From an evolutionary perspective, both atavism and somatic evolution/convergent evolution theories can account for the consistent occurrence, and astounding attributes of cancers: being able to evolve from a single cell to a complex organized system, and malignant transformations showing significant similarities across organs, individuals, and species. Here, we first provide an overview of these two hypotheses, including the possibility of them not being mutually exclusive, but rather potentially representing the two extremes of a continuum in which the diversity of (...) cancers can emerge. In reviewing the current literature, we also discuss the criteria that should be applied to discriminate between the two competing theories and to determine their relevant contributions to oncogenesis and cancer progression. Finally, we deliberate on the potential applications of this conceptual framework in developing novel treatment strategies. (shrink)

Stochastic gene expression plays a leading developmental role through its contribution to cell differentiation. It is also proposed to promote phenotypic diversification in malignant cells. However, it remains unclear if these two forms of cellular bet‐hedging are identical or rather display distinct features. Here we argue that bet‐hedging phenomena in cancer cells are more similar to those occurring in unicellular organisms than to those of normal metazoan cells. We further propose that the atavistic bet‐hedging strategies in cancer originate from a (...) hijacking of the normal developmental bet‐hedging of metazoans. Finally, we discuss the constraints that may shape the atavistic bet‐hedging strategies of cancer cells. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of totalitarianism as formulated in her magnum opus—The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). It argues that, to comprehend totalitarianism, Arendt forged a heterodox method of historical analysis. Employing that method, she conceived totalitarianism as a form of transcendence of historical context. In doing so, however, she ignored crucial historical contexts that were in fact related to the history of totalitarianism. Subverting her interpretation of totalitarianism as transcendence, these elided contexts erupted inadvertently and (...) repeatedly into her analysis—revealing that totalitarianism was solidly embedded in them. The Origins of Totalitarianism thus exhibits a conceptual contradiction that confuses its attempt to understand totalitarianism. (shrink)

Cancer is most commonly viewed as resulting from somatic mutations enhancing proliferation and invasion. Some hypotheses further propose that these new capacities reveal a breakdown of multicellularity allowing cancer cells to escape proliferation and cooperation control mechanisms that were implemented during evolution of multicellularity. Here we critically review one such hypothesis, named “atavism,” which puts forward the idea that cancer results from the re‐expression of normally repressed genes forming a program, or toolbox, inherited from unicellular or simple multicellular ancestors. (...) This hypothesis places cancer in an interesting evolutionary perspective that has not been widely explored and deserves attention. Thinking about cancer within an evolutionary framework, especially the major transitions to multicellularity, offers particularly promising perspectives. It is therefore of the utmost important to analyze why one approach that tries to achieve this aim, the atavism hypothesis, has not so far emerged as a major theory on cancer. We outline the features of the atavism hypothesis that, would benefit from clarification and, if possible, unification. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that cancer onset and progression represent a type of reversion to an ancestral quasi‐unicellular phenotype. This general concept has been refined into the atavistic model of cancer that attempts to provide a quantitative analysis and testable predictions based on genomic data. Over the past decade, support for the multicellular‐to‐unicellular reversion predicted by the atavism model has come from phylostratigraphy. Here, we propose that cancer onset and progression involve more than a one‐off multicellular‐to‐unicellular reversion, and (...) are better described as a series of reversionary transitions. We make new predictions based on the chronology of the unicellular‐eukaryote‐to‐multicellular‐eukaryote transition. We also make new predictions based on three other evolutionary transitions that occurred in our lineage: eukaryogenesis, oxidative phosphorylation and the transition to adaptive immunity. We propose several modifications to current phylostratigraphy to improve age resolution to test these predictions. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/3unEu5JYJrQ. (shrink)

In the atavistic model of cancer progression, tumor cell dedifferentiation is interpreted as a reversion to phylogenetically earlier capabilities. The more recently evolved capabilities are compromised first during cancer progression. This suggests a therapeutic strategy for targeting cancer: design challenges to cancer that can only be met by the recently evolved capabilities no longer functional in cancer cells. We describe several examples of this target‐the‐weakness strategy. Our most detailed example involves the immune system. The absence of adaptive immunity in immunosuppressed (...) tumor environments is an irreversible weakness of cancer that can be exploited by creating a challenge that only the presence of adaptive immunity can meet. This leaves tumor cells more vulnerable than healthy tissue to pathogenic attack. Such a target‐the‐weakness therapeutic strategy has broad applications, and contrasts with current therapies that target the main strength of cancer: cell proliferation. (shrink)

For over two centuries, the platypus (Ornithorhynchus anatinus) has been constructed and categorized in multiple ways. An unprecedented mélange of anatomical features and physiological functions, it long remained a systematic quandary. Nevertheless, since 1797, naturalists and biologists have pursued two recurring obsessions. Investigations into platypus reproduction and lactation have focused attention largely upon females of the species. Despite its apparent admixture of avian, reptilian and mammalian characters, the platypus was soon placed as a rudimentary mammal – primitive, naïve and harmless. (...) This article pursues a different taxonomic trajectory, concentrating on a specifically male anatomical development: the crural spur and venom gland on the hind legs. Once the defining characteristic of both the platypus and echidna (Tachyglossus aculeatus), by 1830 this sexed spur had been largely dismissed as inactive and irrelevant. For a creature regularly depicted as a biological outlier, the systematic and evolutionary implications of platypus poison have remained largely overlooked. In Australia, however, sporadic cases of ‘spiking’ led to consistent homologies being remarked between the platypus crural system and the venom glands of snakes. As with its reproductive reliance upon eggs, possession of an endogenous poison suggested significant reptilian affinities, yet the platypus has rarely been classed as an advanced reptile. Indeed, ongoing uncertainty regarding the biological purpose of the male’s spur has ostensibly posed a directional puzzle. As with so many of its traits, however, platypus poison has been consistently described as a redundant remnant, rather than an emergent feature indicating evolutionary advance. (shrink)

