In _Debating Cognitive Existentialism_ the authors offer philosophical, cultural-theoretical, and sociological perspectives on the value of extending hermeneutic philosophy to the natural sciences. At stake is the universality of post-metaphysical hermeneutics.

In my presentation, I will try to develop a picture of scientific research in terms of heremeneutic phenomenology. I will claim that theoretical objects of science do exist at once as "inscriptions" on the horizon of possibilities for doing research, and as "traces" left by practices of formalization, experimentation, calibration, measurement, and calculation. The possibilities become appropriated in the research process, whereby a conceptual structure of scientific domain gradually takes shape. According to this, the horizon of possibilities remains always an (...) open fore-structure of interpretation concerning the structure of the domain. In elaborating on this view, I will sketch out a phenomenological program of "cognitive existentialism". (shrink)

_ _In __The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism__, Dimitri Ginev draws on devel-opments in hermeneutic phenomenology and other programs in hermeneutic philosophy to inform an interpretative approach to scientific practices. At stake is the question of whether it is possible to integrate forms of reflection upon the ontological difference in the cognitive structure of scientific research. A positive answer would have implied a proof that “science is able to think.” This book is an extended version of such a proof. (...) Against those who claim that modern science is doomed to be exclusively committed to the nexus of objectivism and instrumental rationality, the interpretative theory of scientific practices reveals science’s potentiality of hermeneutic self-reflection. Scientific research that takes into consideration the ontological difference has resources to enter into a dialogue with Nature. Ginev offers a critique of postmodern tendencies in the philosophy of science, and sets out arguments for a feminist hermeneutics of scientific research. (shrink)

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 335-343, September 2012.

Review of: Dimitri Ginev (2011), The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism (Athens: Ohio University Press).

ExcerptI. Marcuse's “New Science”In his celebrated critique of “technological rationality,” Herbert Marcuse pleads for a “new science” in which an “erotic” attitude toward nature would permit the entities of the natural world to transform in such a manner that they become free to be what they are. Following this line of reasoning in Eros and Civilization, he reaches the conclusion: “To be what they are they depend on the erotic attitude: they receive their telos only in it.”1 In addition, the (...) erotic attitude will reveal aesthetic qualities inherent in nature. This view implies a revolutionary change…. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect on the psychological well-being of (...) individuals, it becomes important to study the philosophical foundations on which this therapy is based. (shrink)

Writing in the late 1990s about the tendency of encyclopedists to designate existentialism a finished project, Thomas W. Busch cautions that such hasty periodization risks distorting our understanding of the contemporary philosophical scene and of depriving ourselves of vital resources for critiquing contemporary forms of oppression, what Garbriel Marcel referred to as processes of dehumanization. We should recall that "existentialism made possible present forms of Continental philosophy, all of which assume the existentialist critique of dualism, essentialism, and totality (...) in modern philosophy," and we should acknowledge that "existentialism remains capable of haunting today's scene as an important and relevant critic." Offered in honor of Thomas W. Busch after his more than fifty years of work in philosophy, the essays in this volume attest to existentialism as a living project. The essays are written by scholars who championed existentialism in America and by scholars who now seek to extend existentialist insights into new territory, including into research in cognitive science. The essays range from studies of key figures and texts to explorations of urgent topics such as the nature of freedom and the possibility of what Busch calls "incorporation," a sense of communicative solidarity that respects difference and disagreement. (shrink)

This paper employs the theoretical framework of phenomenology of the body to explore embodiment and existentialism in contemporary Chinese dance. With the backdrop of the current status and influence of Chinese contemporary dance in the realm of dance arts, it analyzes the unique forms and techniques of bodily expression in Chinese contemporary dance, attempting to explore how personal emotions, inner experiences, and spiritual states are conveyed through bodily expression in Chinese contemporary dance. The paper utilizes case analysis and observational (...) research methods to delve into the cognition of bodily expression and identity construction in Chinese contemporary dance, as well as how the body is used to reflect on the cognition and positioning of Chinese traditional and modern cultural identities, exploring the diversity and changes in Chinese cultural identity. Finally, by applying Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body theory, it deeply analyzes the significance and existentialism of bodily expression in contemporary Chinese dance, experiencing and understanding the relationship between bodily subjectivity and self through dance. Through these studies, we can gain a deeper understanding of the complexity and diversity of bodily expression in contemporary Chinese dance, enabling dancers to reassess their ability to express emotions, as well as the application and insights of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body therein. (shrink)

