To teach art well clearly requires considerable understanding of autonomy in art. Some theorists with autonomy in mind have argued that art must be without constraint. I challenge aspects of this view because it is unrepresentative of the art world, it is not necessarily good for art, it is an inadequate concept of autonomy in general, and it is very naïve about teaching responsibilities in art. For reasons to be explained, the restorative notion that I present is (...) that art education requires the teaching contributions of art lessons that are appropriately aware of variable moral-ethical assessment issues1 in order to be able to facilitate, in an autonomous manner, more of the enigmatic and the venerable that is... (shrink)

Aesthetic autonomy has been given a variety of interpretations, which in many cases involve a number of claims. Key among them are: (i) art eludes conventional conceptual frameworks and their inherent incompatibility with invention and creativity; and (ii) art can communicate aspects of experience too fine‐grained for discursive language. To accommodate such claims one can adopt either a convention‐based account or a natural‐kind account. A natural‐kind theory can explain the first but requires some special scaffolding in order to support (...) the second, while a convention‐based account accommodates the second but is incompatible with the first. Theodor W. Adorno attempts to incorporate both claims within his aesthetic theory, but arguably in his aesthetic theory each is cancelled out by the other. Art’s independence of entrenched conceptual frameworks needs to be made compatible with its communicative role. Jürgen Habermas, in contrast, provides a solution by way of his theory of language. I draw upon the art practice of the contemporary Icelandic‐Danish artist Olafur Eliasson in order to demonstrate this. (shrink)

This volume contains a selection of essays presented at the international conference on Cultural Crises in Art and Literature, held in Groningen in November 2002, in a special session on the question of the autonomy of the arts. Do we witness, in western culture, the end of the autonomy of the arts as it has been conceptualized and institutionalized since the eighteenth century? Indeed, developments of quite a different nature seem to have contributed to a blurring of boundaries (...) between art and non-art, art and the market, art and politics or ethics, as well as between the arts themselves, and between 'high' and 'low' art. Although this volume does not pretend to map this complex process in its entirety - partly because it is impossible to step out of one's own history - it is meant as a contribution to the elucidation of the process itself, offering some challenging explanations as to the heat of the current debate. (shrink)

“That the imagination should be both free and yet of itself conformable to law, that is, that it should carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction.” So Kant writes to express as a paradox the epistemological problem that the feeling on which an aesthetic judgment is based must be free of the constraint provided by determinate concepts, for otherwise there will be no reason why it should be pleasurable, yet must also be subject to some kind of rule, for (...) otherwise the claim of universal validity which this judgment asserts will be irrational. And so understood, the remark is entirely rhetorical, for it is the express purpose of Kant’s main argument in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment to show that this conception of the judgment of taste is coherent rather than contradictory. But taken from its intended context, the remark need not be rhetorical, for it can be seen as an expression of competing demands for aesthetic integrity, or demands for individual freedom and social agreement in the creation and reception of art which, unlike the two epistemological constraints on aesthetic judgment, cannot be simultaneously satisfied but which instead introduce a permanent source of instability into the history of art and taste. Indeed, it is even fitting that Kant’s remark has to be taken out of context to be given this interpretation, for although Kant lays the theoretical basis for such a picture of art history he also tries to suppress its consequence and to avert the destruction of the eighteenth-century ideal of aesthetic stability which is its inevitable outcome. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, (...) is that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

Autonomy and free will are essential conditions for moral agency: we aren’t responsible for effects we couldn’t choose or avert. Skeptics argue that the experience of free will is illusory; those defending it say that the conscious experience of intention and responsibility are sufficient evidence of free choice. This essay defends autonomy and free will from an alternate perspective: it affirms that choice has exhaustively material conditions but disputes the determinist claim that every choice is an involuntary step (...) in a causal trajectory progressing blindly from nature’s original conditions. There is a paradox: we are responsible for much we choose and do, though all that comes to pass has sufficient conditions. This is the virtue of soft determinism and its emphasis on autonomy: the sensibility evolving within us is often a barrier to other influences while a sufficient condition for one’s choices and deeds. (shrink)

Autonomous labor and its attendant values have now become familiar tools of neoliberal capitalism: work has become freelance, flexible, mobile, project-based, hybrid and temporary. If these conditions are novel to the general economy, this way of working is not new to artists, who began experiencing these precarious conditions long before Post-Fordism was a buzzword. The contributors to Mobile Autonomy, drawn from a variety of disciplines including art, political philosophy and sociology, examine the alternate working methods and economic models developed, (...) in theory and in practice, by artists and other creative professionals to make artistic work viable in contemporary social, economic and political conditions. (shrink)

