In order to confirm that the sophist is a manufacturer of illusions, Plato argues that it is necessary to refute Parmenides’s thesis which states that there is only – as Plato interprets it – the absolute being. Most likely an echo of this thesis is found in Antisthenes, whom Plato seems to allude to in the _Sophist, _for whom “what is, is true”. This conception of truth is known as “ante-predicative” or ontological, and, according to Heidegger, would be (...) original. It is not the case. From Homer to Parmenides, truth was always attributed to a speech or thought, never to a “being”. The “ante-predicative” conception of truth was a creation of philosophy, which probably began with Parmenides and continued with Antisthenes. When Plato refutes it, in the second part of the _Sophist, _only returns to the past, because he makes speech the “place” of truth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the research program of formal ontology developed by M. Scheler before his last 1922 theoretical shift. Scheler’s theory of dialectical negation will be also investigated. In regard to the first topic, the focus will be on the complex architecture of Scheler’s formal ontology, deepened within a theoretical framework of realistic ontology: integrated into this framework, formal ontology becomes a basic tool for building phenomenological realisms. In regard to the second topic, the focus (...) will be on the close theoretical relationship between Scheler’s mature suggestion of a phenomenological objective dialectics essence-being underlying his theory of the “functionalization of the essential knowledge” (Funktionalizierung der Wesenserkenntnis) ─ systematically presented for the first time in the 1921 work Probleme der Religion ─, and the formal ontological foundation of a logical theory of a “pluralistic” dialectical negation, that is, dually, an intuitionistic, hence paracomplete, and a paraconsistent negation. Finally, it will be introduced the basics of a semiotic interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological formal ontology within the rigorous framework of Category Theory (TC). This interpretation “strengthens” the traditional (inter)subjective side of phenomenological analysis with a new ─ in the application suggested ─ “in the third person” objective side of semiotic analysis, that shares with the first one a common pre-logical and ante-predicative level of inquiry. (shrink)

O artigo interpreta o pensamento de Heidegger como transformação da filosofia transcendental que conduz à sua radicalização e, ultimamente, destruição. A este projecto contrapõe Apel a sua tentativa de estabelecer uma filosofia transcendental linguístico-pragmática que procura estabelecer um compromisso entre as temáticas da constituição antepredicativa do sentido e da exigência de validade intersubjectiva. /// L'article interprète la pensée de Heidegger comme transformation de la philosophie transcendantale qui conduit à sa radicalisation et, en dernier lieu, à sa destruction. A ce projet, (...) Apel oppose sa tentative d'établir une philosophie transcendantale linguistique pragmatique qui cherche à faire un compromis entre les thématiques de la constitution anteprédicative du sens et de l'exigence de validité intersubjective. /// The author interprets Heidegger's thought in terms of a transformation of transcendental philosophy, leading to its radicalization and finally its destruction. In the place of this project, the author proposes a transcendental philosophy of a linguistic and pragmatic kind, wich seeks to establish a compromise between the thematics of ante-predicative constitution of sense and the demand for intersubjective validity. (shrink)

In this article, I sketch out and examine the aesthetic basis of an implicit ontological model of community, grounded on dialogical practice, which appears in Grant Kester’s proposal for a dialogical theory of socially engaged contemporary art. I address two distinct but related aspects of Kester’s view on understanding as a constitutive part of dialogical aesthetic experience. First, I endeavour to show that the post-foundational framework of a ‘procedural knowledge’ which he uses to support his theory of aesthetic communication requires (...) a stronger intersubjective ground to ensure the actual empathic understanding of the other dialogical partner. In this respect, I claim that he could be using the Kantian notion of sensus communis in a constitutive rather than in a regulative manner, thus grounding empathy on an ante-predicative level of experiencing alterity. This unorthodox usage of the Kantian aesthetic postulate points towards a particular understanding of sensus communis as the universal communicability of human finitude, which I eventually argue for on the lines of Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking. (shrink)