Existentialist philosophy has, at times, been exceptionally popular. This is because of its promise of possibility, both in doctrine and in style: Its doctrine promises that we can break free from the shackles of cognitive or social structures we are thrown into, and we can overcome our marred personal or collective history. Its style promises that philosophy can be exciting, moving, exhilarating, and funny. Analytic Existentialism brings together ten essays in which analytic philosophers engage with existentialism. The (...) essays take up central existentialist themes, such as freedom, consciousness, and bad faith. Some bring existentialist ideas to bear on issues in contemporary analytic philosophy; some engage analytically with existentialist concerns; some employ the methods of analytic philosophy to interpret existentialist texts; and some articulate how existentialist insights speak to ongoing matters of concern outside of philosophy. All essays, taken together, make good on the existentialist promise for analytic philosophy: Even as analytic philosophers, we can embrace the thought that freedom is at the heart of our being. And even as analytic philosophers, we can write philosophical texts that capture the imagination. We trust that these essays can rekindle the excitement of philosophical thought. (shrink)

Since fully covering such a topic in the short space imparted to this paper is an impossible task, I have chosen to focus on three philosophers: Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. Of the three, only the latter was undoubtedly an existentialist ⎯ Heidegger explicitly rejected the categorisation (in the Letter on Humanism), and there is disagreement among commentators about Nietzsche’s status1. However, they have two major common points which justify my focusing on them: firstly, they uphold the primacy of existence over (...) essence. Against the rationalist trend prevalent until the end of the XVIIIth Century, which saw human nature as determined a priori (as rational), all three authors consider human beings as living, self-interpreting entities, whose understanding of themselves is dependent on specific cultural and historical conditions. Given that this self-understanding is taken as constitutive of what it means to be human, it becomes impossible to define the essence of man independently of (let alone prior to) his existence. Secondly (and consequently), they reject the idea that philosophy can start from the study of man as a detached, disembodied consciousness primarily bent on knowing the world ⎯ or even that such a consciousness exists, except as a fiction propagated by rationalism2. Man is viewed as an embodied being, whose reason and cognitive powers are only the visible part of a much deeper and wider engagement with the world. In turn, this rejection of the primacy of rationality and of consciousness explains the central part played by affectivity in our three authors’ works. In all its forms3, affectivity is strongly tied to the body (although existentialist thinkers hold that it is neither identical to nor determined by physical reactions4): once the importance of embodiment has been recognised, an analysis of affectivity becomes necessary to understand the ways in which human beings relate both to themselves and to the world. Whereas the rationalist tradition mostly rejected affectivity5, either on moral grounds (as emotions interfere with self-mastery) or for epistemological reasons (because they cloud the clarity of mind supposedly required by knowledge), Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre insist on rehabilitating it, mostly for two reasons: firstly, as it is constitutive of what it means to be human, affectivity just cannot be set aside ⎯ so the rationalist ideal to do away with emotions is unmasked as an illusion, the roots of which need to be investigated.. (shrink)

The Continuum Companion to Existentialism offers the definitive guide to a key area of modern European philosophy. The book covers the fundamental questions asked by existentialism, providing valuable guidance for students and researchers to some of the many important and enduring contributions of existentialist thinkers. Eighteen specially commissioned essays from an international team of experts explore existentialism’s relationship to philosophical method; ontology; politics; psychoanalysis; ethics; religion; literature; emotion; feminism and sexuality; cognitive science; authenticity and the self; (...) its significance in Latin American culture; and its contribution to the development of Poststructuralism. In addition, five short chapters summarise the status of canonical figures Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and de Beauvoir, delineating the historical approach to their work, while pointing to new directions such research is now taking. Featuring a series of indispensable research tools (A to Z of terms, concepts and thinkers; timeline of existentialism; list of resources and an annotated guide to further reading), this Companion is an essential tool to help the new reader navigate through the heart of Existentialism and modern European philosophy. (shrink)

This fully revised and updated 2nd edition provides a comprehensive reference guide to existentialism, featuring key chapters on key existentialist thinkers, as well as chapters applying existentialism to subject areas ranging across politics, literature, feminism, religion, the emotions, cognitive science, and poststructuralism. Contemporary developments in the field of existentialism that speak to issues of identity and exclusion are explored in 4 new chapters on race, gender, disability, and technology, whilst the 5th new chapter new chapter outlines (...) analytic philosophy's complicated relationship to existentialism. Presenting the field of existentialism beyond the European tradition, this edition also includes a new key thinker chapter on Frantz Fanon, alongside Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and de Beauvoir, as well as new engagement with the work of scholars on race and existentialism, including Lewis R. Gordon, George Yancy, and Richard Wright. The resources section at the end of the book includes an updated A to Z glossary, and timeline of key events, texts and thinkers in existentialism, as well as a list of relevant organisations, and an annotated guide to further reading, making this 2nd edition an invaluable text for scholars and students alike. (shrink)

