This article formulates a new approach to combating corruption in Uganda. In pursuit of this research, the author highlights the chronicity of corruption in Uganda, which is uniformly political and bureaucratic. Bureaucratic corruption takes place in service delivery and rule enforcement. It has two sides: demand-induced and supply-induced. Political corruption occurs at high levels of politics. There are 'political untouchables' and businessmen who are above the law and above institutional control mechanisms. The established institutions (...) of checks and balances in Uganda have assiduously continued to have a limited bearing on corruption. Neither coherent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions are able to dishearten certain politicians and civil servants in Uganda from the deviant behaviour of structural corruption. Corruption is a spiritual departure from the law and standard of God. It is an action conceived in the human mind and carried out by the corrupt. Therefore, corruption deterrence not only lies in sound public financial management systems but depends to a large extent on having people with positive human character in all aspects of national life. This article thus provides the framework of corruption and discusses the manifestation of political and bureaucratic corruption in Uganda. It also exegetes the biblical stance regarding corruption. Finally, it proposes a panacea for combating political and bureaucratic corruption. (shrink)

Are federal prosecutions of non-federal officials for corruption likely to improve non-federal government? This essay suggests that such prosecutions can undermine the distinctive style of democracy at the state and local level, an effect that can be harmful to democracy in America overall. This conclusion rests on a larger argument about the different nature of federal and non-federal democracy in the United States. To insure that each official maintains impartial loyalty to values defined by a single, popularly accountable policymaker, (...) the federal system of bureaucratic populism strictly separates the officials’ public and private interests, through various devices such as civil service protection for executive officials, Article III life tenure, and fixed salary for federal judges, specialized training for federal officers, and conflict-of-interest rules that bar federal officers from acting when their judgment could be compromised by private interests. By contrast, participatory populism rejects this separation of the public and private spheres, instead mixing professional and lay decision-making by using thousands of part-time, under-paid executive and legislative officers who are expected to have substantial private interests in the communities that they represent. The essay argues that each style of democracy has mutually exclusive advantages and disadvantages. However, enforcement of federal anticorruption law against non-federal democracies can undermine their system of mingled private and public interests, reducing the degree to which such governments can provide laypersons with opportunities for political activity. As an illustration of the overextension of federal criminal law, I examine the First Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, the federal mail fraud statute in United States v. Sawyer. Sawyer comes dangerously close to declaring that any undisclosed state or local officer’s conflict of interest constitutes a violation of § 1346 when it involves the U.S. mails. I argue that this view of § 1346 is an error. Participatory populism requires that private and public tasks be closely mingled in ways that bureaucratic populism forbids. Undoubtedly, this mixture of public and private creates a risk that public office will be used for private gain. However, it also avoids some of the bureaucratic sclerosis and lack of lay participation that can be endemic to the more centralized federal tradition. In conclusion, I suggest that federal prosecutors ought to content themselves with using § 1346 to enforce already-existing state criminal conflict-of-interest rules, for the sake of preserving a place in our federal regime for participatory populism. (shrink)

Making use of facilitating payments is a very widespread form of corruption. These consist of small payments or gifts made to a person – generally a public official or an employee of a private company – to obtain a favour, such as expediting an administrative process; obtaining a permit, licence or service; or avoiding an abuse of power. Unlike the worst forms of corruption, facilitating payments do not usually involve an outright injustice on the part of the payer (...) as they are entitled to what they request. This may be why public opinion tends to condone such payments; often they are assumed to be unavoidable and are excused on the grounds of low wages and lack of professionalism among public officials and disorganisation in government offices. Many companies that take the fight against “grand” corruption very seriously are inclined to overlook these “petty” transgressions, which are seen as the grease that makes the wheels of the bureaucratic machine turn more smoothly. Despite this, facilitating payments have a pernicious effect on the working of public and private administrations: all too often they are the slippery slope to more serious forms of corruption; they impose additional costs on companies and citizens; and in the long run they sap the ethical foundations of organisations. Although many articles on corruption mention facilitating payments, there have been no systematic studies from a company’s point of view. This article thus focuses on facilitating payments from the point of view of the company that makes the payment, either as the active partner (when it is the company that takes the initiative) or as the passive partner (when the official or employee is the instigator). (shrink)

As Nietzsche famously declared, only that which has no history can be defined. Robert Sparling's superb book shows that corruption is a concept with a history. Although Political Corruption is ordered chronologically, it is expressly not a linear account of how one modern definition of corruption evolved. History instead discloses how the concept has been deployed in a variety of modes in occidental political philosophy, seven of which are recovered here: from Erasmus's focus on the moral integrity (...) of the prince to Weber's ethics of bureaucratic office, via Machiavelli, Étienne de la Boétie, Bolingbroke, Robespierre, and Kant. Pursuant to the book's nonlinearity, these philosophers are not placed in conversation... (shrink)

Traditionally, corruption is seen as a rational pursuit of profit, focusing on personal gain. However, this view overlooks behavioral, social, and systemic influences. This paper focuses on the behavioral aspects of corruption, providing a deeper understanding of its complexities by addressing the factors overlooked by conventional approaches. Reviewing some of the literature, we highlight how researchers have approached the study of corruption from the perspective of behavioral sciences. Additionally, we examine how the emerging discipline of Behavioral Public (...) Policy (BPP) employs innovative methods to reduce corrupt practices, offering new insights and strategies that transcend traditional approaches. The core contribution of our paper lies in its novel approach: showing a path for corruption decrease by replacing traditional regulations and bureaucratic burdens, which research shows can increase its likelihood, with non-regulatory behavioral tools such as nudges and sludge audits. By reducing regulations and administrative red tape, these tools simplify processes minimizing opportunities for corrupt behavior in certain contexts, while aligning with liberal principles. In this article, we aim to infuse corruption research with a behavioral twist and a liberal perspective, offering policymakers alternative strategies to foster transparency, accountability, and ethical governance. While this approach will not completely eradicate corruption, it strives to show how BPP can reduce its occurrences. (shrink)