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the main tenets of Husserl ‘s conception of formal logic, its different levels and its relationship with formal mathematics and formal ontology. It will, therefore, undertake a delimitation of the logical domain, in its autonomy, taking as its point of departure the presentation Husserl makes of this subject in his works of maturity, particularly in Forma/e und. transzendentale Logik. The second ·part shows why, for phenomenology, the analysis of objective (...) logical configurations has to be completed by a subjective analysis of the intentional achievements in which these configurations have their genesis. ln other words, we will try to ground such an autonomy in. the very nature of logical reason. Finally, the third and last part, following the text of the first two sections of Erfahrung und Urteil, adresses the roots of the logical-categorical activity in the ante-predicative passive experience. (shrink)

The paper explores the difference between semiology and hermeneutics of pain and suffering by focusing on narrativity and the body. First, it recapitulates some historical distinctions between explaining and understanding in the context of psychopathology. It shows how the hermeneutic method culminates in the idea of the cohesion of life, constituted through biography and narrative. The second section deals with the relationship between narrativity and selfhood in stories of suffering. The third part addresses the problem of the lived body and (...) the ante-predicative embodiment of suffering and pain, which fuse with the ambiance, coloring the lifeworld. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is not to affirm or deny particular philosophical positions, but to explore the limits of intelligibility about what post-mortem harm means, especially in the light of improper post-mortem procedures at Bristol and Alder Hey hospitals in the late 1990s. The parental claims of post-mortem harm to dead children at Alder Hey Hospital are reviewed from five different philosophical perspectives, eventually settling on a crucial difference of perspective about how we understand harm to the dead. On (...) the one hand there is the broadly 'analytical' tradition1 of thinking that predicates the notion of harm on the basis of an existing subject. Since the dead are non-existent persons, it makes little sense to view the dead as being harmed. On the other hand, there is a phenomenological perspective, where the dead, in respect to the experience of grief, are existentially absent. This forms the basis that it is possible to harm grieving parent's experiences of how their dead are treated. The article ends with a short examination of what harming the dead implies for traditional bioethical concerns, namely, obtaining informed consent from significant others when planning medical research on the newly dead. (shrink)

The article focuses on debates concerning ontology and predication in early Neoplatonism (Porphyry and Iamblichus). Evidence coming from Simplicius’ Commentary on the Categories and from the Categories Commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest suggests that Porphyry and Iamblichus interpreted Aristotle’s theory of synonymous predication (dici de subiecto) and specific differentia within the framework of their ontology (doctrine of the hierarchy of being). While Porphyry possibly suggested that a slightly emended version of Aristotle’s predication could express the relation between ante rem (...) and in re items (akatatakton, katatetagmenon), Iamblichus argued that different metaphysical levels cannot in any way be conceived of as species ranked under the same genus (hence Iamblichus’ emphasis on paronymous predication). Further evidence coming from Iamblichus’ Reply to Porphyry and from the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides attributed to Porphyry confirms these conclusions. (shrink)

En este complejo futuro que se nos predice, no solo se nos podrá superar en nuestras capacidades intelectuales o físicas, incorporando a nuestro entorno y a nuestro propio cuerpo un ingente aparataje tecnológico, sino que se nos podrá mejorar, y ello, incluso, antes de nacer, interviniendo directamente sobre el embrión. La naturaleza de lo humano se pone en cuestión, sobre todo, cuando la alteramos en su propia esencia, no solo en su entorno, y, además, desde su propio inicio. Se trata, (...) pues, de una disrupción y alteración sustancial ad intra del ser humano, no ad extra, como ocurre con la tecnología, aún cuando esta también tiene, obviamente, muchos efectos en el interior de aquél. Los cambios que se derivan de la Biotecnología y, concretamente, de la edición genómica, por un lado, ofrecen un enorme potencial para desarrollar nuevos conceptos, métodos y novedosas aplicaciones para los urgentes retos y necesidades de la sociedad. Por el otro lado, tales biotecnologías son percibidas como si tuvieran el potencial de desafiar y, a veces, desdibujar las actitudes, valores y modelos culturales de la propia sociedad. A tal reto no puede estar, obviamente, ajeno el Derecho en atención a los valores, intereses y derechos en conflicto. Si la pregunta que debemos nuevamente formularnos es qué es el hombre o qué es la naturaleza humana, el Derecho debe también ofrecer respuestas que permitan dar un sentido jurídico contemporáneo a tal esencia, preguntas que conectan directamente con el propio concepto jurídico de dignidad, no solo en cuanto valor ontológico del ser humano, sino también, recogiendo los términos explícitos del artículo 10.1 de nuestra Constitución, en cuanto fundamento del orden político y de la paz social. (shrink)

Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais (...) sejam crenças elas jamais são verdadeiras. Em contraste com teorias do erro contemporâneas, contudo, a tese de Hume não se baseia em uma alegação metafísica para efeito de que não há propriedades morais. Antes, ele sustenta que ideias morais não são ideias de qualidades que possam ser corretamente predicadas de ações ou traços de caráter, mas ideias de sentimentos e que, portanto, crenças morais incorporam sistematicamente um erro categorial. AbstractIn this paper I consider and reject a noncognitivist reading of Hume’ s moral sentimentalism (according to which he identifies moral convictions with impressions of particular kind) as well as a dispositional reading (according to which Hume takes moral convictions to be causal beliefs about the power of character traits to produce certain feelings in suitable spectators). I argue that the shortcomings of these views show that Hume is best understood as an error theorist, according to whom although moral convictions are beliefs they are never true. In contrast with contemporary error theories, however, Hume’s view is not grounded on a metaphysical claim to the effect that there are no moral properties. He holds instead that moral ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that could be truthfully predicated of actions or character traits but rather ideas of feelings and, therefore, that moral beliefs systematically incorporate a category error. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“El secreto oficio de la abeja”A Sociopolitical Metaphor in the CelestinaCristina Guardiola (bio)Rojas returns again and again in La Celestina to the theme of the disruption of human relationships.—Stephen Gilman, The Spain of Fernando de RojasEnabled by the old bawd Celestina, the loco amor felt by the clandestine lovers Calisto and Melibea exposes a society living in disorder and conflict. Calisto and Melibea’s transgressive desire, and those who make (...) it possible, may be seen as directly contradicting moral and social laws upon which the tragicomedy claims to be predicated. Most of the characters in the work live their lives as transgression; their disorderly conduct leads inevitably to their death and destruction [Baranda 9]. The negative example offered by this work was, according to Maravall, what led early readers such as Quevedo to understand how the work: “debaxo del nombre de Comedia, enseña a vivir bien, moral y políticamente, acreditanto las virtudes y disfamando los vicios [under the title of Comedy, teaches one to live well, both moral and politically, accrediting virtues and discrediting vices]” [qtd. in Maravall 19].1 The Celestina lays bare its social and moralistic message by exposing the corruption of social and moral values prevalent in this late fifteenth-century work. Bringing together the aristocratic world of courtly love (already brought low through the Calisto’s crass treatment of waspish Melibea) and the bawdy world of the whorehouse, Rojas debases the people and passions therein. Connecting both worlds through her comings and goings is Celestina. Characterized as abeja, a political animal used in the Middle Ages and early modern period that informs the ideal structure of society, Celestina exposes a satire of society and its corruption of moral values.As the Síguese and prologue indicate, the tragicomedy was written with a dual and moral intent. The author wrote to disabuse the many “galanes y enamorados mancebos [handsome young men and enamored youth]” of his country from the cruel and evil fires of love, but also to expose “engaños de las alcahuetas y malos y lisonjeros siruientes [the deceptions of procuresses and evil sycophantic servants].” In the Celestina, the deceits of the bawd and servants Sempronio and (later) Pármeno complicate the narrative and move it to its tragic conclusion. As Celestina and Sempronio set out to profit by Calisto’s lovesickness, they are met with opposition from Pármeno. The initial resistance Pármeno puts up to defend himself and his master from the economic lust felt by Celestina and Sempronio serves to expose a conflict in social class. The heedless attainment of wealth demonstrated by the servants contradicts a more aristocratic principle that was perceived to guide economic thought in the Middle Ages [Maravall 60]. Celestina’s spoken adage, “[a] tuerto o a derecho, nuestra casa hasta el techo [by hook or by crook, our house [End Page 147] through the roof],” exposes her unmitigated greed and contrasts sharply with Calisto’s more courtly (if yet parodic) examples of largesse. The alcahueta’s greed is not merely opportunistic, it belies a certain Schadenfreude felt for Calisto’s woes. Like “cirurjanos [ante] los descalabrados [surgeons before patients with head trauma],” Celestina pursues Calisto in search of money, which at this particular moment in history was slipping through the hands of her real-life counterparts and into those of state-appointed brothel keepers. As Lacarra notes, the granting of royal mercedes for the incomes derived from prostitution to royal towns or notable persons became prevalent during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel [40]. One must imagine women such as Celestina doubly feeling the pinch from this seemingly “catholic” imposition. Income from the alcahueta livelihood from all of Castile certainly must have been dwindling. At the same time, the alcahueta’s dishonest way of living was being usurped by speciously honorable citizens who no doubt maligned the prostitutes on whom their wealth was gained. Despite the growing danger of her increasingly clandestine profession, Celestina shows little shame or fear. Indeed, her sense of “honor” for the putería is so brightly and enthusiastically expressed in the work bearing her name that one wonders if it might not stem from... (shrink)