Thus Pascal sets forth the romanticist thesis that reason has nothing to do with the deep intimations of the worshipping soul. Religion is an affair of the heart, and the productive Source of all things cannot be comprehended by the exercise of the finite intellect. This doctrine foreshadows the Kantian dichotomy between phenomena and noumena: the understanding can legitimately operate only within the sphere of space, time and natural causality, as it knows nothing of the transcendental postulates of the moral (...) life. In Kant's case, however, the opposition is worked out by means of a sustained and systematic analysis of man's faculties of cognition, and the intuitions of moral feeling are not without a rationality of their own. One might say that in Kant's view there is a logic of ethical sentiment as well as a logic of the scientific understanding, the former being practical, the latter theoretical. In the practical domain of morality the categories of the scientific understanding do not apply: the individual who acts from a sense of duty is free and immortal, besides being destined to receive rewards from the hand of God according to his deserts. The practice of the moral life therefore creates a sort of categoreal vacuum, the individual becoming a noumenon, emancipated from the shackles of the sensible world; from an empirical point of view, morality means self-transcendence. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relevance of the view of cognitive existentialism to a multi-gendered picture of science education. I am opposing both the search for a particular feminist standpoint epistemology and the reduction of philosophy of science to cultural studies of scientific practices as championed by supporters of postmodern political feminism. In drawing on the theory of gender plurality and the conception of dynamic objectivity, the paper suggests a way of treating the nexus between the construction (...) of gender within the interrelatedness of scientific practices and the constitution of particular objects of inquiry. At stake is the notion of characteristic hermeneutic situation which proves to be helpful in designing a multi-gendered pedagogy as well. (shrink)

At the beginning of the third millenium the aspect of truth comes out to be especially topical. The greatest interest is risen by existentialistic and social aspects of the truth issue. Their correlation studying is the most productive way to research the aspect of truth. An individual life passes under certain circumstances, one of them being social reality. Presence of other people, necessity of communication and correlation of individual and social substances allows emphasizing a social side of the truth aspect. (...) The notion of truth is shaped under condition of intersubjectivity or within the process of social subjects interaction. On the one hand it provides a possibility to take the truth as an objectively existing phenomenon, on the other hand it transfers individual valuables and strivings into generally significant field. So Truth is destined to stay one of the most important and notional for a person concepts (despite of post-modernism attempts not to use it basically), as it legitimates a universal principle of common valuables availability for all people on the earth. (shrink)

Even the so-called empiricists, though they rejected an extreme rationalization of reality, nevertheless performed an analogous operation, replacing the object of reason by the object of sense. Reality thus became sensation, or sense impression, rather than concept. The individual substance was interpreted as a cluster of sense data, and change as the mere succession of impressions. This noetic etherealization of existence, however, was soon subjected to attack by a number of critics, resolved to follow the concrete facts of existence, irrespective (...) of their agreement or disagreement with the apparent structure of human cognition. (shrink)

In this work, the author presents an updated state-of-the-art study about the fundamental concept of time, integrating approaches coming from all branches of human cognitive disciplines. The author points out that there is a rational relation for the nature of time coming from human disciplines and scientific ones, thus proposing an overall vision of it for the first time. Implications of this proposal are shown providing an existentialist approach to the meaning of “time” concept.

This dissertation explores the dialectic of thought and existence implicit in the human person's task of self-constitution as both a knower and a chooser. By way of comparative interpretation and critical analysis of the thought of Soren Kierkegaard and Bernard Lonergan, it argues for the complementarity of cognitional and existential praxis and adumbrates the possibility of an intellectualist existentialism. ;The Kierkegaardian polarization of thought and existence is situated within the context of a polemic against Hegelian holism and its totalizing (...) aspirations. Not only does Hegelian speculation attempt to reduce Christianity to a mere philosophical theory, it also absentmindedly yet oppressively neglects the ethical and religious exigencies of the concretely existing individual. ;In Lonergan's account of the dynamism of conscious intentionality , there is found support for Kierkegaard's critique of speculative aestheticism. There occurs not only a clear differentiation between knowledge and decisiveness, but also an affirmation of the primacy of conscience. In the full expansion of this dynamism, the cognitional is sublated by the existential; immanent exigencies of intelligence are preserved, yet knowing is to be contextualized within a wider horizon of concern for actualizing the good. Hence Lonergan's intellectualism offers the possibility of re-integrating thought and existence; it is an alternative both to anti-intellectual existentialism and to anti-existential rationalism. ;The task of self-appropriation, which is the core of Lonergan's philosophy, is complementary to the Kierkegaardian retrieval of existential subjectivity. Full self-appropriation involves both self-knowledge and self-choice. Yet self-appropriation, unlike Kierkegaardian and later existentialism, also reveals how objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Lonergan avoids, as Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus does not, a denigration of objectivity and theoretical knowing. ;On grounds of performative self-contradiction, an objection is raised concerning existentialism's tendency to view objectivity in a merely pejorative manner. Theoretical knowing is more relevant to ethico-religious existence and to the actualization of personalist values than is commonly realized. A normative notion of objectivity is a necessary condition for the possibility of an ethics of historical authenticity. (shrink)

