By ‘a blank’, let us mean a situation including no actual existents: nothing beyond such platonic realities as that three groups of five apples, were there to exist such groups, would contain fifteen apples in total. Now, why is there a world and not a blank?

This is Warrior Yoga, New York Times bestselling author and retired Navy SEAL Commander Mark Divine's latest contribution to mental and physical achievement exercises started with 8 Weeks to SEALFIT and Unbeatable Mind. This is not your average yoga book. Using Coach Divine's signature integrated training curriculum, Warrior Yoga is an intense physical workout designed for both the nation's elite special ops soldiers, and the regular athlete with the heart and mind of a warrior. His tried (...) and true warrior sequences are designed to be simple and flexible. These short, powerful drills can be done from home or on the road to enhance existing workout regimens and cultivate new ones. The sequences are targeted and focused to adapt to any athlete's physical and mental capabilities including those rehabilitating from injuries and suffering from PTSD. Mark's decades of experience with amateur and professional athletes, active and aspiring Navy SEALS, and wounded warriors uniquely qualify him as an expert motivator and teacher. To be a SEALFITTM Yoga Warrior requires a harmonious balance between mental and physical toughness, strength, and agility. Mark's short digestible exercises will help any athlete hone their fitness routine to reach their fullest potential, combining the physical, emotional and spiritual aspects of an unbeatable mind and body program. (shrink)

This chapter argues that both Berkeley and Vasubandhu accept a kind of metaphysical idealism: while Berkeley’s theistic idealism claims that all of reality exists only in the mind of God, Vasubandhu teaches that external objects have no intrinsic existence and exist only as objects of perception; mind is the ultimate reality. This chapter explores the possibility of reading both these doctrines as a kind of idealist panentheism. Specifically, it will address two questions: (1) in what sense are Berkeley’s (...) and Vasubandhu’s theories idealist philosophies? (2) Is it justified to interpret them as panentheists? More precisely, the second question has two parts: (2a) Should Berkeley’s idealism be regarded as a kind of panentheism? (2b) Can the theism-part of panentheism justly be applied to Vasubandhu’s notion of mind as ultimate reality? The answer will be mostly negative: Berkeley is not a panentheist, and labeling Vasubandhu as a panentheist stretches the concept of God beyond the limits of reasonable application. Finally, though, it is argued that a Yogācārin reading of Berkeley’s idealism opens an interesting possibility for idealist panentheism. (shrink)

In his landmark book on philosophical theology, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry, Mark Johnston develops a panentheistic metaphysic of the divine that he contends is compatible with ontological naturalism. On his view, God is the universe, but the ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of constitution, not identity. The universe and God are coinciding objects that share properties but have different essential modal properties and, hence, different persistence conditions. In this paper, I address the problem of accounting for what it is (...) about the organization or structure of the universe that makes it sufficient to constitute the Divine Mind. Specifically, I consider what kind of unity the universe exhibits in virtue of which it constitutes the Divine Mind. I consider how Johnston’s hylomorphic account of the unity of composite objects might be applied to provide a solution and offer an alternative that emends the Johnstonian proposal I present by exploiting a variant of a neo-Aristotelian ontology of causal powers that takes properties to be powerful qualities. On the framework I defend, we can understand the universe as a constellation of powers that displays the sort of unity sufficient to truthfully described it as a Divine Mind. The approach I recommend will, however, ultimately lend itself to a pantheistic metaphysic of the divine rather than Johnston’s preferred panentheism. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Review of the Position A Pantheism of Infinitely Many Divine Minds How Humans would Fit Into a Divine Mind Unity of Existence, Not Mere Causal Integration Existential Unities in Quantum Physics Quantum Computers Might Quantum Computing Occur Inside Brains? The “What‐it's‐like” of Having Complex Consciousness Qualia Summing Up.

Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors (...) suggest, to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine. (shrink)

I demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that (...) essences depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant's transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom. (shrink)

I survey John Leslie's Platonic thesis that if something sufficiently good possibly exists, then it could be ethically required that it actually exists—along with the pantheistic world‐picture to which this thesis leads.

