It is the thesis of the paper that the arts of the twentieth century have gone much further in the criticism of customary modes of thought than have both the sciences and the various critical philosophies which exist today. Moreover, they have not only developed an abstract principle of criticism, they have also studied the psychological conditions under which criticism can be expected to become effective. Some plays and the theoretical essays of Ionesco are analysed as an (...) example. It is pointed out that Ionesco resembles Bacon in that he believes in an unchangeable basis of humanity from which all ideologies proceed. An attempt is made to free Ionesco from these dogmatic elements, theoretically, as well as practically (i.e. as regards the performance of his plays) and to utilize to the full his contributions to a theatre that is free of prejudice, and fully critical. (shrink)

Commented Article: YANG, Baohong. Criticism of Feuerbach thought by Marx and Engels through the Reflection on the Text of the German Ideology. Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Journal of Philosophy, v. 47, n. 1, e0240002, 2024. Available in: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/14519.

Cho-Gye Kim's poetry, spanning from 1931 to 1945, captures the quintessential experience of colonial subjugation, marked by a profound sense of pessimism and oppression. Yet, despite the thematic continuity of despair, a significant transformation in emotional expression is evident in his works before and after his immigration. This transition—from a loss of spirit, through escapism, to a renewed engagement with reality and eventual revival of spirit—illustrates a profound spiritual journey. Kim's poetry evolved from expressing the melancholy of homesickness, identity confusion, (...) and the anxiety of belonging to an unwavering determination to 'strive for survival amidst adversity.' His post-immigration works, devoid of earlier decadence and despair, reflect a silent resistance against Japanese colonial oppression and an unwavering faith in the triumph of justice. This paper delves into the philosophical and religious dimensions embedded in Kim's poetry, highlighting how his works serve as a medium for social criticism and ideological evolution. Analyzing the historical events, societal phenomena, and character portrayals within his poems unveils the shifting ideological perspectives and social consciousness across different epochs. Initially, Kim's poetry voiced discontent with feudal injustices and empathy for the afflicted masses, gradually shifting focus towards existential themes such as human nature, freedom, and dignity. The study seeks to uncover the intersections and collisions between philosophy, religion, and history through Kim's poetic oeuvre, emphasizing how his artistic expressions contribute to understanding historical and cultural transformations. In doing so, it provides insights into the philosophical and theological undercurrents of his era and illustrates how poetry can encapsulate complex spiritual and moral questions, offering reflections relevant to the philosophical and religious discourse. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man is framed as a response to the “end of ideology” thesis of political equilibrium and a criticism of mainstream theoretical construction in advanced industrial countries. Such formulations obscured new forms of self-alienation in totally administered society, and replaced any conceived potential subjectivity with objective laws that govern social relations. One-Dimensional Man is also framed as a response to the “crisis of Marxism” by underscoring the importance of popular ideology in shaping subjective action, which (...) at present, precludes proletarian revolution. (shrink)

Three issues essential to our insight into the concept and function of historical consciousness, and the description thereof, form the core of this book: historical truth, historical comment and criticism, and ideology (including the historian's trustworthiness). Taking as a point of departure the workings of these concepts in Chinese historical thinking, the volume carefully draws comparisons with similar topics in the Western tradition. It thus advocates and shows a truly comparative approach that sets the stage for an intercultural (...) dialogue on this important subject. The first comprehensive work on the political and cognitive dimensions of Chinese historical consciousness set against its Western counterpart. (shrink)

Adorno’s conception of ideology was denounced by Habermas as incompatible with a viable form of social critique. By conflating ideology and the ‘identity principle’ inherent to modern Western reason, he argues, Adorno offered an overly negative characterisation of modernity and failed to recognise its rational potential. This paper questions this line of criticism by revisiting Adorno’s position. While he does sometimes associate ideology with identity-thinking, this association does not exhaust his views on the subject. For Adorno, (...) ideology is just as much a matter of Identität as a matter of Schein, or illusion, and its practical effects. Moreover, he views ideology as an intrinsically dynamic concept, whose definition has changed throughout human history. Drawing on his late sociological writings, I distinguish three major stages in the development of the concept of ideology, namely (a) ideology as simple illusion, a definition associated with the Enlightenment and expanded by the so-called sociology of knowledge; (b) ideology as necessary illusion, invoked by Marx to capture the structural logic of capitalism; and (c) ideology as disillusionment, related to the positivism of late capitalist society. Finally, I reflect on what this survey reveals about the relationship between illusion and identity in Adorno’s theory of ideology. (shrink)

The article takes on the problem of ideology, critical consciousness and social criticism and distinguishes two distinct ways of thematizing it. The first approach is developed within the post-Hegelian framework. According to this paradigm, critique of ideology is a means of transgressing the antagonistic forms of socialization and emancipating humanity from the false forms of consciousness and corresponding irrational and oppressive social institutions. The postmodern paradigm questions two basic assumptions of the modern approach: firstly, it denies that (...) there exists a possibility to find purely rational and universal contexts, where ideological shackles could be exposed and thrown away; secondly, it rejects the idea that we can rely on the concept of self-awareness or critical reflection as informing our action and elevating our understanding of the social being to the higher level, for critical consciousness has no direct consequences. While portraying the postmodern paradigm, Stanley Fish’s views, considered exemplary to the postmodern rendition of the problem of ideology, will be discussed in a more detailed manner. In the final section of the article a provisional attempt is being made to elucidate what is the task of social criticism within the postmodern paradigm. (shrink)

