Is there a corporate social work? Do business corporations as a part of their ‘social responsibility’ aim to socially empower the community by enhancing their basic ‘capability’ registers? While the newly acquired critical conscience has made social work ethics self-reflexive and thus interrogative about a lot of concept-metaphors taken for granted in traditional social work discourse, the language of ‘empowerment’ seems to have still bullied this apocalyptic, experimental eye. All the negative effects of power are lost in the blood (...) of positive nonchalance that seems to promise the granting of power to the people people’s empowerment)—as if. Corporate social responsibility leading to social empowerment which we term as—Corporate Social Work —thus is affirmed in more ways than one. This article—instead of an external disavowal—offers through a theoretical and an empirical problematic—an internal unpacking of the concept metaphor ‘empowerment’—where ‘empowerment’, ‘doing empowerment’ and ‘being empowered’ are demonstrated to be completely separate registers awaiting an ethical reckoning. Having completed this separation—however, the article proposes a discourse ethical monitoring of the capability approach where empowerment participates only as a fractured phrase in dispute. (shrink)

This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders' choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design (...) and the optimal monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types, monitoring efficiency, and effectiveness of ethics education. We conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value. When managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms, ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation. (shrink)

Corporate social monitoring has reached its most systematic form and has had the most practical impact with regard to companies doing business in South Africa. The Sullivan Principles have guided the monitoring system for U.S. companies, of which about 166 remain in South Africa and about 140 have withdrawn. However, corporate social monitoring in South Africa is currently subject to certain tensions. The Rev. Sullivan has called for the withdrawal of U.S. companies, and has himself withdrawn from the (...) monitoring effort.This paper discusses the economic climate for U.S. business in South Africa both historically and currently, the conflicting pressures experienced by U.S. companies remaining there, and the effectiveness of strategies aimed to create pressure for companies to withdraw, including divestment resolutions, purchasing restrictions, and sanctions. (shrink)

This article considers what policy reforms may help catalyze corporate commitment to combating corruption. The starting point for this discussion is a voluntary, corporate principles approach to self-regulation. Such an approach should seek to encourage corporations to implement effective compliance and ethics programs and to disclose information related to their anti-corruption activities to relevant stakeholders. Although a corporate principles approach is a private initiative, there is a significant role for the public sector. This article discusses some of (...) the ways that the public sector can support and further the goals of a corporate principles approach to combating corruption. The reforms discussed in this article include amnesty programs for corporations that self-disclose corrupt payments, the use of corporate monitors in the enforcement of anti-corruption laws, expanding the definition of corruption in criminal laws, sustainability reporting indicators related to bribery, and the implementation of multi-stakeholder initiatives to support a corporate principles approach. (shrink)

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the (...) fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics. (shrink)

Debt-ridden corporate growth and increased vulnerability was one of the causes of the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. Introduction of the outside director system has been the core part of the board reforms following the crisis. Our estimation using instruments obtained from a natural experiment illustrates that outside monitoring has improved capital structure of firms even when we control for the leverage regulation effect, enhanced compliance with leverage regulation and thus reduced business risks, and reduced excessive growth and excessive (...) investment more consistently for the top 10 largest chaebols than non-chaebol firms and smaller sized chaebol affiliates. Our results shed some light on why existing studies report the positive effect of outsiders on firm value and add value to existing agency theory by illustrating that the effect of improved governance on capital structure could be non-linear. (shrink)

This article discusses the development and application of various types of corporate social monitoring systems. Boycotts are a relatively simple form of social monitoring system which aim to produce changes in corporate social behavior. Boycotts may be organized by a single group, or by a number of groups simultaneously. Rating systems may be organized around a single issue, such as the Sullivan Principles rating scheme, or may include multiple companies and multiple issues, such as shopping guides or ethical (...) investment systems.Monitoring systems may be unidimensional or multidimensional, qualitative or quantitative, and absolute or relative. Consumers and investors appear to be the groups most likely to be targeted in these schemes. The importance of these monitoring systems appears to be increasing as both consumers and investors become more interested in using social criteria in decision-making. (shrink)

While commentators have long decried managerial short-termism, the deleterious effects of managerial short-termism on corporate social performance (CSP), and how to ameliorate those negative effects, remain underexplored. Specifically, due to the difficulty of unobtrusively measuring what is fundamentally a cognition in managers, empirical evidence at the organizational level of managerial short-termism’s effect on CSP is relatively sparse. Here, we measure managerial short-termism by content analyzing firms’ publicly filed annual reports (10-Ks). Using a combined dataset for 1,665 U.S. firms for (...) the period 2000–2012, we show that managerial short-termism is negatively associated with CSP. However, we also show that this effect can be reduced through increased external monitoring by important stakeholders who value CSP. Specifically, we show that increasing dedicated institutional ownership and increasing analyst coverage both decrease the negative effect of managerial short-termism on CSP. We contribute to theory by predicting and showing the negative effect of managerial short-termism on CSP, and how external monitoring can reduce its deleterious effects. We contribute to practice by showing how this managerial cognition can be identified, and how its negative effects can be ameliorated, at the organizational level. (shrink)

