fantasy to seize reality"and makeitfully transparent and communicable is a source of terror.5 Postmodernism views the desire to master reality as leading to intellectual dictatorship, by eliminating the relevance and the rights ofthe other" which does not conform to modern principles and is thus downgraded in the modern hierarchy. The theoretical core ofthis anti-foundationalism, in my opinion, is the poststructuralist theory of meaning, developing the structuralist view (of Saussure) that meaning is never... (shrink)

In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper's philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort.

Pharmacists who refuse to provide certain services or treatment for reasons of conscience have been criticized for failing to fulfil their professional obligations. Currently, individual pharmacists in Great Britain can withhold services or treatment for moral or religious reasons, provided they refer the patient to an alternative source. The most high-profile cases have concerned the refusal to supply emergency hormonal contraception, which will serve as an example in this article.I propose that the pharmacy profession's policy on conscientious objections should be (...) altered slightly. Building on the work of Brock and Wicclair, I argue that conscientious refusals should be acceptable provided that the patient is informed of the service, the patient is redirected to an alternative source, the refusal does not cause an unreasonable burden to the patient, and the reasons for the refusal are based on the core values of the profession. Finally, I argue that a principled categorical refusal by an individual pharmacist is not morally permissible. I claim that, contrary to current practice, a pharmacist cannot legitimately claim universal exemption from providing a standard service, even if that service is available elsewhere. (shrink)

Existence and coexistence of and by means of speech, and its consequences. – The text is concerned with several questions that are interrelated with what was termed “logos” by the ancient Greeks. The questions are as follows: If, according to Aristotle, man is the only spiritual being in the world to be endowed with speech, what does this mean for the (self)education of man? If, according to Augustine, understanding another person’s speech is decisive for whether we want to be in (...) his/her presence, or rather that of our dog, what does it imply as regards the essence of relationship with the other person? If, according to Heidegger, human expression is interrelated with what is real or unreal, what does it mean with respect to our existence through speech? If, according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to determine the limits of the soul, because its logos is too deep, what, then, is the purpose of man? Or where is he/she headed? What does this imply when it comes to the relation of a human being to logos? (shrink)

This text, titled The Responsibility of Educators, is the editorial of the second issue of the second volume of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education.

The paper compares Comenius’ usage of the terms unum, verum and bonum in his metaphysical writings both with the expression of the image of the Trinity in De civitate dei by Aurelius Augustinus and with the concept of existence as three basic movements in the philosophical work of Jan Patočka. The purpose of the text is to show, despite the differences in historical periods, language and life experience, the possible similarity or connection of the vision that Augustine, Comenius and Patočka (...) mediate in their works. (shrink)

Although Łukasiewicz and Quine do not share many common views, they agreed on one important point in the 1950s: they both denied the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences. This agreement might be surprising as this denial was rather controversial at that time. This paper focuses on Quine’s and Łukasiewicz’s denials of the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences, and proposes three possible answers to the question of why both formulated the same conclusion at a similar time. Firstly, (...) it discusses Quine’s possible influence on Łukasiewicz as Łukasiewicz agreed with Quine’s criticism of modality at that time. Secondly, it considers the possibility that Quine was affected by Łukasiewicz via his debates with Łukasiewicz’s student, Tarski. Lastly, it takes into account the possibility that both philosophers were inspired by an external source, namely the rise of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Sameness and alterity: Alterity as the hope of education. – The contribution introduces questions that originate from the very nature of the dynamics of education, where change happens. In the dynamics of education, what is ‘identical’, is formed in the environment of the other; it also creates a new form, which, compared to the original form, is different/dissimilar. At the same time, what is ‘identical’, maintains the core, out of which each of the other forms are formed. As an intentional (...) human activity, education should reflect the relations between ‘same’ and ‘other’. This means, above all, enquiring about their origins and purpose as well as reflecting upon their raison d’être. Following such a reflection, the otherness of the environment, in which education takes place, can become both a challenge and hope for education. (shrink)

It is the editorial for the first issue of the second volume of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education. The journal’s logo is described and interpreted here in the context of the journal’s aim. All the texts of the offered issue are briefly introduced here.

Editorial of the second issue of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education.