Organizational corruption has recently attracted considerable scholarly attention, especially since its devastating effects following recent major corporate scandals, the worldwide economic crisis of 2009, and the current European Union monetary crisis. This paper is based on the analysis of three distinct, yet contextually related, case studies in a European Union member state: (a) an incident of corruption by a minister in an adjudicative role, (b) widespread financial misreporting and perjury within an organization, and (c) abuse of due process (...) and obstruction of justice by civil servants within a ministry. These cases serve to illustrate, for the first time, Aguilera and Vadera’s (in J Bus Ethics 77:431–449, 2008 ) framework of organizational corruption, which relates distinct types of a corrupter’s opportunity, motivation, and justification with the type of corruption present in the organization. Furthermore, the data suggest how the framework may be extended and reveal conceptual issues that require reconciliation. This study attempts such reconciliations and offers some suggestions on how the findings may be utilized by policy reformers or corruption controllers. (shrink)

This work addresses corruption in politics and the public services, arguing that corrupt public officials should be exposed, prosecuted and gaoled, just like their colleagues in the private sector. It covers ethical standards in the public service, both state and federal; the practice of government; the relationships between officials; their advisors and the public; the interplay between politics and personal behaviour, and offering explanations as to what can be done about corruption in public service through asking questions like; (...) how does corruption gain a foothold in public affairs?; how can public trust be rebuilt between bureaucrats, the politicians and the people who vote for them?; and how can we improve accoutability over the cover-ups? (shrink)

The paper dealt with the control on political corruption in Italy, in particular with the reasons why most of the control mechanisms did not work for a long time, allowingfor the development of"tangentopoli". First of all, we briefly discussed the reasons why the controls ''from below"--that is, from citizens or electors--did not function in Italy: the pervasive occupation of the administration and the civil society by the political parties, as well as "secret" agreements between political parties in order to (...) avoid political scandals were discussed.The paper continued by analyzing two types of institutional control: the administrative controls and the judiciary controls. In the second part, we presented some main characteristics of the Italian public administration that hampered internal controls, the informal control of parties over the bureaucrats through clientelism and complicity in corruption being one among them. In the third part, we focused on the peculiar characteristics of a magistracy that enjoyed of a very high degree of format autonomy from the political power, but was "pushed" towards politics for reasons as different as complicity in corruption and the need to "substitute" for the weak policy making capacity of political parties. In the fourth part, we reviewed some reform bills to deal with the control of political corruption. (shrink)

This article uses the concept of partial organization to examine how organizing principles can facilitate the effective operation of networked forms of corruption. We analyze the case study of a corruption network in the South Korean maritime industry in terms of how it operated by selectively appropriating practices normally associated with formal bureaucratic organizations. Our findings show that organizational elements built into the corruption network enabled coordination of corruption activities and served to distort and override (...) practices within member organizations. The network was primarily organized through the hierarchical organization of a bounded and controlled set of members and, to a lesser extent, through processes of monitoring and sanctions. Given its clandestine nature, the network avoided the use of explicit rules to govern behavior, instead relying on habituated routines to ensure consistent and predictable action from members. We find that organizational elements were rescinded when the corruption network was exposed after the sinking of a passenger ferry, the Sewol. By rolling back its hierarchical organization and reverting to core relationships, the corruption network sought to preserve its center. The article illustrates the explanatory value of studying how the activities of corruption networks are enabled and adapt to existential challenges through partial organization. (shrink)

Models treating the simple properties of social groups have a common shortcoming. Typically, they focus on the local properties of group members and the features of the world with which group members interact. I consider economic models of bureaucratic corruption, to show that (a) simple properties of groups are often constituted by the properties of the wider population, and (b) even sophisticated models are commonly inadequate to account for many simple social properties. Adequate models and social policies must (...) treat certain factors that are not local to individual members of the group, even if those factors are not causally connected to those individuals. Key Words: individualism • corruption • supervenience • model • cause. (shrink)

This paper represents an effort to distinguish between two types of guanxi prevalent in mainland China: favor-seeking guanxi that is culturally rooted and rent-seeking guanxi that is institutionally defined. Different rules of maneuvering the two types of guanxi are identified in light of Chinese cultural and business ethics. Strategies for entering guanxi in mainland China are also suggested.

National decline is typically blamed on special interests from the demand side of politics corrupting a country's institutions. The usual demand-side suspects include crony capitalists, consumer activists, economic elites, and labor unions. Less attention is given to government insiders on the supply side of politics - rulers, elected officials, bureaucrats, and public employees. In autocracies and democracies, government insiders have the motive, means, and opportunity to co-opt political power for their benefit and at the expense of national well-being. Many storied (...) empires have succumbed to such inside jobs. Today, they imperil countries as different as China and the United States. Democracy - government by the people - does not ensure government for the people. Understanding how government insiders use their power to subvert the public interest - and how these negative consequences can be mitigated - is the topic of this book by Mark A. Zupan. (shrink)

This study examines the degree of state ownership on corporate bribery. Integrating the theories of state ownership and corporate corruption, we propose that state ownership influences bribery propensity and bribery intensity in different ways; it lowers a firm’s tendency to pay bribes but increases the relative amount of bribery payment. Building on the control rights/bargaining hypotheses, we demonstrate that state ownership shields firms from bribery demands by reducing administrative hurdles that include bureaucratic requirements of obtaining licenses or settling (...) taxes in business operations. However, state ownership elevates the level of bribes by weakening their capital mobility. Using a sample of 23,018 firms from 54 countries covering 2006 to 2013, we find evidence to support our hypotheses. This article contributes to corruption research by drawing attention to an important channel of corruption and by highlighting the importance of considering not only the propensity but also the intensity of bribe payments. (shrink)