Homeosis is a developmental abnormality corresponding to the transformation of a part of the body into another one. This term was introduced in 1894 by William Bateson, who aimed to make an inventory of all kinds of biological variation in order to understand how evolution proceeds. But, immediately afterwards experimental embryology, or Entwicklungsmechanik in Germany, adopted and redefined this term to refer to abnormal regenerations in which the newly developed organ was not identical to the initial one but rather resembled (...) another part of the body. At that time, many experimental embryologists, such as Wilhelm Roux, were calling for the elimination of any phylogenetic explanation of development and were attempting to promote more mechanistic, proximate explanations. Despite these recommendations, several biologists continued to account for developmental processes by turning to phylogeny instead of mechanical forces. The case of homeosis is representative. Indeed, abnormal regenerations were often seen as examples of atavisms, or recurrence of ancestral characteristics, and many embryologists appealed to Ernst Haeckel's 'fundamental biogenetic law' to explain these strange phenomena. The break between Haeckelian tradition and Entwicklungsmechanik is thus less radical than often assumed, and the homeosis concept represents one of the factors of this continuity. (shrink)

Bishop Desmond Tutu's call, in 2013, for former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to be tried for war crimes, led to much reporting and comment in the online pages of UK newspapers. At first sight, it was a topic that seemed particularly conducive to the attraction of trolling, flaming and Ebile in the comments posted below journalistic pieces. Both Tutu and Blair are controversial and divisive characters, and the context of the Iraq War seemed fertile ground for heated exchanges. A (...) content analysis of 2,476 comments and 27,970 likes/dislikes offered a fairly substantial for identification of and evaluation of the value this discourse. In the event, trolling, flaming and Ebile were rare in the context of this political discourse, suggesting, at least a form of discourse closer to the ideals of Habermas. (shrink)

The idea of ‘reversion’ or ‘atavism’ has a peculiar history. For many authors in the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries – including Darwin, Galton, Pearson, Weismann, and Spencer, among others – reversion was one of the central phenomena which a theory of heredity ought to explain. By only a few decades later, however, Fisher and others could look back upon reversion as a historical curiosity, a non-problem, or even an impediment to clear theorizing. I explore various reasons that reversion might (...) have appeared to be a central problem for this first group of figures, focusing on their commitment to a variety of conceptual features of evolutionary theory; discuss why reversion might have then ceased to be an interesting phenomenon; and, finally, close with some more general thoughts about the death of scientific problems. (shrink)

An important historical relation that has hardly been addressed is the influence of Prosper Lucas's Treatise on Natural Inheritance on the development of Charles Darwin's concepts related to inheritance. In this article we trace this historical connection. Darwin read Lucas's Treatise in 1856. His reading coincided with many changes concerning his prior ideas on the transmission and expression of characters. We consider that this reading led him to propose a group of principles regarding prepotency, hereditary diseases, morbid tendencies and (...) class='Hi'>atavism; following Lucas, he called these principles: laws of inheritance. (shrink)

Criminal Woman [La Donna delinquente], Cesare Lombroso’s book on women criminals, published with Guglielmo Ferrero in 1893, marks the moment when the Italian criminologist first systematically integrated the animal world into his explanations of deviancy. At this time, he put forward a general theory of evolution based on femininity. This article queries the way this structure functions on the theoretical level, via a precise example: female brigands. It proposes that the textual and visual strategies of representing these women, notably their (...) virilization, was closely linked to the theory of “the primitive superiority of the female” and the lack of distinction between the sexes in certain “lower” animal species. Paradoxically, the atavism of criminal women thus brought them closer to masculine features, making them throwbacks on the evolutionary path that the “normal woman”– “a man in a state of arrested development” – had interrupted. (shrink)

From _atavistic_ to _folie a deux_, from _engram_ to _Weltschmerz_ and _Seashore test_, this edition of _The Concise Dictionary of Psychology_ contains more than 1,300 references to words, phrases and eminent pioneers in psychology. Updated to take account of recent developments, each definition is clear, instructive and concise. A lean and efficient source of information, written in a straightforward and readable manner, this book will be an indispensable reference tool for students of psychology, for professionals and for people in the (...) health and caring professions. (shrink)

An atavism is the ..reappearance of a lost character (morphology or behaviour) typical of remote ancestors and not seen in the parents or recent ancestors of the organisms displaying the atavistic character (Hall, 1984). In humans, hypertrichosis (extensive body hair), the presence of a tail and supernumerary nipples are often quoted as examples (Hall, 1995). However, Louis Bolk (1866–1930) explained these phenomena in another way. He considered human morphology as an unspecialized expression of the mammalian developmental pattern. The latter (...) also encompasses potentialities for unilateral or propulsive development pathways (specializations) that usually remain latent in humans, but can become expressed in other species. According to Bolk, the appearance of so-called atavisms in humans results from the occasional expression of these latencies in Homo sapiens; they do not recapitulate ancestral conditions. (shrink)