The study explores the challenges UK-based institutional investors face when trying to monitor investee companies and influence their social, environmental, and governance practices. Consistent with previous research, I find that misalignment of interests within the investment chain and dispersed ownership are factors which inhibit investor activism. However, other underexplored challenges include lack of investee company transparency and investor experience in activism, as well as low client demand for engagement and internal conflicts of interest. The results contribute to the literature on (...) institutional investor activism by using direct empirical evidence to systematically discuss the challenges to stewardship. Given the intensification of media and regulatory attention on shareholders in the post-global financial crisis era, coupled with investors’ growing awareness and practice of stewardship, the research opens new avenues for enquiry which go beyond the on-going debate about the monitoring versus short-termism roles of institutional investors. (shrink)

Corporations have increasingly turned to voluntary, multi-stakeholder governance programs to monitor workers’ rights and standards in global supply chains. This article argues that the emphasis of these programs varies significantly depending on stakeholder involvement and issue areas under examination. Corporate-influenced programs are more likely to emphasize detection of violations of minimal standards in the areas of wages, hours, and occupational safety and health because focusing on these issues provides corporations with legitimacy and reduces the risks of uncertainty created by (...) activist campaigns. In contrast, these programs are less likely to emphasize workers’ rights to form democratic and independent unions, bargain, and strike because these rights are perceived as lessening managerial control without providing firms with significant reputational value. This argument is explored by coding 805 factory audits of the Fair Labor Association between 2002 and 2010, followed by case studies of Russell Athletic in Honduras, Apple in China, and worker rights monitoring in Vietnam. (shrink)

This study examines whether the delegated monitoring of main banks effectively decreases severe agency problems. For example, this includes accounting fraud in bank-dominated corporate governance. In this context, the fraud triangle specifies the three main factors of opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. Main banks may reduce the factor of opportunity through actions such as monitoring, which plays a moderating role by reducing the potential for managerial misconduct, whereas, the incentive factor may be enhanced through the subsequent pressure that influences managers (...) to force turnover when they do not repay debts. The potential influence that the main banks have on the fraud rationalization factor may be stronger in firms that are more dependent on main-bank borrowing. This study analyzed data from publicly listed firms in Japan for the period between 2008 and 2016 to determine how main-bank relationships affected accounting fraud, thus allowing an assessment of delegated monitoring practices. Findings showed that main-bank relationships were helpful for reducing accounting fraud, suggesting its overall effectiveness in delegated monitoring. Results also showed that large audit firms did not necessarily prevent accounting fraud, which implies that main banks can employ their own monitoring as a substitute for the roles typically played by these firms. Here, the main policy implication is that main-bank relationships may strengthen business ethics in the context of bank-dominated corporate governance. In conclusion, the continued analysis of bank monitoring may benefit stakeholders while strengthening business ethics in bank-centered economies. (shrink)

In combining the micropolitics approach in international management, the industrial relations literature and business ethics, this article conceptualizes global framework agreements as an alliance between central CSR managers of transnational corporations and central actors within trade unions to monitor subsidiaries in the implementation of CSR policies. The empirical investigation, based on the qualitative analysis of ten French multinational companies, confirms the relevance of such a conceptualization. It particularly shows that central CSR managers hope mobilizing the union network to increase their (...) capacity to supervise subsidiaries. Over there, it helps understanding concrete mechanisms adopted to implement global framework agreements since, in some of the studied cases, the managerial and union channels are coordinated precisely to strengthen this capacity. It, then, highlights the procedural nature of policies regarding global framework agreements. Overall, this paper examines the conditions necessary for mobilization of the union network and suggests avenues for future research. (shrink)

As a result of recent corporate scandals, several rules have focused on the role played by Boards of Directors on the planning and monitoring of corporate codes of ethics. In theory, outside directors are in a better position than insiders to protect and further the interests of all stakeholders because of their experience and their sense of moral and legal obligations. Female directors also tend to be more sensitive to ethics according to several past studies which explain this (...) affirmation by early gender socialization, the fact that women are thought to place a greater emphasis on harmonious relations and the fact that men and women use different ethical frameworks in their judgments. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence of these characteristics of the Board in terms of promoting and hindering the creation of a code of ethics. Our findings show that a greater number of female directors does not necessarily lead to more ethical companies. Moreover, within Europe as a continent, board ownership leads to an entrenchment of upper-level management, generating a divergence between the ethical interests of owners and managers. In light of this situation, the presence of independent directors is necessary to reduce such conflicts. (shrink)

Companies increasingly communicate about corporate social responsibility (CSR) through interactive online media. We examine whether using such media is beneficial to a company’s reputation. We conducted an online experiment to examine the impacts of interactivity in CSR messages on corporate reputation and word-of-mouth intentions. Our findings suggest that an increase in perceived interactivity leads to higher message credibility and stronger feelings of identification with the company, which also boost corporate reputation and word-of-mouth. This result implies that using (...) interactive channels to communicate about CSR can improve corporate reputation. Our results also show that the detrimental impacts of negative user evaluations on corporate reputation are much higher than the favorable impacts of positive evaluations. This finding suggests that, despite the effectiveness of interactive communication channels, firms need to carefully monitor these channels. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee (...) education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the effects of the corporate governance model on social and environmental disclosure (SED). We analyze the disclosures of the 100 U.S. Best Corporate Citizens in the period 2005–2007, and we posit a series of simultaneous relationships between different attributes of the governance system and a multidimensional construct of corporate social performance (CSP). We consider both the extent and the quality of SED, with the purpose of identifying increasing levels of (...) corporate commitment to stakeholders and shedding some light on whether SED is used as a signal or rather as a legitimacy tool. Our empirical evidence shows that the stakeholders’ orientation of corporate governance is positively associated with CSP and SED. On the other hand, we do not find support for the monitoring intensity of corporate governance being negatively associated with social performance. We also find that CSP in the “product” dimension is positively associated with the extent and quality of SED whilst CSP in the “people” dimension is negatively associated with the extent and quality of SED. At a time when shareholders and stakeholders share more common aspects in their relationships with firms, this is a significant area to explore and this research fills an important lacuna in this respect. (shrink)

