I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the surface. Keywords: picture perception; dorsal subsystem;.

I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of (...) our experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception. (shrink)

Neural correlates exist for a basic component of logical formulae, PREDICATE(x). Vision and audition research in primates and humans shows two independent neural pathways; one locates objects in body-centered space, the other attributes properties, such as colour, to objects. In vision these are the dorsal and ventral pathways. In audition, similarly separable “where” and “what” pathways exist. PREDICATE(x) is a schematic representation of the brain's integration of the two processes of delivery by the senses of the location of an (...) arbitrary referent object, mapped in parietal cortex, and analysis of the properties of the referent by perceptual subsystems. The brain computes actions using a few “deictic” variables pointing to objects. Parallels exist between such nonlinguistic variables and linguistic deictic devices. Indexicality and reference have linguistic and nonlinguistic (e.g., visual) versions, sharing the concept of attention. The individual variables of logical formulae are interpreted as corresponding to these mental variables. In computing action, the deictic variables are linked with “semantic” information about the objects, corresponding to logical predicates. Mental scene descriptions are necessary for practical tasks of primates, and preexist language phylogenetically. The type of scene descriptions used by nonhuman primates would be reused for more complex cognitive, ultimately linguistic, purposes. The provision by the brain's sensory/perceptual systems of about four variables for temporary assignment to objects, and the separate processes of perceptual categorization of the objects so identified, constitute a pre-adaptive platform on which an early system for the linguistic description of scenes developed. Key Words: argument; attention; deictic; dorsal; logic; neural; object; predicate; reference; ventral. (shrink)

Norman's aim to reconcile two longstanding and seemingly opposed philosophies of perception, the constructivist and the ecological, by casting them as approaches to complementary subsystems within the visual brain is laudable. Unfortunately, Norman overreaches in attempting to equate direct perception with dorsal/unconscious visual processing and indirect perception with ventral/conscious visual processing. Even a cursory review suggests that the functional and neural segregation of direct and indirect perception is not as clear as the target article would suggest.

Although developmental dyslexia (DD) is frequently associate to a phonological deficit, the underlying neurobiological cause remain undetermined. One prominent hypothesis suggests a specific deficit in magnocellular-dorsal (M-D) pathway. Here we investigated the visual M-D and parvocellular-ventral (P-V) pathway in dyslexic and in chronological age and IQ-matched normally reading children by measuring dynamic (frequency doubling illusion) and static stimuli sensibility, respectively. A specific deficit in M-D task was found. Importantly, the M-D deficit was selectively shown in poor phonological decoders. M-D (...) deficit appears to be frequent because 75% of poor pseudo-word readers were at least 1 SD below the mean of the controls. Finally, a replication study by using a new group of poor phonological decoders and reading level controls suggests a possible role of M-D deficit in DD. These results showed that a M-D deficit might impair the sub-lexical mechanisms that are critical for reading development. The possible link between these findings and the oscillatory “temporal sampling” framework is discussed. (shrink)

Dorsal closure (DC), the closure of a hole in the dorsal epidermis of Drosophila embryos by the joining of opposing epithelial cell sheets, has been used as a model process to study the molecular and cellular mechanisms underlying epithelial spreading and wound healing. Recent studies have provided novel insights into how different tissues function cooperatively in this process. Specifically, they demonstrate a critical function of the epidermis surrounding the hole in modulating the behavior of the amnioserosa cells inside. (...) These findings shed light not only on the mechanisms by which the behavior of different tissues is coordinated during DC, but also on the general mechanisms by which tissues interact to trigger global morphogenesis, an essential but yet poorly explored aspect of embryogenesis. (shrink)

The dorsal turn -- Facades of the other : Heidegger, Althusser, Levinas -- No one home : Homer, Joyce, Broch -- A line drawn in the ocean : Exodus, Freud, Rimbaud -- Friendship in torsion : Schmitt, Derrida -- Revolutions in the darkroom : Balázs, Benjamin, Sade -- The controversy of dissidence : Nietzsche.

