A lo largo de las siguientes páginas repasaremos el uso de la forma prosaica por parte de los sofistas y socráticos, viendo la influencia y relación entre ambos tipos de escritura. A este respecto, analizaremos los escritos sofísticos antinómicos resultantes de prácticas erísticas, ejemplificados por los llamados Dissoi Logoi. Consideraremos a continuación la influencia de este escrito sobre los Logoi Sokratikoi, desarrollados por los círculos de seguidores de Sócrates, buscando ver la correlación en la metodología y forma (...) argumentativa, así como también en el contenido, de ambos escritos, considerados tradicionalmente como representantes de posturas totalmente contrapuestas. Pretendemos, por tanto, resaltar la continuidad entre la corriente sofística y la socrática frente a la usual consideración de ambos grupos como enemigos intelectuales. (shrink)

Die Dissoi Logoi - "Zweierlei Ansichten" - sind ein kurzer Traktat, der als Anhang zu den Schriften des kaiserzeitlichen Skeptikers Sextus Empiricus uberliefert wurde. Der von einem anonymen Autor wahrscheinlich an der Wende vom 5. zum 4. Jh. verfasste Text gibt einen einzigartigen Einblick in die Debatten und den Unterricht der Sophisten. ".

섹스토스 엠피리코스의 22편 원고 뭉치 끝자락에 일종의 부록처럼 첨부되어 발견된 《이중 논변》은 그 (부분적인) 논증만을 제외하곤 작성 연대나 저자 그리고 구성 의도 등에 대하여 아무런 정보가 전해지지 않는다. 철학사를 해석하는 학자들은, 주제에 대해 상반된 두 입장을 제시하는 《이중 논변》의 논의 방식이 고대의 소피스트들이 지향하던 ‘반박논증(antilogia)’의 형태이기도 하거니와, 지혜와 탁월함의 교육가능성 및 연설 기술과 같은 주제들은 소피스트들의 주된 논의거리였다는 점에 기인하여, 이를 대체로 소피스트식 상대주의 논증의 사례로 여겨왔다. 그러나 《이중 논변》은 자신의 논증 안에서 상대성 및 경험주의적 논변에 적극적으로 기대면서도 논리적 혹은 (...) 귀류적 논법을 사용하여 정당성을 호소하면서 같은 강도의 서로 상반된 입론들을 병행시켜가며 그 사이에서 특정의 확언을 피하는 중립적 자세를 취하고 있다. 사안들에 대하여 경험적 사례들과 논리적 추론을 이용해 논증을 구성하되 필연성은 거부하면서 ‘그럼직함’만을 강조하고, 그로부터 그것들에 대한 규정성과 확증성을 피하고 있는 《이중 논변》의 성격은 고대 회의주의, 특히 어떠한 것에 대해서도 독단적 단언을 피하면서 판단을 중지하면서 오로지 경험에 나타나는 것들만을 그리고 그것들의 축적으로 갖추어진 관습이나 법률 등만을 유용한 삶의 인도자로 삼되 끊임없이 탐구를 지속하는 퓌론주의와 성격적 유사성을 지닌다. 그러나 《이중 논변》이 기원전 403에서 395년 사이에 작성되었을 것이라 추정되는 반면 퓌론주의는 그 이후인 기원전 4세기 말엽에 시작되어 1세기부터 적극적인 영향력을 지니게 되었다. 이와 같은 시대적 선후관계는 퓌론주의가 《이중 논변》으로부터 사상적이자 논증적 이념을 물려받은 후 보다 구체적으로 하나의 학파로서 핵심적인 회의주의 입론들을 구축할 수 있게 되었다는 점을 유추케 한다. 이러한 맥락에서 《이중 논변》은 퓌론 회의주의의 원형적 가능성으로서 역할하고 있다고 이해할 수 있다. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar Dialex. § 5 a fin de mostrar que allí no sólo se hace uso de paradojas erísticas para la argumentación, sino que al mismo tiempo se propone un criterio para resolverlas. Para ello, en primer lugar, expongo algunas consideraciones generales sobre la datación, la autoría y la estructura de Dialex. que permitirán comprender las particularidades del quinto parágrafo del tratado. Luego, presento la traducción completa de Dialex. § 5 y señalo algunas semejanzas entre (...) los razonamientos que allí se desarrollan y los atribuidos a los erísticos en Eutidemo de Platón y Refutaciones sofísticas de Aristóteles. Finalmente, analizo el argumento presentado en Dialex. § 5. 15 y ofrezco una interpretación que atienda a su sentido y al contexto de la discusión filosófica en el que ha sido formulado. (shrink)