The debate about the appropriate standards for upstream corporate social responsibility of multinational corporations has been on the public and academic agenda for some three decades. The debate originally focused narrowly on “contract responsibility” of MNCs for monitoring of upstream contractors for “sweatshop” working conditions violating employee rights. The authors argue that the MNC upstream responsibility debate has shifted qualitatively over time to “full producer responsibility” involving an expansion from “contract responsibility” in three distinct dimensions. First, there is an (...) expansion of scope from working conditions to human rights and social and environmental impacts broadly defined. Second, there is expansion in depth of this broader responsibility to the whole upstream supply chain without regard to contracting status. Upstream responsibility now includes all suppliers, including direct contractors and the chain of suppliers to such contractors. Finally, the change in CSR scope and depth has led to an evolution of CSR management practice. (shrink)

Crowdsourced regulation has been discussed to date by legal and social science scholars mainly in the context of legislation and rulemaking, without paying sufficient attention to non-legislative regulatory functions. This article provides a richer theory of crowdsourced regulation which extends to all regulatory functions, focusing on monitoring and enforcement. Regulatory agencies worldwide harness the power of the public using digital platforms to carry out monitoring and enforcement tasks in regulated markets and sectors. For example, agencies operate online complaint databases that (...) invite the public to report mistreatment of consumers and environmental nuisances by regulated firms. Agencies also publish information concerning corporate misbehavior to publicly shame companies into compliance. Crowdsourcing regulatory monitoring and enforcement can help minimize some prominent ailments of the regulatory task, such as poor resources, diminishing deterrence, declining legitimacy, and capture. It can also promote goals and values such as public participation, increased transparency, public trust in regulators, administrative efficiency, and effectiveness in achieving regulatory objectives. However, crowdsourcing regulatory monitoring and enforcement is subject to a new set of legal, administrative, and democratic failures that need to be acknowledged and addressed. The article develops a theory of crowdsourced regulation that supplies justifications and rationales for crowdsourced regulatory monitoring and enforcement, points out its main pitfalls, and normatively evaluates law and policy implications. (shrink)

One of the fundamental principles of good corporate governance is transparency, i.e., the disclosure of private information to external stakeholders, so that they may make judgments and decisions relating to the corporation. Equally important, but less discussed, is the competing value that corporations need to protect legitimate secrets. Corporations thus need a communication strategy for dealing with external stakeholders which addresses the conflict between disclosure and secrecy. This article focuses on an important element of that communication strategy in the (...) context of financial reporting: the possibility that corporate insiders may consider it in their interest, or in the interest of specific stakeholders, to alter or manipulate the financial information that it discloses publicly. Using concepts from the corporate governance and financial reporting literatures, it addresses the ethical question of who (management or the board of directors) should be responsible for making the fundamental strategic choices whether and (if so) how the corporation alters or manipulates the financial information. This article argues that the board of directors is responsible for formulating (and monitoring) the corporation's communication strategy, and that management is responsible for carrying it out. (shrink)

This research aims to explore the relationship between corporate governance and CSR: What are the major factors that play a direct role in the establishment of this relationship? How does context and institutional background impact upon the relationship between CSR and Governance? Using in-depth semi-structured interviews from two types of governance systems in three countries over three years, this study has demonstrated that in practice, within different settings, CSR is being used both as a strategy as well as a (...) reaction to different drivers. We call this adaptive governance where governance can be defined as a flexible system of action incorporating strategic and monitoring activities that determines the way a company enacts its responsibilities to its shareholders and stakeholders and which is determined at any given time by the interrelationship of institutional drivers and behavioural norms. Governance systems and their interrelationships with CSR are demonstrated as fluid according to the national and institutional context, economic situation and industry impact. In the eyes of practitioners corporate governance includes both structural and behavioural factors as well as responsibilities and actions towards shareholders and stakeholders. Contextual factors that this research highlights to be important to the incorporation of CSR into governance include the economic environment, national governance system, regulation and soft law, shareholders, national culture, behavioural norms and industry impacts. Hypotheses on the impact of institutional contexts, industry impacts and economic situations on different types of CSR actions are proposed for further research. (shrink)

This research documents consumers’ potential to monitor corporations’ License to Operate through their consumption responses to corporate social responsibility failures. The premise is that the type of social contracts or standards in place may determine how consumers, through their individual and collective behaviors, can play a direct role in influencing corporate behavior, when corporations fail to meet social responsibility standards. An experiment conducted with a large sample of consumers in the United States shows that consumers respond differently to (...) a company’s failure in its social responsibilities depending on whether the violated standard is a government mandate or a voluntary commitment and depending on the consumers’ own environmental consciousness. The findings highlight the potential power of individual consumers and consumer collectives in narrowing the governance gaps relative to social and environmental issues and reducing the likelihood of CSR failures. (shrink)

