: The concept of the person has come to be intimately connected with questions about the value of life. It is applied to those sorts of beings who have some special value or moral importance and where we need to prioritize the needs or claims of different sorts of individuals. "Person" is a concept designating individuals like us in some important respects, but possibly including individuals who are very unlike us in other respects. What are these (...) respects and why are they important? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to develop a coherent and useful concept of the person. (shrink)

Whitehead holds that the person is a society consisting of all the momentary occasions of experience that make up the life history of the man. At each moment of experience a single soul is operative. Personal identity is maintained when the present soul inherits from its own superannuated soul all the values imbibed from its past momentary occasions, currently contribute its own new values during the present occasion, and subsequently passes them on to forthcoming new occasions which it will (...) experiential undergo. This paper attempts to examine the relevance and significance of this doctrine as a new way of conceiving human reality. (shrink)

This article endeavours to sketch the debate about the concept of a person in the realm of bioethics. Initially, it sets out three understandings of the issue, namely the concept of a person in naturalistic philosophy, in the current of communitarianism and in one of the humanistic positions. The analysis of these approaches lead to the conclusion that a human person is perceived either as an empirical and psychological entity or as a free subjectivity creating (...) him/herself. This thesis provides stimulation for further research. In order to avoid a kind of dualism in the perception of a person stemming from the stances outlined above, the personalistic approach is developed. This points out that a human being should be depicted as one indivisible entity unifying in itself more strictly its self, a subjective aspect of the person, with nature-body aspect which is an objective facet of being human. Given this personalistic perspective, a person comes out as an embodied subjectivity formed by the unique personal act of existence. In this article, such a concept of a person is argued as a vital support in the complex field of bioethical dilemmas. (shrink)

: The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating (...) its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics. (shrink)

Viacheslav Ivanov's concept of person underwent significant development in the course of his career. In his earliest works the person is a transient form that is to be superseded by union with the supra-personal, transcendent self. In works of his middle period Ivanov posits the person as an image of the transcendent self. Lastly, in the 1910s Ivanov integrated these two concepts into a hermeneutic view of the person as an agent of transcendence.

In today'sbioethical debates, the concept of the person plays a major role. However, it does not hold this role justly. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the concept of the person is unsuited to be a central concept in bioethical debates, because its use is connected with serious problems. First, the concept is superfluous. Secondly, it is a confusing concept and it lacks pragmatic use. Thirdly, its use leads to simplifications. (...) Finally, the concept can easily be used as a cover-up concept. Therefore, it is argued that relinquishing the concept of the person could enhance the clarity and quality of bioethical debate. Moreover, the historic origin of much of the present confusion surrounding the concept of the person is clarified. It is demonstrated that three influences resulting from Locke'sideas on the person and personal identity can be determined as contributing factors to the confusion and controversy within the present bioethical debates centering around the person. (shrink)

The concept of the person is widely assumed to be indispensable for making a rights claim. But a survey of the concept's appearance in legal discourse reveals that the concept is stretched to the breaking point. Personhood stands at the center of debates as diverse as the legal status of embryos and animals to the rights and responsibilities of corporations and nations. This Note argues that personhood is a cluster concept with distinct components: the biological (...) concept of the human being, the notion of a rational agent, and unity of consciousness. Use of these component concepts (in lieu of the concept of the person) in legal reasoning would promote greater systematicity and coherence. (shrink)

This article reviews the medieval law background of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the state as it has been exercised over incompetent persons who formerly were competent adults, concluding that the fiduciary standard implied in the statute De Prerogative Regis (1324), which is the basis for modern guardianship status, requires that the court and guardian adopt an attitude of respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though they were to be accountable to the person himself, were he (...) to recover his faculties and become competent once more. This ficuciary responsibility, originating in the device of the "use" or trust employed for the management of the estates of lunatics, contrasts with the self-interested feudal guardianship used for the custody of "natural fools" or "idiots", who were under paternalistic arrangements. The article argues that because the determination of legal incompetence and the consequent transfer of custody of the person and property of an incompetent person to the state would result in a drastic forfeiture of liberty and property interests were it not for the fiduciary obligation owed by the state to the incompetent, the state is under an obligation to exercise its fiduciary duties in good faith and may not impose states policies or advance state interests of its own in the supervision of the affairs of incompetent persons, apart from interests arising legitimately out of the state's institutional interest in providing competent administration for the benefit of the incompetents themselves. Keywords: concept of the person, Cruzan, feudalism, guardianship, incompetent person, parens patriae CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The recent discussion in scientific psychiatry has paid increasing attention to the role of concepts of the person in psychiatric discourse. What are the uses of concepts of the person, such as self or person, in psychiatric discourse? Does describing these uses clarify the significance of conceptual and empirical elements in conceptions of mental illness? I try to answer these questions in a philosophically informed textual analysis of one representative psychiatric article. I conclude that concepts of the (...) person are used largely interchangeably in their various relevant meanings. The interplay between different uses of the concepts of the person allows us to conceptualize psychopathology and to conceive possibilities of overcoming this vague usage. My results underline the importance of a sensitivity to the ways concepts of the person are used in psychiatry and manifest the embeddedness of the language of psychopathology in everyday "person discourse.". (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de justificativa epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – (...) Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood. A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

This ran against all that Robinson believed most deeply about belief in God- influenced as he was by the new wave of German the.

