In der Wissenschaftsgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts steht die deutsche Tradition sprachbasierter Erkenntnistheorie im Schatten der primär rationalistischen Strömungen. Der an Leibniz' Begriff der cognitio symbolica ebenso wie an den englischen Empirismus Bacons und Lockes anknüpfende Ansatz gerät dabei in den Hintergrund, obwohl diese Traditionslinie, die sowohl rationalistische als auch empiristische Elemente vereinbart, bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts fortbesteht. Dies hat weitreichende Konsequenzen sowohl für die Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte als auch für die literaturwissenschaftliche Detailforschung, da weder Herders Erkenntnistheorie noch (...) die poetologischen Konzeptionen des 'Anti-Klassikers' Jean Paul und des Frühromantikers Novalis ohne Kenntnis der theoretischen Voraussetzungen erklärt werden können. Unter Auswertung empirisch belegbarer Quellen wie handschriftliche Nachlässe, Briefwechsel und Zitate wird die Entwicklung eines semiotischen Wissensbegriffs bis zu seinen Ursprüngen im 17. Jahrhundert zurückverfolgt und schrittweise nachvollzogen: Die theoretische Ausbildung erfolgt um 1760 durch den für die Wissenschaftsgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts höchst bedeutsamen Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftler Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777). Eine systematische und historische Analyse der zentralen Schrift Herders "Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft" aus dem Jahr 1799 ergibt, daß Lamberts Ansatz in Herders Entwurf der Zeichenabhängigkeit allen menschlichen Denkens konsequent rezipiert wird. Schließlich müssen die poetologischen Konzeptionen Jean Pauls in der "Vorschule der Ästhetik" und in Novalis' "Theoretischem Werk" in die genannte Traditionslinie eingebunden werden. Infolgedessen sind besonders die Begriffe des Witzes und der Ironie Jean Pauls sowie der romantische Kritik-Begriff Novalis', der seine Enzyklopädistik stützt, wesentlich schärfer zu fassen als bisher. (shrink)

Studie se zabývá problematikou renesančních historiae naturalis, zejména potom vztahem, který v tomto žánru zaujímala empirie a tradiční vědění. Článek analyzuje rozdíly mezi historiae naturalis Starého světa (Gessner, Aldrovandi) a světa Nového (Oviedo, Hernández). Hlavním cílem textu je charakterizovat specifika těchto dvou typů „přírodní historie“ a stejně tak ukázat jejich podobnosti a poukázat na „zdánlivé paradoxy“.

Die thomanische Erkenntnismetaphysik und -psychologie wird auch heute noch weithin in rein intellektualistischem Sinn gedeutet. Eine eindringliche Untersuchung der Texte zeigt jedoch, dass Thomas neben der streng rationalen Erkenntnis um eine -Erkenntnis durch Naturverwandtschaft- weiss, die vom liebenden Affekt getragen ist. Die vorliegende, lateinisch geschriebene Arbeit untersucht die Rolle des Willens in der Konstitution dieser Erkenntnisweise.".

According to Scotus, the philosophers hold – with Aristotle – that the ultimate goal of human life, and that which makes it perfect, consists in the knowledge of the separate substances. But neither this assumption, nor the theoretical knowledge accessible to human reason alone, is enough to ensure that human beings can achieve this goal. This goal can only be achieved if God reveals himself by means of traditions in the context of a community. Although Scotus does not deny that (...) philosophers can recognize their ultimate goal by use of reason, he insists also on concrete and contingent conditions that can be understood as a revelation of God who otherwise would be unaccessible. This adds an important feature of contingency to the rational achievements of which human beings are capable. (shrink)