As a result of the developments in science and technology, humanity began to experience a digital transformation after the 19th century. With this digital transformation, it is seen that a serious change has occurred in human beings biologically, socially, and, more specifically, religiously. One could say that different trends have emerged at many points where human relations, the relationship of the human with the environment and with God are also affected. Among the most comprehensive and prominent of these trends is (...) transhumanism because of its aims for humanity and the world. Transhumanism, which views technology as the main point of reference for the future of humanity, is also considered a cultural, social, and ideological human movement with its statements intended for society. It considers immortality as a goal, along with such claims as improving welfare, extending human life, and wiping out diseases by using technology in every aspect of human life. Transhumanists, who claim that they can achieve immortality thanks to technology, argue that this will happen in two ways. The first is biological immortality. It will be achieved by eliminating all kinds of biological factors that lead to humans aging and death. The second is digital or virtual immortality, which is achieved by transferring human consciousness from the biological body to computer interfaces and installing it in any desired entity. This perspective must be critically examined as it can be considered an attempt to challenge death, which is the basic doctrine of classical religions. In the present study, human immortality, considered the most important claim made by transhumanists, is criticized within kalām, Islamic theology. Of course, transhumanists’ account of human immortality is impossible, according to kalām. It can be said that transhumanists view of immortal human can be considered in the category of created beings, which is defined in kalām as "the being created later and needs another being in order to exist and to continue its existence". Given that transhumanists base the idea of the immortal being upon biological healing or digital transmission, it is clear that both types of beings need someone else. Therefore, one could say that it would be more reasonable to define transhumanists’ notion of immortality as the act of prolonging human life. It is because the life of immortal beings, accepted as biological or digital entities, is shaped by many factors. If these factors disappear, so does the being. On the other hand, the attribute of immortality, which belongs to the eternal being only, according to kalām, must come from itself without needing any other being. Therefore, the notion of immortal being suggested by the transhumanists must be reexamined within kalām and be redefined as the extension of life. The redefined immortality as the extension of life hardly poses kalāmī (or theological) problems. In fact, Islam encourages using all types of tools and equipment to enable humans to have a healthy and blissful life. (shrink)

Reform is a call for renewal and modernity, therefore. Much study and refutation were attributed to it, in comparison with others, it always needs to be set and defined, that’s not for its difficulty but it’s connected to its concept with the ideologies of its advocates and their projection of its connotations and meanings on the contents of their projects and visions. For this reason, reform advocates had a dilemma in defining this concept accurately. This dilemma has dimensions that made (...) it more obvious, by shedding light on the Ideology of reform and historical criticism. The research focused on two great thinkers with different ideologies. Ahmad Amin began his journey through research and exploration of the historical, religious, and intellectual life of the Arabs and produced several historical writings that reflect his ideology in the field of reform and historical criticism. But Sayyid Qutb had a classical fundamentalist tendency that was later translated into Qutbist thought, which was adopted by some Islamic groups, and from whose texts they took ideas for building their structure. The different vision between secular, "rational" Islam and fundamentalist, "extremist" Islam lies in the reformist and critical visions of each of the two trends. It can be said that historical reform and criticism of Ahmad Amin had a character that relied on reason before transmission and sifting through historical and classical texts. As for reform in Sayyid Qutb, it was a longing for the era of early Islam and a view of society as ignorant and far from monotheism, and that it must be reformed by reviving faith in it once again. Qutb showed this clearly in his writings and followed this approach in the process of historical criticism. (shrink)

This article focuses on Max Horkheimer’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology in basic philosophical matters such as method, theory, logic, truth, metaphysics, etc. Horkheimer objects to Husserl’s conception of philosophy as a mathesis universalis and of science as relativistic research. However, he finds Husserl’s criticism of scientific rationalism the most important step for the legitimacy of philosophy. According to him, Husserl’s method is intended to be a science of apriority. But his understanding of apriority is static, is radically abstract, (...) and overlooks the dialectical relation. Therefore, his method is ahistorical and undialectical. Horkheimer does not interpret Husserl’s idealism in the sense of classical idealism. However, he believes that the positivistic and Cartesian implications in Husserl’s philosophy made his method less fruitful in concrete situations. Consequently, he calls Husserl’s phenomenology abstract positivism, traditional theory and a bourgeois ideology. Horkheimer’s critique focuses on Husserl’s early period of phenomenology. (shrink)