Wisdom of love, which does not avoid suffering: The teachers’ life. – Paper reflects the book Suffering and the Intelligence of Love in the Teaching Life: In Light and In Darkness. In the latter, seventeen authors from different helping and arts professions ask the question of the meaning of suffering in human life, and especially in the life of teachers. In a world, which is pluralistic in terms of values it seems to be even more important to reflect on the (...) meaning of the key phenomena of humanity, such as that of suffering. Reflections on the quality of education which, potentially, wants to eliminate suffering, are important, indeed. Especially so by teachers, who are aware of their responsibility for future generations and the world, where suffering would not be hidden in centers of palliative care only. (shrink)

From the other side: On dialogue in texts by Jostein Gaarder. – By analysing the phenomenon of dialogue in the works of the Norwegian writer Jostein Gaarder the paper shows the essence of the dialogical situation of man in the world. Admittingly, people find themselves in such dialogical situation already. However, by virtue of their freedom, they are capable of going beyond the existing feeling of security, and – through fundamental dialogue with a person coming from the other side, one, (...) that is different, whose situation is different – finding a new dimension of human life, find life in truth, life of the uncovered (alétheia), in which freedom and responsibility of the dialogical being can be realised in a unique way. (shrink)

According to Gabriel Marcel, no task is more important and more complex than looking for ways of confronting and overcoming despair. Therefore, the search for the essence of hope is the objective of this paper. Reference is made to the theme of the open soul in Henri Bergson’s, Gabriel Marcel’s, and Jan Patočka’s works. Such a soul is not centred in itself; moreover, according to Marcel, hope and soul are intrinsically linked together. Hope opens people towards the future. The concept (...) of hope in the biblical context is shown briefly, according to which hope is in God (Ps 62:5), while God is coming to man. At the same time, biblical texts sketch a pathway to hope, setting out from suffering through endurance and character (Rom 5:3–4). The paper stresses that hope takes root in dialogue and that a person is empowered to adopt hope as a gift. (shrink)

The first editorial of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education.

At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength “certain amount” of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. These are alarming statements, undermining Popper’s methodological imperative of falsification. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons, for evolutionary reasons, and for ideological reasons. Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defining the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens (...) doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality. (shrink)

Hume built his philosophical system with the ambition to become a Newton of human nature. His science of man is the fulfillment of this project. Hume was inspired by the Newtonian experimental empirical method excluding hypotheses, and he applied this method to moral sciences; he took those to be the basis of all other knowledge. The observation of human cognitive faculties, however, brought him to sceptical conclusions concerning the rational justification of empirical sciences. His original ambitions are thus undermined and (...) his scepticism leads to the loss of legitimacy of natural science. The core of Hume's science of man is twofold - it consists in the analysis of mind and of human social behaviour. Hume contributed to the development of psychology and helped to form social sciences as a specific research area. Following his empirical method based on observation, his science of man has rather a documentary role than any normative features. (shrink)

AbstractŁukasiewicz introduced a new methodological approach to the history of logic. It consists of the use of modern formal logic in the research of the history of logic. Although he was not the first to use formal logic in his historical research, Łukasiewicz was the first who used it consistently and formulated it as a requirement for a historian of logic. The aim of this paper is to present Łukasiewicz's contribution and the history of its formulation. In addition, the paper (...) will present its reception. There are two main themes in Łukasiewicz’s work on the history of logic. He discussed Stoic logic and Aristotle’s syllogistic. The second part of the paper focuses on current reception of Łukasiewicz’s contribution and on the question of whether there is a difference between knowledge about his contribution to Stoic logic and to Aristotle’s syllogistic, given that it has been hypothesised that Łukasiewicz’s contribution is currently more known among Aristotelian scholars than among those who focus on Stoic logic. Based on the papers that have appeared in the last five years at Web of Science and Scopus this hypothesis has not been confirmed. (shrink)

This book studies Hume’s scepticism and its roots, context, and role in the philosopher’s life. It relates how Hume wrote his philosophy in a time of tumult, as the millennia-old metaphysical tradition that placed humans and their cognitive abilities in an ontological framework collapsed and gave way to one that placed the autonomy of the individual in its center. It then discusses the birth of modernity that Descartes inaugurated and Kant completed with his Copernican revolution that moved philosophy from Being (...) to the Self. It shows how modernity gave rise to a new kind of scepticism, involving doubt not just about the adequacy of our knowledge but about the very existence of a world independent of the self. The book then examines how Hume faced the sceptical implications and how his empiricism added yet another sceptical theme with the main question being how argument can legitimize key concepts of human understanding instinctively used in making sense of our perceptions. Placing it firmly in a historical context, the book shows how Hume was influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism and how this becomes clear in Hume’s acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the practical role of philosophy. As the book argues, rather than serving as the foundation of science, in Hume’s hand, philosophy became a guide to a joyful, happy life, to a documentary of common life and to moderately educated, entertaining conversation. This way Hume stands in strong opposition to the modern mainstream. (shrink)