In many countries, science is challenged by science-related populism, which deems the common sense of “ordinary people” superior to the knowledge of “academic elites”. Individual support for science-related populism can be associated with people’s communication behavior: On the one hand, people who hold science-related populist attitudes may inform themselves differently about science; they may even be disconnected from societal discourse around science. On the other hand, they may communicate more actively on social media and in interpersonal conversations. We test this (...) using nationally representative survey data from Switzerland. Results show that science-related populists use TV and social networking sites more often to get information about science. They are also more likely to communicate about science in social media comments. However, science-related populist attitudes are not associated with a general preference for social media over journalistic media. Science-related populism has thus not (yet) fueled a “science-related public disconnection”. We also run multiverse analyses, which show further nuances of our results, and discuss implications for science communication. (shrink)

This paper presents an original interpretation of the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio is a cognitio. This debate, I argue, was at its heart a debate about what constitutes the mark of occurrent mental states. Three participants in this debate – Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and John of Ripa – articulated three distinct accounts of the mark of the mental. In doing so, they also developed several philosophical accounts of the intentionality of occurrent affective states.

The aim of this paper is to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cog­ito: is the cogito known by intuition or by inference? There have been several studies based on both analytical and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations. Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it ap­pears that the previous studies have overlooked Descartes’s use of words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various (...) discourses on the cogito con­sistently. In this paper, I focus on the terms which Descartes uses to indicate the varied status of the cogito, such as ‘haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum’, and so on; Descartes changes carefully the terms in each of the cogito arguments. By focusing on these terms, I try to interpret Descartes’s explanations consistently. (shrink)

A equipe editorial de Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia informa que, em virtude de melhor atender ao seu escopo acadêmico, neste ano de 2021, sofreu fusão com sua coirmã Cognitio-Estudos: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia. Este procedimento acarretou uma completa reformulação do seu processo de editoração, bem como transformação em seu formato de publicação de Semestral para Fluxo Contínuo, implicando que o número de artigos do presente volume adequou-se a esse contexto circunstancial. As futuras edições abrigarão um número superior de (...) artigos publicados. Atenciosamente, Equipe Editorial. (shrink)

This paper considers the role of constitutivity and normativity in Frege’s conception of logic. It outlines an historical interpretation with two goals. First, it traces these concepts back to their origins in Kant’s philosophy. Second, it considers some of the different ways in which the issue of normativity and its proper grounding was addressed in the neo-Kantian tradition and in early analytic philosophy. Some neo-Kantians worked out an epistemic-normative conception of objective judgment, according to which the objectivity of cognition is (...) constituted by distinctively logical norms. In Frege we find an original and sophisticated version of this line of thought. For Frege, the normative and constitutive roles of logic come to the fore in the articulation of scientific reason which follows the classical model of demonstrative science as cognitio ex principiis. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus then opens up a fresh Kantian perspective on the constitutivity of logic, one that grounds logic in structure rather than norms, and does so in conscious opposition to Frege and his normative science. Logic is transcendental, according to Wittgenstein, being the essence of the world and of all description. Hence, the normative function of logic becomes, in a way, superfluous. (shrink)

Axiom 4 of the Ethics of Spinoza runs:The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.Since this is in the ancestry of some of Spinoza’s most important and characteristic claims, a clarification of its meaning would be highly desirable (in the literature it is left unhelpfully vague.) I argue that A4 is a causal likeness principle, according to which causal relationships always feature a property which in some sense is “passed” from the cause (...) to the effect. This interpretation provides a key to understanding some darker passages. (shrink)

This paper explicates Descartes’ theory of intuition (intuitus). Departing from certain commentators, I argue that intuition, for Descartes, is a form of clear and distinct intellectual perception. Because it is clear and distinct, it is indubitable, infallible, and provides a grade of certain knowledge he calls ‘cognitio’. I pay special attention to why he treats intuition as a form of perception, and what he means when he says it is ‘clear and distinct’. Finally, I situate his view in relation (...) to those of his Scholastic predecessors on one hand and current theories on the other. His view anticipates the contemporary ‘perceptual model of intuition’, though it is much bolder with its promise of certainty. (shrink)