The article further elaborates on a project of phenomenological critique of ideology and reveals its potential for the discourse of literature. Since the paradigm of studying ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ set in classical Marxism run into several problems connected with the transition from being in ideology to performing its critique, a genuine way out of it became impossible due to the totality of a discursive structure common to them. The articulation of this paradox in Karl Mannheim, (...) Louis Althusser, Paul Ricœur, Michel Pecheux, and Mikel Dufrenne changed the way of statement of the question, shifting the emphasis from the content of ideology and its characteristic features to the status of a critic who is inevitably hypostatizing his thinking. The change of perspective, in turn, entailed a transformation of the method: while the previous tradition focused on finding a connection between the distorted representation of reality in ideological consciousness and the social position of its bearer, structuralist and phenomenological approaches tend to consider the contingent content of consciousness as an inevitable consequence of its structuring always-already-given horizon of meaning. Working with the latter, Mark Richir introduces the concept of a symbolic institution—the domain of meaning, which determines the human habitus, providing it with linguistic and cultural practices that have lost their phenomenological origin. In this framework, the criticism of ideology is understood as an exit from a symbolic institution, albeit temporary. Mark Richir thematizes this exit as an encounter between symbolic and phenomenological registers, i. e. a phenomenological challenge that assumes the agent of the reduction. Nevertheless, gaining a foothold 'outside' the symbolic institution is impossible: the overcome symbolic order undergoes recoding over time. Therefore, the phenomenological criticism of ideology cannot offer a normative program of a presumed non-ideological field to which the previous tradition aspired. The work hypothesizes that such critique is given as a trace of a once-perfect exit from a symbolic institution and is subject to interpretation as evidence. The development of this hypothesis is presented in the final, practical part of the work. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Psychiatry as a medical speciality lies in the fact that aside from tackling what it considers as illnesses, it has perchance to comment on and tackle many issues of social relevance as well. Whether this is advisable or not is another matter; but such a process is inevitable due to the inherent nature of the branch and the problems it deals with. Moreover this is at the root of the polarization of psychiatry into opposing psychosocial and biological (...) schools. This gets reflected in their visualization of scope, in definitions and in methodology as well. Whilst healthy criticism of one against the other school is necessary, there should be caution against hasty application of one's frame of reference to an approach that does not intend to follow, or conform to, one's methodology. This should be done within the referential framework of the school critically evaluated, with due consideration for its methods and concepts. Similarly, as at present, there is no evidence to prove one or the other of these approaches as better, aside from personal choice. We can say so even if there is a strong paradigm shift towards the biological at present. A renaissance of scientific psychoanalysis coupled with a perceptive neurobiology which can translate those insights into testable hypotheses holds the greatest promise for psychiatry in the future. This suggests the need for unification of diverse appearing approaches to get a more comprehensive and enlightened worldview. It requires a highly integrative capacity. Just as a physicist thinks simultaneously in terms of particles and waves, a psychiatrist must think of motives, emotions and desires in the same breath as neurobiology, genetics and psychopharmacology. However, the integration must be attempted without destroying the internal cohesiveness of the individual schools. This will give a fair chance for polarization in which a single proper approach in psychiatry could emerge, which may be a conglomerate of diverse appearing approaches of today, or one which supersedes the rest. A synthesis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience offers the greatest promise at present. (shrink)

한반도의 근현대 사상사를 전통과 근대의 역동적인 상호작용으로 해석하려는 시도는 매우 중요하다. 한반도와 서구 제국주의의 급격한 접촉이 만들어낸 역동적인 담론투쟁은 그 자체로 한국근현대철학의 내용이 되기 때문이다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 그러한 과정에서 중요한 역할을 담당했던 식민지 출신의 일본 유학 지식인들의 『學之光』 논설들을 분석했다. 특히 ‘신지식층’으로 불렸던 그들이 수행한 동양전통사상에 대한 자기인식과 평가를 추적했다. 구체적으로 본 연구는 우선 동양전통사상 비판의 출발점으로서 신지식층이 가지고 있었던 민족의 생존이라는 문제인식 및 진화론적 세계인식을 살펴봤다. 여기서 동양전통사상에 대한 인식론적 분화과정이 진행되었음을 드러내는 한편 근대적이면서도 탈식민적 기획들이 어떻게 (...) 입안되고 결국 굴절되었는지를 밝혔다. 이는 결국 식민주의적 정체성(停滯性)론 및 타율성(他律性)론의 등장과 확산 속에서 동양전통사상에 일종의 원죄들이 일방적으로 부여되는 담론적 변화과정이었다. 끝으로 본 연구는 1910-20년대 『學之光』의 동양전통사상 비판담론에 담긴 사상사적 의미는 무엇이었는지를 살펴봤다. (shrink)