This article examines the construction and implementation of the Sullivan Principles, a two-decade effort to use corporate codes of conduct to improve the behavior of multinational corporations in South Africa under apartheid. Without organized social movement pressure, corporations would not have agreed to adopt the code, and corporate compliance required sustained pressure from the anti-apartheid movement. The system's independent monitoring process was problematic, and managers' definitions of “good corporate citizenship” were more guided by monitors'emphases than by (...) substantive concerns. Based on the historic case, the article raises questions about the voluntaristic, stateless character of transnational corporate codes of conduct and questions whether such codes offer a viable strategy for improving working conditions. (shrink)

This paper investigates the potential and actual contribution of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to gender equality in a framework of gender mainstreaming (GM). It introduces GM as combining technical systems (monitoring, reporting, evaluating) with political processes (women’s participation in decision-making) and considers the ways in which this is compatible with CSR agendas. It examines the inclusion of gender equality criteria within three related CSR tools: human capital management (HCM) reporting, CSR reporting guidelines, and socially responsible investment (SRI) criteria on (...) employee and diversity issues. Although evidence is found of gender equality information being requested within several CSR related reporting frameworks, these requirements are mostly limited in scope, or remain optional elements. The nature and extent of relevant stakeholder opportunities are investigated to explain this unfulfilled potential. (shrink)

We outline the drivers, main features, and conceptual underpinnings of the compliance paradigm. We then use a similar structure to investigate the drivers, main features, and conceptual underpinnings of the cooperative paradigm for working with CSR in global value chains. We argue that the measures proposed in the new cooperation paradigm are unlikely to alter power relationships in global value chains and bring about sustained improvements in workers’ conditions in developing country export industries. After that, we provide a critical appraisal (...) of the potential and limits of the cooperative paradigm, we summarize our findings, and we outline avenues for research: purchasing practices and labor standard noncompliance, CSR capacity building among local suppliers, and improved CSR monitoring by local resources in the developing world. (shrink)

Corporations despite their status as legally fictitious persons are not such, and to confound them with real persons in even the minimal legal sense is to negate much of the force of the concept of rights when applied to the society. When corporations have rights individual rights become meaningless. While corporations may need some form of protection to make them financially feasible investments, they need not be given the full protection of rights which are assigned to the individual. A much (...) attenuated version of corporate rights is warranted. I would argue against Werhane's notion of a corporation possessing “secondary rights” which can be asserted only after the claims of individual rights have been met. Ibid., p. 62.One solution to the problems raised in this essay would be to ascribe rights to individuals only. This could occur without interfering with the financial independence of the corporation by a simple legal prescription that individuals within a corporation be held responsible for their activities and that the corporation p e r se not be blamed for individual actions. This is consistent with the judgments against the Nazi war criminals who were denied the defense of justifying their actions on the basis of following orders. Responsibility for those actions which are the result of the workings of the “invisible hand” cannot be ascribed to any individual or group of individuals. Donaldson is helpful on this point in recommending an “office of social responsibility” be created as part of the corporation to monitor those actions which otherwise escape scrutiny. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 207.A more radical solution is to restructure the corporation in such a way as to introduce the element of democracy in the workplace. Opponents would argue that such a practice would diminish the profit-making potential of the corporation by limiting the discretion of the corporate officers in making decisions. Similar arguments have been advanced against the democratic state. Yet democratic states have proven to be viable institutions capable of effective action and demonstrably more survivable than the authoritarian regimes which are the analogs of the corporation.Given the current hierarchical structure of the corporation and its ability to dissolve in the face of questions of responsibility, individual accountability is the only viable solution. This requires that members of the corporation not find cover behind the “invisible hand.” This in turn necessitates the granting of a greater degree of discretionary power to corporate functionaries at all levels. We cannot be responsible for a state of affairs over which we have no effective control. The courts would make the ultimate decision as to the assignation of responsibility in particular cases of corporate crime, with the stipulation that the ascription be to an individual and not “the corporation.” By making corporate officers individually responsible for their actions a much more effective deterrent to corporate crimes would be created. Corporations can easily afford most of the fines that are imposed on them, and corporations cannot be put in prison.The view of the corporation advanced here puts it in a legal and moral position greatly inferior to that of the individual as well as the state. Consequently, corporate needs and welfare must remain a tertiary concern. The rights of the individual must figure primarily, and the welfare of the state as preserver of those rights secondarily, in social policy decisions. The libertarian vision of the corporation is therefore a misguided result of the conflation of the corporation and the individual in the legal and moral realms. Corporations and individuals are ontologically distinct entities and must be recognized as such. The failure to do so has enabled corporations to abrogate individual rights with legal and moral impunity. Such a situation is inconsistent with the demands of a rights-based democracy. (shrink)

While a corporate ethics program is expected to reduce employees’ unethical behavior, understanding the effects of the ethics program elements on reducing the unethical behavior is a crucial issue. This study aims to explore how a corporate ethics program with multiple control elements, including punishment, monitoring, internal reporting, code of ethics, ethics support service and ethics training, influence employees’ threat appraisal process, coping appraisal process and unethical behavior at workplaces. The data to verify proposed research hypotheses were collected (...) by administering questionnaire survey on four autonomous government organizations in Bangladesh. Research findings show that only punishment and monitoring have significantly negative relationships with unethical behavior. Monitoring and internal reporting have significantly positive relationships with threat appraisal. The code of ethics, ethics support service and ethics training are associated positively with coping appraisal. The mediation results reveal that coping appraisal mediates the relationship between ethics program elements and unethical behavior; but the mediation effects of threat appraisal are not significant. This study provides valuable insights into how a corporate ethics program with multiple control elements reduces employees’ unethical behavior as well as how employees’ threat and coping appraisal processes are related to the corporate ethics program and unethical behavior in organizations. (shrink)