Psychopathy fascinates. Modernist writers construct out of it an image of alienated individualism pursuing the moment, killing they know not why, exploiting in passing, troubled, if troubled at all, not by guilt, but by perplexity (Camus 1989; Gide 1995; Mailer 1957; Musil 1996). Psychiatrists and psychologists—even those who should know better—are drawn by it to take off into philosophical speculation about morality, evil, and the beast in man (Mullen 1992; Simon 1996). Philosophers succumb to the temptation of attempting to ground (...) speculation in the supposed facticity of psychopathy. -/- Psychopathy is a cultural construct with roots going back to the eighteenth century, but which only came to full flower over the last fifty years (Hare 1998; Lewis 1974). The currently fashionable constructions of psychopathy find wide acceptance among clinicians and academics. The problem is, however, whether the concept has connections that have been established to the behavior, psychopathology, or the structure and function of brain worthy of according even a modest level of scientific status. There is little point in basing an argument on some supposed scientific gold standard if what glitters is iron pyrites (fools' gold). -/- Neil Levy's opening paragraph contains the statement "Yet in other respects they seem quite irrational; so much so that the term moral insanity has sometimes been applied to them" (p. 129). This both asserts that there is a category "them," namely the psychopaths, and connects them to "moral insanity." Moral insanity entered the language of psychiatry when Pritchard chose to use the term to translate Pinel's category of mania sans deliré (Pritchard 1836). Pinel was attempting to conceptualize a range of disorders that bordered on insanity in the sense of severe disturbances of affect, judgment, and behavior, but that were not accompanied by hallucinations or delusions (Pinel 1798/1964). In today's terminology, the cases he described would probably fall into diagnostic groups, including major depression, bipolar disorder, epilepsy, and a range of personality disorders. A number of his more striking case histories involved antisocial and even murderous behavior, which probably reflected Pinel's role in assessing offenders for the criminal courts of Paris. Pritchard's use of the English word "moral" reflected an appeal first to its use at the time to designate something which was like or similar, but not identical (a usage the OED labels "vulgar"), and second moral in the sense of ethical, conforming to virtuous behavior. Anglophones seized on the latter meaning, although Pinel emphasized the former. Forty years later, Henry Maudsley, the most widely read psychiatrist of his generation, could assert that moral insanity was as real as Colour blindness, some people being Colour blind and some moral blind (Maudsley 1879). Moral insanity became connected variously to phrenology with its own bump over the underlying moral cortex, with the twisted genetics of degeneration, with atavistic theories of criminality, and with a range of disorders of brain from epilepsy to frontal lobe damage (Combed 1853; Ellis 1890; Pick 1989). Although it is anachronistic to use the terms "psychopathy" and "moral insanity" together, it is clear they occupied a similar social and psychiatric space, albeit in different era. This should caution against too ready acceptance of psychopathy which may turn out to be as empty and dangerous a conceptualization as moral insanity. Why dangerous? Dangerous to those labeled, because the morally insane and the moral imbeciles were placed in preventive detention in asylums and prisons, and even sterilized in some jurisdictions. Dangerous to society, because it gave a spurious scientific justification for viewing crime not as reflecting the social evils of deprivation, ignorance, and inequality but as the ravages of the born criminals. -/- Psychopaths are not, as Levy asserts, "(causally) responsible for … more than fifty percent of violent crime" (p. 129). A proportion of violent offenders, which varies widely between observers, are labeled psychopaths. This is often on the basis of Hare's psychopathy checklist, which is a subjective, albeit through training aspiring to be reproducible, and to some extent self-sustaining, evaluation system (Hare 1980, 2003). Part of the checklist gathers data on prior antisocial behavior; part constrains the examiner to subjectively estimate such matters as glibness and callousness, part requires judgments about whether the... (shrink)

: Skepticism as doubts about religious knowledge played a significant role in the intellectual reflection of the fourth and fifth Islamic centuries, a period of considerable plurality within Islam on many levels. Such skepticism was directed at revealed knowledge that spelled out the customs and norms particular to the Islamic way of life. Doubts were pushed by theologians who, themselves caught within a web of "parity of evidence" between the various schools of Islam, saw little hope of verifying the superiority (...) of Muslim ways over those of other communities, and Muslim intellectuals who viewed the particular religio-moral practices of Islam as shamefully atavistic and primitive, seeking instead to table "visible" religion for an esoterically conceived one. Against such detractors, a significant scholar of the period, Abū l-Hasan al-'Āmirī, constructed a philosophical defense of exoteric Islam, arguing in Aristotelian terms for the superiority of religio-moral knowledge over philosophical knowledge in light of the greater benefit of the former to the welfare of society and the superiority of Islamic religio-moral knowledge, since, he claims, it squares with logic more than any other communal way of life. The argument, one of many seeking to come to terms with the intellectual vagaries of the day, demonstrates how skepticism pushed scholars to explore more profoundly the nature of religion. In al-'Āmirī's case, his argument, metaphysically based with mystical inclinations, set the stage for later articulations of Islamic religiosity that integrated the human mind into the arena of Islam's revealed way of life. (shrink)

Cancer viewed as a programmed, evolutionarily conserved life‐form, rather than just a random series of disease‐causing mutations, answers the rarely asked question of what the cancer cell is for, provides meaning for its otherwise mysterious suite of attributes, and encourages a different type of thinking about treatment. The broad but consistent spectrum of traits, well‐recognized in all aggressive cancers, group naturally into three categories: taxonomy (“phylogenation”), atavism (“re‐primitivization”) and robustness (“adaptive resilience”). The parsimonious explanation is not convergent evolution, but (...) the release of an highly conserved survival program, honed by the exigencies of the Pre‐Cambrian, to which the cancer cell seems better adapted; and which is recreated within, and at great cost to, its host. Central to this program is the Warburg Effect, whose malign influence permeates well beyond aerobic glycolysis to include biomass interconversion and genomic heuristics. Warburg‐type metabolism and genomic instability are targets whose therapeutic disablement is a major priority. (shrink)

Many recent gene knockout experiments cause anatomical changes to the jaw region of mice that several investigators claim are evolutionary reversals. Here we evaluate these mutant phenotypes and the assertions of atavism. We argue that following the knockout of Hoxa-2, Dlx-2, MHox, Otx2, and RAR genes, ectopic cartilages arise as secondary consequences of disruptions in normal processes of cell specification, migration, or differentiation. These disruptions cause an excess of mesenchyme to accumulate in a region through which skeletal progenitor cells (...) usually migrate, and at a site of condensation that is normally present in mammals but that is too small to chondrify. We find little evidence that these genes, when disrupted, cause a reversion to any primitive condition and although changes in their expression may have played a role in the evolution of the mammalian jaw, their function during morphogenesis is not sufficiently understood to confirm such hypotheses. BioEssays 20:245–255, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