The method of dissoi logoi in Pre-Platonic testimonies The paper analyzes some references to the method of "dissoi logoi" (which is called by Plato "antilogic") in Pre-Platonic testimonies such as Aristophanes’ The Clouds, fragments of Euripides' Antiope and The Phoenicians, and the anonymous work called "Dialexeis" (Dissoi logoi). The analysis of these Pre-platonic sources results in the following conclusions: (1) The method of dissoi logoi was the universal strategy adopted by the sophists (...) to argue on both sides - for and against any thesis. (2) The Sophists are pointed out by all the testimonies as those who invented this method. (3) the same as it is in Plato's dialogues the criticism of the method in these Pre-platonic sources is based on the conviction that the method can be used immorally. (shrink)

Les Dissoi logoi posent de nombreux problèmes d’interprétation. Partant du troisième chapitre du traité, cette étude cherche à montrer que la soi-disant « thèse de l’identité » n’établit pas l’identité des prédicats opposés, mais leur relativité : certaines actions, telles que mentir, voler ou tuer, pourraient être considérées comme tantôt justes, tantôt injustes selon le kairos, c’est-à-dire le moment précis où il faut agir. Les vers de Cléobuline et d’Eschyle cités en faveur de celle-ci non seulement transmettent des (...) exemples d’actions normalement jugées injustes qui, dans certaines occasions, devraient être considérées comme justes, mais montrent aussi que la tâche créative des poètes et poétesses est un exemple de tromperie juste, ce qui constitue un argument additionnel en faveur de la thèse mentionnée. (shrink)

Dissoi Logoi 4.6 presents a beautiful self-refutation argument, which I analyse here, offering a different assessment of its relation to self-contradiction and the Liar paradox from the only one available in the literature.

Aceptar que los Dissoì Lógoi fueron escritos a mitad del siglo V a.n.e., tal como propuso Santo Mazzarino, permite dejar de considerarlos un mero apéndice a los sofistas. Propongo un nuevo análisis de su estructura y considerar que los fragmentos 8 y 9 recogen la tesis criticada por el autor; no, como habitualmente son considerados, la tesis defendida por él. Se restituye así el aroma de las discusiones filosóficas antes de que Platón las sometiera a su criba.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Two Thought Experiments in the Dissoi LogoiDeborah Levine GeraRecent scholarship has stressed that it is not useful to speak of Greek scientific experimentation in sweeping fashion. The Greeks did perform scientific experiments, but the quantity, quality, and areas explored varied over different periods. Thus, while at certain times such testing procedures flourished, at other times very few actual experiments were performed. So, too, certain fields were more fruitful (...) or feasible for experimentation than others.1 Those who tend to play down the quantity and quality of Greek scientific experimentation usually point to the Greeks' preference for speculation and theory over observation and performance of manual tasks.2 Thought experiments allow the mind to range freely without leaving one's armchair or getting one's hands dirty, and that may be why such mental tests were favored by Greek thinkers, from Xenophanes onward. My purpose here is to study two thought experiments found in the Dissoi Logoi in conjunction with several related trials found in Herodotus, Xenophon, Plato, and Xenophanes. All these thought experiments make use of hypothetical human beings and deal with educational and ethical matters. Generally speaking, these hypothetical tests contrast two types of people, either individuals or larger groups, in an attempt to determine the roles played by heredity and environment in the acquisition of knowledge and moral values.It is notoriously difficult to arrive at a precise definition of thought experiments,3 and the following is meant to be no more than a working definition. Thought experiments are, first of all, experiments.4 In ancient [End Page 21] Greece scientific experiments were not used as a neutral means to decide between two competing theories but rather were intended to prove or refute a hypothesis, and this is true of Greek thought experiments as well.5 Experiments must involve a procedure of some kind, a test consisting of at least one change deliberately introduced into the initial situation.6 Normally, then, an experiment is composed of (1) a thesis to be proven (or refuted), (2) a carefully contrived starting point, (3) at least one further action to be undertaken, an action affecting the original situation, and (4) a test of the results of the action(s). In a thought experiment these steps are carried out in thought, in the laboratory of the mind.7 The thought experimenter visualizes a situation, mentally carries out an operation, and then sees, in the mind's eye, the results. A Gedankenexperiment is not actually performed, either because there is no need to do so—common sense, intuition, or experience is sufficient to supply the results of the procedure—or because the test is one that cannot, in fact, be executed in the real world. Such experiments are not intended to prove fanciful, unlikely theories, nor are they meant to yield results which are intrinsically implausible. Generally, thought experiments are carefully imagined scenarios, which are convincing both because they have some basis in empirical observation and because they use specific details, often colorful ones, to appeal to the audience's intuition.8 These well-conceived tests teach us new things, even though their execution does not supply us with new empirical data of any kind.Let us begin by looking at one such hypothetical trial in the Dissoi Logoi, an anonymous sophistic composition, written mainly in Doric, which is generally dated to the beginning of the fourth century.9 This [End Page 22] brief work is comprised of nine chapters, often presented in the form of double (or opposing) arguments, on subjects such as good and evil, justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, etc. Of these, chapter 6 discusses whether wisdom and virtue can be taught, and here the anonymous author touches upon the acquisition of language, while contrasting systematic teaching with informal instruction. He argues that we learn language and are not born knowing it, and offers an imaginary skeptical opponent the following proof of his claim (, 6.12): if one were to send a newborn Greek infant off to Persia and raise him there, without his hearing Greek, he would speak Persian; and if one were to bring a Persian baby to Greece, he would speak Greek (, 6.12... (shrink)