이 글은 ‘롤스의 정의론이 지닌 이론적 결함을 유교의 인간관을 통해 치료할 수 있는가’라는 문제의식에서 출발한다. 이러한 문제의식은 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 바탕으로 자신의 이론을 정당화할 경우 얻을 수 있는 이론적 혜택이 있는지를 비판적으로 검토하는 작업과 연결된다. 작업의 초점은 유교의 인간관이 롤스가 정의의 원칙을 정당화하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들에 대한 검토와 해명을 시도함으로써 양자 간의 이상적 결합을 시도하는데 있다. 이러한 시도가 성공적인 것으로 밝혀진다면 기존의 정의론은 동양철학적 관점을 통해 새로운 이론적 방향을 발견하는 계기를 마련할 수도 있다. 보통 정의론은 인간의 본성과 (...) 사회의 본성에 대한 전제에서 출발하여 사회의 구체적인 맥락 및 제도 그리고 관계를 초월하여 모든 사회에 적용될 수 있는 근본적인 규범적 원칙을 도출하려는 기획을 갖는다. 롤스 역시 최소한의 선 이론으로서 칸트의 의무론적 자유주의에 기초하여 합리적인 이기심을 지닌 개인을 전제로 정의의 원칙을 정당화한다. 이러한 방법은 외부의 사회적 맥락들에 휘둘리지 않고 공정으로서의 정의를 실현했지만 무연고적 자아, 원자적 인간관, 반사회적 개인주의라는 공동체주의의 비판에 직면했다. 그런데 한 가지 의문점은 과연 롤스가 추구한 사회 즉 차등의 원칙을 바탕으로 민주적 평등(demacratic eauqlity)을 추구한 롤스에게 그러한 비판이 그다지 적절한 것으로 보이지 않는다는 것이다. 롤스는 자유로운 선택능력을 지닌 개인들에 대한 동등한 고려와 존중을 바탕으로 함께 더불어 잘 살아갈 수 있는 원칙을 제시함으로써 질서정연한 사회를 꿈꾼다. 그런데 그를 반사회적이고 원자적 개인주의자로 규정하는 것은 다소 성급한 것이다. 만약 롤스에게 가해진 비판 중 몇 가지가 그가 자신의 의도를 제대로 반영하지 못하는 이론적 도구인 자유주의적 인간관을 전면에 내세운 데서 비롯된 것이라면 우리는 기꺼이 새로운 도구를 시험해보는 전략을 구상해볼 수 있을 것이다. 앞서 언급했듯이 이 글은 유교의 인간관을 롤스가 자신의 의도와 달리 직면하게 된 비판에서 벗어날 수 있는 통로를 제공하는 새로운 도구로서 제안하고 그것의 유용성을 비판적으로 검토하는데 목적을 둔다. 이러한 목적을 위해 우리는 먼저 롤스의 인간관과 정의의 원칙의 정당화 과정을 살펴볼 것이다. 이어서 그에 대한 비판들을 살펴본 후, 유교의 인간관이 롤스의 정의의 원칙을 정당화 하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들은 없는지 검토하고자 한다. 결론에서는 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 통해 그의 의도를 오해 없이 제대로 전달할 수 있으며 보다 안정된 이론적 체계를 구축할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

The wide diffusion of the concepts of “cultural personality” or “cultural originality” in the social thought of developing Asian and African countries is determined by a number of circumstances. These concepts, though they claim a theoretical understanding of the processes involved in the “entry of these countries into the 20th century,” all boil down to the basic fact that the source, the foundation and the decisive sphere for the processes of self-determination in developing Asian and African countries in the present (...) day world must be their traditional cultures, as opposed to the industrial civilization of the West. (shrink)

In Part I of this book Professor Perrin evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of Scheler's pioneering study. Part II provides an explication of the main features of Scheler's ethics and explores their implications in light of more recent studies of moral cognition and development.

It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties (...) for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view—which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)—has great trouble with. (shrink)

On the grounds of the fundamental value of the human rights, which is the human dignity, this article describes a basis of the right to health care in terms of quality, discloses its concept, reviews the spheres of health system in which this right is exercised: health care and public health. The right to health care is stressed as one of the fundamental rights, without which the person will not able to enjoy other rights: economic, political and social (...) rights. It comprises the right to enjoy the best physical and mental health. The right to health care is not absolute in itself: efficiency of its implementation depends upon both ability of administrative and institutional systems, which were created by the state, to properly implement the assigned functions and upon the individual, its state of health and lifestyle. (shrink)

This paper presents an experiential exercise introducing the concept of the personal ethical threshold (PET) to help explain why moral behavior does not always follow moral intention. An individual’s PET represents the individual’s vulnerability to situational factors, i.e., how little or much it takes for members of organizations to cross their proverbial line to act in a way they deem unethical. The PET reflects the interplay among the situation, the particular ethical issue, and the individual. Exploring the PET can (...) help account for why some people are sometimes able to withstand substantial organizational pressures to behave in congruence with their ethical intentions, whereas others crumble in the face of apparently minimal situational forces. We hope that students’ exposure to and subsequent reflection upon their PET, by means of the exercise we present, will foster the development of their moral courage. (shrink)

In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second-personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second-personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second-personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to (...) solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second-personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity. (shrink)

For many years, modern social science and philosophy have been a battlefield of conflicting visions of the human person. There are many armies involved in this fight—among them the personalists who, even among themselves, represent different approaches to the understanding of the human person.G. W. Allport states that both philosophy and psychology are interested in the same common subject matter—that is, the human person.1 Allport's statement in this regard is very clear: personalistic psychology and philosophy must join (...) forces to fight against the reduction of the human person to a mere football or an academic pawn. We have to acknowledge an interior power of self-directedness in the human person.This article is .. (shrink)

Rose presents an important critique of the determinism and reductionism of modern biology. However, such trends are probably temporary aberrations in the development of science. Another form of determinism which has deeper roots is emerging from modern studies of brain dynamics. To reconcile this evidence with the concept of a “person” will require more radical rethinking of our received notion of natural law.

A revision of the author's thesis, University of Michigan, 1969. Bibliography: p. [154]-161. Includes index.