The central focus of this research is: The growing corporate espionage activities due to fierce competition lead to highly controlling security measures and intensive employee monitoring which bring about distrust in the workplace. The paper examines various research works on trust and distrust. It highlights the conflictful demands managers face. They have to deter espionage activities, but at the same time, build trusting relationships in the workplace. The paper also describes various operations, personnel, physical and technical countermeasuresto combat (...) class='Hi'>corporate espionage together with three espionage case examples which illustrate the importance of some of these countermeasures. Various authors'' trust and distrust arguments are used to assess the cases. The paper ends with suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Managers are most likely to turn to the board of directors for guidance during a period of crisis. But can good corporate governance prevent an organization from reaching that critical point in the first place? In light of the recent global financial crisis, this question has become all the more pressing, and so to prevent future crises, we argue that corporate boards of directors need to be keenly aware of the potential social harms that might arise from the (...) value-creating activities of the firm they are tasked with monitoring. Boards of directors must be vigilant in understanding the firm’s value proposition, perceiving the potential harms that managers tend to overlook, and inserting themselves into the strategy-making process. We offer a typology of scenarios involving potential social harm and benefit and analyze when boards of directors must take a more active role in shaping firm strategy despite resistance from management. (shrink)

Boards of directors affect corporate strategy and decision-making through monitoring of management and resource provision. Recently, an increasing number of studies have examined the relationships between board characteristics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). These studies have yielded inconsistent findings. This article therefore reports the results of a study applying meta-analytical techniques to a sample of 82 empirical studies to help clarify the relationships between board characteristics and CSR. Although prior research has tended to apply relatively simplistic models investigating (...) the impact of individual board characteristics independently and only directly, we adopt a more complex perspective to shed new light on the board characteristics–CSR nexus. Specifically, we use a meta-analytic path model that accounts for the potential interplay between board characteristics in determining CSR and tests whether the presence of a CSR committee plays a meditating role. Our findings suggest that board size, board independence, and female board representation are partially interrelated with each other and jointly influence CSR directly as well as indirectly via the presence of a CSR committee. In addition, we find that country-level institutional factors act as moderators and that the relationships differ with regard to the specific dimension of CSR (i.e., social, environmental, or aggregate). (shrink)

This study investigates the effects of internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and the value of firms engaging in CSR activities. The study finds the CSR choice is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and anti- takeover provisions, after controlling for various firm characteristics. After correcting for endogeneity and simultaneity issues, the (...) results show that CSR engagement positively influences firm value measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. We find that the impact of analyst following for firms that engage in CSR on firm value is strongly positive, while the board leadership, board independence, blockholders’ ownership, and institutional ownership play a relatively weaker role in enhancing firm value. Furthermore, we find that CSR activities that address internal social enhancement within the firm, such as employees diversity, firm relationship with its employees, and product quality, enhance the value of firm more than other CSR subcategories for broader external social enhancement such as community relation and environmental concerns. (shrink)

Despite the detrimental consequences of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), the role of monitoring and incentive-based corporate governance (CG) mechanisms in mitigating stakeholder mismanagement has been largely neglected in the literature. At the same time, there has been growing interest in holding executives accountable for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance by linking their compensation to related targets. However, prior research provides scant and inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of ESG pay in curbing CSiR. This study addresses these shortcomings (...) and contributes to the emerging CSiR/CG literature by harnessing an institution-based view on executive compensation. Specifically, it recognizes national culture as the “missing determinant” in comparative CG studies and investigates the culturally-driven boundary conditions for the relationship between ESG pay and CSiR. The hypotheses were tested on a data set of 4066 firms from 56 countries during 2010–2020. The analysis supports a negative, though modest, effect of ESG pay on CSiR. Furthermore, the study shows that this relationship varies in statistical and economic significance across cultural contexts. Particularly, incentives prove effective for firms headquartered in nations characterized by low power distance, individualism, low uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Conversely, in other settings, compensation linked to ESG may either lack motivational impact or even yield counterproductive outcomes. These findings have implications for both the CSiR and CG literature, as well as for practice. (shrink)

With the expansion of multinational corporations, the alarming upsurge in widely publicized and notable corporate scandals involving MNCs in emerging markets has begun to draw both academic and managerial attention to look beyond home market practices to the pressing concern of CSR in emerging markets. Previous studies on CSR have focused primarily on Western markets, reserving limited discussions in addressing the issue of MNC attitudes and CSR practices in their emerging host markets abroad. Despite this incongruity in academic response (...) to CSR in emerging markets, managers of multinational companies continue to face mounting and most often conflicting pressures to weigh among multiple strategic CSR responses in emerging markets. Such a task is often further complicated by the complexity of varying business norms and standards, regulatory environments, and stakeholder demands for CSR across national boundaries. With such a challenge in mind, I attempt to examine the explanatory factors in leading MNCs, otherwise recognized for accountability and integrity in their home markets, to employ inconsistent or negligent practices under CSR pressure in Chinese emerging economy. Preliminary findings reveal that discrepancies exist in how MNCs perform in CSR in home countries versus in host countries. While MNCs do have much to improve, the institutional environment in the emerging market, including the legal framework and the ethical culture, also needs to be improved by the host country governments, the industry associations, and local firms. Meanwhile, media interest and journalists, NGOs, third party monitors, industry stakeholders as well as consumer advocacy groups can raise the visibility of MNC’s contradictory practices between their origin nations and countries with emerging economies and offer the pressures and incentives for MNCs to amend their ethical shortcomings. This article also suggests implications for both theory and practice. (shrink)