Questo contributo teorico propone una prospettiva innovativa nel dibattito sul concetto di “bullshit”. L’ipotesi principale è che la vaghezza sia un elemento fondamentale delle bullshit, che si focalizza sull’attività. In questo modo si supera il dibattito in letteratura che mette al centro o l’intenzionalità dell’enunciatore o la struttura e il contenuto degli enunciati. Si sostiene inoltre che la vaghezza non debba essere considerata come un limite, ma come un’opportunità per comprendere situazioni comunicative complesse. Questo differente approccio, basato sulla tradizione pragmatista, (...) supera alcuni limiti evidenziati in letteratura, aprendo la strada a una comprensione più approfondita del fenomeno delle bullshit. Offre inoltre una risposta esaustiva ad alcuni quesiti di Frankfurt e riconosce il lato “produttivo” delle bullshit, adattandosi meglio a molteplici circostanze quotidiane. Un approccio pragmatista al fenomeno-bullshit basato sulla vaghezza offre una maggiore comprensione di fenomeni complessi di comunicazione senza cadere nel “paradigma della sincerità” evidenziato da Frankfurt. (shrink)

Provides an overview of the anonymous work of sophistic rhetoric known as Dissoi Logoi or Double Arguments.

Resumo: Tradução anotada do tratado anônimo sofístico datado do começo do séc. IV a.C., Dissoi Logoi, ou "Discursos Duplos". A apresentação do texto traz informações básicas sobre transmissão do texto, autoria, datação e uma pequena discussão sobre a caracterização das teses nele presentes. As notas da tradução analisam passagens e conceitos importantes, sugerem questões e inter-relações com outras obras, buscando traçar um panorama possível de interpretação do texto. O tratado, incompleto, compõe-se de nove pequenos capítulos que versam sobre (...) temas importantes durante o período de atuação do movimento sofista e pode ser considerado um exemplar das técnicas retóricas ensinadas por esses pensadores.: This article is a translation, followed by notes, of the anonymous Sophist treatise from the 4th century b.c., Dissoi Logoi. The introduction provides basic information about text transmission, authorship, and date of composition, as well as a brief discussion of the work's content. Important passages and concepts are analyzed in the notes to the translation. In addition, questions about the work and its interrelations with other works are discussed, and a reading of the text is developed. The treatise was transmitted in an incomplete form and contains nine small chapters on the central themes of the Sophist movement. It can be considered an example of the rhetorical techniques taught by those thinkers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:160 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY A PLATONIC PARALLEL IN THE DISSOI LOGOI The Dissoi Logoi or Two-/old Arguments (Diels-Kranz, II, 405-416) is an anonymous sophistic treatise written in literary Doric at some time subsequent to the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404-403.1 As early as 1911, A. E. Taylor wrote that the treatise "must be seriously reckoned with in any attempt to reconstruct the history (...) of Greek thought in the generation immediately anterior to Plato." 