The mathematician Georg Cantor strongly believed in the existence of actually infinite numbers and sets. Cantor’s “actualism” went against the Aristotelian tradition in metaphysics and mathematics. Under the pressures to defend his theory, his metaphysics changed from Spinozistic monism to Leibnizian voluntarist dualism. The factor motivating this change was two-fold: the desire to avoid antinomies associated with the notion of a universal collection and the desire to avoid the heresy of necessitarian pantheism. We document the changes in Cantor’s thought with (...) reference to his main philosophical-mathematical treatise, the Grundlagen (1883) as well as with reference to his article, “Über die verschiedenen Standpunkte in bezug auf das aktuelle Unendliche” (“Concerning Various Perspectives on the Actual Infinite”) (1885). (shrink)

Is the human mind uniquely nonphysical or even spiritual, such that divine intentions can meet physical realities? As scholars in science and religion have spent decades attempting to identify a 'causal joint' between God and the natural world, human consciousness has been often privileged as just such a locus of divine-human interaction. However, this intuitively dualistic move is both out of step with contemporary science and theologically insufficient. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist (...) class='Hi'>divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind. Sarah Lane Ritchie suggests that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God's active presence, one may affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. (shrink)

The book offers a novel approach to the idea of divinity in guise of a philosophical doctrine called 'Logical Pantheism', according to which the only way to establish the existence of God undeniably is by equating God with Logical Space.

In the first part of this paper I argue that even if at first Alvin Plantinga’s reasons for allowing special divine action seem similar to those of Thomas Aquinas, particularly in De Potentia Dei for allowing miracles, the difference in their metaphysical language makes Aquinas’ account less prone to the objections raised against Plantinga’s. In the second part I argue that Plantinga errs when recurring to quantum mechanics for allowing special divine action, making God to be a cause (...) among causes. Thomas Aquinas, by speaking of primary and secondary causality when referring to God’s activity, avoids taking this step, evading the conclusion that God could be seen as a cause among causes. Aquinas, however, maintains in a statement which goes beyond Plantinga’s, that God’s providence requires the universe to be indeterministic because this indeterministic feature makes the universe more perfect. (shrink)

Does God have a mind? Western theism has traditionally construed God as an intentional agent who acts on creation and in relation to humankind. God loves, punishes, and redeems. God's intentionality has traditionally been construed in analogy to human intentionality, which in turn has often presumed a supernatural dualism. Developments in cognitive science, however, render supernatural dualism suspect for explaining the human mind. How, then, can we speak of the mind of God? Borrowing from Daniel Dennett's intentional (...) stance, I suggest that analogical reasoning regarding the mind of God be abandoned in favor of an ontologically agnostic approach that treats God as an intentional system. In this approach, God's purposive action is an explanatory feature of the believer's universe, a real pattern that informs our values and beliefs about the world and our place in it. (shrink)

The search for God begins by looking inwards into oneself. Our consciousness bears a resemblance to that consciousness from which it is directly derived. It bears his imprint. It is from the characteristics of that imprint we get to know what kind of God we are dealing with. Only then can we be open to realizing how the physical world also bears his imprint.

In this paper, I shall argue that Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), a disorder in which seemingly independent identities (alters) arise within the same individual, can have considerable consequences in Christian theology. I shall focus on traditional Christian understandings of the afterlife. I shall begin by outlining DID, and shall argue that in some DID cases, alters appear to be different persons according to some definitions of personhood in Christian theology. I shall then illustrate the difficulty this raises for two influential (...) ideas in the Christian tradition: the heaven and hell understanding of the afterlife, and the idea of the resurrection of the body. Finally, I shall consider some objections to the problem, and shall highlight which responses are the most plausible. (shrink)

How does God think? How, ideally, does a human mind function? Must a gap remain between these two paradigms of rationality? Such questions exercised the greatest ancient philosophers, including those featured in this book: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus. This volume encompasses a series of studies by leading scholars, revisiting key moments of ancient philosophy and highlighting the theme of human and divine rationality in both moral and cognitive psychology. It is a tribute to Professor A. (...) A. Long, and reflects multiple themes of his own work. (shrink)

The central doctrine of traditional Christianity, the doctrine of the Incarnation, is that the Second Person of the Trinity lived a human existence on Earth as Jesus Christ for a finite period. In the words of the Nicene Creed, the Son is himwho for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man.