Inhalt: Michael Albrecht: Zum Wortgebrauch von 'Aufklarung' bei Johann Joachim Spalding. Mit einer Bibliographie der Schriften und zwei ungedruckten Voten Spaldings - Bruno Bianco: Schulbegriff und Weltbegriff der Philosophie in der Wiener Logik. Ein Beitrag zum Verstandnis von Kants Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsbegriff - Luigi Cataldi Madonna: Theorie und Kritik der Vernunft bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Claudio Cesa: Reformation statt Aufklarung. Hegel uber Friedrich den Grossen - George di Giovanni: Rehberg, Reinhold und C. C. E. Schmid uber Kant und die (...) moralische Freiheit - Jean Ecole: Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik - Gunter Gawlick: Theodizee fur den Alltag. Bemerkungen zur Rezeption von A. A. Sarasas Ars semper gaudendi in der deutschen Aufklarung - Volker Gerhardt: Prolegomena zum Begriff der Individualitat - Hansmichael Hohenegger: Der Weg der Wissenschaft und die Arbeitsteilung in der Philosophie. Zur Rolle der Teleologie in Kants Philosophieauffassung - Gerd Irrlitz: Antinomik bei Kant und was er von deren Aufklarung erwartete - Fumiyasu Ishikawa: Die 'ungesellige Geselligkeit' der Vernunftkritik. Kant als Polemiker - Soo Bae Kim: Ethik als Kasuistik. Kants Antwort auf die Garvesche Kritik - Lothar Kreimendahl: Hat Hume William Kings 'De origine mali' gelesen? Die Notizen zur Theodizee in den 'Early Memoranda' und ihre Quelle - Silvestro Marcucci: Kant, Gustav von Starck und die 'pythagorischen Ternen' - Pietro Pimpinella: 'Cognitio intuitiva' bei Wolff und Baumgarten - Horst Schropfer: Ludwig Martin Trager - ein fruher Anhanger der philosophischen Ideen und Bestrebungen Immanuel Kants - Clemens Schwaiger: Vollkommenheit als Moralprinzip bei Wolff, Baumgarten und Kant - Rainer Specht: John Lockes Lehre vom Allgemeinen - Katrin Tenenbaum: 'Was ist der Mensch?' Mannliche Universalitat und weibliche Partikularitat in der Anthropologie Kants - Robert Theis: Gottes Spur in der Welt? Kant uber den Optimismus um die Mitte der 1750er Jahre - Maria Jesus Vazquez Lobeiras: Kants Logik zwischen Tradition und Innovation - Verzeichnis der Schriften Norbert Hinskes. (shrink)

This work proposes a synthesis of the Augustinian Trinitarian conception of Mens with the dual theory of intentional relationships and the genres of the power of the sole that are true to the Aristotelian tradition. To this end, we will analyse the theory of the existential and essential sole of Saint Augustine, the duplex cognitio of Saint Thomas Aquinas, as well as other important aspects of the Jaime Bofill's Thomistic Augustinism which are relative to his theory of «memoria de (...) sí» or «Sentimiento fundamental». (shrink)

This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian Problematic”, which foundationalism and coherentism attempt to solve, and also to the clash of intuitions between internalists and externalists. It is argued that the kind of knowledge that externalists and foundationalists claim differs from the kind of knowledge that internalists and coherentists claim, and which Pyrrhonists doubt. This (...) distinction between kinds of knowledge is traced back to Descartes’s distinction between cognitio and scientia. If this is correct, externalism and internalism might both be correct, and Pyrrhonism might turn out to be compatible with externalism. (shrink)