2 But scholars have been slow to take up Taylor's challenge. From those writing in English we have had little beyond the summary in Kathleen Freeman's Companion a and the papers of Adolfo Levi4 and E. S. Ramage." There is not even a full English translation in print, s In this paper I shall call attention to one brief passage which seems to me to be of exceptional interest since it offers a solution to a type of sophistical argument which occurs in Plato's Euthydemus. In so doing, I hope to arouse interest in a document much neglected by historians of ancient thought. Dzssoz Loaox, V, 15. With respect to the assertion that the same man both is and is not, I put the following question: "Does he exist with respect to some particular thing, or just in general?" Then if someone denies that the man exists, he is mistaken, because he is treating (the particular and) universal senses as the same. Because everything exists in some sense. GENI~I~AL REMAI~KS.The nature of the solution offered is clearly based on a distinction similar to that made by Aristotle in On Sophistical Re]utations (166b 37 ft.) between expressions used "in a certain respect" and "absolutely." The formulation of the fallacy to which the distinction is intended to be applied, however, is considerably less clear. Is it supposed that the opponent has put forward an argument purporting to demonstrate (a) that the same man both is and is not, or (b) that a particular man, thought to exist, does not in fact exist? This question can best be answered by an analysis of the Euthydemus passage, to which I now turn. EUTttYDgMUS 283b-e: The sophist Dionysodorus inquires of Socrates and his friends whether they genuinely wish their young prot4g6, Cleinias, to become wise. On gaining their assurance that they do, he then proceeds as follows: 1) You wish him to become wise and not to be ignorant (283d 1). 1This terminus post quem is derived from I, 8, in which the author lists a number of victories and speaks of that won by the Spartans over the Athenians as being "the most recent." "The 6,~ao~X6-tot,"Varia Socratica, Fizst Series (Oxford, 1911), p. 128. aCompanion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, (Oxford, 1946),pp. 417-423. ""On 'Two-fold Statements,'" American Journal o/Philology, LXI (1940), 292-~06. 5"An Early Trace of Socratic Dialogue," American Journal of Philology, LXXXII (1961), 418-424. 6The present writer has cempleted a translation which is to be published in Mind in the near future. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 161 2) You wish him to become what he is not, and no longer to be what he is now (literally: what he is now, no longer to be [283d 2-3]). 3) You wish for his death, since you wish him no longer to be (283d 5-6). The obvious way of dealing with this argument is to make precisely the distinction made by the author of the Dissoi Logoi at V, 15: we should say to Dionysodorus, "Your conclusion that the friends of Cleinias wish for his death is the result of an illegitimate step: you went from 'you wish him not to be ignorant' to 'you wish him not to be'. To have made this step is to have ignored the distinction between existence with respect to some particular thing, i.e., ignorance, and existence in general." (A later critic might point out to Dionysodorus that he has confused the copulative and existential uses of the verb "to be.") It now becomes possible to return to the question, which of the two formulations, (a) or (b... (shrink)