The growing assumption thattransnational corporations (TNCs) will apply``best practice'''' and ``international standards''''in their operations in developing countries hasseldom been checked against close observationof corporate behavior. In this article, Ipresent a case study, based on field research,of one voluntary initiative to useinternational standards and best practice forenvironmental protection in the AmazonRainforest, by a US-based oil company,Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) in Ecuador. The moststriking finding is that the company refuses todisclose the precise standards that apply toits operations. This, and the refusal todisclose (...) other important environmentalinformation, make it impossible to verifyindependently Oxy''s claims of environmentalexcellence, or assess the effectiveness of theinitiative. At the same time, Oxy uses theinvocation of international standards to wrapitself in a veneer of corporate responsibility;reassure government officials and localresidents; cultivate confusion about standardsand practices that apply to the operations;deflect meaningful oversight and transparency;and arbitrarily legitimize norms that have beendefined by special interests. In short,international standards offer great promise forneeded environmental improvements; but can alsobe used to impede, rather than advance,corporate responsibility and the development ofeffective environmental law at the nationallevel. These findings suggest that for theapplication of international standards to bemeaningful, the international community needsto move beyond statements of principle anddevelop mechanisms that can be used toevaluate, verify, and monitor independentlyenvironmental claims by TNCs. (shrink)

This article explores how corporate governance processes and structures are being used in large Australian companies to develop, lead and implement corporate responsibility strategies. It presents an empirical analysis of the governance of sustainability in fifty large listed companies based on each company’s disclosures in annual and sustainability reports. We find that significant progress is being made by large listed Australian companies towards integrating sustainability into core business operations. There is evidence of leadership structures being put in place (...) to ensure that board and senior management are involved in sustainability strategy development and are then incentivised to monitor and ensure implementation of that strategy through financial rewards. There is evidence of a willingness to engage and communicate clearly the results of these strategies to interested stakeholders. Overall, there appears to be a developing acceptance amongst large corporations that efforts towards improved corporate sustainability are not only expected but are of value to the business. We suggest that this is evidence of a managerial shift away from an orthodox shareholder primacy understanding of the corporation towards a more enlightened shareholder value approach, often encompassing a stakeholder-orientated view of business strategy. However, strong underlying tensions remain due to the insistent market emphasis on shareholder value. (shrink)

Although personal attributes have gained recognition as an important area of effective corporate governance, scholarship has largely overlooked the value and implications of individual virtue in governance practice. We explore how authenticity—a personal and morally significant virtue—affects the primary monitoring and strategy functions of the board of directors as well as core processes concerning director selection, cultivation, and enactment by the board. While the predominant focus in corporate governance research has been on structural factors that influence firm financial (...) outcomes, this paper shifts attention to the role of authenticity and its relationship to individual board member qualities and collective board activities. We explore how authenticity has the potential to influence board dynamics and decision making and to enhance transparency and accountability. (shrink)

Although US and European research has documented improvement in earnings quality associated with corporate governance characteristics, the situation in Latin America is questionable, given the business environment in which firms operate, which is characterized by controlling family ownership and weak legal protection. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between the internal mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management measured by discretionary accrual. We use a sample of listed Latin American non-financial companies from the period (...) 2006–2009. Our results show how in the Latin American context the role of external directors is limited and that Boards which meet more frequently take a more active position in the monitoring of insiders, so showing a lower use of manipulative practices. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between insider ownership and discretionary accruals, also pointing to the fact that ownership concentration may be a manipulative practices constrictor mechanism only when the ownership of main shareholders is moderate. The findings have important policy implications since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to analyze the relation between the effectiveness of the government and the earnings management behavior. As policy implications, we document how when a country implements controls aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law or improving the effectiveness of government, this leads to a reduction in firm earnings management. (shrink)

While pharmaceutical industry involvement in producing, interpreting, and regulating medical knowledge and practice is widely accepted and believed to promote medical innovation, industry-favouring biases may result in prioritizing corporate profit above public health. Using diabetes as our example, we review successive changes over forty years in screening, diagnosis, and treatment guidelines for type 2 diabetes and prediabetes, which have dramatically expanded the population prescribed diabetes drugs, generating a billion-dollar market. We argue that these guideline recommendations have emerged under pervasive (...) industry influence and persisted, despite weak evidence for their health benefits and indications of serious adverse effects associated with many of the drugs they recommend. We consider pharmaceutical industry conflicts of interest in some of the research and publications supporting these revisions, and in related standard-setting committees and oversight panels. We raise concern over the long-term impact of these multifaceted involvements. Rather than accept industry conflicts of interest as normal, needing only to be monitored and managed, we suggest challenging that normalcy, and ask: what are the real costs of tolerating such industry participation? We urge the development of a broader focus to fully understand and curtail the systemic nature of industry’s influence over medical knowledge and practice. (shrink)