It would be very desirable to have an account of the relation between mind and world that sustained the integrity of each. In this paper, we will argue that a theory of cognition which is broadly Thomistic can do just that. Many commentators recognize that cognitio is Aquinas’s basic epistemic concept, and that it designates knowledge in the broadest and most basic sense, as distinguished from scientia, or knowledge in the paradigmatic sense. There are several important consequences of this (...) distinction which are relevant to a proper understanding of the way in which a theory of knowledge which is in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition approaches the issue of the relation between the mind and the world. First and foremost, knowledge cannot be construed as a univocal concept in the A/t context. There are different senses of knowledge and we should not expect there to be a theory which supplies necessary and sufficient conditions for “S knows that p” that satisfies all the different senses of knowledge. It is perplexing that the contemporary discussion seems to miss this point, for the same sort of systematic ambiguity of the term ‘knowledge’ seems to hold in English. Second, the A/t theory of knowledge is not an epistemological theory in the modern sense, if by “epistemological” we mean one which is clearly demarcated from a metaphysical, psychological, or even semantical theory. The A/t theory is a metaphysics of knowledge. Third, a Thomistic theory of knowledge begins with a theory of cognition which provides the grounds of knowledge across the board, including even that of scientia. (shrink)

Excerpt from Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta Plagulis correctis indicibusque non sine taedio confectis dum respiro et laetiore animo quid praefandum sit meditor, ecce nuntius longe tris tissimus afi'ertur, georgium kaibelium nobis litterisque acerba morte ereptum esse, qui non solum studiorum societate inde a beatissimo oon tu'oernio - Bonnensi mihi erat coniunctissimus, sed in hoc quoque communi amicorum opere velut auspex et signifer, cuius auctoritatem me aequi et decebat et iuvabat. Nam singularis graecae artis cognitio, quae in illo fuit, in nullo (...) genere litterarum magis enituit quam in Comicis, unde splendidum ante biennium factum est huius Corporis initium. Iam adu lescentem prima tirocinia in Aristophane ponere memini eundemque audio supremam fuisse moribundi curam ac querelem. Inter bos vitae laboriosae et fructuosae terminos omnem graecitatem peragravit et undique messem uberrimam rettulit; at nusquam libentius et intentius versabatur quam in atticae comoediae reliquiis. Dorienses enim, quos edidit, propter illos cpinor tetigerat.' quodsi verum est cum primi illins voluminis perfectione vix unam alteramve aequalium editionem recte posse eom parari, quid prasstaturum eum fuisse credimus, si fatum concessisset, ut ipsam 'atticam comoediam nobis ex fragmentis instauraret, in qua totus habitabat et spirabat! Aut nemo mortalium aut, si quisquam, ille et natus erat et paratus ad Menandri et aequalium umbras ex inferis citandas et in vitae lucem revocandas. Adeo in intimam eorum consuetudinem inde fesso labore atque fortasse magis etiam sensus quadam cognatione se insinuaverat. Nam tota eius indoles ad atticum istum saporem facta erat. Ut scripture eius elegantia apicum prae ceteris nitebat, ut suavissima sermocinatio mirum quantum amicos tenebat, priusquam morbi ingra veseentie tormentis animi serenitas obscurari coepta est, ita tota eius ars versus graecos et exblicandi et pangendi Praxiteleo quodam perfusa erat nitore. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

The paper is the first of two to be published in Cognitio which explore the hypothesis that the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803- 1882), brilliantly expounded in the generation before Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), anticipated, if not provided the direct provenance of, Peirce’s mature metaphysical ideas. The papers provide running commentaries on Emerson’s later-phase essays, “Poetry and Imagination” (1854, published in 1876) and “The Natural History of Intellect” (1870). “Poetry and Imagination” is shown to contain the seeds of (...) Peirce’s objective idealism — namely, that “matter is effete mind,” or “mind hide-bound with habits,” — set within an evolutionary cosmology that grounds the human mind’s connaturality or affinity with the laws of nature, a doctrine subtending his abductory logic of scientific discovery. Mutatis mutandis, all these components were already present in Emerson’s essay. Peirce spoke of his “buddhisto-christian religion,” which was another name for Emersonian cosmosemiosis. His originality consisted in applying Emerson’s emphasis on the poetic to the scientific imagination, though the seeds of the latter are present in Emerson’s “The Natural History of Intellect” and other essays as well. (shrink)