This book presents some of the most recent trends and developments in Presocratic scholarship. A wide range of topics are covered - from the metaphysical to the moral to the methodological - as well as a broad a range of authors: from recognized figures such as Heraclitus and Parmenides to Sophistic thinkers whose place has traditionally been marginalized, such as Gorgias and the author of the Dissoi Logoi. Several of the pieces are concerned with the later reception and (...) influence of the Presocratics on ancient philosophy, an area of study important both for the light it sheds on our evidence for Presocratic thought and for understanding the philosophical power of their ideas. Drawing together contributions from distinguished authorities and internationally acclaimed scholars of ancient philosophy, this book offers new challenges to traditional interpretations in some areas of Presocratic philosophy and finds new support for traditional interpretations in other areas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 161 2) You wish him to become what he is not, and no longer to be what he is now (literally: what he is now, no longer to be [283d 2-3]). 3) You wish for his death, since you wish him no longer to be (283d 5-6). The obvious way of dealing with this argument is to make precisely the distinction made by the author of (...) the Dissoi Logoi at V, 15: we should say to Dionysodorus, "Your conclusion that the friends of Cleinias wish for his death is the result of an illegitimate step: you went from 'you wish him not to be ignorant' to 'you wish him not to be'. To have made this step is to have ignored the distinction between existence with respect to some particular thing, i.e., ignorance, and existence in general." (A later critic might point out to Dionysodorus that he has confused the copulative and existential uses of the verb "to be.") It now becomes possible to return to the question, which of the two formulations, (a) or (b), does the author of the Dissoi Logoi presuppose? On the basis of the Euthydemus passage, it seems likely that he presupposed both. The conclusion of Dionysodorus' argument is (b), that Cleinias does not exist, but his conclusion is based upon (a) that Cleinias both is (ignorant) and is not (wise). The Euthydemus passage shows clearly that the words "if someone denies that the man exists" are considerably less of a non sequitur than might first appear. CONCLUSmN. The fallacy-solving distinction of Dissoi Logoi, u 15 was probably understood by Plato~ although not clearly formulated until Aristotle. How is this fact to be assimilated? Is the Dissoi Logoi (or at least this section) much later than has hitherto been presupposed? Or have scholars simply failed to credit its author with this important distinction? Until we have additional studies of the treatise, further discussion would be premature. ROSAMOND KENT SPRAGUE University o] South Carolina HUME'S A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN, A REVIEW NOTE In his biography of David Hume, E. C. Mossner notes that on May 21, 1745 there appeared in two Edinburgh newspapers the following advertisement: This Day will be published, and sold by the Booksellersin Town, A LETTER from a Gentlemanto his Friend at Edinburgh: containing some Observations on a Specimenof the PrinciplesconcerningRELIGION and MORALITY, said to be maintain 'd in a Booklately published,intituled, A Treatiseo] Human Nature, &c.I This Letter, Mossner discloses, was sent by David Hume to his friend Henry Home (later Lord Kames), and its publication was, he suggests, the "last 7A later passagein the Euthydemus, 293b ft.,in whichSocratesuses obstructive tactics when the sophistswish to movefrom "knowingx" to "knowingsimpliciter" seems to me to point in this direction.See R. K. Sprague,Plato's Use o] Fallacy (London, 1962),22-23, and passim on secundumquid. 1See The Li]e o] David Hume (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1954), pp. 153162,esp.p. 160. 162 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY frantic effort" by Hume's friends to stem the rising opposition to his appointment to the vacant chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University. Mossner was obliged to report further, however, not only that this effort had been in vain, but also that what "may well constitute an important document in the further interpretation of some aspects of the Treatise" has "never been located." z Now a copy of the Letter has been located. It was purchased from a Birmingham bookseller in December, 1966, by the National Library of Scotland. And, with admirable celerity, a facsimile edition of it has been published by the Edinburgh University Press. Adding still further to the value of this important discovery is the accompanying Introduction which describes the events, parties, and personalities which occasioned the Letter. The editors tell us that John Pringle first offered to resign his chair of philosophy in June, 1744, two years after he had taken leave to accept the position of Physician-General to the British forces in Flanders. He sent his offer to John Coutts, Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and Courts, in turn, suggested to Hume that he apply. Had Pringle not delayed... (shrink)

Plato’s Phaedrus is a dialogue in which rhetoric is not only discussed, but also displayed. The first half of the plot depicts a rhetorical contest in which Socrates himself offers two opposite speeches on love, a kind of dissoi logoi. The current paper tries to explain that the second half of the dialogue offers the necessary keys to understand that for Plato true rhetoric is nothing but dialectic and that beyond the apparent antilogic exercise carried out by Socrates (...) there can be found philosopher’s dialectical practice itself. Last but not least, the article defends that dialectic does not necessarily deal with Forms. (shrink)