A recent paper shows that in gene expression space the manifold spanned by normal tissues and the manifold spanned by the corresponding tumors are disjoint. The statement is based on a two-dimensional projection of gene expression data. In the present paper, we show that, for the multi-dimensional vectors defining the centers of cloud samples: 1. The closest tumor to a given normal tissue is the tumor developed in that tissue, 2. Two normal tissues define quasi-orthogonal directions, 3. A tumor may (...) have a projection onto its corresponding normal tissue, but it is quasi-orthogonal to all other normal tissues, and 4. The cancer manifold is roughly obtained by translating the normal tissue manifold along an orthogonal direction defined by a global cancer progression axis. These geometrical properties add a new characterization of normal tissues and tumors and may have biological significance. Indeed, normal tissues at the vertices of a high-dimensional simplex could indicate genotype optimization for given tissue functions, and a way of avoiding errors in embryonary development. On the other hand, the cancer progression axis could define relevant pan-cancer genes and seems to be consistent with the atavistic theory of tumors. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that we need to analyze ‘religious violence’ in the ‘post-secular context’ in a twofold way: rather than simply viewing it in terms of mere irrationality, senselessness, atavism, or monstrosity – terms which, as we witness today on an immense scale, are strongly endorsed by the contemporary theater of cruelty committed in the name of religion – we also need to understand it in terms of an ‘originary supplement’ of ‘disengaged reason’. In order to confront (...) its specificity beyond traditional explanations of violence, I propose an integrated phenomenological account of religion that traces the phenomenality of religion in terms of a correlation between the originary givenness of transcendence and capable man’s creative capacities to respond to it. Following Ricœur, I discuss ‘religious violence’ in terms of a monopolizing appropriation of the originary source of givenness that conflates man’s freedom to poetically respond to the appeal of the foundational with the surreptitiously claimed sovereignty to make it happen in a practical transfiguration of the everyday. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, transhumanism is a movement seeking to advance the cause of post-humanity. It advocates using science and technology for a reconstruction of the human condition sufficiently radical to call into question the appropriateness of calling it “human” anymore. While there is not universal agreement among transhumanists as to the best path to this goal, the general outline is clear enough. Advances in genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology will make possible the achievement of the Baconian vision of “the (...) relief of man’s estate,” as they allow us to conquer disease, eliminate unhappiness, end scarcity and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, death itself. But fulfilling such long-standing dreams is only the beginning of what our new powers will make possible. Left to itself, the present trajectory of technological development necessarily aims at a future incomprehensible to beings such as we are – at no distant date an evolutionary leap in the way intelligence is embodied, and what it can accomplish. Transhumanism seeks to make sure no atavistic scruple obstructs this momentum, and to maximize its benefits and minimize its admitted risks. While there is no lack of illuminating print works advocating transhumanism, that its public face should be on the World Wide Web is as much a matter of course as once would have been the use by similar movements of the printed broadside or the public lecture. On the websites of the World Transhumanist Association (www. transhumanism.org) and the Extropy Institute (www.extropy. org) – premier among transhumanism’s many organizations – one finds authoritative statements explaining and justifying the transhumanist project. If transhumanism were primarily an academic school or a professional association, it would not be entirely fair to turn to these admittedly popular presentations for a critical look at the transhumanist vision. But as these are the documents by which transhumanism presents itself to the public as a movement, and through which it hopes to gain adherents, it is legitimate to make.... (shrink)

Clarice Lispector has been studied thoroughly against the backdrop of Western ontology and feminism, but she has not often been read in relation to postcolonial theory and Black studies. Yet, their critique of coloniality and the radicality with which they conceive of a different world, can provide a fitting frame for understanding what is at stake in Lispector’s thought. When put in dialogue with the work of Édouard Glissant and Denise Ferreira da Silva, Lispector makes a key contribution to the (...) reconfiguration of the relation between the subject and the world that can be understood as an attempt to, echoing Sylvia Wynter, “unsettle the coloniality of being.” Where Glissant effectuates “creolization” and Silva a “hacking” of the subject, Lispector attempts to transgress our colonial relation to the world through a reconfiguration of fertility. In our study of The Passion According to G.H., supported by fragments from the Chronicles, we show: (1) how the passion of G.H., is the passion of a specifically colonial subject; (2) how fertility is an essential link between subjectivity and coloniality, ensuring an atavistic chain of filiation and hence the continuation of a colonially dominated world; and (3) how Lispector reconfigures fertility as a possibility of being deeply affected by the world, so much so that the colonial subject perishes and the chain of filiation is disrupted. As a consequence, we argue that Lispector’s project must not primarily be understood as ontological or in search of pre-discursivity, but as concerned with the revolutionary question of dismantling the colonial subject and its world in order to open up a potential of life otherwise. (shrink)