While the cancellation of a number of high-profile loans because of corruption concerns has made headline news, the World Bank's principal approach to poorly governed countries is lending in order to support reforms. Although designed to be an apolitical technocratic development financier, increasingly the Bank has focused its attention and resources on promoting good governance in its borrowers. Bank lawyers and presidents have attempted to hive of apolitical aspects of governance by arguing a distinction between the rule of law (...) and the political character of government, but this distinction is illusory. The Bank's inability to address the political embeddedness of poor governance in neo-patrimonial governments skews risk assessments and impedes the formation of effective strategies. Reform of the charter would not eliminate the Bank's bureaucratic and political constraints. (shrink)

This article traces the career path and personality of a chancery official or secretary in the service of the Gonzaga, the ruling dynasty of Mantua, in the middle years of the fifteenth century. It relates Giovanni Arrivabene to the contemporary social, political and cultural context of this secondary northern Italian power or signoria but touches the wider Italian world at many points, particularly the papal court, whether in Rome or other locations, where Giovanni’s talented younger brother served first as the (...) secretary of Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga and later as an apostolic secretary. The comparison between the two brothers and their interdependence as property owners is a recurring theme. Giovanni emerges with evident limitations which hampered the succession to his father’s superior role in the chancery, where other privileged families also tended to prevail. Humanist educated and efficient, he seems to have been a bureaucrat of routine abilities, not quite astute enough to outpace certain departmental rivals or to avoid being tainted by association with some possibly corrupt practice which caused loss of favour. His later rehabilitation, first as a provincial magistrate concerned with criminal jurisdiction and later as an estate management official, illustrates that private relationships within the narrow world of a civic quasi despotic government were all important. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In its attempt to prove that voters, politicians, and bureaucrats are motivated by the public interest, Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics overlooks a great deal of public-choice research, to which much has been added during the two decades since it was published. The importance of self-interest at both the micro and macro levels of politics becomes clear once one looks not simply at the ?inputs? of a democracy but at its ?outputs? as well. The prevalence of interest (...) groups, the dysfunction of the United States tax code, the lobbying by unions for their members? self-interest, the earmarks in the Patriot Act, the numerous cases of corruption in Western democracies, and the dissatisfaction of citizens with their governments? failings all point to the importance of self-interest in politics. (shrink)

1. THRENODY Is it any longer possible to talk seriously about justice and rights? Are these words corrupted and debased beyond redemption? There is no need to multiply examples of how anything that any pressure group has the chutzpah to lay claim to forthwith becomes a right, nemine contradicente. Nor is this Newspeak restricted to the vulgar. The President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association has granted permission to misuse words like rights and justice if you do (...) so in the service of desirable political ends. Our most universally acclaimed theoretician of justice has shown at length that justice is a will perpetual and constant to forcibly take goods from those who have earned them and give them to those who have not; and the leading light of Anglo-American jurisprudence has constructed a “straightforward” argument proving that a citizen's right to equal protection of the laws is fully satisfied if only the bureaucrat denying him or her a public benefit on racial grounds shows “respect and concern” while processing the forms. (shrink)

Japan’s economy has stagnated since the bursting of the twin real estate and stock bubbles in 1990. Construction employment rose after the bubbles burst despite a real estate glut.Systemic corruption is delaying recovery. The key is thedango—Japan’s system of bid rigging, which is pervasive in public construction. The firms rotate who will win the “competitive” bid. The bureaucrats leak the highest price bid that will be accepted in return for favors from the industry and lucrative sinecures when they retire. (...) The ruling politicians get kickbacks and ensure the adoption of enormous public construction programs.The result is that Japanese public and private capital flows are corruptly routed to uses that are not simply inefficient, but outright harmful to society. Pervasive corruption is the primary obstacle to Japanese economic health and political reform. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the face of widespread poverty, Peter Singer argues that the best response is giving money to charitable organizations that give aid to the poor. In response, much criticism has been leveled by cosmopolitan philosophers that philanthropy is unable to effectively combat poverty for many reasons: such funds fall prey to corrupt bureaucrats, the poor will waste the money, or become dependent upon donations rather than providing for themselves. In this paper, I argue that the work of the organization GiveDirectly (...) offers an approach that can overcome the criticisms leveled against philanthropy. GiveDirectly works by providing direct cash transfers to the poor; by adopting such a straightforward method, GiveDirectly provides practical benefits to the poor, and overcomes key philosophical critiques. The poor are empowered to make choices to meet their own needs, and do not become dependent upon donations. While GiveDirectly does not constitute the solution to the problem of global poverty, it does pro... (shrink)