An attempt to warrant specific readings and to discredit others through appeal to the authority of the “text itself” … must be recognized for what it is: a political strategy for reading in which the critic’s own construction of the “text itself” is mobilized in order to bully other interpretations off the field. This passage, from an article by a contemporary English literary theorist, is typical of a genre of assertions that may, at first glance, seem to have less to (...) do with critical theory than with pop psychology. For the writer, like other writers in this genre, may appear to be making a psychological observation to the effect that the disposition to claim that one’s interpretations of texts are “correct” and other interpretations are “incorrect” is the function of an arrogant belligerence . But such a psychological observation is closely related to a somewhat more dignified and elaborate sort of claim, namely, that the objectivist notion that there can be a standard of correctness in the interpretation of texts can be shown to have specific –and unsavory—political implications. And although contemporary polemicists who refer to connections between objectivist theory and right-wing tendencies generally omit to demonstrate the existence of such a relationship, it is possible to suppose that their omission, rather than reflecting a preference for invective over analysis, is tied to implicit references to analyses that have already been carried out. An ideal arena for such ideological analysis is the seventeenth century, the period during which early modern epistemology and the scientific movement laid the foundations for modern notions about objective knowledge, and during which philosophers were quite willing to discuss both their epistemological principles and their political convictions. Provided with such a wealth of raw materials, the contemporary scholar with an interest in ideological analysis need not attribute political opinions to theorists, but need only uncover the deeper ideological connections between views that were publicaly expressed. And if the relationship between objectivism and politics is one that can be revealed by darwing out the implications of the epistemological theory itself, then the results of an ideological analysis of early modern objectivism should, mutatis mutandis, be applicable to twentieth-century varieties. In the light of these considerations, it is quite apt that Michael Ryan, in attempting to merge deconstruction with ideological analysis in his Marxism and Deconstruction, uses as his paradigmatic case an analysis of Hobbes’ views on metaphor and on sovereignty. Oscar Kenshur is associate professor of comparative literature at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is the author of Open Form and the Shape of Ideas: Literary Structures as Representations of Philosophical Concepts in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries , and he is currently at work on Dilemmas of Enlightenment, a study of tensions between epistemological and ethico-political commitments during the early-modern period. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sacred and the Myth: Havel's Greengrocer and the Transformation of Ideology in Communist Czechoslovakia Marci Shore University ofToronto There is nothing a free man is so anxious to do as to find something to worship. But it must be something unquestionable, that all men can agree to worship communally. For the great concern ofthese miserable creatures is not that every individual should find something to worship that (...) he personally considers worthy ofworship, but that they should find someming in which they can all believe and which they can all worship in common; it is essential that it should be in common. And it is precisely that requirement ofshared worship that has been the principal source of suffering for individual man and the human race since the beginning of history. In their efforts to impose universal worship, men have unsheathed their swords and killed one another.Fyodor Dostoevsky (306) Thus the conflict between the aims of life and the aims of the system is not a conflict between two socially defined and separate communities; and only a very generalized view (and even that only approximative) permits us to divide society into the rulers and the ruled. Here, by the way, is one of the most important differences between the post-totalitarian system and classical dictatorships, in which this line of conflict can still be drawn according to social class. In the post-totalitarian system, 1 64Marci Shore this line runs defacto through each person, for everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a supporter ofthe system. Vaclav Havel (37) The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia arrived as a symbolically gentle conclusion to a half-century long era ofharrowing violence and totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. It was an era that saw the emergence ofNazism, Stalinism, and various indigenous fascisms, effecting a startling demonstration of the potency of ideology to co-opt minds and to wreak violence. The existence of communist ideology as a myth cohering communist totalitarian societies has been widely enough asserted. Yet this analysis can be taken to a further level through the aid oftwo paradigms. The first is a theory of human relationships developed by René Girard, which blends the disciplines ofliterary criticism, anthropology, philosophy, and political science. The second is a model arising from Vaclav Havel's parable of the greengrocer, told in "The Power ofthe Powerless" (1979). Girard's model posits the existence ofthe sacred, that locus of power that was once the pole of primitive religions. The core of the sacred is transfigured human violence. Girardian scholar Robert Hamerton-Kelly explains the process by which the sacred comes into being: Girard tells us that [the sacred] is a mendacious representation of human violence; "it is the sum ofhuman assumptions resulting from collective transferences focused on a reconciliatory victim at the conclusion of a mimetic crisis." The element of "the overwhelming" defines the Sacred...but its primary content is violence understood as being...outside ofnormal human control. (142) The sacred is established as the result of a crisis, one which finds resolution in the purging ofa relatively arbitrary scapegoat. Following this catharsis, three expressions sustain the sacred: myth, ritual, and prohibition. An examination ofthe evolution ofthese expressions in Czechoslovakia from the Stalinist period through normalization (the so-termed "posttotalitarian " period described by Havel in his essay) reveals much about the paradoxical dynamics ofideologically-based totalitarianism—which Havel defines most poignantly by suggesting that at the essence of ideological totalitarianism is the collapsing of the traditional dichotomy between victim and oppressor. The Sacred and the Myth: Havel's Greengrocer165 A Girardian deconstruction of Stalinism A political space for Stalinism developed in Czechoslovakia through the tumultuous period of Nazi occupation and the communist nature of anti-Nazi resistance. By the eve ofthe 1948 communist coup, the communists had claimed thirty-eight percent ofthe popular vote in free elections. Milan Kundera describes the coup as a usurpation of power "not in bloodshed and violence, but to the cheers of about half the population" (1986, 8). Defining this initial fanaticism was its honesty, especially among the younger generation. A young Stalinist later to become a reformist, and still later a dissident, Zdenek Mlynár, explains... (shrink)

Ideology criticism, like scepticism, calls into question the objective or justified status of beliefs. However, where scepticism only refutes, and never puts forward, a substantive claim about anything, the ideology critic must maintain some criterion for distinguishing ideas which support relations of domination from those that do not, in virtue of her criticism of a particular set of ideas as “ideological”. The trouble for the ideology critic is that the sceptical methods she deploys undermine any (...) critical thesis, including her own. Thus, the theory of ideology tends to undercut ideology criticism with a fundamental problem of self-implication. This paper draws on the epistemological problem of the criterion to explain and define a basic problem of justification for the theory of ideology. A problem of self-implication is introduced in part one. I argue that the basis for ideology criticism inevitably succumbs to the very doubt it puts forward. I draw on various criticisms of ideology criticism to formulate a specific account of the basic, fundamental problem for the theory of ideology. I show how norms for ideology criticism are vulnerable to an Ancient sceptical problem for epistemic criteria, which brings the ideology critic to a dilemma: either (i) find independent grounds for criticism, immune to ideology, or (ii) show how ideology is self-undermining. Each horn of the dilemma is ideological. (shrink)