This article addresses the conversational process taking place during a TV interview in which the contrast shows up between the canonical procedure overseeing the succession and nature of conversational roles and turn-takings in contemporary media contexts and the preservation of an atavistic attitude tied to a traditional culture, Albanian tradition of oda. The discourse in these chambers is a revered phenomenon in the Albanian culture. The interviewee uses the traditional code of oral communication in the oda as a strategy for (...) saving his honour in public, while the interviewer uses another code, the language of investigative journalism. In this paper, a detailed analysis of this interview shows how the sequences built on a basic adjacency pair operate to allow the interviewee to attempt to save face in a compromising situation. We see how the oda structures override normal turn-taking rules and how the face-work process (Goffman Interaction ritual. Essays on the face-to-face behavior, Doubleday, New York, 1967) is reflected in expanded sequences. We consider this topic as an extension of a potential CA analysis when describing how cultural forms with different procedural rules affect general turn-taking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 20-39 [Access article in PDF] Anderson and the Novel Jonathan Culler 1 Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism has, in the past decade, become a classic of the humanities and social sciences. Any theoretically savvy discussion of nations or of societies of any sort must cite it for its fundamental insight that nations and, as Anderson points out, "all communities (...) larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined" [6]. In retrospect, it seems obvious that nationality, nationness, and nationalism "are cultural artifacts of a particular kind" [4], but this had previously been obscured by intellectuals' sense that nationalism was above all an atavistic passion, an often noxious prejudice of the unenlightened. Imagined Communities both argued that we had better seek to understand it, since "nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" [3], and gave us a constructivist way of thinking about the phenomenon of nationalism, which becomes more interesting and intellectually more acceptable when we ask how it is created, what discursive, imaginative activities bring particular nationalisms into being and give them their distinctive form. When nationalism was vulgar passion provoked by empirically occurring nations, it was vulnerable to the objection implicitly or explicitly mounted against it: why should I feel more affinity with people who happen to inhabit the country I live in than with others, more like-minded, who happen to have been born in other nations? Anderson neatly turned the tables on us by taking this as a serious question. Why indeed do we feel such affinities? How to explain the fact that people are more willing to make great sacrifices for others of the same nation whom they have never met (and whom they might dislike if they did) than for worthy and unfortunate people elsewhere?Read today, the introduction to Imagined Communities has the rightness and efficiency of a classic ("why hadn't anyone realized this before?"), as it guides us into the paradoxes of the modern world of nationalism: nations are objectively recent but subjectively antique, even eternal; nations may be messianic, but no nation's citizens imagine that everyone should eventually join their nation. Already here Anderson displays what I take to be the key to his appeal to the nonspecialist: his ability concretely to show us the strangeness of the familiar by judicious comparisons. Try to imagine a "Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a Cenotaph for fallen Liberals," he suggests. But a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier does not seem risible. Why? "Many different nations have such tombs without feeling any need to specify the nationality of their absent occupants. What else could they be but Germans, American, Argentinians...?" [10]. We are in a sentence or two brought to appreciate the necessity of accounting for a social and cultural phenomenon that comparison and humor highlight.The second edition of Imagined Communities demonstrates, in a compelling if serendipitous way, just how much we need Anderson to provide such insights, as it takes up what he and his readers had failed to notice in the first edition. There he had quoted Ernest Renan remarking "in his suavely backhanded way," "Or l'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous [End Page 20] aient oubliés bien des choses [in fact the essence of a nation is that all the individuals have many things in common and also that they have all forgotten many things]," with a footnote continuing the quotation: "tout citoyen français doit avoir oublié la Saint-Barthélemy, les massacres du Midi au XIIIe siècle [every French citizen must have forgotten Saint Bartholomew's, the Provence massacres in the thirteenth century]" [6]. In the preface to the second edition Anderson notes, "I had quoted Renan without the slightest understanding of what he had actually said: I had taken as something easily ironical what was in fact utterly bizarre" [xiv]. He calls this a "humiliating recognition" [xiv], which led him to write... (shrink)

Why it's OK to Be Amoral argues that self-righteous moralism has replaced religion as a source of embattled and gratuitous certainties. High-minded moral convictions invoke the authority of sacred moral truths; but there are no such truths. In reality, moral passions are rooted in atavistic emotional dispositions and arbitrary social conventions. While public and private discourse is saturated with guilt, shame, and righteous indignation, professional philosophers, under cover of clever argumentation, promote the utopian idea that all practical questions have uniquely (...) right answers-providing that you adopt the right moral principles. But their justifications for those principles appeal to contested "foundations," among which no rational adjudication is possible. Moreover, because there are two discrepant ways of understanding motivation, our access to agents' true reasons is never sufficiently reliable to warrant moral praise or blame. Finally, every agent has a wide diversity of reasons for action; yet moralists claim that some reasons trump all others, because they are "moral" reasons. Since these too must be grounded in facts, that amounts to double counting some reasons. Having exposed these aspects of the institution of morality, this book suggests that if we cannot abstain altogether from moralising, we can at least try to use it against itself. (shrink)

This article comprises a dialogue between two historians who have attempted, individually, to narrate the life of Lord George Gordon (1751 – 93), the Scottish prophet, revolutionary, and convert to Judaism. For modern cultural historians, Gordon's peregrinations between identities offer a kaleidoscopic view of Britain in the overlooked but crucial interstice between the upheavals of 1776 and 1789. Yet the partial nature of the evidence, the long omission of Gordon from the historiography of eighteenth-century Britain, and the complex, often furtive (...) nature of Gordon's activism create multiple ambiguities in his story. These ambiguities are compounded here by the authors' differing approaches. Marsha Keith Schuchard argues for a Gordon shaped by Scottish origins; Dominic Green, for a Gordon responding to English opportunities. They disagree over the likely date of Gordon's conversion to Judaism and, crucially, over whether he was a religious atavist or a Romantic pioneer. This dialogue is meant to illustrate the utility of a scholarship that acknowledges fuzziness rather than attempting to overclarify it. The article is also meant to show, however, that on the public stage fuzziness can be less benign: Gordon was a religious politician, who reworked his complexities and confusions into a violent, uncompromising critique of eighteenth-century British social order. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ibsen's Drama of Self-Sacrifice William A. Johnsen Michigan State University Henrik Ibsen, like Flaubert, is a fundamental precursor of all subsequent modern literature. His development, which takes place over a lifetime of playwriting, is nevertheless only obscurely recognized in theories ofthe modern. Critics quarrel about his antecedents: Scribe, Feydeau, as well as Norwegian and Scandinavian dramatists and poets. Yet nothing in any of his predecessors could prepare one for (...) the great prose plays of the last twenty-five years of his career. How did he modernize himself? Ibsen said ofhis transition to prose, that he could no longer allow his characters to speak in verse, the language of the gods.1 It is tempting to begin reading Girard in here, because Ibsen offers us a fascinating variation on the historical moment ofcrisis represented by Flaubert, the moment of modernization itself, where the disintegration ofan accepted political and cultural aristocracy forced everyone to compete for prestige and for unique being in a common marketplace. In the case ofNorway during Ibsen's time, it is the crisis caused by the delegitimation ofDano-Norwegian as the uncontested literary language, in favor of competing versions of an emerging national language for a 1 Ibsen's famous comment is in a letter to Edmund Gosse, 15 January, 1874: "Speaking generally, the dialogue must conform to the degree of idealization which pervades the work as a whole. My new drama is no tragedy in the ancient sense. What I sought to depict were human beings, and therefore I would not let them talk the 'language of the Gods'" (Sprinchorn 145). 142William A. Johnsen uniquely national literature that provokes a rivalry for atavistic or nativist preeminence: Who is the most Norwegian ofall? Ibsen and Henry James (as well as Borges) do not choose chauvinist atavism, yet they also avoid becoming mere disciples of the dominant philosophical traditions which have marginalized them. They are more outspoken discussants of the significant historical and cultural developments analyzed in Girard's Deceit, Desire, and the Novel because they are from "new" countries, outsiders to European culture. It is here we must avoid the occupational hazard ofcritical theory: we must not permit a resemblance between a literary and a theoretical text to degenerate into a transcoding of the former into the latter, without ever considering that their resemblance means that each proposes some contribution to a converging theory ofhuman behavior. Critics who merely convert literature into the theories they already know contribute little to literary knowledge, and nothing to theory. Girard has insisted on the quasitheoretical potential of literary texts from the beginning. Only by staying as close to Ibsen as possible, can we ever hope to add to the considerable work that Girard's hypothesis has already achieved. If there is a general principal at stake in not prematurely transcoding the language of Ibsen's plays into theoretical language (not being prematurely theoretical for the sake of a more inclusive theory), there is also the specific risk of burying the peculiar diversity of his dramatic accomplishment. Ibsen is above all the playwright of complex characterization —no one before him was as subtle in motivating the ordinary characters ofeveryday life. Yet during his time, his plays were awaited for the intense discussions of ideas that they were certain to provoke. How is it that Ibsen is not considered the most theoretical and didactic of writers? Partly, the sheer number of controversial ideas and positions dramatized in play after play kept him from being seen (for very long) as the propagator ofany one ofthem. Michael Meyer reproduces in his biography ofIbsen a contemporary Norwegian political cartoon, which depicts Ibsen flailing first right, then left, then all (Meyer 447). More importantly, Ibsen, beginning with Samfundets Stotter (1877) [Pillars ofSociety], created a drama of ensemble theorizing conducted by characters themselves. Ibsen's work, beyond the creation ofcharacter, was to imagine the conditions and events that might make it possible for ordinary individuals to contribute discoveries about human behavior which, collectively, allow amplification and consolidation as a hypothesis. Ibsen 's Drama ofSelf-Sacrifice143 The mimetic hypothesis first found itself explaining the spectacular results of negative reciprocity in modern resentment, the unperceived commonality ofan isolation... (shrink)