This impressive volume of essays that includes contributions from Herbert Dreyfus, Sean Kelly, Mike Wheeler, Dan Zahavi, and Shaun Gallagher reflects an emerging trend in cognitive science, and explores this new approach to cognitive science informed by Heidegger's thoughts on human existence.

This is a sequel to my paper, "Searching for a Foundational Approach to Philosophy of Science", which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal [Ginev 2001, Journal for General Philosophy of science 32, 27-37]. In the present paper I continue to scrutinize the possibility of a strong hermeneutics of scientific research. My aim is to defend the position of cognitive existentialism that combines the advocacy of science's cognitive specificity and the rejection of any form of essentialism. (...) A special attention will be paid to the notion of the thematizing project of scientific research. (shrink)

This volume centers on the exploration of the ways in which the canonical texts and thinkers of the phenomenological and existential tradition can be utilized to address contemporary, concrete philosophical issues. In particular, the included essays address the key facets of the work of Charles Guignon, and as such, honor and extend his thought and approach to philosophy. To this end, the four main sections of the volume deal with the question of authenticity, id est what it means to be (...) an authentic person, the ways in which the phenomenological and existential traditions can impact the sciences, how best to understand the fact of human mortality, and, finally, the ways philosophical reflection can help address current questions of value. The volume is designed primarily to serve as a secondary resource for students and specialists interested in rediscovering the practical application of existential and phenomenological thought. The collection of scholarly essays, then, could be used in conjunction with some of the more recent scholarship concerning the practical value of philosophy. Along with contributing to previous scholarship, the essays in this proposed volume attempt to update and expand the scope of phenomenological and existential inquiry. (shrink)

The article examines some features of the philosophical-anthropological approach to the cognitive activity of a person, which is presented in it primarily as the «of-being-relationship» of a person to his world. The peculiarities of this approach to cognition are primarily due to the following. All contemporary philosophical trends, such as the transcendental-critical approach, evolutionary theory, existentialism, or various representatives of the linguistic turn, always come from the (cognitive) achievements of culture (intentional, intersubjectively constituted, immersed in the specifics (...) of the subjectivity of consciousness, language, etc. ) and from there they try to investigate the factors enabling the subject's achievements; or, like the evolutionary theory, ultimately level out the essential difference in the principle of organization of human life, limiting it to the adaptive self-preservation of the organism. The philosophical-anthropological approach is based on the laws of the organic as a prerequisite for all cultural formations, from the vital process, and precisely from its fateful breakthrough for the human figure, from which it tries to derive the cognitive relationship as one of the mediators, which contributes to overcoming this gap and restoring the vital cycle in the human world. Accordingly, the cognitive relationship acts as a relationship that emerges in the very being, woven into the specific functionality of a living being, a person. And reflexively decisive here is not "exclusively" the internal status of the subject-object-splitting of the fact of knowledge, but its, so to speak, fully cognitively capable presence as an essential relation. The being of cognition does not arise, it only "does not disappear"; it "accompanies" the entire process of anthropogenesis, during which only an increase in the intensity of the unity of being is observed. As a conclusion, it would be appropriate to demand: scientific thinking, by its type of organization and objective intent, must resort to methodological and conceptual self-criticism, and pay attention precisely to the substantive importance of its anthropological foundations, that is, not simply to certain personal or community circumstances in which a scientist or the scientific community work, and on the anthropic principle as an internal principle, on the basis of which the constitutive interpretation of knowledge as such takes place. (shrink)

In his article “Insight: Genesis and Ongoing Context,” Fred Crowe calls out Lonergan’s line “the diagram is more important than…is ordinarily believed” as the “philosophical understatement of the century.” Sixteen pages later he identifies elaborating an invariant cognitional theory to underlie generalized emergent probability and thus “the immanent order of the universe of proportionate being,” as “our challenge,” “but given the difficulty” he does not “see any prospect for an immediate answer.” Could this have something to do with the lack (...) of a comprehensive diagram of cognitional theory? Appendix A of The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism offers diagrams of the dynamics of knowing and doing perhaps copied from Lonergan’s own blackboard work, but they do not distinguish explanatory and descriptive insights, let alone statistical insights, and do not illustrate the pull upwards or the fusing of routinized insights. Before we can effectively relate cognitional theory to generalized emergent probability, we must have an adequately rigorous and precise cognitional theory. I firmly believe in the truth of Lonergan’s fundamental insights, but in order to rigorously undergird generalized emergent probability there are many pertinent questions about his cognitional theory which must be asked and answered. In this paper I (1) review some of Lonergan’s attempts to diagram cognitional theory and discuss what insights they do and do not express, (2) elaborate and defend principles for making our formulations of insight into insight rigorous and clear, and (3) attempt to build up a diagram which makes full use of those principles in a maximally expressive way. (shrink)