Werner Jaeger once remarked that fifth-century sophistry is the one ancient intellectual movement that is readily comprehensible to a modern mind. In the light of this fact, it is all the more surprising that until the publication of the present volume there has been no complete English version of the sophist material collected in the standard edition of Diels-Kranz. Kathleen Freeman’s Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels’ "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" included some of the (...) material, but the longer extracts from Gorgias and Prodicus, a concluding essay by the Anonymous Iamblichi, and the Dissoi Logoi were summarized rather than translated. Apparently complete translations of sophist texts have heretofore existed only in two Italian versions, one of which dates back to 1923. The present handbook is the first complete English translation of the sophist material, and it is the work of ten different hands under the general editorship of Rosamond Kent Sprague. It is also a new edition in that J. S. Morrison, the translator of Antiphon, believed, contrary to Diels, that the sophist Antiphon and the orator Antiphon of Rhamnus were one and the same, and he has reedited the material completely so as to produce a unified Antiphon. Another exception is the sophist Euthydemus of Chios, who is an historical person and is included in an appendix. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that God is portrayed in the Hebrew Bible and in the Rabbinic literature—some of the very Hebrew texts that have influenced the three major world religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—as One who can be argued with and even changes his mind. Contrary to fundamentalist positions, in the Hebrew Bible and other Jewish texts God is omniscient but enjoys good, playful argumentation, broadening the possibilities for reasoning and reasonability. Arguing with God has also had a (...) profound influence upon Jewish humor, demonstrating that humans can joke with God. More specifically, we find in Jewish literature that humor’s capacity to bisociate between different domains of human experience can share a symbiotic relationship with argumentation’s emphasis on producing multiple, contested perspectives. Overall, once mortals realize that figures such as God can accept many perspectives through humor, teasing, arguing, criticism, and in at least one case, even lawsuits, a critical point emerges: citizens should learn to live, laugh, and reason with others with whom they disagree. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kyklikoi Logoi BENJAMIN HALLER i. palinode I really think Steisichorus had it all wrong, This rank and futile puttering in palinodes. And Simonides: did Ceos boast no beauties on its shores? Skopas would have laughed. The flute girls’ tatter, On and on and on and on—who would have thought Of recantations for a promise posed while perched Amidst... pornography of pillows, feastingSick symposiasts fed beasts dragged down with (...) spear. Wise, redundant Ocean. Wine, topped with a sleek Red-figured trireme would have bobbed its Watchful eye, and soon grown turgid. Louder, Now, the waves which rock the mountains, Waves of earth which crash across the mountains, Turn the blank limestone entablature of crags and ridges to a cyma cornice—rigid, cold. Steisichorus to Helen. Stop. Regrets. Misunderstanding. Stop. Your chastity unblemished. Stop. Grant voice to worship, praise you. Stop. Some will leave with tripods, some with gold. And Simonides? Will know these wilted sacks of flesh, Like flowers touched by some insensate plowshare, Sudden, dumb within the space of heavy seconds, Will know them for himself, and trace the path his errant Feet trod in egress, inscribe a witless placard on their graves. arion 27.2 fall 2019 ii. phaiakis 1. Appleton Wisconsin, Autumn Through the reddening maples and the birch where once a sluggish puddle moped round rocks a sudden surge, a rising tide, a convex tumescence building up for years, released. The sluice is open on the Fox, and all the hidden rocks that snooped like hounds about the pillars of the derelict railroad bridge are made a carcharodontous maul for hipboot fishers, waiting patiently beneath the lock’s expostulating lip. We flock, the shrieking gulls and I, to see what fish may drift by stunned beneath the bridge, what fishers might need fished from their upended sport, what crimson leaves have chosen at the very last, a final act of will, when all prevarication and all staring at the frothed abyss and all coy curling round their pendant stems like blonde Wisconsin girls twining locks and bounding O’s round fingers in the sunny stillness of a main street morning coffee shop, will choose this moment to precipitate themselves into the stream, inexplicably abandoning their elevated perch, and drift down toward the chilly Northern wood, meet muddy dissolution in the sediment, mingle in the bloated belly of that Ice Age Belua, Leviathan of Lakes. 120 KYKLIKOI LOGOI 2. Virginia Autumn, Five Years Later The light was yellow as a Martha Jones Postmodern; It was a bar, and it was late. I plaudered on about some... something? It was the wrong thing, and the music Capered on. And then the next day, It was like the year I spent in Appleton, Balmy cidermill frost in the morning, Mists on the polluted Fox, and bounding Rounded O’s on the red lips of buxom Girls. I lay upon the floor and watched The motes of dust in light no longer Cancerous from summer’s balmy claws. It was the wrong thing. And today Despite Virginia, it is autumn, where Yesterday was summer, and another year Has bobbed along beyond the sluice; It has weathered the railroad truss, Observed, with passing interest, thinking Every shore would be as polychrome As this, the evanescent burnt orange Oakleaves, without sighing. Worlds Of wanwood flap like navy wives In some old vintage film of VE day, All eager to embrace us from a distance, But soon past and little matter whether Waves or stern caresses were the fruit Of battles fought. And now the sluice Approaches, and the ominous broad Back of Winnebago, with its plesiosaurs And ex wives on its banks. There is little To regret. The sun upon the shores of Winnebago is yellow, honest yellow, Like some faded photo from an old Vacation that your parents took; such Benjamin Haller 121 Colors don’t exist (you thought) the Atmosphere has changed, attenuated, Global climate shifts have taken those Cold days,... Or yellow like the wan bar Lightbulb, chuckling at my hubris, pulsing In the silent starts, warning, as I pay my slinking tab and head for home. 122 KYKLIKOI LOGOI iii. kairos (christina) Ibycus on Spring this year, But... (shrink)