Many philosophers embrace both evolution and existentialism as though these two views provide a mutually supportive foundation for atheism. The story goes that evolution tells us life is meaningless while existentialism tells us what to do about it. In this paper, I aim to debunk this story. I begin by explaining the existentialist quest for the meaning of life. Then I explain why it is inconsistent with the principles of evolution. In the end, I argue that the quest for the (...) meaning of life should be abandoned. It is a misleading project that science renders unnecessary. Looked at in this light, existentialism appears as a stripped down version of religion, vainly clinging to dramatic fantasies about human life. Evolution has had a deep and valuable impact upon philosophy. It will not have completed its work, however, until it stamps out existentialism and its atavistic angst once and for all. (shrink)

Prosper Lucas (1808–1885) is a unique figure in the history of psychiatric genetics. A physician-alienist, he authored one of the most important books on human genetics in the mid-19th century cited frequently by Darwin: the 1,500 page treatise—Philosophical and Physiological Treatise on Natural Heredity (1847–1850). This book contained a novel theory of the nature of inheritance and a detailed review of the heredity of a range of human traits and disorders, including various forms of insanity. Lucas postulated four forms of (...) heredity (direct, crossed, indirect, and atavistic), supported the importance of hereditary factors in insanity, accepted the inheritance of acquired characteristics, considered it important to examine both ancestors and collateral relatives, and recognized that heredity could influence both primary insanity and insanity secondary to other medical conditions. He reviewed the then available literature on most major forms of insanity including separate sections on hallucinations and suicidal monomania. The literature consisted of case reports of unusual families with high concentrations of illness. Lucas advocated for the homogeneity of transmission of forms of illness in families but recognized that—just as the form of illness could evolve within individuals over time—it could change forms when transmitted between relatives. (shrink)

The barrier to global health most often noted in Western discourse is the enduring disparity of access to medical technologies. This assessment of the circumstances in global health fits well within a bioethic centered on the equitable distribution of access to medical goods. Yet through an interrogative consideration of two episodes in the marketing of progress, namely the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago (1933–1934) and one post-war spin on atomic development in the National Geographic, I suggest that the language (...) of medical advancement continues to trade on a division between civilized, rational, scientifically developed peoples and the atavism of peoples by whom Western science gauges its progress. I recommend unremittingly self-critical attention to the dynamics of language and legitimization used within the Western academy by those who seek ostensibly to be of use in regions (powerfully) labeled as “developing.”. (shrink)