Debata o tzv. „Novém Humovi“ byla v posledních desetiletích dominantním tématem humovské interpretace. James Hill ve svém příspěvku v tomto časopise podporuje hlavní požadavek „novohumovců“, který vymezuje Huma jako epistemologického skeptika a ontologického realistu. Vůči tomuto pojetí máme několik výhrad. Některé se týkají nejasností v definici realismu a celkově i smysluplnosti projektu „Nový Hume“. Některé se týkají konkrétních Hillových argumentů zaměřených na Humovy Dialogy a především jeho tvrzení, že v tomto díle lze nalézt další důkaz Humova realismu.

This article examines the key conditions for the development of business ethics in the Slovak Republic, drawing on insights from the Global Survey of Business Ethics 2022–2024. By analyzing the survey's findings, we highlight the critical factors shaping the ethical landscape of Slovak businesses, including corporate governance, regulatory frameworks, and cultural influences. The study reveals a growing awareness of the importance of ethical practices among Slovak companies, with an emphasis on compliance, transparency, and corporate social responsibility. However, challenges persist, such (...) as inconsistent enforcement of regulations and the need for further education on ethical standards. We discuss the role of key stakeholders, including government, business leaders, and educational institutions, in fostering a culture of ethics within the country. Our findings offer valuable insights into the evolving nature of business ethics in Slovakia and suggest strategies for strengthening ethical practices in the business environment. (shrink)

A unique feature of Hume’s epistemology is his concern for the philosopher’s state of mind in the process of doing philosophy. Philosophizing should bring agreeable feelings and avoid such contemplations that lead to distress. This is my main argument for proposing the affinity of Hume’s philosophy with the Pyrrhonian tradition. At the same time, however, Hume suspects that this goal is unattainable because a deep philosophical reflection necessarily leads to skeptical conclusions that give rise to depression. So how should a (...) philosopher bear this burden and “feel good” at the same time? For Hume, the conception of true philosophy remains contradictory, oscillating between an escape from philosophy to common life and the natural need to pursue profound reasoning. Hume later tries to remove these contradictions by proclaiming it necessary to blunt the edges of radical Pyrrhonism and move to the position of Academic skepticism. I have doubts about the success of his strategy. His proclaimed turn to academicism has no support in the ancient doctrines and, furthermore, Hume does not develop the theme of probable knowledge, which inspired the modern skeptics in their effort to provide rational foundations for the newly emerging sciences. (shrink)

Los viajes y desplazamientos a Italia se desarrollan en cuanto al entorno eslovaco se refiere desde el siglo XIX. Este trabajo se centra en la investigación del viaje, que en sus diarios describe el sacerdote y escritor católico, Štefan Nemecskay, representante de la segunda generación de los seguidores de Bernolák y que han sido publicados originalmente en varias revistas. Aunque el punto de partida del análisis es la categorización de los aspectos de la representación literaria de Italia esbozada por M. (...) Beller (ayuda no sólo a resumir los conocimientos previos sobre el país o la forma del relato de viaje, por ejemplo, el grado de predominio de los hechos factuales sobre la representación subjetiva de las experiencias individuales), el objetivo del trabajo es sobre todo reflejar la estrategia personal del autor basada en subrayar las dimensiones espirituales de la vida y reavivar la relación del hombre con Dios. (shrink)

Popper proposed his theory of objective knowledge to eliminate subjectivist epistemologies. Popper’s objectivism culminated in the theory of the autonomous World 3 characterized by its independence from the subjective factors belonging to World 2. I argue that Popper did not succeed in unifying his idea of the autonomy of knowledge with the requirement of the creative role of the critical subject in cognition. Moreover, his effort to desubjectivize knowledge undermined the vital importance of the critical activity that ensures the dynamism (...) of the growth of knowledge. In this respect, Popper suppressed the most interesting feature of his philosophical contribution. (shrink)