No society works exactly like its constitution, and no organization functions exactly according to its official administrative guidelines. In the life of all societies and all bureaucratic organizations — East and West — there exist a whole variety of “informal structures” by which people accomplish their delegated tasks or through which they achieve their own personal goals. In the West, we speak of such informal structures in terms of “networks” or “connections.” Those who “know somebody” can go around the (...) bureaucratic queue or obtain free goods and services which others have to pay for. When the use of such connections becomes too blatant, we call it “nepotism” or “corruption.” When they take on an openly acknowledged market value we call it “bribery.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 2-15 [Access article in PDF] Economic Aspects of Social and Environmental Violence John B. Cobb Jr. Claremont School of Theology I When we think of violence, what first comes to mind are violent acts by individuals or groups against other individuals. We think of rapes and murders, lynchings and muggings, beatings and armed robberies. We want the police to protect us from this violence. Unfortunately, (...) we know that police are tempted, in turn, to employ their power in violent ways, chiefly against those guilty of crimes, but sometimes against the innocent. The cycle of violence on the part of individuals and groups goes on.Bad as this violence is, it is worse when the state, instead of restricting it, supports and requires it. Political authorities have always exercised violence against their own people, especially those they suspected of being threats to their power. But in the twentieth century, state violence reached previously unheard of levels. For the sake of building a communist society, Stalin killed millions and imprisoned millions more. The Nazis undertook to purify Germany of Jews, gypsies, and other undesirables through extermination undertaken through bureaucratic processes.We Americans do not think of ourselves as having employed state power in any such way. We know that national power was used violently to drive Native Americans off their land down through the nineteenth century. We know that southern states used their power to enforce segregation and protect whites who engaged in violent acts against blacks in order to maintain total white domination over them. But we now think of the national government much more as the protector of human rights. This is not entirely false.We tend not to recognize, however, the amount of violence the national government is exercising in the wars against crime and drugs. In order to reduce individual violence as well as drug use, we have created a prison population of two million. One-fourth of all the prisoners in the world are in the United States, most of them jailed for nonviolent crimes. Although drug use is more or less equally spread among ethnic and economic groups, most of those imprisoned for this crime are poor and ethnic minorities. In the name of law and order, enormous violence is inflicted by the United States against the people of its ghettos. [End Page 3]In this same century war also took on new dimensions. It has been waged against entire populations instead of armies. The aim at total destruction came to its fullest expression when twice the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan.World War II has made all of us sadly aware of the horrors of state violence. It has turned us against nationalism. We are appalled as we see nationalism raise its ugly head again in the former Soviet Union and especially in the former Yugoslavia. When ethnic groups undertake to destroy each other, our moral condemnation is unambiguous. Personal, group, and state violence remains a problem, but at least the wrong involved in this is widely understood.In all civilization there has been another kind of violence—economic. In much of history economic violence has been closely related to the forms noted above. The rich have been able to impose their will on the poor because they could employ persons to exercise violence for them and they could influence state action. We see this glaringly in the "goon squads" employed by the wealthy in some Latin American countries to intimidate and kill those who protest their actions. These goon squads often work closely with the military power of the state.We know that in this country as well, wealth reduces the chance of conviction for crimes. It also buys influence in government. On the whole the United States government throughout history has supported the interests of those with money. Today the power of wealth in the political process is clearly evident. We recognize that this situation is corrupt, but we do not ordinarily think of it as a form of violence. This is because the violent consequences are indirect, and we are... (shrink)

When the Chinese Communist Party gained control of the entire country in 1949, it faced a country that had been long plagued by civil and foreign wars, [and] was politically disintegrated and economically in shambles. During the civil war, the corrupt Guomindang regime brought the country to the brink of destruction and ruins rarely seen in China's history. In terms of economic formation, the Four Big Families [Jiang, Song, Chen, and Kong] of the Guomindang represented the interests of the major (...) bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie and seriously hindered the growth of the national bourgeoisie. Right after liberation, industry accounted for less than 10 percent of the gross national product, while the remaining 90 percent was composed of either an enormous small peasant economy or a feudal-patriarchal economy. In the old liberated areas in the North, the land reform led by the Chinese Communist Party freed the peasants from the feudal-patriarchal economy and enabled the emergence of groups of small private owners. However, in the newly liberated areas in the South, land reform had not yet been carried out. Therefore, whether in the urban or rural areas, complete transformations of a capitalist nature must take place to clear the way for the development of the capitalist mode of production. The period of recovery of the national economy during the three years after the founding of the People's Republic of China happened to be the same period when capitalism was fully developing. As described by Liu Shaoqi, China during that time was in an early stage of capitalist development. All reform measures of a capitalist nature had been successful, and indeed greatly helped with the recovery of the national economy. The Movement to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and the Movement to Eliminate Counterrevolutionaries were both highly necessary and correct in wiping out the destructive elements of the surviving forces of the Guomindang and consolidating the political basis of the new society. The divisive activities of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi1 did not affect the general historical situation. (shrink)

This article examines difficulties with bureaucratic reform for transitional economies, drawing on the American experience. Bureaucracies have incentive and performance problems that could retard economic growth in transitional economies. A remedy for a politicized corrupt bureaucracy is an autonomous, professional bureaucracy, chosen on the basis of merit. This article argues, however, such a move will not necessarily bring improvement. Political controls over the bureaucracy must be developed and inserted so that the bureaucracy has incentives to be more efficient and (...) to be more responsive to changing citizen demands. The American experience indicates that absent such provisions, a highly-protected, professional bureaucracy can engage in opportunism to advance its interests and those interests may not coincide with promoting economic growth.Cet article examine les difficultés auxquelles font face les tentatives de réforme de la bureaucratie dans les économies en transition en s’inspirant de l’expérience américaine. Les questions d’incitation et l’inefficacité des bureaucraties pourraient retarder la croissance économique dans les économies en transition. Une bureaucratie autonome, professionnelle, choisie sur la base du mérite est un remède à une bureaucratie politiquement corrompue. Cependant, cet article soutient qu’une telle démarche n’engendre pas nécessairement des améliorations. Il faut en plus élaborer des contrôles politiques de la bureaucratie afin que celle-ci soit incitée à être plus efficace et davantage sensible aux besoins changeants des citoyens. L’expérience américaine indique qu’en l’absence de telles dispositions, une bureaucratie professionnelle et très protégée peut se comporter de manière opportuniste en cherchant à promouvoir ses propres intérêts, pas toujours compatibles avec l’accélération de la croissance économique. (shrink)