Given the dominance of the United States' constitutional tradition, the modern world has inherited a widespread conservatism that holds constitutional 'reform' to be risky and change to mean decline. This attitude has ancient roots. Atavism in politics may be traced to movements that draw (however remotely) upon the legacy of the presocratic philosopher, Parmenides, who promoted a monist view of the world and graphically represented a radical rejection of all change as mere illusion. As one of the forerunners of (...) the immeasurably influential Plato and Aristotle, he helped to shape a philosophical worldview in which the ultimate reality was locked in a realm of disembodied and unchanging Forms. Despite his 'new modes and orders', archaism is apparent in Machiavelli's constitutional inheritance from Polybius, who sought to arrest change through a blending of the 'given' forms of government. This mixed constitution is inherently not conducive to democratic development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 58-83 [Access article in PDF] Imagi-Nation: The Imagined Community and the Aesthetics of Mourning Marc Redfield Of the many relics of the Romantic era that continue to shape our (post)modernity, the nation-state surely ranks among the most significant. Two decades ago Benedict Anderson commented that "'the end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight" [IC 3], and the intervening years (...) have made it increasingly clear that the developments and processes we summarize as "globalization" operate in mingled synchrony and tension with the political form of the nation-state. 1 That the nation-state should remain the premier vehicle of political and economic legitimation in an era dominated by American imperialism and international capital--forces that, of course, regularly and flagrantly violate the sovereignty of disadvantaged nations--is unsurprising if one accepts the continuing pertinency and power of a Western master-narrative of modernity, according to which the nation represents the emergence of a people into history and prefigures the global achievement of universal human concord. As the proper subject of history, the nation-state can prefigure history's end because, as David Lloyd writes, "the particularism of [nationalism's] contents, potentially in contradiction with the universalism of modernity, is subsumed in the formal congruence between its own narratives of identity, directed at one people, and the narrative of identity that universal history represents for humanity in general" ["Nationalisms" 178]. Lloyd goes on to note that the nation's intermediate status in this narrative--halfway between primitive tribalism and modernity's ever-deferred perpetual peace--accounts for nationalism's irreducibly double association with modernization and atavism. In consequence, the modernist paradigm continues to rule many skeptical or hostile accounts of nationalism, for so long as the nation-state is taken to supersede other political or social formations, the cosmopolitan critique fails to challenge "the fundamental philosophy of universal history that underwrites nationalism's inscription in modernity" ["Nationalisms" 177]. Indeed, both in the corporate media and in mainstream Western political discourse generally, nations and nationalisms are commonly treated as atavistic or progressive depending on the degree to which their behavior harmonizes with globalizing imperatives. That these imperatives emanate quite blatantly from Wall Street in no way seriously troubles the effectiveness of modernity as a narrative paradigm. 2Seeking to discredit universalizing narrative, much cultural criticism in recent years has exchanged cosmopolitanism and the abstract question of "nationalism" for an emphasis [End Page 58] on the contextual construction of national movements or identities. 3 This valuable body of work has sought to recover the particularity of cultural and socioeconomic circumstance, stressed the fundamental role of racism in colonialist contexts, and noted ways in which nationalist movements draw on or unleash forms of resistance that challenge representationalist politics. The pages that follow, however, remain focused on the nationalist fantasy proper to the discourse of modernity. Cultural critique can only profit from knowing as much as possible about the favored turns of the universal-historicist model, particularly since, as Lloyd and others have emphasized, this model is an aesthetic one that grants a world-historical role to "culture." The state, in a tradition that in its main lines runs from Schiller through Hegel and Matthew Arnold and is still very much alive today, represents the community to itself, thereby giving the community form and in a certain sense giving it an ethical imperative and a future: the state represents "our best self" [Arnold 99, passim], "the archetype of a human being" [Schiller 17], because it signifies the formal unification both of the citizen with the community and of the community with universal humanity. Because this unification is ideal rather than actual, it can be projected as the ethical terminus of history (that is, as the ideal of an accomplished modernity). The state's core mission thus becomes pedagogical: its job is to acculturate its subjects into citizens. The production of a docile citizenry thereby obtains an ethical aura and an aesthetic character, insofar as the artwork and the domain of aesthetic or "cultural" experience generally become... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Politics of Eating: Feasting in Early Greek SocietyJohn RundinIn Euripides’ Cyclops, Silenus and his satyr companions have been shipwrecked in the realm of Polyphemus and have become his slaves. 1 Odysseus lands there, meets Silenus, and, conversing with him, asks who inhabits the land:Odysseus: Who occupies the area? A race of beasts? Silenus: Cyclopes. They live in caves, not roofed houses. Odysseus: Who is their leader? Or do (...) they have a democracy? Silenus: They’re herdsmen. No one has any power over anyone else. Odysseus: Do they sow Demeter’s grain? Or what do they live on? Silenus: Milk and cheeses and meals [borai] of mutton. Odysseus: Do they have Dionysus’ drink, the liquid of the vine? Silenus: Not at all. For that reason, they live in a land without choruses. Odysseus: Are they hospitable, and do they treat strangers with respect? Silenus: They claim that strangers have the most delicious flesh. [End Page 179] Odysseus: What do you mean? They like meals [borai] of men they have killed? Silenus: Everyone who comes here has been eaten up.(117–28)Silenus has rapidly made clear the beastly level of Cyclopean gastronomy. The savagery of the Cyclopes’ diet is underlined by his diction: the LSJ tells us that the word translated twice here as “meals,” borai, is more appropriately used to describe food for animals than for people. Silenus also lets us know that the Cyclopes are herdsmen and, like atavistic throwbacks to a time before cereal culture, raise no grain. 2 They are so backward that they do not have even wine. One dire consequence of this is spelled out by Silenus: they have no choruses. Polyphemus himself later illustrates another: they totally lack sympotic sophistication (483–589). So great is their culinary degeneracy, that, in defiance of the accepted norms of hospitality, they eat strangers who visit their realm. Not only, however, do the Cyclopes lack the elements of a cultured cuisine, they also lack basic political institutions. They have no ruler, nor do they have a democracy: as Silenus says, “no one has any power over anyone else.” The lack of political institutions and of culinary development may at first seem like two independent elements of a culturally deprived life. This is not the case, however. We shall see that in early Greek culture there is a strong connection between eating and politics. Indeed, it will soon be apparent that the Cyclopes’ culinary and political deficiencies are closely related.It is my hope to demonstrate this relationship. Emphasis will be placed on representations of eating in the Iliad and the Odyssey. It will then be shown how the patterns uncovered in Homeric texts lived on in later documents and institutions. It is impossible to know how accurately the life portrayed in the Homeric poems represents the historical conditions of any real society. 3 It may be true that the analysis of institutions [End Page 180] described in them is relevant only to an ideal world or to an aristocratic ideology. Such complex issues, however, may be avoided by merely analyzing certain aspects of eating as presented by Homer without thought of how well those aspects match the practice of any actual people. In the endeavor, of course, caution must be exercised not to expect too much of the data. Even if Homer’s narrative does represent some actual society, it is the nature of narrative to be selective, and it would therefore be inappropriate to try to extract from the poems either a comprehensive picture of foodways or any quantitative data about them. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to be struck by how consistent representations of eating in Homer are, and, moreover, not to acknowledge that patterns revealed in the Homeric representations had a long afterlife not only in later texts but even in social institutions.Feasting and the Homeric Political EconomyOn the shield of Achilles, a microcosm of the Iliadic world, is wrought a scene which reveals some political aspects of eating.And he put on it [the shield] the precinct of a king. There workmen were reaping with sharp sickles in their hands. Some of the bunches of grain were falling... (shrink)

This paper examines the congruence of the method of abandoning the mental limit regarding what it states, what it does, and what it is. The solid congruence that this method exhibits obliges us to exceed its mere formal use: and it helps us discover that congruence constitutes an intrinsic feature of real truth. This finding overcomes the atavistic mistrust that has accompanied philosophical research, making unnecesary the searching for signals or proofs to recognize truth.