Because it promises to benefit business and society simultaneously, strategic philanthropy might be characterized as a “happy marriage” of corporate social responsibility behavior and corporate financial performance. However, as evidence so far has been mostly anecdotal, it is important to understand to what extent empirics support the actual practice as well as value of a strategic approach, which creates both business and social impacts through corporate philanthropic activities. Utilizing data from the years 2006 to 2009 for a (...) sample of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, which monitors the world’s most sustainable companies, the authors test a model of strategic philanthropy in which the dependent variable is evidence that a firm does or does not measure business and social impacts simultaneously. From the DJSI data, the authors find a proposed measure of overall corporate social performance to be the most important explanatory factor for engagement in strategic philanthropy. Moreover, this measure of CSP has a mediating effect on the relations between certain independent variables and strategic philanthropy. Other important findings provide support for the influence of the institutional factors industry and region on the likelihood that companies are practicing strategic philanthropy, but little effect of the business characteristics company size and profitability on that likelihood. (shrink)

This study examines corporate publications of U.K. firms to investigate the nature of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Using a stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility, our results suggest a hierarchical model of disclosure: from general rhetoric to specific endeavors to implementation and monitoring. Industry differences in attention to specific stakeholder groups are noted. These differences suggest the need to understand the effects on social responsibility disclosure of factors in a firm's immediate operating environment, such as the extent (...) of government regulation and level of competitiveness in the industry. (shrink)

This paper investigates different modes of organizing for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based on insights from organization theory, we theorize two ways to organize for CSR. “Complete” organization for CSR happens within businesses and depends on the availability of certain organizational elements (e.g., membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctioning). By contrast, “partial” organization for CSR happens when organizers do not have direct access to all these organizational elements. We discuss partial organization for CSR by analyzing how standards and cross-sector (...) partnerships make selective use of organizational elements. We maintain that an important feature of the increasing institutionalization of CSR—not only within businesses but also among non-governmental, governmental, and professional actors—is the rise of partial forms of organization. We discuss the contributions to this Special Issue in the context of our theorization of complete/partial organization for CSR and outline avenues for further research. (shrink)

Research on corporate political connections has long focused on their strategic and financial outcomes. Yet, most of this research has avoided exploring the downstream risks associated with such connections, in particular, legal risks. The buffering nature of political connections, aimed at reducing sociopolitical uncertainty, as well as their potential to provide public policy benefits and protection, may cause politically connected firms to be more insular and less sensitive in their obligations and commitments to firm outsiders and thus be targeted (...) for lawsuits. Exploring the S & P 1000 firms for 16 years and controlling for other aspects of political activity, across different analytical approaches, I find consistent evidence that corporate political connections are associated with lawsuits and associated with corporate‐governance‐related lawsuits. I further document that the monitoring and disciplining presence of equity blockholders moderates the association between political connections and lawsuits. The findings shed a novel light on the need to explore downstream legal risks, associated with politically connected firms, and the potential legal costs of political ties. (shrink)

We examine the impact of a government-initiated CSR project on corporate misconduct using the unique setting of China’s Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) program. The difference-in-differences estimates show that firms participating in the TPA program engage in fewer misconduct activities than do their counterparts. This finding is robust to the parallel trends test, the placebo test, alternative regression specifications, alternative research designs, the reverse causality analysis, and the bivariate probit model with partial observability. Further analysis shows that TPA participation enhances (...) the ability of external financial professionals to monitor performance by stimulating the dissemination of TPA-related incremental information, thereby contributing to the decline in corporate misconduct. The cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of TPA participation on corporate misconduct is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry, with weaker political connections, and with weaker internal governance. Furthermore, we find evidence that TPA participation improves corporate financial performance but does not deteriorate information transparency. (shrink)

Improving corporate governance, business sustainability, and accountability for business organizations appears to be a global trend. Society is holding public companies responsible and accountable for their business activities and their financial reporting process. The public, regulators, accounting profession, and academic community are also taking a closer look at colleges and universities to find ways to hold these institutions more accountable for achieving their mission of providing higher education with relevant curriculum. Three areas that have recently received long-awaited attention are (...) business sustainability, professional ethics, and corporate governance. Business schools play an important and everlasting role in preparing the next generation of business leaders who possess life-long education and training of acting with integrity and upholding the highest level of ethical conduct and the heavy burden of public trust. These next generations of business leaders must understand the importance of ethical conduct, business sustainability and corporate governance corporations to our society and the complexity of financial reporting. Thus, business curriculum must reflect promotion of ethical behavior, professional accountability, and personal integrity taught to business students. Corporate governance, business sustainability, ethics including accountability, integrity, and transparency must be integrated throughout the business curriculum. The book is organized into three modules. Module I presents business sustainability, its importance, five dimensions of business sustainability performance including economic, governance, social, ethics and environmental (EGSEE), sustainability reporting and assurance and sustainability research and education. Module II provides the emergence of corporate governance, a framework for discussion of important functions of corporate governance including oversight, managerial, compliance, advisory, auditing, and monitoring as well as and integrating corporate governance into accounting research and business curricula. Module III discusses the importance of business and professional ethics, workplace ethics and trends in ethics research and education. (shrink)