One Seit Platon (mit dem Spott von Diogenes) über Kant ist die Fundamentalfrage "Was ist der Mensch?" bis heute nicht nur von der Philosophie (als regina scientiarum), sondern von der Wissenschaft überhaupt nicht beantwortet. Phänomenologisch hat der Mensch a posteriori physische (somatische), psychische(perceptio, emotio, cognitio), mentale (logische), spirituelle (conscientia, volitio, actio) "Sphären". Ontologisch in Kontext von to ti en einai (Aristoteles) sollte der Mensch a priori ein "Programm" (Information) vor der Kosmogonie haben. Der (Neo‐) Positivismus (z.B. Hume bis Carnap, (...) Russel*; * Nobel Laureate) verwirft Fragen der Metaphysik als Scheinprobleme. Damit bleibt das Menschen‐Wesen in Kontext von Postulaten, wie res cogitans (Descartes), Monaden(Leibniz), "Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit", Seligkeit und (moralischer) Vollkommenheit (Kant), absoluter Geist (Hegel) in der theologischen Dimension. Antwort könnte eine zukünftige (holistisch‐multidimensionale) philosophische theoretische und Experimentaltheologie (kontrollierbare Beobachtung) durch weitere Forschung geben, in Kontext (bzw. Existenz) von A. Physikotheologie bzw. (a) höhere (als drei) geometrische/physikalische Dimensionen (Hilbert, Riemann /Friedmann, Minkowski, Schmutzer), (b) Paralleluniversen (z.B. L. Randall), (c) Quantentheorie/‐philosophie (Planck*, u.a.), (d) Gravitations‐/Relativitätstheorie (Newton/Einstein*), (e) Vakuumenergie (Sato), etc. B. ChemoBiotheologie bzw. "psychischen" (Fechner) und "spezifischen" (Joh. Müller) Energien,"biologischem Feld" (Gurwitsch), künstlicher Biogenese (Oparin, Fox, Urey*, u.a.; 32 Fragen von John Bernal). C. Psychotheologie bzw. parapsychische Phänomene (Carrel*, Richet*/France, Rhinne/USA, Vassilev, Bechterew/Russia, etc.). D. Religionstheologie: (über‐) Bewußtsein, übersinnliche, immaterielle, supraphysikalische Phänomene (Sri Aurobindo, Dalai Lama*, Konfuzius/Laotse, Gopi Krishna, Papst Benedikt, Paramahansa Yogananda, Sri Yogendra, etc.)und ihre physiologische Begründung (Anand/Chinna, Kasamatsu/Hirai, Ornstein, Pauli*, von Weizsäcker, etc.). Damit hängt die ontologische Frage nach dem MenschenWesen mit der Lösung des Problemkomplexes "Gott Geist/Seele Mensch Natur" zusammen. (shrink)