The primary aim of Jeong Do-jeon’s criticism of Buddhism is, like Mencius, to promote both political and moral actions based on the virtues of Confucianism. In a similar way to Mencius’ denouncement of heretical discourses, Jeong Do-jeon thinks that the disapproval of Buddhism is indispensable for accomplishing the ways of Sages-that is, for effectuating the virtues of Confucianism. Rather than an intellectual debate against Buddhism, Jeong Do-jeon’s criticism of Buddhism is done in the context of political movement, to (...) incorporate Neo-Confucianism as a national ideology. His disapproval, followed and enhanced the discourses of former Confucianists - Zhang Zai, Cheng Brothers, and Zhu Xi - displays both distinctive criticism of Buddhism and better understanding of Neo-Confucianism than other relevant Neo-Confucianists of the Joseon Dynasty. In his book Bulsi-japbyeon 佛氏雜辨, Jeong underlines that Neo-Confucianism, which is based on the concrete facts unlike Buddhism, has realistic practicality, and maintains that the ontological foundation of human morality exists by showing the distinction between the nature(性) and the mind(心). Jeong’s argument has two implications: first, it sheds light on the living moral agent even in fluctuating political conditions; second, it shows that Jeong did not simply reiterate Zhu Xi’s criticism of Buddhism but, based on his particular systematic understanding of overall aspects of Neo-Confucianism, Jeong did criticize Buddhism in his own way. From this point of view, it could be understood that Jeong Do-jeon’s disapproval of Buddhism focuses on the realistic value of the virtues of Confucianism and its actual practice, unlike his predecessors of the Song dynasty who focused on human nature, mind and self-cultivation. (shrink)

For my present purposes, and in terms of my immediate concerns, the problem of ideology in American literary history has three different though closely related aspects: first, the multivolume American literary history I have begun to edit; then, the concept of ideology as a constituent part of literary study, and, finally, the current revaluation of the American Renaissance. I select this period because it has been widely regarded as both the source and the epitome of our literary tradition; (...) because it has become, accordingly, the focal point of the critical revision now under way in American studies; and because, from either of these perspectives, literary or critical, it seems to me a particularly fitting subject for the occasion. For one thing, we owe the idea of an American Renaissance to F. O. Matthiessen, who was a prime mover of the Salzburg Seminar, and a member of its first faculty in 1947. Moreover, American Renaissance was a classic work of revisionist criticism. It reset the terms for the study of American literary history; it gave us a new canon of classic texts; and it inspired the growth of American studies in the United States and abroad. It is not too much to say that Matthiessen, American Renaissance, and the Salzburg Seminar brought American literature to postwar Europe. What followed, from the late forties through the sixties, was the flowering of a new academic field, complete with programs of study, periodicals, theses, conferences, and distinguished procession of scholarly authorities, including many graduates of the Salzburg Seminar.Matthiessen figures as a watershed in this development. For if American Renaissance marked the seeding-time of a new academic field, it was also the harvest of some three decades of literary study. I refer, first of all, to the dual legacy that Matthiessen acknowledges of T. S. Eliot and Vernon Parrington—which is to say, the partnership in American Renaissance between the terms “literary” and “history”; or, in the words of Matthiessen’s subtitle, between Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman: “art,” meaning a small group of aesthetic masterpieces, and “expression,” meaning representative works, reflecting and illuminating the culture at large. It was the remarkable achievement of Matthiessen that his book yokes these concepts gracefully together. Somehow, one concept seems to support the other. The historical designation American seems richer for its association with an aesthetic renaissance; Emerson’s and Whitman’s art gains substance by its capacity to express the age. Matthiessen himself did not feel it necessary to explain the connection. But we can see in retrospect that what made it work—what made it, indeed, unnecessary for Matthiessen to explain the connection—was an established consensus, or rather a consensus long in the making, which American Renaissance helped establish. I mean a consensus about the term “literary” that involved the legitimation of a certain canon, and a consensus about the term “history” that was legitimated by a certain concept of America. Sacvan Bercovitch is Carswell Professor of English and American Literature at Harvard University. He is the Author of The Puritan Origins of the American Self and The American Jeremiad, among other works. He has also edited several collections of essays, most recently Reconstructing American Literary History. (shrink)

Justifying judicial review as a democratic institution is a core concern of Cristina Lafont’s splendid new book. Even though her interpretation is appealing, this also poses some problems. This is due to the non-thematization of ideology that results from Lafont’s ideal-theoretical and argument-privileging approach. I will first address this ideology-problem and then reflect on the implications that this has for the question of what is considered legitimate political action.