According to Joseph Heath, privatizations should be judged on a case-by-case basis with appeal to the Pareto criterion. This approach, or so I argue, amounts to a depoliticization of privatization. While Heath’s approach is effective and at times illuminating, I show that a consistent application of his methodology is self-defeating in that it eventually requires a politicization of privatization. With appeal to transaction cost theory, I show there are social costs associated with affirming the competitive pressures of the market. Subsequently, (...) I argue that while private actors may, according to Heath, pursue efficiency with appeal to an adversarial morality, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are much more constrained in how they may achieve such gains. Due to the pressures of liberal neutrality, SOEs may chase efficiency only without setting actors back. Conversely, the private sector’s potential for success is predicated on its ability to compete for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which specifically allows for win-lose interactions. While SOEs are often no more able than the private sector to achieve Pareto optima, this discrepancy makes it so that SOEs produce gains that are ex-ante lower but more equal, whereas the private sector produces gains that are ex-ante higher but more unequal. Thus, the social cost of affirming the competitive pressures of the market is ex-ante inequality. If this premise is accepted, there is no way to avoid the conclusion that a consistent case-by-case approach requires a structural, political view on how privatizations affect the state’s ex-post Pareto-enhancing abilities. (shrink)

The word pro-tasis is etymologically a near equivalent of pre-mise, pro-position, and ante-cedent—all having positional, relational connotations now totally absent in contemporary use of proposition. Taking protasis for premise, Aristotle’s statement (24a16) -/- A protasis is a sentence affirming or denying something of something…. -/- is not a definition of premise—intensionally: the relational feature is absent. Likewise, it is not a general definition of proposition—extensionally: it is too narrow. This paper explores recent literature on these issues.