En este trabajo se propone una síntesis de la concepción agustiniana trinitaria de la mens con la teoría dual de las relaciones intencionales y de los géneros de potencias del alma que profesa la tradición aristotélica. En este sentido, se analiza el conocimiento existencial y esencial del alma en San Agustín, la "duplex cognitio" en Tomás de Aquino, así como alarmas de las aportaciones y claves interpretativas del agustinismo tomista de Jaime Bofill relativas a su concepto de "memoria de (...) sí" o "sentimiento fundamental". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciato, Pierre de l’Estoile: Renaissance Interpreters of Roman LawMichael L. MonheitIn the Renaissance, jurists and other scholars intensely debated the problem of how to interpret correctly the Corpus iuris civilis (CIC), Justinian’s great sixth-century-ad compilation of Roman law. 1 Yet by the sixteenth century jurists had been closely interpreting its texts for four centuries; indeed Roman law jurists, much more than pre-Reformation theologians, innovated through close (...) commentary on the text (a characteristic sometimes wrongly considered a humanist innovation). Assuming that these texts were fully consistent, largely lacking a sense of historical distance, they “found” the CIC’s dictum on a given question by weaving many passages that seemed to address it partially into a complex logical fabric, and eliminated apparent internal conceptual disparities in the same way. 2But from the fifteenth century such humanists as Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) and Angelo Politiano (1454–94) applied humanist critical methods to the CIC and ridiculed the methods of the civilians. In the early sixteenth century the work of Guillaume Budé (1468–1540), Andrea Alciato (1492–1550), and Ulrich Zasius (1461–1535) intensified the crisis in legal interpretation. Budé, the [End Page 21] period’s leading French humanist, was the first humanist to publish an exhaustive study of Justinian’s Digest, while the Milanese jurist Alciato and the German jurist Zasius were among the first humanist-trained Roman lawyers to tackle the CIC. Across the century’s first three decades these humanists debated each other and other jurists, including the eminent Orléans professor of Roman law, Pierre de l’Estoile (1480–1537), best known to scholars as the teacher of a youthful law student named Jean Calvin. 3 We consider here a debate between Budé, Alciato, and Estoile, which also involved Nicolas Duchemin, Estoile’s student and partisan, and Calvin himself, who made his first appearance in print by contributing a preface to the work of his friend Duchemin. Though often referred to in Calvin scholarship, the debate has never been thoroughly explored. 4 [End Page 22]Unlike some recent studies of interpretation in the Renaissance, this study focuses on each interpreter’s practice, rather than his explicit methodological pronouncements alone, on what Wittgenstein calls a writer’s “language game”—here the meaning of each interpreter’s statements in the context of his interpretive practices. Indeed we shall view this debate as a clash of three “forms of life,” since the three protagonists could not agree as to what rules to follow to determine the meaning of a particular expression. 5In the passage in question, Lex Nec quicquam, §Ubi decretum, from the Digest section On the Duties of the Proconsul and Legate (D.1.16.9.1), the third century Imperial jurist Ulpian, declares:Ubi decretum necessarium est per libellum id expedire proconsul non poterit: Omnia enim quaecunque causae cognitionem desiderant per libellum non possunt expediri. (Where a decretum [decree] is required, the proconsul will not be able to dispose of the matter per libellum. All matters whatsoever requiring causae cognitio [judicial investigation] cannot be disposed of per libellum.)In unravelling the meaning of such key terms as decretum and libellus, the interpreters applied assumptions and practices rooted in both the humanist and [End Page 23] scholastic traditions—sometimes the same individual applied both. The debate presents the issue of interpretation apart from that of textual recovery, for no participant claimed any passage involved had been corrupted or offered a significant variant. Had they possessed the Mommsen edition of the CIC (albeit without necessarily understanding its principles of construction), each would have faced little added difficulty.I. Guillaume Budé on §Ubi decretumGuillaume Budé sparked the debate with his comments on the passage in the first part of his famous study of Justinian’s Digest, the Annotationes in quattuor & viginti Pandectarum libros (1508). He argued that the term libellus as used in the passage meant a supplicatory petition addressed to the Emperor. The matters involved could include both controversial cases, for which the Emperor would rely on the judgment of his council, and uncontested matters in which Emperors acted by their own “liberality or beneficence.” Budé confined himself to the... (shrink)