This paper introduces Prior’s unpublished paper Aristotle on Logical Squares, which is deposited in the Bodleian Library and which discusses Greniewski’s definition of the \ operator, which Greniewski introduced in his paper Próba ‘odmłodzenia’ kwadratu logicznego. It is a unique attempt to formalize the square of opposition. Bendiek’s review, which is an important intermediary between Greniewski’s and Prior’s paper, is also mentioned here. Greniewski’s main motivation was to rejuvenate the traditional square of opposition in order to make a square of (...) opposition more precise. He did not investigate the history of the square of opposition. Prior’s approach differs a great deal from Greniewski’s one because he bases his analyses of Greniewski’s operator on Aristotle’s definitions of squares of oppositions. There are some queries, which arise due to the different aims of Greniewski and Prior and their different approach might have caused Prior’s effort to the approximation of Greniewski’s operator to Aristotle’s definitions of the squares of opposition was unsuccessful. (shrink)

Complementary and alternative medicine is becoming increasingly popular in western countries, with estimates of CAM usage as high as 40%. This has prompted a change of attitude of the medical establishment: the initial dismissal of CAM is being replaced by a drive to integrate CAM into the mainstream. Two possible explanations for this integration thrust are considered. Firstly, integration could be motivated largely by cognitive interest in CAM. Secondly, integration could be mainly power-driven, aimed at controlling the alternative movement and (...) exploiting its capacity to make money. The second explanation seems more plausible, and is supported by data showing the paucity of research on CAM. The medical establishment does not sufficiently appreciate the challenge CAM poses, and does not consider its scientific appraisal to be a high priority. Instead, the allopathic community seems preoccupied with the opportunistic desire to protect its authority and social status. Such a discourse can become dogmatic, reluctant to revise critically the ‘accepted’ body of knowledge. Popper's critical rationalism could help to undercut dogmatism and encourage a critical, open-minded orientation of medical science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González QuinteroZuzana ParusnikováCatalina González Quintero. Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics. Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. 268. Hardcover. ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9. £99.99.This book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding field of research into the formative impact of ancient skepticism on early modern philosophy. This new paradigm was introduced several decades (...) ago, as González Quintero acknowledges, by the pioneering work of Richard Popkin; and while Popkin emphasized the constitutive role of Pyrrhonism in this process, recent philosophical debates have been characterized by a more measured approach, carefully differentiating between the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, and their respective influence on modern skeptics. Gonzáles Quintero opts for the Academic interpretation of Hume’s skepticism, applying it to both his Treatise and the first Enquiry, and extending it to both of Kant’s Critiques—an area much less explored in the context of ancient skepticism. She thus heads into a complex philosophical landscape.The reader may be somewhat puzzled by the book’s subtitle, one which seems to add yet another theme to its already broad structure. However, as Gonzáles Quintero explains in the Introduction, she wants to take the discussions of Academic skepticism beyond the field of empirical science and concentrate on the attitude of the skeptics towards metaphysics; her aim is to show how Cicero, Hume, and Kant “used skeptical means to examine the justification of metaphysical claims and to determine, in this way, which resulting beliefs could be held non-dogmatically and for practical purposes” (1). Perhaps then, the book may be more accurately titled Academic Skepticism and Metaphysics: Cicero, Hume and Kant.Though this may seem a reduction in the scope of the topics, in this particular case it is an expansion, since the author reconstructs how the attitude of the skeptics to metaphysics unfolds from their general epistemological skepticism concerning the limits of reason. She divides the book into three main parts (Cicero, Hume, and Kant), with the first chapter of each part describing the skeptical method of that particular philosopher or school, and the second examining its application to metaphysical matters. This is a huge undertaking for one book, requiring the author to navigate a vast field of philosophical material, including a significant amount of primary and secondary literature, while turning it all back toward the main question concerning the role played by Academic (Carneadean) skepticism in the ancient, Humean, and Kantian treatments of religion and other metaphysical issues. The danger of topic-overload arises and a selective approach is crucial to avoid “dropping the ball.” Gonzáles Quintero tackles this task with varying success. [End Page 346]The first chapter of the first part of the book provides a thorough analysis of Academic skepticism and how it differs from Pyrrhonism and stoicism. With an extensive knowledge of scholarly debates on ancient skepticism, the author discusses various nuances in the relationship between radical Pyrrhonism and Arciselaus of the Second Academy, moving on, predictably, to Carneades of the Third Academy, who proposed a moderate version of skepticism based on evaluating the degree of persuasiveness of impressions. Such impressions deserve non-dogmatic approval and can thus reduce the scope of epoché; they motivate our search for truth while admitting our fallibility; and they guide us in practical matters. Her argument that assenting to persuasive beliefs contains a rational (normative) aspect perhaps deserves further discussion; for the ancient skeptics the criterion of persuasiveness was subjective and unstable, reflecting our momentary feelings about appearances.In the chapter on metaphysics, the author compares Cicero’s skeptical method in De Natura Deorum (DND) and the Tusculan Disputations. In the former, Cicero (through the character of Cotta) abandons skeptical principles (which would prevent us from defining the nature of the gods) for the sake of the practical usefulness of religious rituals as endorsed by the Stoics; while for the Epicureans (Velleius) the gods (or some cosmic Deity) are utterly unconcerned by our world, for the Stoics (Balbus) they care about human affairs—thus this latter stance supports the state religion that Cicero... (shrink)