Modern epistemology is reluctant to presume the objectivity of a mental event. Because a valid theory of knowledge is subjected to objective standards of rationality, the invocation of a transcendent ground of existence termed ‘god’ is deemed extra‐systematic. This reference lacks warrant because it fails to satisfy the impartial criteria methodologically basic to contemporary paradigms of knowledge. Still the biochemist Arthur Peacocke (1924–2006) claimed defensible public truth for an ultimate reality based on the ‘supremely’ rational nature of existence; it is (...) the further contention of this paper that there are intelligible patterns to the universe whose discovery is incapable of ‘objective’ explanation. By failing to meet these criteria, however, they do not fall into irrationality, still less do they disqualify or exclude themselves from public consideration; quite the opposite. There are perhaps depths to human experience then, including science, to which an existentialist epistemology is appropriate. In this connection the philosophy of Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) provides a compelling account of the transition of scientific research into aesthetics and theological discourse. (shrink)

Fifty years before the present volume appeared, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science (Cogsci) emerged from a couple of small-scale academic encounters on the East Coast of the United States. Wedded together like Siamese twins, these nascent research programs appeared to rest on some general assumptions regarding the human mind, and closely connected methodological principles, which set them at such a distance from phenomenology that no contact between the two approaches seemed conceivable. Soon however contact was made, in the (...) form of a head-on critique of the AI/Cogsci project mostly inspired by arguments from phenomenology. For a while, it seemed like nothing would come of it: AI/Cogsci bloomed while the small troop of critical phenomenologists kept objecting. Then AI and Cogsci went their separate ways. AI underwent a deep transformation and all but surrendered to the phenomenological critique. Cogsci meanwhile pursued the initial program with a far richer collection of problems, concepts and methods, and was for a long time quite unconcerned by suggestions and objections from phenomenology. The last decade and half has seen a remarkable reversal: on the one hand, a few cognitive scientists have been actively pursuing the goal of reconciliating Cogsci, whether empirically or foundationally, with some of the insights procured by phenomenology; on the other, many cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind who think of themselves as, respectively, mainstream and analytic, and have no or little acquaintance with, and often little sympathy for, phenomenology, have been actively pursuing research programs geared toward some of the key issues identified by phenomenological critics of early AI/Cogsci. It might seem then as if those critics were now vindicated. But while these new directions are undoubtedly promising, it is not yet clear that phenomenology and Cogsci can be truly reconciled. Some suspect that Cogsci must distort beyond recognition those phenomenological themes it means to weave into its fabric, while phenomenology may be losing touch with its roots by tuning onto the logic of Cogsci which is, after all, an empirical science. To the present writer, it is far too early for anything like a verdict, as the task of clarifying the issues and gaining a much deeper understanding of the issues on both sides has barely begun. But whatever emerges from this exploration will probably have deep consequences for both Cogsci and philosophy.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Phenomenologically Inspired Critique of Early AI A Methodological Interlude. Threesomes A Sample of Phenomenologically Inspired Interventions in Cognitive Science.

Neonatūralisto Josepho Rouse’o kultūrinių mokslinio žinojimo studijų filosofinė programa yra natūros ir kultūros, taip pat mokslinio ir nemokslinio žinojimo radikalios atskirties kritika, inicijuojanti autonomiško mokslo sampratos suspendavimą. Dimitrijaus Ginevo kognityvinio egzistencializmo (hermeneutinės fenomenologijos atmainos) požiūriu, kultūrinė mokslo autonomija yra pamatinis demokratijos ramstis, o natūralistinis „postmodernus“ mokslo „nuvietinimas“ vertinamas kaip kultūros ir visuomenės scientifikacijos grėsmė. Tad ginti kultūrą, visuomenę, demokratiją, o kartu ir savo teises į mokslo tyrimus yra hermeneutinio naratyvo akademinė-pilietinė priedermė. Kultūrinių mokslinio žinojimo studijų požiūriu – atvirkščiai – mokslo (...) autonomijos idėjos (modernybės naratyvo relikto) propagavimas tolygus kultūrinei mokslo stigmatizacijai, o hermeneutinė fenomenologija pati ją skatina. Straipsnio tikslas – palyginti neonatūralistinę ir hermeneutinę-fenomenologinę mokslo topologijas iš „metafilosofinės“ perspektyvos ir įvertinti jų bendradarbiavimo galimybes. (shrink)