In this dissertation, I present Marx's conception of ideology as a counterpart of his critical analysis of society. I take exception to current Marxist notions of ideology, and I attempt to show that they correspond to Marxism's failure to develop an historical, material analysis of contemporary society, and its consequent reliance upon an idealist theory of social change. I am ultimately interested in utilizing Marx's theory of ideological critique as the basis for a return to a materially grounded (...) social criticism. ;The thesis begins with an analysis of Marx's early philosophical investigations, showing his concept of ideology emerge with his recognition of a pattern of philosophical abstractions from social movement. Marx's demonstration that nineteenth century economists reduced political economy to a static theory of social distribution and reproduction is contrasted with his theory of the dynamics of social production. ;Marx's anti-ideological methodology decrees, however, a continuing need to reassess the social organism, digging beneath prominent theoretical abstractions to reveal the processes of historical development immanent in present society. Modern Marxism shirks this responsibility, countering the abstractions of liberal theory with its own tired categories of class struggle and false consciousness, offering a moral critique rather than an alternative conception of capitalism. ;I present Althusser's theory of ideological practices as the basis for a renewed interest in the historically specific structures of present society. It grounds my critique of the ideological assumption, shared by Marxism and liberalism, that economic relations have priority in theories of social transformation. Applying Marx's materialist, historical methodology to the analysis of contemporary social relations, I conclude that a post-Marxist theory, emphasizing noneconomic contradictions as sources of instability and immanent social change, is now warranted. The traditional economic oppositions of class and consciousness have, I maintain, been superseded rather than merely conditioned by noneconomic social antagonisms. (shrink)

In his critique of historicism and utopian social engineering, Karl Popper treats various writers – notably, Plato, Hegel, and Marx – as expounding these mistaken ideas, and as illustrating the threat they pose to ‘the open society’. Among contemporaries, one of those he singles out for criticism is the sociologist Karl Mannheim. While he spends relatively little time discussing Mannheim’s work compared to that of Plato and Marx, I argue that Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society in (...) an Age of Reconstruction may have had particular significance for Popper. I examine his evaluation of Mannheim’s work, assessing its accuracy, and what it reveals about the similarities and fundamental differences in the orientations of these two writers, both of whom had a significant impact upon social science in the twentieth century. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Psychiatry as a medical speciality lies in the fact that aside from tackling what it considers as illnesses, it has perchance to comment on and tackle many issues of social relevance as well. Whether this is advisable or not is another matter; but such a process is inevitable due to the inherent nature of the branch and the problems it deals with. Moreover this is at the root of the polarization of psychiatry into opposing psychosocial and biological (...) schools. This gets reflected in their visualization of scope, in definitions and in methodology as well. Whilst healthy criticism of one against the other school is necessary, there should be caution against hasty application of one's frame of reference to an approach that does not intend to follow, or conform to, one's methodology. This should be done within the referential framework of the school critically evaluated, with due consideration for its methods and concepts. Similarly, as at present, there is no evidence to prove one or the other of these approaches as better, aside from personal choice. We can say so even if there is a strong paradigm shift towards the biological at present. A renaissance of scientific psychoanalysis coupled with a perceptive neurobiology which can translate those insights into testable hypotheses holds the greatest promise for psychiatry in the future. This suggests the need for unification of diverse appearing approaches to get a more comprehensive and enlightened worldview. It requires a highly integrative capacity. Just as a physicist thinks simultaneously in terms of particles and waves, a psychiatrist must think of motives, emotions and desires in the same breath as neurobiology, genetics and psychopharmacology. However, the integration must be attempted without destroying the internal cohesiveness of the individual schools. This will give a fair chance for polarization in which a single proper approach in psychiatry could emerge, which may be a conglomerate of diverse appearing approaches of today, or one which supersedes the rest. A synthesis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience offers the greatest promise at present. (shrink)

Recent criticism of the role of respect for autonomy in bioethics has focused on that principle's status as ‘dogma’ or ‘ideology’. I suggest that lying beneath many applications of respect for autonomy in medical ethics are some influential dogmas — propositions accepted, not as explicit premises or as a consequence of reasoned argument, but simply because moral problems are so frequently framed in such terms. Furthermore, I will argue that rejecting these dogmas is vital to secure and protect (...) an autonomy worthy of respect. The concept of autonomy that is widely applied in clinical ethics emphasises decision-making competence, at the expense of considering the authenticity of those decisions. Respect for such autonomy is interpreted in largely synchronic and individual terms — concerned with the isolated decisions of individual agents — and thus neglects the diachronic and social dimensions of many moral dilemmas arising in the health care context. I will examine how these unwritten rules lead to an impoverished understanding of respect and a systematic neglect in bioethics of certain kinds of ethical consideration, and draw on insights from feminist and communitarian work on autonomy to sketch an alternative approach to understanding respect, modelled on the norms of respectful conversation — a respect that is firstly concerned with engaging with the another as a potential giver and bearer or reasons, and working with them to promote both individual and social flourishing. (shrink)

This article examines the role of the aesthetic in the criticism of Edward Said through a reading of two lesser-explored texts, Musical Elaborations and On Late Style. It explores how, by drawing upon ideas from Gramsci and Adorno, Said advocates a convergence of social and aesthetic approaches to musical analysis and criticism. Although critical of some of the tensions arising from Said's varying perspectives on music and society, the article suggests that we can nonetheless detect a distinctive (...) class='Hi'>ideology of the aesthetic in Said's writings on music. It argues that Said's ideas on the temporal or narrative structure of certain musical works or performances function, within his wider thinking, as an aesthetic paradigm for undermining fixed identity and linear or totalizing narratives. Thus Said's reflections on music do not simply retreat from social and political concerns, but rather elaborate a utopian thinking regarding the interface between criticism and the aesthetic. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 338-369.