This essay examines various conceptions of autonomy in relation to recent artistic practices. Starting from the apparent opposition between modernist notions of the autonomy of art and theorizations of political autonomy, the text problematizes the notion of the autonomy of art by using Jacques Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic regime. Focusing on the importance of the act and performance in the art of the last decades, it is argued that while political and artistic autonomy may (...) never quite converge, aesthetic acts can under certain circumstances function in both the political and the artistic register, simultaneously or successively. The aesthetic act thus stages a passage from the artistic to the political, and vice versa. (shrink)

There is a well-documented Pre-Reflective Hostility against Machine Art (PRHMA), exemplified by the sentiments of fear and anxiety. How can it be explained? The present paper attempts to find the answer to this question by surveying a considerable amount of research on machine art. It is found that explanations of PRHMA based on the (alleged) fact that machine art lacks an element that is (allegedly) found in human art (for example, autonomy) do not work. Such explanations cannot account for (...) the sentiments of fear and anxiety present in PRHMA, because the art receiver could simply turn to human art for finding the element she is looking for. By contrast, an explanation based on the idea that machine art is “symbolically” a threat to human survival can be successful, since the art receiver’s turning from machine art to human art does not eliminate the (alleged) “symbolic” threat machine art poses for human survival. If there is a pre-reflective belief or feeling that machine art is such a threat, then it is perfectly understandable why humans exhibit a pre-reflective hostility against machine art. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This introductory article discusses the state of the art in contemporary argumentation theory regarding the relationship between autonomy and argumentation. It introduces the contributions to the special section and discusses their relationship to each other and to the broader debate.

Museums influence society’s ideas about canons in relation to art and the aesthetic. Such canons, as represented in museum exhibitions and collections, have sometimes been criticized for exclusion of artists from some groups. These artists include members of racial minorities, women, and others. It may be objected that there is a danger in some such criticism. Group membership might, it may be said, come to matter too much in choices by museums, rather than what should matter, producing and appreciating work (...) of the highest artistic or aesthetic value. (shrink)

Aesthetic autonomy is sometimes equated with an art for art’s sake approach to art. On the contrary, the philosophers whose work is often cited as backup to this concept of aesthetic autonomy held a very different conception of it. I will trace an alternative notion of aesthetic autonomy in the work of Adorno and Habermas, the origins of which can be found in Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory, the popular notion of his formalism, notwithstanding. I draw upon the (...) art practice of the contemporary Icelandic-Danish artist Olafur Eliasson in order to demonstrate this alternative notion of aesthetic autonomy. (shrink)

Whether art can be wholly autonomous has been repeatedly challenged in the modern history of aesthetics. In this collection of specially-commissioned chapters, a team of experts discuss the extent to which art can be explained purely in terms of aesthetic categories. Covering examples from Philosophy, Music and Art History and drawing on continental and analytic sources, this volume clarifies the relationship between artworks and extra-aesthetic considerations, including historic, cultural or economic factors. It presents a comprehensive overview of the question of (...) aesthetic autonomy, exploring its relevance to both philosophy and the comprehension of specific artworks themselves. By closely examining how the creation of artworks, and our judgements of these artworks, relate to society and history, Aesthetic and Artistic Autonomy provides an insightful and sustained discussion of a major question in aesthetic philosophy. (shrink)

This study questions the common premise that individualism was lacking in premodern China and contends that not only was the concept of the individual important in traditional China, but that it existed in interesting ways that are different from modes of individualism in the West. Key terms such as xing ("human nature"), xin ("heart-mind"), and ji ("self") are used to analyze various texts. In addition to weaving together ideas from history, philosophy, art, and literature, especially the literary dimensions of late (...) imperial history (both classical and vernacular), this study also incorporates Western intellectual tradition, including the ideas of thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and the Romantics. This inquiry into the moral philosophy and ethics of the self-seen in both its public and private dimensions in late imperial China is an important resource for scholars and students in many subfields of Chinese studies, such as history, intellectual history, art history, history of literature, and history of religion. (shrink)