The paper suggests a critique of scientism by revealing the existential genesis of knowledge-constitutive interests in scientific research. This scenario of overcoming scientism is spelled out in terms of the doctrine of cognitive existentialism. On the doctrine?s central claim, a knowledge-constitutive interest is not fixed and determined by a strongly situated epistemic position that is distinguished by invariant norms of theorizing, methodological devices, cognitive aims, goals, and values. In reflecting upon its situated transcendence, scientific research has a (...) potentiality for discarding that form of objectivist realism which is pre-supposed by the ideology of scientism. The paper develops arguments against the essentialist picture of scientific research shared by philosophers as different as Heidegger and Habermas. (shrink)

In Propelled, Elpidorou persuasively argues that the three prima facie undesirable conditions of boredom, frustration and anticipation are, in fact, importantly valuable to human life. His method is an interesting combination of existentialist explorations and reporting of cognitive science research, all written in a style more friendly to the analytic-philosophical tradition. However, I argue, the book’s precision and depth of philosophical analysis have some limitations. This is so in two main respects: first, in the relative lack of discussion of (...) important philosophical antecedents, and secondly, in the relative lack of critical engagement with some of the empirical literature the book discusses. (shrink)

This paper is an assessment of the key debates on Heidegger’s existential conception of science. It relates the topics to contemporary problems in the philosophy of the natural sciences, providing the reader with a framework to evaluate various versions of hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific research as alternatives to both, naturalistic and normativeepistemological conceptions of scientific research. The paper delineates a context of constitution that is irreducible to the context-distinction between discovery and justification. In this context, the tenets of the doctrine (...) of cognitive existentialism are formulated. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work is commonly associated with the philosophical movement called existentialism and its intention to begin with an analysis of the concrete experiences, perceptions, and difficulties, of human existence. However, he never propounded quite the same extreme accounts of radical freedom, being-towards-death, anguished responsibility, and conflicting relations with others, for which existentialism became both famous and notorious in the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps because of this, he did not initially receive the same amount of attention as his (...) French contemporaries and friends, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. These days though, his phenomenological analyses are arguably being given more attention than either, in both France and in the Anglo-American context, because they retain an ongoing relevance in fields as diverse as cognitive science, medical ethics, ecology, sociology and psychology. Although it is difficult to summarize Merleau-Ponty’s work into neat propositions, we can say that he sought to develop a radical re-description of embodied experience (with a primacy given to studies of perception), and argued that these phenomena could not be suitably understood b y the philosophical tradition because of its tendency to drift between two flawed and equally unsatisfactory alternatives: empiricism and, what he called, intellectualism. This article will seek to explain his understanding of perception, bodily movement, habit, ambiguity, and relations with others, as they were expressed in his key early work, Phenomenology of Perception, before exploring the enigmatic ontology of the chiasm and the flesh that is so evocatively described in his unfinished book, The Visible and the Invisible. (shrink)

This paper opens with a presentation of the philosophical underpinning and rationale of the concept of physical literacy. This is followed by an articulation of the concept of physical literacy. Three subsequent sections then consider aspects of the concept in a little more detail. The first investigates the relationship of the physical literacy to the development of a sense of self and to establishing interaction with others. Here the philosophical approach is informed by writings on cognitive development and recent (...) neurological insights. The second considers the universality of the concept and looks briefly at the views of existentialists and of contemporary sociologists. The third section addresses the place of propositional knowledge in being physically literate. The implications of objectifying the body in descriptive language are weighed against the fact that verbally expressed understanding and knowledge are an integral part of Western culture. The debate presented is one of a series that has, over the last five years, mapped the author's work on developing the concept of physical literacy. The aspects chosen to be discussed here are three that have generated considerable interest and debate. In conclusion, there is a short reflection on the implications of the views discussed for education and physical education. (shrink)

This paper takes up one of the least apparent problems of Philosophy. It believes that there are problems in philosophy as a discipline; especially in the field of Metaphysics. Problems of Body and Mind, Freewill and Determinism, Euthanasia and Sanctity of life, are such problems which have been given spectacular cognitions and ameliorative opinions. But problems in philosophy are not restrained to these ones. That is why the paper seeks to appraise the ‘Problem of Method’ as it occurs to the (...) universal frame of Philosophy. It also claims that the Existentialist approach can be a model that the philosophical traditions should follow in solving or evading the metaphilosophical problem. The above will be carried out by looking at what the word ‘method’ means, its affiliation with disciplines generally then with philosophy; emphasizing much on its problematic features as vivid in some philosophical quests. Furthermore, the notion of existentialism shall be explicated as the sublime, in putting to a halt the problematic trend of method in the whole enterprise of Philosophy. (shrink)