Previous research suggests that how people conceive of minds depends on the culture in which they live, both in determining how they interact with other human minds and how they infer the unseen minds of gods. We use exploratory factor analysis to compare how people from different societies with distinct models of human minds and different religious traditions perceive the minds of humans and gods. In two North American samples (American adults, N = 186; Canadian students, N = 202), we (...) replicated a previously found two‐factor agency/experience structure for both human and divine minds, but in Fijian samples (Indigenous iTaukei Fijians, N = 77; Fijians of Indian descent, N = 214; total N = 679) we found a three‐factor structure, with the additional containing items related to social relationships. Further, Fijians’ responses revealed a different three‐factor structure for human minds and gods’ minds. We used these factors as dimensions in the conception of minds to predict (a) expectations about human and divine tendencies towards punishment and reward; and (b) conception of gods as more embodied (an extension of experience) or more able to know people's thoughts (an extension of agency). We found variation in how these factors predict conceptions of agents across groups, indicating further theory is needed to explain how culturally generated concepts of mind lead to other sorts of social inferences. We conclude that mind perception is shaped by culturally defined social expectations and recommend further work in different cultural contexts to examine the interplay between culture and social cognition. (shrink)

Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this essay we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views and draw connections to (...) current discussions in philosophical theology. (shrink)

The common view that Aquinas changed his mind about analogy (before and after De Veritate 2.11) is unwarranted. Dialectical context, and clarifications about the logic of analogy and the implications of proportionality, reveal consistency in Aquinas's teaching on the analogy of divine names.

Priscian's _Institutiones Grammaticae_, which rely on Stoic and Neoplatonic sources, constituted an important, although quite neglected, link in the chain of transmission of ancient philosophy in the Middle Ages. There is, in particular, a passage where Priscian discusses the vexed claim that common names can be proper names of the universal species and where he talks about the ideas existing in the divine mind. At the beginning of the 12th century, the anonymous _Glosulae super Priscianum_ and the _Notae (...) Dunelmenses_, which heavily quote William of Champeaux, interpret the passage in the context of a growing interest in the problem of universals, raising semantic as well as ontological questions, and introducing a Platonic view on universals in the discussions on the signification of the noun. Moreover, this same passage will be used by Abelard to elaborate one of his opinions about the signification of universal or common names—that they signify "mental conceptions". (shrink)

_Divine Providence_ is one of the major works of the Enlightenment scientist and religious seer Emanuel Swedenborg. It provides a coherent and satisfying solution to what has been called “the problem of evil”: How are God’s goodness and power reconcilable with evil’s presences in the larger world and in the human mind and heart? By tackling an array of issues that commonly undermine belief in God, including war, suffering, and inequality—and by revealing the wise and loving laws that lie (...) hidden behind these seemingly senseless phenomena—_Divine Providence _aims to restore our faith in the meaningfulness of the world. Despite its universal focus, _Divine Providence_ is also a highly practical book on the personal level, demonstrating how we can put aside negative attitudes and behaviors and grow into positive thought and action. The New Century Edition of the Works of Emanuel Swedenborg is a modern-language, scholarly translation of Swedenborg’s theological works. The series’ easy-to-read style retains the dignity, variety, clarity, and gender-inclusive language of Swedenborg’s original Latin, bringing his thought to life. This portable edition contains the text of the New Century Edition translation, but not the introduction, annotations, or other supplementary materials found in the deluxe editions. (shrink)