The existentialism of the human being within the Latin American context marks a fundamental essence, from the intrinsic and the extrinsic, to identify their relationship with their other self, within the otherness that characterizes the thinking being faced to his own thought. The Coreguaje are an indigenous ethnic group settled in the department of Caquetá, Colombia. With their own language, the Korebajü, and their cultural identity, they make echo of their wisdom of the jungle where the autochthonous roots of their (...) daily work can be found through their customs, their rituals, their language and their own territory. Giving yourself away and understanding the other is one of their fundamental principles to establish interpersonal relationships within their habitat. Similarly, identifying their cosmic and ancestral knowledge, which is the starting point within the knowledge of the Amazon rainforest, makes this conceptualization a treasury of the cosmogonic vision that the Coreguaje ancestors develop. Thus, their postulates can be ordered under three conceptions: the Chejaboebü, the relationship with nature, water, wind, thunder, the moon and the sun; the Chejasanaba, the relationship with the air and, the Chejasesebü, the relationship with the stars, atavistic positions that forge a philosophical dialogue manifested in the orality of their own knowledge. (shrink)

The existentialism of the human being within the Latin American context marks a fundamental essence, from the intrinsic and the extrinsic, to identify their relationship with their other self, within the otherness that characterizes the thinking being faced to his own thought. The Coreguaje are an indigenous ethnic group settled in the department of Caquetá, Colombia. With their own language, the Korebajü, and their cultural identity, they make echo of their wisdom of the jungle where the autochthonous roots of their (...) daily work can be found through their customs, their rituals, their language and their own territory. Giving yourself away and understanding the other is one of their fundamental principles to establish interpersonal relationships within their habitat. Similarly, identifying their cosmic and ancestral knowledge, which is the starting point within the knowledge of the Amazon rainforest, makes this conceptualization a treasury of the cosmogonic vision that the Coreguaje ancestors develop. Thus, their postulates can be ordered under three conceptions: the Chejaboebü, the relationship with nature, water, wind, thunder, the moon and the sun; the Chejasanaba, the relationship with the air and, the Chejasesebü, the relationship with the stars, atavistic positions that forge a philosophical dialogue manifested in the orality of their own knowledge. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, Richard Rorty has developed a compelling metaphilosophical theory on the history of analytic philosophy. On this telling, analytic philosophy was atavistic from the outset, a forlorn attempt to reinstate scheme/content distinctions. Rather than asking whether our claims "correspond" to some nonhuman, eternal way the world is, we should ask about their pragmatic utility. On Rorty's account, analytic philosophy terminates in pragmatism. In this paper, I argue against this assessment of the fate of our tradition. More (...) specifically, I argue against Rorty's indictment of the notion of correspondence truth. My aim is to show that correspondence truth, in providing an indispensable background for the intelligibility of pragmatism, is not the needless dogma that Rorty takes it to be. Rorty's pragmatism, I thus argue, fails to be a freestanding doctrine. (shrink)

Ideas of racial genetic determinism, though unsupported by scientific evidence and atavistic, are common and readily apparent in American medical education. These theories of biologic essentialism have documented negative effects in learners, including increased measures of racial prejudice.

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. (...) Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

In this article I want to argue that Foucault’s engagement with the Iranian Revolution was neither romantic fascist atavism nor does it presage any sort of transformation of his thought. Indeed, Foucault’s investigations of neoliberalism and subsequent work on spirituality, truth-telling and ethics are fully continuous with his critical genealogy of power. This is an important point, as we shall see, insofar as Foucault’s journalism on the Iranian Revolution occurs in the midst of his Collège de France lectures on (...) biopolitics and governmentality. Foucault’s enthusiasm for the Revolution might indicate, albeit very indirectly, directions for thought that might resist neoliberalism. I will argue that Foucault was engaged in a very specific telling of the ‘history of truth’, emphasizing a partisan and agonistic form of truth-telling and transformation through struggle and ordeal, as opposed to the pacifying, neutralizing and normalizing forms of modern Western power. The ‘political spirituality’ Foucault wit... (shrink)

Are we the Citizens of just one empirical world? Have all reminiscences to the transcendental become atavistic in the political domain? This article defends the lasting relevance of the kantian doctrine of analogy for the significance of both religion and politics in post-modern times. The symbolic representation of the indemonstrable concept of practical reason itself functions as well in politics as in religion in the manner of a typology of the law and a legislation, which must be understood as the (...) always indirect representation of the absolute good will. Only this idea avoids the empirical illusions of an imaginary self-sufficient political or religious authority. All authority based on the concept of God as legislator as far as a promulgator of the moral law, with its intrinsic character of obligation, is conceived as unavoidable for the finite reason. Therefore the execution of the king during the French revolution as a legal act in itself is inconceivable as far as it intended the abrogation of the representation of the instance of executive obligation as such. All political doctrines that would claim the installation of the moral kingdom of God on earth are equally chimerical. Since Kant only claims the idea of legislation of practical reason and the guarantee of the viability of morals in the empirical world when evoking God in practical philosophy and calling upon the historical Christian religion, his theological political doctrine goes beyond the ideological political and religious setting of his time and it remains on the contrary a valuable warning for actual political and religious terrorism. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss the contents and the context of Italian zoologist and entomologist Carlo Emery’s discussion of the germ-plasm theory. August Weismann considered him one of his very few creditable supporters, and encouraged him to publish his theoretical reflections. In his Gedanken zur Descendenz- und Vererbungstheorie, which appeared between 1893 and 1903 as a series of five essays in the journal Biologisches Zentralblatt, Emery developed a very personal account, applying the concept of determinants to problems like atavism, (...) sexual dimorphism, speciation, geographical isolation, transmission of characters, and putting forward, as early as 1903, the idea of a genetic program. (shrink)