Essays on Greek philosophy and literature from Homer and Hesiod to Aristotle. In Logoi and Muthoi, William Wians builds on his earlier volume Logos and Muthos, highlighting the richness and complexity of these terms that were once set firmly in opposition to one another as reason versus myth or rationality versus irrationality. It was once common to think of intellectual history representing a straightforward progression from mythology to rationality. These volumes, however, demonstrate the value of taking the two together, (...) opening up and analyzing a range of interactions, reactions, tensions, and ambiguities arising between literary and philosophical forms of discourse, including philosophical themes in works not ordinarily considered in the canon of Greek philosophical texts. This new volume considers such topics as the pre-philosophical origins of Anaximander’s calendar, the philosophical significance of public performance and claims of poetic inspiration, and the complex role of mythic figures (including perhaps Socrates) in Plato. Taken together, the essays offer new approaches to familiar texts and open up new possibilities for understanding the roles and relationships between muthos and logos in ancient Greek thought. “This is a stellar effort. The essays are all of extremely high quality and interest. The scholarship is rigorous and the content is innovative. The conception of the book is highly original, well-grounded, and well-thought-out. William Wians’s work as a scholar and as an editor has been consistently first-rate, and with this volume he has surpassed himself.” — Rose M. Cherubin, George Mason University. (shrink)

In Plato's Republic, the Analogy of the Sun famously points out that as the Idea of the Good relates to the knowable Forms so does the Sun to the visible things. Yet, no one has ever questioned whether the consequences claimed to be caused by the sun – among them especially the vital genesis of all physical things – can, based on Plato's philosophy, actually be caused by the material body of the sun. Taking this as a point of departure, (...) the present article looks into whether one can reveal more of the Analogy, just as Socrates himself frequently emphasises the incompleteness of his presentation. The article thus develops a series of detailed arguments to propose a differentiation of each analogical relation into two subrelations, which imply a transcendent principle and an immanent representation of this principle on both sides of the Analogy. Implementing this differentiation bears the potential to solve existing tensions within the interpretation of Republic VI and VII, it allows for further systematic considerations about, among others, the Good and the Beautiful and it may help to contextualise Plato's Analogy historically. (shrink)

This paper explores Lucian's presentation of the philosopher as a creator of discourse. In particular, the paper argues that the lack of control over the discourse, once it is passed on, is at the core of Lucian's treatment of philosophers. An analysis of this eminently Platonic problem allows the interpretation both to go beyond the simplistic view that Lucian has no real philosophical interest at all but merely follows the Second Sophistic trend of subordinating philosophy to rhetoric, and to qualify (...) the idea that the dissolution of the authorial voice represents a sense of rupture experienced on the margins of the Roman empire. More importantly, this approach opens up new possibilities to understand two portraits of philosophers in Lucian's oeuvre that stand out for their positive character, Nigrinus and Demonax. While the latter work depicts a philosopher who uses words sparingly, but ideally enables a cognitive progress in the interlocutor, the former—a portrait of a “Platonist”—stages the breakdown of philosophical teaching by focusing on the impact of the philosopher's discourse on an underprepared student. The paper argues that Lucian, while posing as a reader of Plato in shaping his characters, raises the question of whether Plato himself succeeded as a philosophical writer, or whether in Lucian's eyes Plato's success as a writer was perhaps also his failure as a philosopher. But rather than shaping his own texts in opposition to philosophy, Lucian, like Plato, explores untrodden literary ways of addressing the most fundamental of philosophical problems, namely philosophy's expression in language. (shrink)