The paper states that, in Ukrainian reception of his philosophy, Nietzsche appears to be a highly ambivalent thinker. Nietzsche himself often defined his philosophizing as ambiguous, and so in this article I try to explicate the different fluctuations in the reception of his ideas. I follow the transformation and adaptation of some of Nietzsche’s key ideas which, in Ukrainian context, got unexpected formulations and ideological connotations. Drawing on this, I argue that most significant elements in the Ukrainian reception are connected (...) to the literary reading of Nietzscheanism. Finally, the main topics of Ukrainian Nietzscheanism are related to ‘histo-rical nihilism’ as a diagnosis of culture. The article traces how Nietzsche’s ideas became a powerful tool in critical approach to naturalism, emotional writing and provincialism. The important characteristics that developed the ideas of Nietzscheanism in Ukraine include the following points. The desire to find a strong man. The problem of individual freedom and its place in society, as well as the criticism of obscu-rantism. The understanding of the critical moments in history and actualization of creativity. The openness to interpretation, discussion, and diagnosis of the cultural conditions. The re-evaluation of the role of morality and religion, the awareness of the tragedy of being and finally, the search for the balance between intelligence and voluntarism. (shrink)

Galligan (Professor Emeritus, English, Western Michigan U.-Kalamazoo) argues that contemporary American critics should embrace literary truths with all of their uncertainties rather than cling to make- believe certainties of ideologies. He celebrates values commonly associated with modern, not postmodern, criticism, applying them to contemporary works in a series of fresh and unusual inquiries. He finds implications for criticism in work from the physical sciences and in the works of largely ignored novelists. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, (...) OR. (shrink)

Law is an important part of Althusser’s thought. He profoundly criticized the mechanism of capitalist law from the perspective of ‘reproduction.’ First, the law cannot be separated from the relations of production. In order to maintain capitalist relations of production, the law covers up the exploitation in the process of capitalist production. The key methods are to determine the ownership of the means of production and products and confuse the technical division of labor and social division of labor in the (...) process of labor. It demands the submission of legal subjects, seducing and tempting subjects through the ideological function of law so that they will actively and willingly accept the restriction of law. Secondly, the law and the State are integrated. The ‘surplus-violence’ that the ruling class holds over the ruled class is transformed by law into legal State power, and the State power shapes individuals into subjects and endows subjects with rights through law, with the aim of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. In addition, at the end of the article, I also mention Althusser’s preliminary conception of communist law. (shrink)

In turning to the language of freedom, I am not automatically freed from the dangers of reduction and self-privileging. "Freedom" as a term is at least as ambiguous as "power" . When I say that for me all questions about the politics of interpretation begin with the question of freedom, I can either be saying a mouthful or saying nothing at all, depending on whether I am willing to complicate my key term, "freedom," by relating it to the language of (...) power. The best way to do that is to get power in from the beginning, by making a distinction taken for granted by many earlier thinkers and too often ignored today: freedom from as contrasted with freedom to; freedom from external restraints and the power of others to inhibit our actions, and freedom to act effectively when restraints disappear.All the freedom from in the world will not free me to make an intellectual discovery or to point a picture unless I have somehow freed myself to perform certain tasks. Such freedoms are gained only by those who surrender to disciplines and codes invented by others, giving up certain freedoms from. Nobody forbids by interpreting the original text of Confucius' Analects or the Principia Mathematica, yet I am not free to do so, lacking the disciplines—having not been disciplined—to do so. The distinction can lead to troublesome complexities, but in its simple form here it cuts through some of the problems that arise in power language.Every critical revolution tends to speak more clearly about what it is against than about what it seeks. The historicists against impressionism, the New Critics against historicism, the new new critics against intentionalism and the authority of canons, the feminists against misogynous art and criticism–clearly one could write a history of modern criticism as a glorious casting off of errors. But it is rightly a commonplace among intellectual historians that all revolutionaries depend on their past far more than they know. Revolutionary critics are enslaved by a nasty law of nature: I can say only what I can say, and that will be largely what I have learned to say from the kings I would depose.Everyone who tries to forge any kind of ideological criticism must struggle with these complexities. Nobody ever knows just what powers have been rejected and what voices heard. But at the moment it seems clear that what follows here, both in its emerging clarities and remaining confusions, results from my somewhat surprised surrender to voices previously alien to me: the "Mikhail Bakhtin" who speaks to me, muffled by my ignorance of Russian, and the feminist criticism" that in its vigor and diversity and challenge to canonic views has—belatedly, belatedly—forced me to begin listening.Wayne C. Booth's most recent work, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism, won the Laing Prize in 1982. He is working on a book about ethical and political criticism of narrative. A new edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction will appear in 1983. (shrink)