This article tries to shed light on the difference between human autonomy and AI-driven machine autonomy. The breadth of the studies concerning this topic is constantly increasing, and for this reason, this discussion is very narrow and limited in its extent. Indeed, its hypothesis is that it is possible to distinguish two kinds of autonomy by analysing the way humans and robots narrate stories and the types of stories that, respectively, result from their capability of narrating stories (...) on their own. To approach the question of autonomy and its different interpretations in robots and humans, using narratives and stories as a lens, I proceed through four steps. First, I provide a brief summary concerning the state of the art with regard to issues concerning autonomy and AI. Second, I focus on specific issues concerning AI that are applied to storytelling. Third, I progressively approach narrative autonomy through what could seem a useless digression by addressing the problem of human creativity in relation to machine creativity. Fourth, I hypothesize a radical difference between narrative autonomy—which is proper to humans—and storytelling capability, which can be observed in both humans and machines. (shrink)

How is aesthetic autonomy to be conceived if one does not want to lose an explanation of the connection between art and human practice in general? The starting point of the present paper is the claim that Hegel overlooks aesthetic autonomy because he wants to explain how art is operative within human practice. He does not conceive the sensuous-material aspects of art- works in their independence. Goodman’s notion of exemplification corrects this shortcoming. But his explanation of the relevance (...) of independent sensuous-material aspects of artworks fails to give us an understanding of aesthetic autonomy, too. I argue that it is possible to avoid such a negative conclusion if one understands the self-referential constitution of sensuous-material shapings in an artwork as the basis of aesthetic autonomy. At the same time, such an under- standing allows for a conception of the potency of art within human practice. (shrink)

This paper extends Mori’s (IEEE Robot Autom Mag 19:98–100, 2012) uncanny valley-hypothesis to include technologies that fail its basic criterion that uncanniness arises when the subject experiences a discrepancy in a machine’s human likeness. In so doing, the paper considers Mori’s hypothesis about the uncanny valley as an instance of what Heidegger calls the ‘challenging revealing’ nature of modern technology. It introduces seeming autonomy and heteronomy as phenomenological categories that ground human being-in-the-world including our experience of things and people. (...) It is suggested that this categorical distinction is more foundational than Heidegger’s existential structures and phenomenological categories. Having introduced this novel phenomenological distinction, the paper considers the limits of Mori’s hypothesis by drawing on an example from science fiction that showcases that uncanniness need not only be caused by machines that resemble human beings. In so doing, it explores how the seeming autonomy-heteronomy distinction clarifies (at least some of) the uncanniness that can arise when humans encounter advanced technology which is irreducible to the anthropocentrism that shapes Mori’s original hypothesis. (shrink)

In _Beyond the Sovereign Self_ Grant H. Kester continues the critique of aesthetic autonomy begun in _The Sovereign Self_, showing how socially engaged art provides an alternative aesthetic with greater possibilities for critical practice. Instead of grounding art in its distance from the social, Kester shows how socially engaged art, developed in conjunction with forms of social or political resistance, encourages the creative capacity required for collective political transformation. Among others, Kester analyzes the work of conceptual artist Adrian Piper, (...) experimental practices associated with the escrache tradition in Argentina, and indigenous Canadian artists such as Nadia Myer and Michèle Taïna Audette, showing how socially engaged art catalyzes forms of resistance that operate beyond the institutional art world. From the Americas and Europe to Iran and South Africa, Kester presents a historical genealogy of recent engaged art practices rooted in a deep history of cultural production, beginning with nineteenth-century political struggles and continuing into contemporary anticolonial resistance and other social movements. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno's writings on jazz call out endlessly for interpretation. The observations of this master of the rhetorical and philosophical paradox seem to have lived on beyond their allotted time—a time perhaps delimited by his reliance upon Winthrop Seargeant's Jazz: Hot and Hybrid (1938) and the term “bebop,” whose hollow ringing deforms the Introduction to the Sociology of Music (1961).1 Adorno perversely denies jazz the most fundamental insight of his aesthetic theory: that “art at every point participates in concepts.” (...) Instead, he dismisses it as a pure instantiation of the culture industry.2 His thought rigidifies whenever he returns to…. (shrink)

The 18th-century emergence of aesthetics has been interpreted as a symptom of the entrance of a new image of man, individuality, a modern conception of subjectivity, a new mode of experience, as well as a new ideology or the modern concept of (fine) art into European consciousness. And even though these narratives all situate aesthetics within heteronomous contexts—from physiology and psychology to morality and politics, from social and economic history to belief and religion—one narrative came out as victorious, which neglects (...) the eighteenth-century interpenetration of various disciplines. It offers instead a teleological history of aesthetics which leads towards the concept of autonomy, aesthetic and/or artistic, as it takes shape, allegedly, in the aesthetics of Kant and then Romanticism. The new volume of the Routledge Studies in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, entitled Beyond Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century British and German Aesthetics, joins the growing body of scholarship that re-examines the influential narratives of autonomy. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider what the limits of autonomous aesthetic experience are, for Adorno. Autonomous aesthetic experience can, in Adorno's view, lead us to knowledge of facts about the world external to the artwork. It is challenging to reconcile this with his account of the “hermetically sealed” nature of artworks. In response, I argue that aesthetic experience is for Adorno intrinsically truth‐directed, and intrinsically speculative.