The article analyzes the problem of Ukraine's development since independence. A comparison of the way of organizing social reality in modern Ukraine and in the Soviet period is carried out. The main regulatory factor in the life of Soviet society was the principle of domination. Ukraine has inherited the principle of domination and retains its leading role in the current social order. Its various manifestations that determine the structure of Ukrainian society, in particular the growth of the bureaucratic class (...) and bureaucratic pressure on all spheres and sections of life, are analyzed. The dominance of bureaucracy contains latent violence, feeds corruption and minimizes social dynamics. It is also a phenomenon of power rent, which finds its expression in a kind of "privatization of the state." Another universal effect of the principle of domination is the doubling of social reality into apparent and hidden. The apparent reality becomes a space for the existence of ordinary citizens and the implementation of legal procedures, while the hidden one contains a system of real circulation of power, which is not regulated by any legal regulations, instead, controls all movements of the social body. The systemic role in the hidden society is played by cliques — informal groups of influential people who really control the course of events. The con- sequence of the principle of domination is the passivity and marginalization of the Ukrainian citizen, associated with the defect of political participation. Such non-participation in power is embodied in such forms of consciousness as hope, liking, and despair. Today, independence is not a given, but a chance that must be realized. The way to this is through the restoration of the role of the people as a sovereign power and the development of non-dominant regulatory factors of sociality. (shrink)

ArgumentContrary to common portrayals of social Darwinism as a transference of laissez-faire values, the widely read evolutionism of Japan's foremost Darwinist of the early twentieth-century, Oka Asajirō (1868–1944), reflects a statist outlook that regards capitalism as the beginning of the nation's degeneration. The evolutionary theory of orthogenesis that Oka employed in his 1910 essay, “The Future of Humankind,” links him to a pre-Darwinian idealist tradition that depicted the state as an organism that develops through life-cycle stages. For Oka, laissez-faire capitalism (...) marked the moment when the state began to decline toward extinction due to the orthogenetic overdevelopment of hitherto subordinate individual egos. Because conservative bureaucrat-intellectuals had been drawing upon this same organicist-developmental tradition since the 1880s in an attempt to forestall the social ills of industrialism, Oka's call for statist measures, including eugenics, to lessen and delay the atomizing, enervating, and corrupting influence of capitalism articulated the political vision of officialdom. Statist evolutionism, not social Darwinism, might be the term that best describes Oka's approach. (shrink)