_Relevance_. Organizations' social responsibility in the market is manifested through the quality of the services they provide, consumer information, care for their health, safety and the integration of environmental requirements into the activities of the organizations. Employees are one of the key stakeholders, and their approach is one way of exposing the organization's CSR issues. From the point of view of organizations' economic responsibility, it is important to strive for competitiveness of goods and services, efficient management and economical use of (...) resources (Carden and Boyd, 2011, etc.). Ethical social sphere emphasizes honest cooperation with stakeholders, taking into account public expectations and customer information. Pedersen (2010), Homburg et al. (2013), Segal (2011) discuss topical issues of social responsibility that define an organization's relationship with its stakeholders in pursuit of organizational customer loyalty and trust and socio-economic justice in the community. In the field of environment protection, the integration of environmental protection legislation into the activities of the company, reduction of pollution, improvement of operational activities, continuous monitoring, anticipation and implementation of necessary changes is important (Delmas et al. 2013, Claydon (2009), Valdes-Vasquez (2011), Fleming (2017), Allen (2016), Shin (2015), etc. A survey of CSR in the market was conducted in small and medium-sized enterprises. 175 respondents participated in the research. _R__esearch aim_. Assess the social responsibility of organizations towards consumers, the environment and the community in terms of employees. _Research methods_. Analysis of scientific literature, questionnaire survey. _Research results and conclusions_. Responsibility in the market for the quality of services provided was assessed on the basis of the following statements: at my workplace there is paid great attention to quality of service (production), effort is made to deliver on our promises to our customers, quality of services declared within the organization does not differ from reality, product quality control system exists in the workplace, consumer complaints are being investigated and the findings improve quality, and not only the legislation is used in customer relations, but generally accepted morals are rated only moderately. Responsibility in the market according to consumer information, caring about their health and safety has been assessed by employees to what extent these statements correspond to the reality: organizations provide detailed product information; I enjoy the services and products of my organization; my organization is concerned with the health of consumers when providing services, products; there has been no evidence that the services (products) provided by my workplace have been detrimental to the welfare of consumers and my organization does not manipulate consumer confidence. From the employees' point of view, the investigated organizations have a higher than average level of responsibility. The lack of responsibility is reflected in the fact that employees disagree that organizations do not manipulate consumer confidence. Promoting environmental protection is important in terms of market responsibility. Responsibility in the market is defined by these statements: the organization uses technologies that comply with organic standards; organizes environmental initiatives; uses only tools and technologies that reduce the negative impact on the environment; the organization takes care of the ecologic education of its employees, the organization takes care of all waste to be recycled, the waste is sorted, and green ideas are encouraged financially in the workplace. Having assessed the respondents' attitudes towards meeting environmental requirements, it could be indicated that the surveyed organizations have a medium level of responsibility, while employees indicate that organizations do not financially promote green ideas or contribute to the organization of environmental initiatives. Based on the results obtained there was ascertained higher than average level of social responsibility of organizations in the market, therefore, in the case under review, the activities of organizations in the context of applying social responsibility principles should be improved according to all categories defining social responsibility in the market. __. (shrink)

Control of the market microstructure theory of corporate governance perspective on the traditional theory of the firm as a deepening of the study, the use of information economics and game theory tools to the mainstream economic analysis framework for the development, the market for corporate control transactions, configuring and tuning the details of the process accurately describes the shares of companies in the separation of ownership and control of internal control case shareholders, tender offers, takeover bids and other (...) governance mechanisms different from the actual control and operation of, the existence of incomplete information and transaction costs under control conditions to analyze market transactions , from the perspective of market microstructure control to clarify the shareholders of the managers to implement effective control mechanisms, policies and conditions. Share control over the behavior of financial market issues, equity market and environmental factors control the interaction between the control and equity issues in the legal protection and market control policy design issues will be the future theoretical research in this field focus. Corporate governance theory based on corporate control market microstructure focuses on trading, allocating and adjusting process of the corporate control market, applying the information economic approach and game instrument to expand the mainstream economic analysis framework. It accurately describes the factual operation of different corporation control and governance mechanism such as corporation owner's internal control, tender offer, takeover bid and negotiating transfer, deepening the traditional firm theory. Moreover it analyzes the corporate control market transactions on the case of incomplete information and positive transaction cost, examines the effective mechanism, strategies and condition by which the owner control and monitor the management based on corporate control market microstructure perspective. Those are the future research topics in this field that behavior finance, interaction with environments and legislation protect and regulation policy designations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Corporate governance scholarship focuses on executive malfeasance, specifically its antecedents and consequences. Academic efforts primarily focus on prevention while practitioners are often left to hold firms and executives (including directors) accountable through a variety of sanctions. Even so, executive malfeasance still occurs even in the face of the vast resources used to monitor, control, and penalize firms and executives. In this paper, we posit equity markets do not adequately penalize firms for inaccurate earnings reports. Using a sample of 129 (...) firms identified by the U.S. General Accounting Office for reporting fraudulent earnings in 10K filings, we found support for our assertion. Consequently, the one party who may benefit but escape accountability is firm shareholders. Moreover, we find little empirical evidence that the subset of firms sanctioned by the SEC is penalized more heavily than the full sample by markets at the time they report and correct their 10K filings. Our results raise serious questions whether such managerial opportunism can be eradicated given the apparent lack of consequences in equity markets for investors. We also question whether the SEC is able to discern between fraud and error in financial reporting and its implications. (shrink)