The second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals introduces the ‘sovereign individual’ as ‘responsible’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. Does this affirmative use of moral terminology reveal an unexpected affinity between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical modernity? In the last decades, this issue has been at the heart of a vast and controversial debate. My analysis shows that, rather than throwing light on Nietzsche’s general position, the specific use of Kantian terms in this passage of GM is due to a polemical intention. Implicitly, (...) Nietzsche rejects Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism of the ‘absolute sovereignty of the individual’. The author of the Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1879) sees the most radical herald of this ‘sovereignty’ in Max Stirner. From Nietzsche’s point of view, Hartmann’s rejection and Stirner’s affirmation share a reductive conception of ‘sovereignty’. Reinterpreting and ‘revaluing’ Kant’s moral terminology, Nietzsche aims to give an interpretation of individual sovereignty that is at the same time antithetical to Stirner’s and wholly at odds with Hartmann’s ethical views. In showing this, the paper gives a new answer to an old question; for already in the 1890s, Hartmann himself, accusing Nietzsche of plagiarizing Stirner, raised the issue of the historical relationship between the two philosophers. More generally, the paper shows that Nietzsche employs a specific textual strategy, which consists in taking Kantian terms in an ‘anti-Kantian’ sense and systematically cultivating the art of using ‘a moral formula in a supramoral sense’. (shrink)

This paper examines the assumptions underpinning one of the constitutive elements of the modern concept of art: the idea of aesthetic autonomy. I argue that the orientation of recent art practice towards what has come to be termed ‘site-specificity’ is best understood as a progressive relinquishment of the principle of aesthetic autonomy. I develop this position through a close analysis of the work of Miwon Kwon. The paper is intended as a case-study that investigates the problematic relation between (...) historical and philosophical enquiry. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on privacy risks in smart home environments and their implications for privacy and data protection. As with other Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the collection and processing of user data in smart home environments currently lack transparency and control. Smart home applications operate within the home, a space that is both morally and legally particularly protected and characterized by a implicit expectation of privacy from the user’s perspective. In contrast to these higher privacy risks, the (...) current regulatory efforts are not yet up to speed with respect to smart home environments. As an interim workaround solution, in this paper, we propose a meta-assistant for the smart home that increases users’ data autonomy and thereby their privacy. In the first section, we give a brief overview of smart home applications, their data collection mechanisms, and the implications for user privacy. Following this, we argue in the second section that consent to datafication, i.e., the prevalent legal option to obtain legal grounds for data collection and processing, in most smart home contexts is—albeit legally sufficient—morally inadequate to provide meaningful possibilities for users to exercise their data autonomy and manage their privacy. The third section introduces an interim solution, outlining the possibility of a meta-assistant, which is capable of operating all other devices—if necessary, by shutting them off completely. (shrink)

This paper proposes an exploration of relationships and exchanges between the philosophies of Cavell and Kuhn by the study of aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Although the notions of language games and family resemblances used by Kuhn in "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" have been elaborated by Wittgenstein, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein inspired that of Kuhn. I will attempt to show that against this background, Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists, can be relevantly compared (...) to Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. (shrink)

This chapter applies the Millian epistemology to ground a robust, inalienable right to freedom of expression and to ground the other autonomy rights, as necessary for the process of the social process of the free give-and-take of opinion. The chapter considers a variety of exceptions to freedom of expression, including product advertising and political advertising. He uses the examples of Google and Wikipedia to provide empirical confirmation for Mill’s claims about the social process of the free give-and-take of opinion. (...) He also shows how the Millian case for freedom of propositional expression can be extended to cover nonpropositional expression in art and literature. The chapter shows that the Millian argument does not limit freedom of expression to reasonable views. The chapter argues that the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive views, which plays a large role in Rawls’s theory and in contemporary discussions of human rights, cannot support the weight that it is intended to bear. This leads to an extended discussion of intolerant subversive advocacy, in which the chapter argues that neither Habermas’s nor Rawls’s theory can explain why the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the Smith Act in Dennis v. U.S. was erroneous. The chapter also explains why Mill’s social process epistemology does not undermine his political philosophy. The author concludes by explaining why the main principle would endorse a human right to freedom of expression. (shrink)