Regardless of unpredictable and contingent geopolitical events such as last year’s surprising rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, this coming year will certainly witness a large surge in patriotism. The Winter Olympics in February, and the World Cup in the summer, both promise to whip national sentiments into a fever pitch. One other thing is certain, though: journals of philosophy and ethics will continue to debate the virtues of cosmopolitanism, as this number of Ethical Perspectives does (...) through its contributions below.Why is this? Why do philosophers and academics hold on to this idea of cosmopolitanism, an idea utterly lacking in the convictions of the general public? Is it perhaps because the first cosmopolitans were in fact philosophers? The first to identify himself as a cosmopolitan was Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato’s dialogues paint many of the Sophists in cosmopolitan hues. Although people generally support the idea of internationalism as far as it promotes trade, travel, and football tournaments, once it begins to meddle in internal affairs, as it does with outsourcing and transnational constitutions, they tend to fall back upon the patria. They killed Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens, not the youth of the world.Whether it is the service and manufacturing industries of Asia and India ‘stealing’ American jobs, or widespread fears of Brussels’ legendary bureaucrats, the non-academic public consistently turns from its tepid embrace of cosmopolitanism to patriotism whenever threatened. Are we too quick to label this as self-interest or even selfishness? Or is there something else at work in the debate between cosmopolitanism and patriotism? Some approaches to cosmopolitanism are certainly guilty of an absolute removal of difference, of wishing away the nation state, of replacing it with an international body based on purely universal principles, and of wiping away the competencies of nations on many levels. The call for the world state can come across as an appeal for an anodyne and internationalist homogeneity based on a clinical morality that, for all its sensitivity, runs roughshod over the well-engrained cultural, legal, and social beliefs of many peoples.Clearly, this is what many Europeans fear, and to a large degree, Americans as well in their dislike for the International Court of Justice. Even the economic hegemony of outsourcing removes national power, and replaces it with pure economic rationality.Our contributors below do not advocate these reductions, although some may point to them. Key to each contribution below is sensitivity to the world as it is, to its need for difference even in the face of an ever-increasing globalisation that sometimes is connected with cosmopolitanism. Yet, every proponent of cosmopolitanism must sketch how it is possible in practice. Of course, an obvious problem is how to dwell consequently as a cosmopolitan. Not many contemporary cosmopolitans would be prepared to follow Diogenes’ commitment to rootlessness: living in exile after having been included in a forgery conviction aimed at his father, the ascetic Diogenes called a barrel his home. Such was his drive to live a levelled life that he cast away his only bowl upon seeing a poor peasant boy drinking from cupped hands. Today’s cosmopolitan leads a much more prosaic life, and hence the problem with cosmopolitanism begins as something mundane. Does not a cosmopolitan still pay national taxes? Does not a cosmopolitan still need a national passport and second country visas? But, the questions quickly turn ontological: how can one shed oneself of one’s nationality, of one’s belonging, as if it is just an accident of one’s own constitution, instead of as an important property of one’s own constitution? In other words, belonging is important: a citizen of the world still values citizenship. Clearly, the absolute cosmopolitan reduction is an absurdity: one is always rooted, in some sense. Even cosmopolitanism is rooted in a specific Western mindset, and is no self-evident preference of human existence.As Rudi Visker’s contribution so clearly shows through an investigation of the narcissism of minor differences, these questions revolve around the question of confrontation with alterity. What I am, in no small way plays off what I am not. I cannot be everything, if I am something. Freud’s analysis of minor differences reveals that members of a group identify with that group on the basis these minor differences. What is self-evident to a particular culture marks that culture off from another culture, a culture that by definition does not share the same set of the self-evident. To be a foreigner, as any ex-patriot can attest, is to stand outside of the self-evident, whether this means interpreting gestures, understanding commercial practices, or, as Freud would have it, staying on the correct side of national taboos. There is thus a dialectic of inner and outer, a dialectic which refuses a reduction of one to the other. As Visker puts it, recognising the stranger within oneself is quite different than recognising the stranger outside of oneself, and to confuse these as being the same is not only to misunderstand the very issue at stake, it is also a dangerous trivialisation of difference.But clearly, there is something viable and laudable in the idea of cosmopolitanism, since it stresses the universal moral community of humanity. Cosmopolitanism is an attempt to see all human subjects as subject to the same moral law. Indeed, the sort of federation to which cosmopolitanism leads, at least in a modified Kantian expression as Bert van Roermund tells us, even gives us good grounds to recognise the legitimacy and moral equivalence of states. Importantly, the international legal order does not draw its power from any supranational force, but from the choice of independent national actors to recognise it. Hence, this cosmopolitan order depends on nationhood, and good standing within this order depends on the degree to which a country decides to participate. Again, the universal here depends on well-rooted particularity, a particularity able to choose for the universal.What do we do, then, with outlaw nations, those nations that are hostile to the choice for the universal? Through a clear reading of Hegel, Paul Cobben proposes that the metric for a state’s legality is the measure to which it permits the moral freedom of its citizens to bloom. A free person requires a free legal order; only in such can a person obtain the full measure of human rights due. States that do not permit this blooming are illegitimate; they contradict the nature of the human person, and citizens dwelling under the yoke of these have the right to ask for outside assistance in removing this illegitimate power above them. However, for this plea to be met, two conditions must obtain: the oppressed people must have the wherewithal to form a political order after the removal of the illegitimate state, and the action must be grounded in the principles and support of a legal community, which in essence would be a world federation of states. In fact, it is morally incumbent upon all legal states to aim at such a world federation, upon pain of contradiction.Our duty to others does not end with the politically oppressed; the economically oppressed also lay a moral claim upon us. So, as Toon Vandevelde asks in his contribution, what about the global poor? The poor are hungry and in need of shelter and a future, but to address these issues at the level of rights is in a way heartless: what good does it do to legislate that everyone has the right to food, when this right can never be called upon, or enforced, in any meaningful sense? Moreover, approaches that demand non-prioritised generosity not only ignore the fundamental economic fact of scarcity, they also run the risk of creating the moral hazard of dependence on charity. The true cosmopolitan approach is the recognition of our common humanity and of our concomitant duty to help others as far as this help does not endanger us. This duty is compounded by the marginalisation of the poor through globalisation, a globalisation that they did not ask for. The extent of our help is indeterminate, but its direction is clear: it must aim to integrate those poor who wish it within our international systems, and so to ease their own transitions from poverty.Both Gil Anidjar and Maria Bonnafous-Boucher continue this theme of economy, but each from a highly specific viewpoint. Indeed, their contributions are perhaps somewhat darker, delving into an aspect of the unspoken underneath the choice for the universal. Anidjar begins with the relation between religion and economy within the interplay of Judaism and Christianity, whereas Bonnafous-Boucher focuses on the development of political economy through a Foucaultian lens. Although highly distinct contributions, both share the insight that the economy is now the central theme of our power structures, and that economy, isolated from questions of morality or justice, must likewise play a decisive role within the structure of cosmopolitanism, or, at minimum, the political unity of peoples. For, national government long ago ceded to a promiscuous mix of governance, and religion to economy. This nexus enthrones governance as an economic rationale stripped of all other trappings, and inscribes any possible cosmopolitanism within a framework of an aggressive capitalism, a kind of economic theology, a kind of hegemony in which state boundaries are essentially liquefied. Capital, after all, knows no boundaries. (shrink)

Economic openness, both in terms of increased international trade exposure and enhanced inter-firm networking, has been a key element of China’s economic emergence since the implementation of market reforms and the “opening-up policy” over 30 years ago. Unfortunately, these changes have also coincided with the increased incidence of bribery and corruption. Both in general, and in the specific context of China, research on the relationship between a firm’s tendency toward openness and its propensity to engage in bribery is scarce. (...) This study seeks to fill this gap based on empirical evidence provided by a large sample of Chinese firms. The findings of the study reveal that firms’ increased networking and openness tend to occur contemporaneously with greater bribery and corruption. We suggest that this may be due to the misuse of guanxi-based networks that coincide with the presence of firms’ open network strategies, heightened by the potential loss of resource and capability heterogeneity (and hence reduced competitive advantages) in the context of openness. We further find that firms paying bribes do so as an attempt to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic processes and ineffective institutional support that might tend to hinder their development. (shrink)

This study focused on the indirect influences of defective higher education, especially management education, on the corruption of Japanese business communities since 1997. Most arrested or penalized Japanese executives and bureaucrats since 1997 were the alumni of prestigious Japanese universities. Their levels of academic achievements are, consequently, conceived to be the highest of Japanese standards. They were, however, found guilty. Why did these highly intelligent Japanese adults make such fatal mistakes? In this article, the author argued that the event (...) of the continuous exposure of scandals and corruptions in Japan since 1997 was an unintended consequence of Japan's educational systems through Habermasian and Foucaultian positions. (shrink)