'Concept' is a central notion in modern philosophy. This book deals with the philosopher Aristotle to compare modern theories of 'concepts' as he is said to be the predecessor both of classical theory and of modal theories of 'concepts' in the modern debate. Both pathêma and logos are central to his theory of language, thought, and concepts.

"The fact that religions show internal variation and develop over time is not only a problem for believers, but has also long engaged scholars. This is especially true for the religions of the ancient world, where the mere idea of innovation in religious matters evoked notions of revolution and destruction. The present volume brings together articles that study this transformation, ranging from broad overviews to detailed case-studies."--BOOK JACKET.

In recent years, several scholars have hinted at a resemblance between Maximus the Confessor's logoi cosmology and evolutionary biology. In this article, I develop these suggestions further and claim that the logoi (divine ideas or wills) do indeed behave in an evolutionary fashion, diverging hierarchically and interactively from the Logos. However, there the similarity ends, for the logoi are also purposeful, inviolable, and good, unlike evolution which is said to be random, ever‐changing, and cruel. But rather than (...) abandon the logoi–evolution congruity, I argue that, by harnessing theological resources from across the Eastern tradition, one can integrate Maximus’ logoi vision more fully, resulting in an “incarnationally panentheistic” model of God's action and presence in evolution. More speculatively, within canonical Darwinism, the underlying (good) evolutionary motion of the logoi might be discernible in variation and adaptation, with the “evil” of competition and natural selection being “garments of skin” conceded by God as part of a simultaneous creation and cosmic fall. (shrink)

The universe is the result of a production that pertains not to craft, but to nature. This production does not involve either reasoning or concepts, but is the result of a power that acts on matter like an imprint. The Intellect transmits the intelligible forms it harbors, to the hypostasis Soul, where they become rational formulas. The hypostasis Soul then transmits these rational formulas to the world soul, which produces animate and inanimate beings, as if it had been ordered to (...) do so. Yet since it is the lower part of the soul of the world that is responsible for these productions, its action, which depends on reasons that do not hold the first rank and are drawn from itself, manifests inferior quality, which explains imperfection and the presence of evil in the sensible universe, despite its government by Providence. (shrink)

The paper proposes (1.) a non-standard interpretation of the proverbial expression “deuteros plous” by giving a fresh look to Phaedo, 99c9-d1. Then (2.) it proceeds to the philosophical problem raised in this passage according to this interpretation, that is, the problem of the “hypothesis” or the “unproved principle”. It indicates finally (3.) the kernel of truth contained in the standard Interpretation and it concludes with some remarks on the “weakness of the logoi”.

O artigo trata da apropriação dos elementos musicais pelo discurso filosófico na Antiguidade. Pretende mostrar a astuciosa incorporação da música pelo lógos, ou como a nudez da linguagem aproxima a palavra prosaca da filosofia ao som puro da aulética.

In the Sophist, Plato presents the possibility of the separation of things in relation to each other based on the communion (koinōnia) of logos. In this study, I discuss the linguistic communion revealed in the dialogue by illuminating its three fundamental aspects: (1) Articulation of letters in names as communion on the syntactic level, (2) Predication of names in logoi as communion on the semantic level, (3) Homologoi of logoi as the ultimate communion of language. I thus conclude (...) that these three linguistic aspects are interdependent. (shrink)

This essay addresses two central issues that continue to trouble interpretation of Zeno’s paradoxes: 1) their solution, and 2) their place in the history of philosophy. I offer an account of Zeno’s work as pointing to an inevitable paradox generated by our ways of thinking and speaking about things, especially about things as existing in the continua of space and time. In so doing, I connect Zeno’s arguments to Parmenides’ critique of “naming” in Fragment 8, an approach that I believe (...) adds considerably to our understanding of both Zeno’s puzzles and this enigmatic aspect of Parmenides’ thought. (shrink)