Supported by a qualitative study of triple bottom line firms—those that simultaneously prioritize economic, social, and environmental objectives—we investigated the market logic and practices of TBL firms to better understand how they fulfill their mission and achieve their goals. We explored if and how TBL firms may differ in their approach to stakeholders and the management of their resources, including dynamic capabilities. We employed a research design that emphasizes the iterative comparison of narrative data within themselves and with scholarly literature (...) [i.e., resource-based view ] to develop new theoretical insights. Because the RBV is commonly used to theorize how firms achieve competitive advantage, we explored whether TBL firms achieve competitive advantage differently from what RBV theory would predict. Our data suggest that how a firm defines value has a significant influence on the capabilities it creates and how it treats its resources. We find that TBL firms redefine value to not only focus on the end product or service but also to include the systemic cost of delivering goods. As a result, TBL firms differ from prevailing scholarly thought in RBV. They strive to have resources that are sustainable and therefore imitable, commonly found, and substitutable. Moreover, they are not only transparent in their processes but also collaborate with others in the value chain and in their sector. In doing so, they deliberately create new markets from which other firms can benefit. Rather than focusing on competitive advantage, they focus on collaborative advantage. (shrink)

The author considers the current process of fragmenting ethics into numerous special ethics at the starting point of the article as a process of destroying ethics as a philosophical discipline. He relates this to the historical failure of ethics which due to categorical limitations could not address the challenges of the advanced scientific-technical civilisation, resulting in an “ethical vacuum”. In response to the ethical vacuum, a number of ethical initiatives have emerged which the author, according to the effects on the (...) rehabilitation of the role of traditional ethics and on the creation of a new orientation framework, classifies on a destructive and productive line. On the productive line of overcoming the ethical vacuum, bioethics has emerged which, along with other ethical projects, has created a new orientation atmosphere that the author calls “a new ethical culture”. On the destructive line, along with the inflation of special ethics, a special form of destruction has emerged in terms of implanting “applied ethics”, which the author refers to as a nonsensical concept, into the fabric of traditional ethics. Then the author presents three main problems of applied ethics. The first is of a substantive nature and consists in the fact that applied ethics does not have and in principle cannot have unquestionable norms as an object of application. The second main problem is of a methodological nature and consists in the inappropriateness and non-acceptance of deductivism as a model of applying ethical norms to practice. The third main problem is of a practical nature and consists in developing the myth of the practicality of applied ethics. The author concludes that applied ethics is neither an ethical concept nor an ethical project but a market brand which on the ethical plane turns out to be nonsense. In the point of the article, the author argues that applied ethics became an institution of ethical absurdity the moment it, as an empty marketing label, took over the vacancy of the object of application and the role of general ethics for an unrelated and undefined conglomerate of special ethics transformed into its branches. (shrink)

Successfully navigating the norms of a society is a complex task that involves recognizing diverse kinds of rules as well as the relative weight attached to them. In the United States, different kinds of rules—federal statutes and regulations, scientific norms, and professional ideals—guide the work of researchers. Penalties for violating these different kinds of rules and norms can range from the displeasure of peers to criminal sanctions. We proposed that it would be more difficult for researchers working in the U.S. (...) who were born in other nations to distinguish the seriousness of violating rules across diverse domains. We administered a new measure, the evaluating rules in science task, to National Institutes of Health-funded investigators. The ERST assessed perceptions of the seriousness of violating research regulations, norms, and ideals, and allowed us to calculate the degree to which researchers distinguished between the seriousness of each rule category. The ERST also assessed researchers’ predictions of the seriousness that research integrity officers would assign to the rules. We compared researchers’ predictions to the seriousness ratings of 112 RIOs working at U.S. research-intensive universities. U.S.-born researchers were significantly better at distinguishing between the seriousness of violating federal research regulations and violating ideals of science, and they were more accurate in their predictions of the views of RIOs. Acculturation to the U.S. moderated the effects of nationality on accuracy. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of future research and education. (shrink)

This study examined the role of reflection on personal cases for making ethical decisions with regard to new ethical problems. Participants assumed the position of a business manager in a hypothetical organization and solved ethical problems that might be encountered. Prior to making a decision for the business problems, participants reflected on a relevant ethical experience. The findings revealed that application of material garnered from reflection on a personal experience was associated with decisions of higher ethicality. However, whether the case (...) was viewed as positive or negative, and whether the outcomes, processes, or outcomes and processes embedded in the experience were examined, influenced the application of case material to the new problem. As expected, examining positive experiences and the processes involved in those positive experiences resulted in greater application of case material to new problems. Future directions and implications for understanding ethical decision making are discussed. (shrink)