Oscar Kenshur’s “Demystifying the Demystifiers: Metaphysical Snares of Ideological Criticism” should go a long way toward convincing most readers that the cure for “ideological” criticism is worse than the disease. His attempt to uncouple ideology and epistemology in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and Michael Ryan’s Marxism and Deconstruction belongs to an increasingly popular subgenre of metacriticism, the “more-historical-than-thou” offensive against Marxists and new historicists for their alleged essentialist procedures.1 There is no question that Kenshur raises significant issues about (...) the nature of ideological analysis that should be debated. However, he has neither interrogated the basis of his own assumptions about seventeenth-century views of language theory and epistemology nor convincingly demonstrated, to my mind, that Ryan is somehow wrong in his reading of Hobbes. The weakness of Kenshur’s argument is that he seems intent on erecting the windmills at which he wants to tile—most damagingly for his argument a simplistic notion of ideology that he assumes both Hobbes and Ryan share. By accepting a deterministic notion of ideology, Kenshur offers a “corrective” to overzealous claims for the significance of ideological criticism that has the effect not of “sav[ing history] from its friends” but of returning it to the status of “background” or “context” that it had been for a previous generation of New Critics. The terms in which he casts his argument—epistemology and/or ideology—redefine “ideological criticism” in a polemical manner designed, it seems, to discourage anyone from wanting to practice it. His ultimate purpose is not simply to save “history” from the Ryans of the world but to inoculate his versions of literature and philosophy against the ideological virus. To respond fully to the various issues that Kenshur raises would require detailed analyses of seventeenth-century literary and political culture and of the institutionalization of twentieth-century criticism; simply to discuss the differences between Hobbes and Ryan on epistemology or ideology would require a full-length study of the various discourses in which and against which their works are situated. Given the limitations of a critical response, I shall confine my remarks to two suspect areas of Kenshur’s argument: his characterization of seventeenth-century notions of the relationships among language, epistemology, and ideology and his assumptions about the nature of claims currently made for ideological analysis. 1. See, for example, Edward Pechter, “The New Historicism and Its Discontents: Politicizing Renaissance Drama,” PMLA 102 : 292-303. Robert Markley teaches in the English department of the University of Washington and is editor of The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation. He is the author of Two-Edg’d Weapons: Style and Ideology in the Comedies of Etherege, Wycherley, and Congreve and coauthor, with Kenneth J. Koespel, of Newton and the Failure of Messianic Science: A Postmodern Inquiry into the Discourses of Natural Philosophy. (shrink)

The question of war and peace — the basic question of our time — is central to the ideological conflict between the two social systems. In these conditions the struggle against bourgeois falsifiers of the problem of war and peace is of current theoretical and political significance.

Rhetorical criticism examines ideology as a form of strategic argumentation that functions to legitimize political authority. Ideology presents itself as political philosophy in a way that calls attention to its argumentation. Ideological arguments support claims (1) that those who wield political power represent the interests of all, and (2) that the existing social order is natural and inevitable in light of human nature. Functionally, ideology is indispensible, but perverse. Formally, ideology is argumentation that obscures its (...) partiality under claims to universality. (shrink)

Laski has been and remains one of the most erudite and influential of the English liberals—indeed, regardless of which of his books the liberal reads, he finishes it with the feeling that Laski is a force for good in political life. However, for the kind of philosopher who is accustomed to make distinctions between morality, ethics, ideology, and descriptive science, there are certain confusions in Laski's writings that give grounds for criticism of both a theoretical and practical nature.

It is a danger in the discursive turn in the human sciences that social criticism be abandoned in favour of ‘continuing the conversation.’ However, an analysis of the reflexive paradox inherent in every communication act provides the basis for a non-foundationalist critique of the historical epoch.

The article is devoted to the study of Soviet and Russian monumental sculpture in historical dynamics, namely: in the period from the 1920s to the beginning of the XXI century. The aim is to determine the degree and nature of the influence of political propaganda and agitation on the production of monumental sculpture throughout the existence of the USSR and in post-Soviet, in particular in modern Russia. It is known that this type of art, due to its essential characteristics, such (...) as monumentality, ideology, historicity, most fully and concretely reflects reality, that is, "physically, bodily and three-dimensional" (A. F. Losev). Such works are able to embody and express the contradictions of socio-cultural transformations and can even participate in an attempt to resolve them, naturally, by artistic means. The methodology is based on the principles of cultural and hermeneutic approaches combined with descriptive and comparative methods used to analyze works that were part of the everyday life of Soviet and Russian citizens and studied for ideological content. Interdisciplinary, environmental, historical, cultural and sociocultural approaches were used, as well as tools for the art criticism analysis of artistic and figurative characteristics. The analysis of the evolution of Soviet and Russian monumental sculpture makes it possible to clearly characterize the specifics of each of the stages of this process, including the object of study – monuments of the XX – early XXI century, characterized by a variety of forms in the positioning of certain positions of state power. The object of this study is the nature of the influence of political propaganda and agitation on the production of monumental sculpture in the Soviet Union and modern Russia, as well as in identifying the semantic content and artistic solutions of such sculpture at the present stage as a certain result of the evolution that the "big ideas" of the Russian state have undergone. The materials were works of Soviet and Russian monumental sculpture, as well as scientific research by Russian cultural and art historians. (shrink)