Sylvia Burrow explores self-confidence as integral to autonomy development within everyday contexts threatening gender violence, arguing that self-defense training is significant to resistance and resilience. -/- Choice Reviews, December 2022 Issue: “Gender Violence explores the myths and realities of the threat of gender-based violence and active forms of resistance to it…. She advocates specifically for martial arts and self-defense programs rooted in feminist frameworks. These are the most successful because they resist rape culture while increasing the capacities of women (...) and other people with marginalized identities who face high risk for sexual violence. This book is a must-read for anyone working at the intersections of gender-based violence prevention and somatic practice. Essential. All levels.”. (shrink)

Currently, the autonomy of artificial systems, robotic systems in particular, is certainly one of the most debated issues, both from the perspective of technological development and its social impact and ethical repercussions. While theoretical considerations often focus on scenarios far beyond what can be concretely hypothesized from the current state of the art, the term autonomy is still used in a vague or too general way. This reduces the possibilities of a punctual analysis of such an important issue, (...) thus leading to often polarized positions. The intent of this paper is to clarify what is meant by artificial autonomy, and what are the prerequisites that can allow the attribution of this characteristic to a robotic system. Starting from some concrete examples, we will try to indicate a way towards artificial autonomy that can hold together the advantages of developing adaptive and versatile systems with the management of the inevitable problems that this technology poses both from the viewpoint of safety and ethics. Our proposal is that a real artificial autonomy, especially if expressed in the social context, can only be achieved through interdependence with other social actors, through continuous exchanges and interactions which, while allowing robots to explore the environment, guarantee the emergence of shared practices, behaviors, and ethical principles, which otherwise could not be imposed with a top-down approach, if not at the price of giving up the same artificial autonomy. (shrink)

She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).

In this collection of essays, art historian and critic Sven Lütticken focuses on aesthetic practice in a rapidly expanding cultural sphere. He analyzes its transformation by the capitalist cultural revolution, whose reshaping of art's autonomy has wrought a field of afters and posts. In a present moment teeming with erosions - where even history and the human are called into question - 'Cultural revolution: aesthetic practice after autonomy' reconsiders these changing values, for relegating such notions safely to the (...) past betrays their possibilities for potential today. Lütticken discusses practices that range from Black Mask to Subversive Aktion, from Krautonomy to Occupy, from the Wet Dream Film Festival in the early 1970s to Jonas Staal's recently established New World Academy. Within these pages Scarlett Johansson meets Paul Chan, Walid Raad, and Hito Steyerl, and Dr. Zira from Planet of the Apes mingles with the likes of Paul Lafargue and Alexandre Kojève. (shrink)

The use of artificial intelligence in healthcare contexts is highly controversial for the (bio)ethical conundrums it creates. One of the main problems arising from its implementation is the lack of transparency of machine learning algorithms, which is thought to impede the patient’s autonomous choice regarding their medical decisions. If the patient is unable to clearly understand why and how an AI algorithm reached certain medical decision, their autonomy is being hovered. However, there are alternatives to prevent the negative impact (...) of AI opacity in shared (healthcare professional–patient) decision-making processes, and benefit from the high accuracy of such systems. Despite these ethical issues, this paper advocates for its usage and also defends the positive role that it could have in enhancing patients’ autonomy. I advocate for a system where the implementation of AI is only partial, and humans will remain in control of oversighting algorithm interpretation of medical images and patients’ data. (shrink)

A key point of feminist moral philosophy is that social and political conditions continue to work against women’s ability to flourish as moral agents. By pointing to how violence against women undermines both autonomy and integrity I uncover a significant means through which women are undermined in society. My focus is on violence against women as a pervasive, inescapable social condition that women can counter through self-defence training.

La vida cotidiana y la cultura contemporáneas experimentan un alto grado de estetización que parece hacer superfluo el arte. El presente artículo responde a esta problemática y plantea la pregunta por la función del arte en la sociedad moderna, e ilustra el debate con las tesis de W. Welsch, R. Bubner, J. Ritter, O. Marquard y K. Konig. El artículo se inclina por las tesis de Marquard, quien aboga por un arte estético contra un arte escatológico. Sólo un arte estético (...) como "organon" de la experiencia puede compensar la pérdida de percepción, de juicio autónomo y el fomento de la ficción que genera el poder de los medios en la cultura actual. Un arte escatológico como "organon" de la idea, por el contrario, se hace cómplice de dicha perversión cultural. (shrink)