I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or (...) mind. My own take is in line with Descartes’ two-level epistemology of cognitio and scientia, a bifurcation that protects him from vicious circularity, and is adaptable for an epistemology naturalized, whether in the way of Quine, or Moore, or Davidson. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the idea of beatitudo in Duns Scotus. We begin with the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum, where the Doctor Subtilis presents a conception of the act of intellective knowledge through the natural meaning of beatitude. Taking up the famous incipit of the Metaphysics, Duns Scotus develops the idea of a maximum desiderium and a maxima scientia as a way of human and natural perfection. In conceiving this desiderium naturale as form of ultimate realization, he sees it (...) as similar to the knowledge of immaterial substances in statu viae. His definition of beatitudo also disagrees with the Thomist doctrine, developing it a priori as a cognitio intuitiva, making it possible for humans to achieve happiness in statu viae. In contrast, in Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, Scotus emphasizes the value of beatitude in its ethical and theological sense, taking recourse to the Augustinian and Boethian definitions in order to understand its nature as the full expression of the intellective, volitional a... (shrink)

This article examines Augustine’s thought conceming the relationship between sensation and knowledge in his early dialogues. A special focus is on Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum. First, I determine Augustine’s epistemological starting point by examining his thought as it appears in Contra Académicos (386). Second, I study the relationship between sensation and knowledge in De quantitate animae (387-388) and observe the development in Augustine’s thought concerning sense-perception. Finally, I analyse Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum, which occurs (...) in De quantitate animae, and make some important observations about the relationship between sensation and knowledge in Augustine’s early thought. In this regard Augustine’s possible influences are also considered. The conclusion of this article is that although Augustine had adopted a version of Platonic epistemology that is very critical toward sense-perception, his considerations in De quantitate animae, especially regarding cognitio per sensum, point towards a more harmonious relationship between the two than his Platonic epistemology in Contra Academicos would lead us to think. (shrink)

From the aforesaid [considerations] the intellect can form an exceedingly exalted knowledgeable idea [cognitio] of God—an idea, first of all, of how it is that all things are present in God. And in this way the intellect can rise upwards unto a knowledge [cognitio] of God, who in Himself is most simple, even though all things are present in Him. And when the intellect sees Him, it sees all things in Him; nevertheless, He infinitely surpasses all things and (...) is unqualifiedly free of all things. And by means of such knowledge—as by means of one foot’s having been planted (viz., the foot of the intellect)—[that foot] can, draw after it the other foot, viz., the affections, by means of their love for God. And [the soul] can locate that [second foot] far more distantly, highly, perfectly, and firmly in God by means of its actual love. And it can do this repeatedly until, at length, the foot of love can remain fixed [out in front] when the foot of the intellect halts.1 And this [topic] is principally my intended focal-point in this present section. In accordance with the meaning of Blessed Dionysius [we may proceed] in a manner similar [to that of the foregoing illustration— proceed] on the basis of the fact (1) that God is all in all and (2) that all things are affirmed of Him and (3) that He is Being for all existing things and is Life for all living things and, in general, is all things and, nevertheless, (4) is nothing of all things by way of composition or inherence but (5) is super-elevated and super-exalted above all things. Hence, [Dionysius] reflects [as follows]: I know most assuredly that You exist and that You are all things and that I cannot know more than that You are exalted above all things. However, You are to be loved maximally because You are so great and so good that You cannot be known. And, thereafter, a man can leave behind all things and.. (shrink)