_Divine Love and Wisdom_ has been called the most profound work of the Enlightenment scientist and seer Emanuel Swedenborg. It demonstrates how God’s love, wisdom, and humanity are reflected in creation and in ourselves, and suggests that the act of Creation is not a mystery of the past, but a miracle ongoing in every instant of the present. Like a blueprint of things unseen, _Divine Love and Wisdom_ makes visible the hidden design of the universe, as well as the qualities (...) of its Architect. Its vivid depiction of the spiritual mechanism of the world has impressed thinkers such as William Blake, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry James Sr. _Divine Providence_ is one of Emanuel Swedenborg's major works. It provides a coherent and satisfying solution to what has been called “the problem of evil”: How are God’s goodness and power reconcilable with evil’s presences in the larger world and in the human mind and heart? By tackling an array of issues that commonly undermine belief in God, including war, suffering, and inequality—and by revealing the wise and loving laws that lie hidden behind these seemingly senseless phenomena—_Divine Providence _aims to restore our faith in the meaningfulness of the world. Despite its universal focus, _Divine Providence_ is also a highly practical book on the personal level, demonstrating how we can put aside negative attitudes and behaviors and grow into positive thought and action. This volume, which contains both works, also has an introduction by Gregory R. Johnson that puts these ideas in the context of the history of philosophy. The New Century Edition of the Works of Emanuel Swedenborg is a modern-language, scholarly translation of Swedenborg’s theological works. The series’ easy-to-read style retains the dignity, variety, clarity, and gender-inclusive language of Swedenborg’s original Latin, bringing his thought to life. Introductions and annotations by eminent, international scholars place Swedenborg’s writings in their historical context and illuminate obscure references within the text, enabling readers to understand and trace Swedenborg’s influence as never before. (shrink)

본 논문은 명대 왕양명의 심에 보이는 심의 신성神性과 성성聖性을 규명하는 데 그 목적을 두고 있다. 필자는 왕양명이 말하는 심에는 신성과 성성이 내재하고 있다는 것을 규명함으로써, 먼저 그가 말하는 심에는 궁극적 실재가 내재하고 있다는 것을 이해하고자 하는 것이며. 다음으로 그 궁극적 실재가 왕양명의 심이 종교적인 의미를 지니게 한다는 점을 살펴보고자 한다. 필자는 본 논문에서 왕양명의 이러한 심을 신성과 성성으로 나눠서 검토함으로써, 심에 궁극적 실재가 내재하고 있고, 그러한 심이 종교적인 의미를 지닌다는 점을 살펴본다. 왕양명은 심의 신성에 대한 정당성을 보장받기 위하여 심의 권위를 (...) 하늘ㆍ상제ㆍ천명과 같은 위치에 둔다. 왕양명이 심과 하늘ㆍ상제ㆍ천명을 동일시함으로써, 심은 자연적으로 생리적ㆍ심리적ㆍ피동적ㆍ유한적인 차원을 뛰어넘는다. 그래서 심은 초월적인 궁극적 실재가 존재하는 형이상학적 본체로서 궁극적 진리와 지혜의 원천이 된다. 이러한 심의 신성은 주로 두 가지 측면에서 검토한다. 하나는 우주 자연의 모든 이치를 담고 있는 심이라는 점이다. 다른 하나는 천지만물을 순리적으로 인식하고, 그들에 대해 천리天理의 지혜를 창출해내는 심이라는 것이다. 이렇게 두 가지 측면에서의 심의 신성을 살펴봄으로써, 심에 궁극적 실재 혹은 궁극적 진리가 내재하고 있다는 점을 밝힌다. 심의 성성에 대해서는 두 가지 측면에서 살펴본다. 첫째 ‘마음이 순수한 천리의 상태에 있다[心純乎天理]’는 것이 곧 성스러움[聖]이라는 것이며, 둘째 ‘생각이 성스러움을 만든다[思曰睿, 睿作聖]’는 것이다. 첫째는 주체가 마음을 순수한 천리의 상태가 되도록 함으로써 하늘이 부여한 궁극적 실재인 성性을 회복하고 실현하게 된다는 것이다. 이런 경지가 바로 성스러움[聖]을 얻은 경지라는 점을 밝힌다. 둘째는 양지에서 발하여 작용하는 생각[思]은 천리 아닌 것이 없으며, 이것은 곧 성스러움[聖]을 만들어 내는 동인이라는 것을 밝힌다. 따라서 하늘의 천명인 양지를 실현하게 되면, 성스러움[聖]은 자연히 나타나게 된다는 것을 살펴본다. 결론적으로 왕양명에게 있어서 오로지 심이 절대자이고 삶의 최고의 심판관이다. 왕양명의 이런 심에 대한 인식과 믿음은, 초월적인 신이나 인격신을 믿는 자가 어느 날 별안간 종교적인 체험을 하고 나서 그의 삶과 인생관이 완전히 바뀌는, 그런 종교적인 고백과 같은 확신에 차 있는 것이었다. 왕양명은 심에 궁극적 실재[天理]가 내재하고 있음을 분명하게 통찰한 것이다. 왕양명이 볼 때, 그 궁극적 실재는 몸과 마음이 하나가 되게 하고, 인간과 인간이 서로 사랑할 수 있게 하고, 인간과 우주가 하나가 되게 하는 궁극적 진리와 같은 것이었다. 이러한 심 안의 궁극적 실재ㆍ궁극적 진리를 깨닫게 됨으로써, 그는 심의 완전한 진리와 지혜를 신앙하게 되었고, 그러한 심을 통해서 개인 구원과 사회 구원도 이룰 수 있다고 확신한 것이다. 따라서 왕양명의 심에 대한 확신은 유신론자가 신과 신의 계시를 확신하는 그런 신앙적인 믿음과 서로 유사성이 있다고 볼 수 있다. 왕양명은 유신론적인 신의 타자성이나 영적 타계성을 목표하고 설정하지 않았을 뿐이지, 심 안의 절대자ㆍ심 안의 궁극적 실재를 확신하고 있었던 것이다. (shrink)