In our article, we will focus on an analysis of the relationship between man and the cosmos, set against the backdrop of ancient Greek ideas about the origin of the world. On the one hand, we will deal with the images of the creation of the world provided in Greek mythology and the religious tradition associated with it (in particular Hesiod); on the other hand, we will approach the anthropomorphic elements within the framework of philosophical cosmogonies (Plato’s dialogue, the Timaeus). (...) Our aim is to show that Greek philosophical thought was never able to fully relinquish this anthropomorphism but nonetheless it did move away from a purely mythological tradition (as found in Hesiod and the pre-Socratics) and, in some measure towards a more scientific interpretation of the cosmos (as found in Plato). (shrink)

I shall situate Hume's scepticism within a broader philosophical and historical context. Firstly, I shall consider the place of Hume's thought within the early modern break with the almost millennium long metaphysical tradition, a break initiated by Descartes. The framework of being structured by a universal order was replaced by the individual human mind that broke free from any higher authority and became an autonomous cognitive agent. Subsequently, the ontological self-evidence of the world or the possibility of adequate knowledge came (...) under sceptical attack. Hume firmly belongs to this discourse and can be seen as themost consistent exponent of this early modern sceptical line. In this light, the ‘New Hume’ claim that Hume was an ontological realist will be shown to be misplaced in principle. Secondly, the strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's philosophy will be considered, together with his concept of mitigated scepticism. The Pyrrhonian legacy is especially noticeable in Hume's acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the instructive role of philosophy – instead of attempting to make it the foundation of science it becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life. In this respect, Hume standsoutside the early modern mainstreamin philosophy. (shrink)

Beginning with the assumption that the normative conception of Zen that Dōgen expounded and practiced constitutes at its heart a religio-philosophical practice, I focus on Dōgen’s zazen-only as its primary locus. Specifying the nature of zazen-only on and off the cushion, I seek to foreground the ways in which the transformation of apparent dualities into non-dual dualities is key to understanding Dōgen’s Zen as a religio-philosophical practice. Since this activity implicates more than experience, e.g., valuations, desires, goals, actions, reactions, etc., (...) i.e., the entire psycho-physical existence of the practitioner, it is itself philosophical in the demands it makes on practitioners in the “nitty gritty” of life. Further, the activity of transforming apparent dualities into non-dual dualities relies on two other important concepts that Dōgen utilizes, those of “weighing emptiness” and non-thinking. I, thus, focus on expounding the manner in which grappling with non-dual duality, weighing emptiness, and non-thinking should be seen as loci of Dōgen’s religio-philosophical activities. Lastly, I note that the extent to which someone can engage the philosophical dimensions will depend on the person, their motivations, and that of their teachers. Yet, the more deeply one can penetrate the various issues, ideas, and concepts at stake, the deeper one’s practice-realization.Yet, following Hee-Jin Kim’s treatment of it, weighing emptiness is vital to the dynamicity of practice-realization in the world. This is because weighing emptiness is a way to describe the transformation and engagement with a non-dual duality in the world. While not denying the idea of “equality in emptiness,” it insists that differences must be taken into consideration in realizing the fairness, reasonableness, and justness of the practitioner acting in the world. (shrink)