A idéia que a teoria ockhamiana da notitia intuitiva tem conseqüências céticas está presente há algum tempo na literatura secundária. Este tema reaparece num recente artigo de Elizabeth Karger. Segundo Karger, o problema central da teoria ockhamiana é que um julgamento pode me parecer evidente e no entanto ser falso, em virtude da intervenção divina – a célebre notitia intuitiva de re non existente. O Venerabilis Inceptor teria tentado evitar o ceticismo, sem sucesso, estipulando que todo conhecimento evidente é relativo (...) ao verdadeiro. Adão de Wodeham percebeu este ponto e negou ao conhecimento natural a certeza acerca de temas contingentes, isto é, diz Karger, teria reconhecido as conseqüências céticas da teoria ockhamiana. Esta interpretação não me parece correta. Inicialmente, julgamentos evidentes não são, em Ockham, julgamentos que pareçam evidentes, mas assentimentos causados de uma determinada maneira. Pode-se responder que a conseqüência cética permanece, o assentimento a proposições contingentes podendo sempre ser causado de maneira sobrenatural, pela ação divina, o que torna instável o conhecimento humano. Deve-se no entanto observar, por um lado, que a ligação estipulativa entre a cognitio evidente e a verdade não altera a situação cognitiva do homem e, por outro, é possível pensar que se pode ainda falar de conhecimento, com a estabilidade de processos naturais. Com efeito, esta parece ser a sugestão de Wodeham acerca da teoria ockhamiana, e certamente é a uma posição teórica possível. Não apenas Wodeham não tira conseqüências céticas da teoria ockhamiana, como estas não decorrem de maneira inelutável de sua teoria. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge WILLIS DONEY IN THEFIFTHMEDITATION, after presenting his a priori argument for the existence of God, Descartes compares the certainty of his conclusion with the c~rtainty of conclusions of mathematical demonstrations. In stating the view that Descartes expresses here, I shall use letters: D for the conclusion of his a priori argument, ttamely, that there is a God, and R for an example that he (...) gives of a conclusion that he has reached in mathematics, that is, the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Concerning the certainty of D and R, he maintains in the Fifth Meditation that he is as certain of D as of "anything else that seems most certain," implying that D is for him as cea-tain as R; and he goes on to make what is clearly intended to be a stronger claim: I also observe that the certainty of other things so depends on this that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known,x This claim is repeated, by way of a conclusion, in the next to the last sentence of the Meditation: And so I clearly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends on an apprehension of the true God, in such a fashion that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of anything else.2 i AT VII, 69; HR I, 183. "AT" stands for the edition of Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Euvres de Descartes (Paris: L~.opold Cerf, 1897-1913); "'HR" for the English translation by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). In quotations I have departed from HR to avoid infeficities or inaccuracies. The Latin locution translated "perfec0y known" is perfecte sciri; in the French translation, sfauoir parfaitement is used (AT IX, 55). This is the first occurrence of this locution in the Meditations. 2 AT VII, 71; HR I, 185. The Latin locution in the last clause is perfecte scire; the F~-ench is, again, s~auoir parfaitement (AT IX, 56). In HR there is vacillation in the translation of scientia. In these passages in the Fifth Meditation, scientia and cognitio are both rendered "knowledge"; whereas, in the Replies to the Second Set of Obj~cttons, vera scientia is "true science" (AT VII, 141; HR II, 39). For scientiae certitudinem & veritatem, I have used "certainty and truth of knowledge," and "apprehension of the true God" for veri dei cognitione. [3S7] 388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In these sentences, Descartes does not limit his claims about certainty and perfect knowledge to propositions Like R, and one of his contemporaries, taking him to be asserting that, unless a person has knowledge of God's existence, he cannot be certain of anything else, raised the objection that, earlier in the Meditations, Descartes claimed to be certain of his own existence as a thinking thing prior to having proved the existence of God) In his reply, Descartes accused his critic of misreading what he had written in the Fifth Meditation. The claim that he made there was not about all propositions---about principles and evident propositions, such as ego cogito, ergo sum and sum res eogitans, as well as propositions like Rmbut specificaUy and exclusively about propositions like R.* Whether, when confronted with his critic's objection, Descartes retracted or modified a view expressed in the Meditations is a question on which sides have been taken. In my paper I have something to say about this question, but I shall be concerned primarily with a problem of interpretation that arises whether or not we take Descartes at his word; that is, whether we take the claim that he makes in the Fifth Meditation to be exclusively about propositions like R or, contrary to Descartes's reply to his critic, to be about other propositions as well. The problem arises when we try to make sense of what he says in the Fifth Meditation in support of this claim. In the first part of my paper, I shall pose the problem, pointing out that, on a very tempting and prima facie... (shrink)

Even though the study of cognition–emotion links is a relatively young field, some findings seem so well-established that they are rarely questioned. For example, researchers interested in cognitio...