A. N. Williams examines the conception of the intellect in patristic theology from its beginnings in the work of the Apostolic Fathers to Augustine and Cassian in the early fifth century. The patristic notion of intellect emerges from its systematic relations to other components of theology: the relation of human mind to the body and the will; the relation of the human to the divine intellect; of human reason to divine revelation and secular philosophy; and from the (...) use of the intellect in both theological reflection and spiritual contemplation. The patristic conception of that intellect is therefore important for the way it signals the character of early Christian theology as both systematic and contemplative and as such, distinctive in its approach from secular philosophies of its time and modern Christian theology. (shrink)

_Divine Providence_ is one of the major works of the Enlightenment scientist and religious seer Emanuel Swedenborg. It provides a coherent and satisfying solution to what has been called “the problem of evil”: How are God’s goodness and power reconcilable with evil’s presences in the larger world and in the human mind and heart? By tackling an array of issues that commonly undermine belief in God, including war, suffering, and inequality—and by revealing the wise and loving laws that lie (...) hidden behind these seemingly senseless phenomena—_Divine Providence _aims to restore our faith in the meaningfulness of the world. Despite its universal focus, _Divine Providence_ is also a highly practical book on the personal level, demonstrating how we can put aside negative attitudes and behaviors and grow into positive thought and action. This volume contains an introduction by Gregory R. Johnson that puts the work in the context of the history of philosophy. The New Century Edition of the Works of Emanuel Swedenborg is a modern-language, scholarly translation of Swedenborg’s theological works. The series’ easy-to-read style retains the dignity, variety, clarity, and gender-inclusive language of Swedenborg’s original Latin, bringing his thought to life. Introductions and annotations by eminent, international scholars place Swedenborg’s writings in their historical context and illuminate obscure references within the text, enabling readers to understand and trace Swedenborg’s influence as never before. (shrink)

The cosmos exists just because of the ethical need for it We, and all the intricate structures of our universe, exist as thoughts in a divine mind that knows everything worth knowing. There could also be infinitely many other universes in this mind....It may be hard to believe that the universe is as Leslie says it is--but it is also hard to resist his compelling ideas and arguments.

The Life Divine explores for the Modern mind the great streams of Indian metaphysical thought, reconciling the truths behind each and from this synthesis ...

A philosophically and historically influential section of the Critique of Judgement presents an ‘intuitive intellect’ as a mind whose representation is limited to what actually exists, and does not extend to mere possibilities. Kant’s paradigmatic instance of such an intellect is however also the divine mind. This combination threatens to rule out the reality of the mere possibilities presupposed by Kant’s theory of human freedom. Through an analysis of the relevant issues in metaphysical cosmology, modal metaphysics and (...) philosophical theology, I show that Kant in fact possesses the resources to reconcile the philosophical claims of §76 of the Critique of Judgement with his keystone commitment to the reality of human freedom. (shrink)

Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant's transcendental idealism. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre‐critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the source of space, time and causation. Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcendental freedom. I show that Kant has (...) significant theological difficulties ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties. I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so‐called “neglected alternative”, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Divine Repentance or Pedagogy?On the Rhetoric of Divine Repentance in 1 Samuel, Exodus, and Genesis*Israel McGrewCommitment both to the philosophical understanding of God as transcendent and immutable (as implied by reason as well as passages of Scripture) and to the inerrancy of Scripture can be a challenging position to hold. Since Scripture refers to God as repenting of things he intended to do, said he intended to (...) do, or even did, Scripture sometimes portrays God as incommensurate with both itself and what seems philosophically necessary. One might opt for holding to biblical literalism in happy defiance of the philosophers—what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?!—but Tertullian himself would reject positing a mutable God: one who grows, changes his mind, or is even surprised. Alternatively, one might hold to the deity's transcendence and explain Scripture's discussions of God's repentance as mere poetic anthropomorphism.Neither approach adequately engages Scripture, but each contains some correct instinct and some shortcoming. For the latter perspective, dismissing Scripture's anthropomorphism as mere poetic flourish for unsophisticated minds fails to recognize Scripture's sophisticated rhetoric. To put the same thing positively, Scripture itself points us to the transcendent deity who, nevertheless, is not bound by his transcendence but reveals himself, however [End Page 1161] philosophically shocking that ontological bridging may be, let alone its means. For the former perspective, this fideistic approach to Scripture is a failure to understand it and is therefore devoted to an unsophisticated (if sometimes edifying) misunderstanding of a sophisticated text.In this article, I will treat three challenging episodes where God is represented as changing his mind regarding nothing less than the economy of salvation: God's regretting making Saul king (1 Sam 15), God's decision to destroy Israel on account of the idolatry of the golden calf (Exod 32–33), and God's decision to destroy humanity in the flood (Gen 6). In each of these passages, the omniscient narrator refers to God's repenting () from his plan of action (Gen 6:6; Exod 32:14; 1 Sam 15:35), and in 1 Sam 15:11, God himself tells Samuel, "I regret that I have made Saul King." I will treat these passages in reverse order, as 1 Samuel gives us the clearest cues in how to understand the pedagogical purposes in divine repentance in Scripture, and as the implications for how we understand these stories become increasingly profound as we read backward in Scripture. But first, I will frame my approach in contrast with another treatment of this conundrum.It should come as no surprise that this issue has already been treated by a theologically interested Old Testament scholar. In his Ecclesial Exegesis: A Synthesis of Ancient and Modern Approaches to Scripture, Gregory Vall addresses these texts with St. Augustine's and St. Thomas's concerns at the forefront.1 Vall develops a three-step approach, going from the Fathers of the patristic era (method A), to critical evaluation of the text (method B), and finally to a synthesis (method C). This method C is not exactly a "method" for Vall, and the sequence is more logical than sequential, as Vall more elegantly integrates the second and third in his discussion and ultimately seeks a more organic approach than the Hegelian synthesis seemingly implied by the discussion of method C. Still, Vall points to Augustine and Aquinas to begin with the premise of divine impassibility to establish that the language of change in God's will is metaphorical, and to Augustine and Chrysostom to explain this metaphorical rhetoric in terms of the condescension of divine pedagogy.2I agree with Vall (and Augustine, Chrysostom, and Dei Verbum) that the [End Page 1162] language of divine repentance must be understood in terms of the divine pedagogy. But I understand some of the key pedagogical strategies and points differently from Vall. Generally speaking, I further wonder whether the A-B-C framework might guide us to allow the tradition's philosophical concerns—which are certainly not alien to the text—to focus the inquiry in advance such that we then neglect the texts' priorities and the richness of the condescension of this pedagogy... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Divine Person" as Analogous NameDylan SchraderThe position of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic school that human beings cannot name God and creatures univocally is well-known.1 This includes the term "person," which is predicated of the Trinity, of angels, and of human beings truly but analogically. In contrast, it might seem that, when speaking of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in respect of one another, "divine (...) person" must be univocal.2 [End Page 217]The seventeenth-century Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the Salmanticenses) thought otherwise. They argued that the ratio3 of "divine person" is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not univocally, but analogically, and that this follows from established Thomistic principles.4 Their position makes for an interesting case study in religious language, as the Salmanticenses apply a highly developed material logic to the central mystery of Christian faith.Words, Concepts, and ThingsIn On Interpretation (Peri hermeneias), Aristotle explains that words immediately signify concepts and, by means of concepts, things.5 This so-called "semantic triangle" makes it easy to misunderstand univocity and analogy if we do not first determine how a particular thinker conceives of the relationship among words, concepts, and things. To discern how the Salmanticenses understood this relationship, it is most helpful to look to their counterparts, the Discalced Carmelites at neighboring Alcalá de Henares outside Madrid, commonly called the Complutenses.6 The Complutenses' Artium cursus [End Page 218] serves as philosophical handmaid to the Salmanticenses' Cursus theologicus, and is therefore essential for correctly interpreting the latter's claims about grammar, logic, and metaphysics.7To begin with the verbal element, this is how the Complutenses, following a fairly typical account, explain the difference between a vocal sound, a name, and a term: A vocal sound (vox) is speech considered simply as an audible phenomenon, the pure sound wave. A name (nomen) is a vocal sound that signifies something. A term (terminus) is a name insofar as it serves as one end of a proposition.8 Terms may be purely mental (as when a proposition is conceived of in the mind alone), or they may be spoken or written.Names and terms are useful precisely because they signify. The Complutenses define "signifying" (significare) as "representing to the knowing power something other than [the signifier] itself."9 A name or term points beyond itself so that something else can become known to the mind through that name or term.When it comes to spoken (or written) terms, a term is "common" (communis) if it signifies more than one thing. Common terms may be "non-transcendent" (non transcendens) or "transcendent" (transcendens). Common terms are non-transcendent if they are predicated of certain things (such as "man" or "animal"). They are transcendent if they are predicated of all things. Six terms are usually acknowledged to be transcendent: "being" (ens); "thing" (res); "true" (verum); "good" (bonum); "something" (aliquid); and "one" (unum).10 [End Page 219]Here it is necessary to distinguish first and second "intention" (intentio).11 The Carmelites take "first intention" properly to be the act whereby the intellect knows things in accord with what is in them as realities.12 This act of the intellect is the "formal first intention," while the thing known is the "objective first intention." A name signifying a thing in this way is a "name of first intention."But the intellect can also attend to those things not in accord with what is in them from their own perspective as realities, but instead with reference to their character as acted upon by the intellect itself. This act is called "second intention."13 An example of first intention is the intellect's knowing that "man is an animal," whereas an example of second intention is its knowing that "'animal' is a genus."The Complutenses stress that first and second intention are, properly speaking, acts of the intellect—distinct ways of attending to what it knows—even though logicians often use "first intention" and "second intention" as shorthand to refer to the objects of these acts.14 In fact, because objective second intentions (the objects of the intellect's second-intentional acts) are beings of reason... (shrink)