Behavioral economics and existentialism both present informative perspectives on human choice. We argue in this article that the dialogue between the two approaches can enrich the current debate about the normative implications of behavioral economics. While behavioral economics suggests that our capacity to choose is constrained by cognitive biases and environmental influences, existentialism emphasizes that we can treat ourselves as free and ‘becoming’ beings in spite of the many constraints we face. Acknowledging these two perspectives in the (...) form of a theoretical synthesis—which we propose to call existentialist behavioral economics—provides us with reasons why we should protect our choices ‘as our own’ and how doing so may be more difficult than we anticipate. It also provides a framework to analyze the threat of identity-shaping social and technological developments, such as preference-altering nudges and artificially intelligent prediction algorithms. (shrink)

Having initially not had the attention of Sartre or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty's work is arguably now more widely influential than either of his two contemporaries. "Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts" presents an accessible guide to the core ideas which structure Merleau-Ponty's thinking as well as to his influences and the value of his ideas to a wide range of disciplines. The first section of the book presents the context of Merleau-Ponty's thinking, the major debates of his time, particularly existentialism, phenomenology, the history (...) of philosophy and the philosophy of history and society. The second section outlines his major contributions and conceptual innovations. The final section focuses upon how his work has been taken up in other fields besides philosophy, notably in sociology, cognitive science, health studies, feminism and race theory. (shrink)

According to behavioural theories deriving from pragmatism, gestalt psychology, existentialism, and ecopsychology, knowledge about the world is gained by intentional action followed by learning. In terms of the neurodynamics described here, if the intending of an act comes to awareness through reafference, it is perceived as a cause. If the consequences of an act come to awareness through proprioception and exteroception, they are perceived as an effect. A sequence of such states of awareness comprises consciousness, which can grow in (...) complexity to include self-awareness. Intentional acts do not require awareness, whereas voluntary acts require self-awareness. Awareness of the action/perception cycle provides the cognitive metaphor of linear causality as an agency. Humans apply this metaphor to objects and events in the world to predict and control them, and to assign social responsibility. Thus, linear causality is the bedrock of technology and social contracts. Complex material systems with distributed non-linear feedback, such as brains and their neural and behavioural activities, cannot be explained by linear causality. They can be said to operate by circular causality without agency. The nature of self-control is described by breaking the circle into a forward limb, the intentional self, and a feedback limb, awareness of the self and its actions. The two limbs are realized through hierarchically stratified kinds of neural activity. Intentional acts are produced by the self-organized microscopic neural activity of cortical and subcortical components in the brain. Awareness supervenes as a macroscopic ordering state, that defers action until the self-organizing microscopic process has reached closure in reflective prediction. Agency, which is removed from the causal hierarchy by the appeal to circularity, re-appears as a metaphor by which events in the world are anthropomorphized, making them appear subject to human control. (shrink)

Existential crises, referred to as inner conflicts, are characterized by identity confusion and meaninglessness. Tension and anxiety accompany them, often to the point where they produce melancholy and make it difficult to go about everyday tasks. Their negative outlook on meaning is reminiscent of some elements of the existentialist intellectual movement. It is possible to categories existential crises' emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects. Emotional components include emotions like emotional discomfort, helplessness, despair, guilt, concern, or loneliness. The issue of insignificance, (...) the erosion of one's spiritual beliefs or personal values, and death anxiety are examples of cognitive components. Among the behavioral components are addictions, which encompass antisocial and obsessive behavior. A person may have existential crises during any time, including adolescence, midlife, older life, and quarter-life. Early crises are typically forward-looking, with the person feeling uncertain and scared about their future course in terms of education, work, identity, and social connections. Subsequent crises are typically retroactive. They are typically accompanied by feelings of regret, humiliation, and fear of dying and are frequently sparked by the idea that one is past one's prime. It is easier for a person to resolve or avoid further existential crises if a previous crisis was well resolved. Existential crises do not occur to everyone. (shrink)

This book is the first monograph fully devoted to analyzing the philosophical aspects of affordances. The concept of affordance, coined and developed in the field of ecological psychology, describes the possibilities for action available in the environment. This work offers a systematic approach to the key philosophical features of affordances, such as their ontological characterization, their relation to normative practices, and the idea of agency that follows from viewing affordances as key objects of perception, while also proposing an innovative philosophical (...) characterization of affordances as dispositional properties. The Philosophy of Affordances analyzes the implications that a proper understanding of affordances has for the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, and aims to intensify the dialogue between philosophy and ecological psychology in which each discipline benefits from the tools and insights of the other. (shrink)

For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.