How to improve clinical practice and, in particular, that of physical therapy? Currently, several strategies are used which all fit the label scientification. These scientific strategies have to make physical therapy''s clinical practice more homogeneous. Sometimes this homogenization is thought to be necessary for other strategies of innovation including effectiveness research. But it has also been suggested that more homogeneity in the clinic is already itself an improvement. In this article we comment on these strategies. More specifically, we direct our (...) attention at attempts in physical therapy to establish a uniform, generally adopted scientific language. We argue that these attempts fail to appreciate the specificity of therapeutic work. The effectiveness research that follows is therefore liable to take irrelevant variables into account. We illustrate this argument with examples taken from analyses of diverging therapies for stroke patients. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:We explore the impact on employee attitudes of their perceptions of how others outside the organization are treated above and beyond the impact of how employees are directly treated by the organization. Results of a study of 827 employees in eighteen organizations show that employee perceptions of corporate social responsibility are positively related to organizational commitment with the relationship being partially mediated by work meaningfulness and perceived organizational support and job satisfaction with work meaningfulness partially mediating the relationship but not (...) POS. Moreover, in order to address limited micro-level research in CSR, we develop a measure of employee perceptions of CSR through four pilot studies. Employing a bifactor model, we find that social responsibility has an additional effect on employee attitudes beyond environmental responsibility, which we posit is due to the relational component of social responsibility. (shrink)

Drawing on social identity theory and organizational identification theory, we develop a model of the impact of perceived corporate social responsibility on employees’ organizational identification. We argue that employees’ perceptions of their company’s social responsibility behaviors are more important than organizational reality in determining organizational identification. After defining perceived corporate social responsibility (PCSR), we postulate how PCSR affects organizational identification when perception and reality are aligned or misaligned. Implications for organizational practice and further research are discussed.

The purpose of this paper was to sketch in the outlines of the New Politics that is necessary following recent changes and events. The requirements of this New Politics aim not to restrict international, national and regional politics solely to the area of rational planning, but to increase the number of its partners by bringing in the religions as well and taking on as tasks their demands for justice, their universal ethics and an education in non-violence. This vision of the (...) tasks is crucially based on peace, ethical standards and promoting the human. Involvement in politics, in the sense of the New Politics described here, gives UNESCO the important role of being the meeting-place for dialogue between religions and civilizations and gives the United Nations the role of political forum for the implementation of the knowledge acquired through dialogue. As regards the university disciplines essential to an advisory function serving this New Politics, the political, economic and social sciences will of course have to be included, but we must also add History now, and particularly the History of Religions (including the Sociology and Psychology of Religion), in order to respond appropriately to the new challenges thrown up by the protest expressed in the name of religion. (shrink)

The education of students and professionals in business ethics is an increasingly important goal on the agenda of business schools and corporations. The present study provides a meta-analysis of 25 previously conducted business ethics instructional programs. The role of criteria, study design, participant characteristics, quality of instruction, instructional content, instructional program characteristics, and characteristics of instructional methods as moderators of the effectiveness of business ethics instruction were examined. Overall, results indicate that business ethics instructional programs have a minimal␣impact on increasing (...) outcomes related to ethical perceptions, behavior, or awareness. However, specific criteria, content, and methodological moderators of effectiveness shed light on potential recommendations for␣improving business ethics instruction. Implications for␣future research and practice in business ethics are discussed. (shrink)

Health and illness are not objective concepts but rather issues which depend upon cultural and religious traditions. In Islam there are two traditional approaches to these concepts: prophetic medicine and the medicine of the Islamic Middle Ages, which was strongly influenced by Galen and Hippocrates. Tody, Islam is increasingly looking at modern western orthodox medicine. With regard to Muslim patients, however, it is still necessary to take into account the peculiarities of their religious traditions.