Aristotle's NE X claim that the best human life is one devoted to contemplation seems in tension with his emphasis elsewhere on our essentially political nature, and more specifically, his claim that friendship is necessary for our flourishing. For, if our good can be in principle realized apart from the human community, there seems little reason to suggest we 'need' friends, as he clearly does in NE VIII & IX. I argue that central to Aristotle's NE X discussion of contemplation (...) is the claim that our chief good accords with whatever is 'most divine' in us, viz. our rational nature. Thus, the best human life involves the excellent exercise of our rational capacities. I distinguish two ways in which human beings flourish through exercising their rationality. The first is in the activity of theoria. The second, I argue, can be found in the virtuous activity of complete friendship. For Aristotle the truest form of friendship is an expression of rationality. It is characterized not merely by our living together, but conversing, and sharing one another's thoughts. Examining Aristotle's notion of a friend as 'another self, I argue that through friendship human beings come to better know themselves and the world in which they live. Complete friendship involves a second-order awareness of oneself in another, and through this awareness our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed through the presence of other minds. Thus, the highest form of Aristotelian friendship is an intellectual activity through which we attain an analogue of the divine contemplation of the unmoved mover, thereby living with respect to what is most divine in us, but doing so in accordance with our uniquely rational-political nature. (shrink)

The principal aim of this chapter is to document and describe the ‘dominant philosophy’ of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: the doctrine that man was made in the image of God. Examining writings by thinkers such as Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Newton, Clarke, and Berkeley, Craig finds that they were all committed to some version of the Similarity Thesis. Its cognitive branch, the ‘Insight Ideal’, manifests itself in the view that our logical and mathematical knowledge and our (...) knowledge of our own mental states possesses a certainty that even God cannot surpass, as well as in the, then widespread, view that we live in a world that is, in principle, fully intelligible to us. The link between the human and the divine mind is usually thought to be provided by the faculty of reason, but the Similarity Thesis has also taken the form that the human mind is in fact a part of the divine intellect. It connects with the prevalence of a contemplative or scientific ethic in which the pursuit of knowledge appears as a good in itself. Moreover, there is a version of the Image of God doctrine focusing on agency and finding expression in the view of, for example, Descartes that, at its best, the human will is as free as a will could possibly be. (shrink)

The concept of God's acting in the world has been seen to be problematic in light of the claims of scientific knowledge that the regularity of a law like universe rules out divine action. There are resources in both scientific knowledge and religion that can render meaningful and credible divine action. The new physics, chaos theory, cognitive psychology, and the concept of top‐down causation are used to understand how God acts in the world. God's action is not an (...) intervention, but is understood on the model of how the mind influences the brain in a downward causative manner. Suggestions for imagining God's actions are discussed. (shrink)

-/- In the Summa Theologiae ‘simplicity’ is treated as pre–eminent among the terms which may properly be used to describe the divine nature. The Question in which Thomas demonstrates that God must be ‘totally and in every way simple’ (1.3.7) immediately follows the five proofs of God's existence, preceding the treatment of His other perfections, and being frequently used as the basis for proving them. Then in Question 13 ‘univocal predication' is held to be ‘impossible between God and creatures’ (...) so that at best ‘some things are said of God and creatures analogically’ because of the necessity of using ‘various and multiplied conceptions’ derived from our knowledge of created beings to refer to what in God is simple for ‘the perfections flowing from God to creatures… pre–exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received divided and multiplied’ (1.13.5). In line with this, in the De Potentia Dei the treatment of analogical predication is integrated into that of ‘the Simplicity of the Divine Essence’ (Q 7). Moreover, it lies at the root of Thomas's rejection of any possibility of a Trinitarian natural theology such as, for instance, St Anselm or Richard of St Victor had attempted to develop, on the grounds that ‘it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason’ since ‘we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons’ (1.32.1). Even modern minds sympathetic to Thomas have clearly found it difficult to understand his concern for the divine simplicity: in his Aquinas Lecture Plantinga speaks for many in stating that it is ‘a mysterious doctrine’ which is ‘exceedingly hard to grasp or construe’ and ‘it is difficult to see why anyone should be inclined to accept it’. Not surprisingly, therefore, some of the most widely read twentieth–century commentators on Aquinas have paid little attention to it. Increased interest has recently been shown in it, but a number of discussions pay insufficient attention to the historical context out of which Thomas's interest in the doctrine emerged, and consequently tend to misconstrue its nature. (shrink)

Many have pointed out that the utility of mathematical objects is somewhat disconnected from their ontological status. For example, one might argue that arithmetic is useful whether or not numbers exist. We explore this phenomenon in the context of Divine Conceptualism, which claims that mathematical objects exist as thoughts in the divine mind. While not arguing against DC claims, we argue that DC claims can lead to epistemological uncertainty regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects. This weakens (...) DC attempts to explain the utility of mathematical objects on the basis of their existence. To address this weakness, we propose an appeal to Liggins’ theory of Belief Expressionism. Indeed, we point out that BE is amenable to the ontological claims of DC while also explaining the utility of mathematical objects apart from reliance upon their existence. We illustrate these themes via a case study of Peano Arithmetic. (shrink)

Rosmini’s philosophy is a comprehensive effort toward the renovation of Christian thought in modern times. An intense discussion of the problem of knowledge led him to reformulate Augustine’s theory of illumination in terms of the ideal presence of universal being to the mind. Universal being is the lumen intellectus and our mind’s first object: it is implied in all our thoughts and makes them possible. Although devoid of reality, it shows remarkable features, such as infinity, necessity, and eternity. (...) Without being God, it may be called “divine,” and confers a special value to intelligent creatures, whose dignity comes from their being enlightened by universal being. The “divine” is also the seal of God’s presence in nature. The present article supports the logic of this argument. (shrink)