For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.

This chapter contains sections titled: Was Socrates the First Stand‐up Comedian? Humor and the Existentialists The Laughing Buddha.

The Thin Red Line is the third feature-length film from acclaimed director Terrence Malick, set during the struggle between American and Japanese forces for Guadalcanal in the South Pacific during World War Two. It is a powerful, enigmatic and complex film that raises important philosophical questions, ranging from the existential and phenomenological to the artistic and technical. This is the first collection dedicated to exploring the philosophical aspects of Malick’s film. Opening with a helpful introduction that places the film in (...) context, five essays, four of which were specially commissioned for this collection, go on to examine the following: the exploration of Heideggerian themes – such as being-towards-death and the vulnerability of Dasein’s world – in The Thin Red Line how Malick’s film explores and cinematically expresses the embodied nature of our experience of, and agency in, the world Malick’s use of cinematic techniques, and how the style of his images shapes our affective, emotional, and cognitive responses to the film the role that images of nature play in Malick’s cinema, and his ‘Nietzschean’ conception of human nature. The Thin Red Line is essential reading for students interested in philosophy and film or phenomenology and existentialism. It also provides an accessible and informative insight into philosophy for those in related disciplines such as film studies, literature and religion. Contributors: Simon Critchley, Hubert Dreyfus and Camilo Prince, David Davies, Amy Coplan, Iain Macdonald. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to reconstruct Iris Murdoch's criticism of the moral self as it was developed by liberalism, romanticism, existentialism and linguistic empiricism that interpreted the moral person as entangled either in a world of essences (Kant's view) or in a world of mere existence in which the interplay of both necessity and freedom is at stake. Thus what is missing from all these theories is a sufficient development of what it is to have a (...) regard for others through aesthetic perception, which is the most important aspect of the moral self. At the difference of these conceptions Murdoch offers an alternative view, both to liberal ethics in the Kantian tradition and to contemporary ethics, as she argues that to have regard for others demands responsiveness which can also be explained in terms of aesthetic sensibility. Murdoch's ethics rests on an analogy between aesthetic sensibility and moral sensibility based upon the model of the artist's unconditional love for his characters, which she interprets as being a matter of seeing and loving others. The author's thesis is that love is the crucial point of Murdoch's conception of the moral self where the moral and aesthetical sensibility, as well cognition, intersect each other, because seeing others incorporates emotions of respect and compassion that characterize love and such seeing is cognitive love. (shrink)

Technology has been at the centre of existentialist (e.g. Heidegger) and sociological (e.g. Marcuse) critique for a long time. The latest versions of criticism rely on the results of “science and technology studies”: they argue that essentialist conceptualisations of technology should be replaced while aiming at “democratizing technology” (e.g. Feenberg). However, even these approaches are characterised by a shortcoming when it comes to providing a normative basis: as contemporary technology intermeshes with the elementary levels of existence (such as perception or (...) cognition), it remains in the blind spot of those users, who could “democratize” it through their critique. Accordingly, the formal normative bases (e.g. the one provided by Feenberg, who relies on Habermas’ democracy principle), need to be complemented with substantive claims. For this purpose, a phenomenological-existentialist framework is elaborated with the help of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. It is argued that due to the ongoing expansion of social systems relying on various forms of technology (Luhmann), the “mediated flesh” becomes rigid. By losing the plasticity of the chiasm, subjects are exposed to existential crises unmanageable by mere technology (e.g. mental disorders). Such experience of technologically induced social suffering could serve as a normative basis for criticising the over-expansion of technology. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) has been hailed by many as the greatest French thinker of the twentieth century. As one of the founding members of the existentialist movement in the 1940s, he played a key role in introducing the work of Husserl and Heidegger into French thought and collaborated with Jean-Paul Sartre in the founding of Les Temps Modernes. His later work laid the foundation for the development of French thought in the direction of post-structuralism and post-modernism.

Merleau-Ponty: Critical (...) Assessments of Leading Philosophers gathers together the best critical writing on Merleau-Ponty’s work from the last half century. The collection includes early reviews of his work and the reactions of his contemporaries both during and after his life. Also covered are examinations of his relationship with Husserl, Sartre and the phenomenological tradition, investigations of key themes from his work on ontology, expression and politics, and the ongoing application of his thinking to such contemporary areas of interest as feminist theory, psychology and child development, environmental philosophy and cognitive science.

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