Corruption in public life needs to be examined in greater detail as not only an individual lapse but also a feature of the collective that either does or does not put pressure on the individual to lapse. This paper takes a methodological holistic perspective exceeding the methodological individualistic perspective in understanding corruption. The claim is that the locus of responsibility cannot be restricted to the individual alone and the collective (if there be such an entity) be left scot-free. (...) This claim is premised on the conception that an individual’s act which is in deviation of expected and established norms cannot be faulted only at the level of the individual, and careful consideration needs to be made to assess the role of the collective in precipitating the lapse(s) in the actions of the individual. This paper argues for sharing the liability of corruption in public life between the legally responsible individual as agent and the cultural milieu in which the agent operates. At a foundational level this paper calls for a reconceptualization of individual agency and decision making from being isolated and discrete, to being construed by the collective that the individual agent is a part of. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is generally regarded as wrong. But in what exactly does this form of corruption consist and what kind of wrong does it imply? This article aims to take stock of the current philosophical discussion of the different senses in which political corruption is wrong in a general sense, beyond the specific negative legal, economic, and social costs it may happen to have in specific circumstances. Political corruption is usually presented (...) as a pathology of the public order. Therefore, the senses in which political corruption has been presented as wrong have varied depending on the normative theory of the public order that is presupposed. In this article, we offer a critical presentation of two major interpretations of the wrongfulness of political corruption that draw respectively on a neo-republican and a liberal account of the public order. Finally, we show how the analytical distinction between these approaches has important normative implications for the identification of relevant cases of political corruption. (shrink)

I argue that, although education should have positive effects on students’ epistemic character, it is often actually damaging, having bad effects. Rather than cultivating virtues of the mind, certain forms of education lead to the development of the vices of the mind - it is therefore epistemically corrupting. After sketching an account of that concept, I offer three illustrative case studies.

The bureaucrat's intellectual configuration is identical with the psychopath's.

Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted (...) with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is generally regarded as wrong. But in what exactly does this form of corruption consist and what kind of wrong does it imply? Recent proponents of the “institutionalist approach” to political corruption have concentrated on those occasions when incentive structures distract institutions from their essential purpose and weaken public trust. The corruption of individual public officials has been less relevant to their work, except for when it leads to the (...) erosion of the functioning of institutions. From this perspective, a clear emphasis has been put on the consequences of corruption. In contrast, I argue that political corruption, whether individual or institutional, can be more fundamentally understood as a form of political injustice in which someone has violated the logic of mutual accountability that undergirds all relations of justice in rights-based systems. In this sense, political corruption occurs when public officials use their entrusted power of office for the pursuit of an agenda whose rationale may not be vindicated as coherent with the terms of their mandate. By focusing on the inherent qualities of corrupt political relations, I lay out a novel relational and deontological understanding of the inherent wrongness of political corruption as a form of unaccountable action. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of bureaucratization within public research bodies and its relationship to scientific performance, focusing on an Italian case-study. The main finding is that the bureaucratization of the research sector has two dimensions: public research labs have academic bureaucratization since researchers spend an increasing part of their time in administrative matters (i.e., preparing grant applications, managing grants/projects, and so on); whereas universities mainly have administrative bureaucratization generated by the increase over time of (...) administrative staff in comparison with researchers and faculty. In addition, I show that research units with higher bureaucratization have lower scientific performance. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding about the internal fraud and corruption problem in the Turkish construction industry. The reasons behind the internal fraud and corruption problem as well as the types of prevention methods were investigated; and as a result various recommendations were made. To this end, a risk awareness questionnaire was used to understand the behavioral patterns of the construction industry, and to clarify possible proactive and reactive measures against internal fraud and (...) corruption. The type of fraud experienced by Turkish construction companies was also surveyed in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent to 89 firms; and depending on the collected data, certain recommendations for construction industry professionals were provided. (shrink)

If more than a tiny minority of people were non-bureaucrats, civilization would not be possible.

Arendt’s reflections on the reverberations of the bureaucratic way of governing give rise to two distinct and, above all, complementary argumentative trajectories: 1) its investigation as a form of domination originating from imperialism and later used as a model of totalitarian; 2) the role of bureaucrats. Both help to understand why the bureaucracy not only survived the fall of totalitarian regimes, but also remained the organizational model of nations. At the intersection of these readings, the essay “Auschwitz on Trial” (...) presents two types of participants in the Nazi bureaucratic apparatus: bureaucratic assassins (desk murderes) and subordinate men. In common among them was a lack of responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the regime and thoughtlessness; however, their degree of participation in the hierarchy and their punishability in post-war trials differed greatly. In these terms, this article aims to analyze the similarities and differences between subordinate men and bureaucratic murderers. To do so, it is assumed that understanding them helps to understand bureaucracy as a form of government that makes public freedom and the free exercise of spiritual activities unfeasible. (shrink)

In this book, Seumas Miller develops distinctive philosophical analyses of corruption, collective responsibility and integrity systems, and applies them to cases in both the public and the private sectors. Using numerous well-known examples of institutional corruption, he explores a variety of actual and potential anti-corruption measures. The result is a wide-ranging, theoretically sophisticated and empirically informed work on institutional corruption and how to combat it. Part I defines the key concepts of corruption, power, collective responsibility, (...) bribery, abuse of authority and nepotism; Part II discusses anti-corruption and integrity systems, corruption investigations and whistle-blowing; and Part III focuses on corruption and anti-corruption in specific institutional settings, namely policing, finance, business and government. Integrating theory with practical approaches, this book will be important for those interested in the philosophy and ethics of corruption as well as for those who work to combat it. (shrink)