At the beginning of modern logic, propositions were defined as unchangeable entities placed in a certain idealistic realm. These unchangeable propositions contain in themselves so-called indexical, i.e. the place, time and other circumstances of the utterance. This concept of the proposition, which is entitled eternalism, was and is still prevalent among analytic philosophers. Often even the term ‘proposition’ is identified with an idealistic entity located outside the real world. In my paper, I would like to focus on the concept of (...) propositions of two logicians who deviated from the standard understanding of propositions, Arthur N. Prior and Pavel Tichý. They were both proponents of temporalism, i.e. the view that propositions could change their truth-value over time. The paper will discuss the reasons why they were proponents of temporalism and compare their views. It claims that in Prior’s case, his metaphysical views were the main reasons he was a proponent of temporalism. In contrast, when Tichý presented his arguments for temporalism, he focused primarily on natural language. (shrink)

In his paper ‘The logic of temporal discourse’, Pavel Tichý pointed out that contemporary systems of logic were unable to sufficiently formalise tenses. He therefore suggested temporal specification in transparent intensional logic (TIL), a system of logic that he developed. Discussing contemporary systems of logic, Tichý also took into account the system of Arthur N. Prior, who developed the first systems of modern temporal logic, and his criticism was also addressed to Prior. Tichý only focused, however, on Prior’s early systems (...) of temporal logic. Patrick Blackburn recently raised the awareness that Prior also developed systems of hybrid logic in his latest periods. From the point of view of temporal specification, this system is particularly interesting as the system has greater expressive power than Prior’s early systems of temporal logic. It could also consequently deal with the problematic specifications of tenses that Pavel Tichý pointed out. It is not only the formal criterion that make Tichý and Prior’s approach suitable for comparison. Both logicians shared similar views on time and logic. All these convictions also influenced their systems of logic. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the temporal propositions that Tichý introduced as problematic could be formalised in Prior’s hybrid temporal logic. I will also compare formalisations in TIL and hybrid logic and Tichý and Prior’s views that influenced their systems of logic. (shrink)

Book review of KOPČÁKOVÁ, Slávka, (Ed.) – ORIŇÁKOVÁ, Slávka – ZUBAL, Pavol (2021) Tobias Gottfried Schröer (1791-1850). Estetika ako vízia lepšieho človeka. [Tobias Gottfried Schroer (1791-1850). Aesthetics as a vision of a better person.] Prešov: University of Prešov, Faculty of Arts. 321 p. ISBN 978-80-555-2767-3.

In the nineteenth century, philosophy was at a crossroads. While the natural and technical sciences were developing in an unprecedented fashion, philosophy seemed to be stalled. Inspired by the progress of the natural sciences, many philosophers attempted to make such progress in philosophy and make philosophy a truly scientific discipline. This effort was also reflected in the philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw school. While its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, following his teacher Franz Brentano, promoted psychology as a method of scientific philosophy, one (...) of his first students, Jan Łukasiewicz, was convinced that mathematical logic was such a method. To use mathematical logic as a tool, Łukasiewicz had to, however, argue convincingly that logic is an independent science and hence is not a part of psychology, i.e., arguing for anti-psychologism in logic. He initially adopted the arguments provided by Husserl, then celebrated as a proponent of anti-psychologism, and Frege’s views. When Łukasiewicz developed, however, his systems of many-valued logic, he denied almost all the principles that characterise Husserl and Frege’s anti-psychologism, i.e., the objectivity of the laws of logic, the existence of apodictic propositions, and the distinction between a priori and empirical sciences. He was, however, a proponent of anti-psychologism up to the end of his life. The aim of my paper is to introduce Łukasiewicz’s unique concept of anti-psychologism that significantly affected the views of mathematical logic in the Lvov-Warsaw School, and the views of his colleagues which helped him develop the concept. (shrink)

Since Kazimierz Twardowski introduced the notions of “symbolomania” and “pragmatophobia,” the relationship between logic and reality was the focus of the philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School — inter alia two prominent logicians of the group, Stanisław Leśniewski and Jan Łukasiewicz. Bolesław Sobociński has pointed out, however, that there was a contrast between their approach to logic and reality. Despite being members of the same philosophical group and even colleagues from the same department, their philosophical views on the position of logic (...) in reality differed considerably. Yet they both agreed that reality has a certain importance for logic and that logic could be valuable for reality. The aim of this paper is to introduce their divergent positions and describe in more detail how Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz understood the relationship between logic and the real world. (shrink)