Although theory refers to organizational culture as an important variable in corrupt organizations, only little empirical research has addressed the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture. Besides some characteristics that go hand in hand with unethical behavior and other features of corrupt organizations, we are still not able to describe a corrupt organizational culture in terms of its underlying assumptions, values, and norms. With a qualitative approach, we studied similarities of organizational culture across different corrupt organizations. In this study, we (...) performed content analysis on interviews of 14 independent experts about their experience with corrupt organizations. With this approach, we gained insights about different corrupt organizations spanning different branches (e.g., government, foreign trade, pharmacy, sports, building industry). We found that corrupt organizations perceive themselves to fight in a war, which leads to their taken-for-granted assumption that “the end justifies the means”. This assumption inspires many values and norms of the organizational culture. An important value in a corrupt organization is “security”, and an important norm is punishment of deviant (i.e., non-corrupt) behavior. Furthermore, managers and employees differ in their perception of organizational culture. While the management endorses values, such as success, results, and performance, and implements these values in their norms of goal setting, employees make use of rationalization strategies and endorse values of security and team spirit. (shrink)

Criticism plays an essential role in the growth of scientific knowledge. In some cases, however, criticism can have detrimental effects; for example, it can be used to ‘manufacture doubt’ for the purpose of impeding public policy making on issues such as tobacco consumption and greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Oreskes & Conway 2010). In this paper, we build on previous work by Biddle and Leuschner (2015) who argue that criticism that meets certain conditions can be epistemically detrimental. We extend and refine (...) their account by arguing that such criticism can be epistemically corrupting—it can create social conditions that are conducive to the development of epistemic vice by agents operating within them. (shrink)

Rankings of countries by perceived corruption have emerged over the past decade as leading indicators of governance and development. Designed to highlight countries that are known to be corrupt, their objective is to encourage transparency and good governance. High rankings on corruption, it is argued, will serve as a strong incentive for reform. The practice of ranking and labeling countries "corrupt," however, may have a perverse effect. Consistent with Social Labeling Theory, we argue that perceptual indices can encourage (...) the loss of needed investment and, thus, contribute to higher rates of corruption within unfavorably ranked countries. In effect, corruption indices may inhibit foreign direct investment, the effect of which is to encourage the status quo in terms of corruption ranking. Using an experimental study design, we test the effects of country corruption rankings on the assessment of country investment desirability and find ranking exposure causes shifts in country investment desirability for 10 of 12 countries studied. These findings suggest that corruption rankings, which are based on perceptions of corruption, may cause country isolation and a reduction in legitimate means of investment. (shrink)

We examine the responses of South African multinational enterprises to corruption in African markets in the context of institutional voids. Corruption is a source of uncertainty and additional transactional costs for MNEs and it necessitates a strategic response. The research employs a qualitative study of a sample of MNEs with experience in internationalising into Africa. The results indicate that corruption in African markets is pervasive and closely associated with the institutional voids in these countries. MNEs see themselves (...) as ‘institution takers’ responding to countries’ institutional makeup at the organisational and individual level but fail to fully appreciate their impact on institutions both positively and negatively. Rather MNEs focus on strategic responses at the organisational level to address corruption operationally in the host country. We add to the existing literature by providing a dynamic framework of the complex webs of association between institutions, MNEs and corruption in conditions of economic underdevelopment. The research suggests that MNEs do not need to get caught in a vicious cycle whereby they perpetuate corruption in conditions of underdevelopment and institutional voids but instead can contribute towards a virtuous cycle through which they institutionalise ethical foundations. (shrink)

Corruption in public administration is a serious problem that negatively affects society and the functioning of the State. It is essential to address this issue effectively to promote transparency, integrity and trust in government institutions. This research aims to review the existing literature on the evaluation of corruption and its effects on the effectiveness of public administration. Three research questions were posed following the PICO methodology (1) What is the effect of corruption on the population's trust in (...) government institutions?, (2) What mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption in public administration have been implemented in different countries?, (3) What is the impact of corruption on government efficiency? The investigations were carried out using the Scopus database and Web of Science for which inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to identification, screening and including 40 relevant articles. The results elucidate citizens' perception of corruption in public administration, as well as the sources that cause this scourge. In addition, the key findings of the review are presented, including the mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption implemented in different contexts. It is concluded that to combat corruption requires a joint effort from society, the government and entities in order to promote transparency and strengthen institutions, which in turn will contribute to building a more just and trustworthy society. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to analyse the influence of sociocultural factors on corruption levels. Taking as starting point Husted (J Int Bus Studies 30:339–359, 1999) and Graeff (In: Lambsdorff J, Taube M, Schramm M (eds) The new institutional economics of corruption. Routledge, London, 2005) proposals, we consider both the interrelation between cultural dimensions and the diverse expressions of social capital with corruption. According to our results, the universalistic trust (linking and bridging social capital) constitutes a (...) positive social capital that is negatively linked to corruption. In contrast, the particularistic levels of trust (bonding) can constitute a negative social capital directly related to corruption levels. Furthermore, cultures which are favourable to the legitimation of dependency relations and the formation of closed particularistic groups (power-distance and community factors) create a breeding ground for the development of these amoral rent-seeking structures. (shrink)

"This book discusses political corruption and anticorruption as a matter of a public ethics of office. It shows how political corruption is the Trojan horse that undermines public institutions from within via the interrelated action of the officeholders. Even well-designed and legitimate institutions may go off track if the officeholders fail to uphold by their conduct a public ethics of office accountability. Most current discussions of what political corruption is and why it is wrong have concentrated either (...) on explaining and assessing it as a matter of an individual's corrupt character and motives or as a dysfunction of institutional procedures. The book investigates the common normative root of these two manifestations of political corruption as a relationally wrongful practice that consists in an unaccountable use of the power of office by the officeholders in public institutions. From this perspective, political corruption is an internal enemy of public institutions that can only be opposed by mobilizing the officeholders to engage in answerability practices. In this way, officeholders are responsible for working together to maintain an interactively just institutional system"--. (shrink)