Today many philosophers of mind accept that the two cortical streams of visual processing in humans can be distinguished in terms of conscious experience. The ventral stream is thought to produce representations that may become conscious, and the dorsal stream is thought to handle unconscious vision for action. Despite a vast literature on the topic of the two streams, there is currently no account of the way in which the relevant empirical evidence could fit with basic Husserlian phenomenology of (...) vision. Here I offer such an account. In this article, I show how the empirical evidence ought to be understood in a way that is informed by phenomenology. The differences in the two streams are better described as differences in spatial and temporal processing. Rather than simply “unconscious,” the dorsal stream can be better described as making a special contribution to what Husserl identified as the visual horizon. (shrink)

In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian (...) spatiotemporal visual horizons, on the other. I argue that Madary’s arguments, for a Husserlian view of the two visual systems, are not convincing. When the notion of visual horizon is adequately understood as a constitutive notion, there will be reason to regard the connections between dorsal processing and the Husserlian spatiotemporal horizons as tenuous at best. (shrink)

Patients with apraxia perform poorly when demonstrating how an object is used, particularly when pantomiming the action. However, these patients are able to accurately identify, and to pick up and move objects, demonstrating intact ventral and dorsal stream visuomotor processing. Appropriate object manipulation for skilled use is thought to rely on integration of known and visible object properties associated with ‘ventro-dorsal’ stream neural processes. In apraxia, it has been suggested that stored object knowledge from the ventral stream may (...) be less readily available to incorporate into the action plan, leading to an over-reliance on the objects’ visual affordances in object-directed motor behaviour. The current study examined grasping performance in left hemisphere stroke patients with (N = 3) and without (N = 9) apraxia, and in age-matched healthy control participants (N = 14), where participants repeatedly grasped novel cylindrical objects of varying weight distribution. Across two conditions, object weight distribution was indicated by either a memory-associated cue (object colour) or visual-spatial cue (visible dot over the weighted end). Participants were required to incorporate object-weight associations to effectively grasp and balance each object. Control groups appropriately adjusted their grasp according to each object’s weight distribution across each condition, whereas throughout the task two of the three apraxic patients performed poorly on both the memory-associated and visual-spatial cue conditions. A third apraxic patient seemed to compensate for these difficulties but still performed differently to control groups. Patients with apraxia performed normally on the neutral control condition when grasping the evenly weighted version. The pattern of behaviour in apraxic patients suggests impaired integration of visible and known object properties attributed to the ventro-dorsal stream: in learning to grasp the weighted object accurately, apraxic patients applied neither pure knowledge-based information (the memory-associated condition) nor higher-level information given in the visual-spatial cue condition. Disruption to ventro-dorsal stream predicts that apraxic patients will have difficulty learning to manipulate new objects on the basis of information other than low-level visual cues such as shape and size. (shrink)

The origin of the isocortex may be seen as a series of gradual changes (each one with an adaptive value) from a reptilian-like cerebral cortex, as proposed by Aboitiz et al., or as a new dorsal pallium derivative in mammals which undergoes a surface expansion concomitant with the expansion of the dorsal tier of the dorsal thalamus.

Perception, as Gibson described it – picking up information that specifies the real local situation – includes not only perceiving affordances and controlling small movements, but also seeing the large-scale environmental layout and the position/movement of the “ecological self.” If the dorsal cortical system is also responsible for that very significant achievement, its activity must be at least partly conscious.

The Role of Dorsal Premotor Cortex in Resolving Abstract Motor Rules provides alternative hypotheses about the cognitive functions affected by the application of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. Their model simulated the effect of stimulation of the left dorsal premotor cortex right as participants provide a Models were used to demonstrate that the increased variability in observed response times can result from interference in replanning during the process of responding to the uninstructed stimulus.

A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious (...) will do so for some – perhaps most – of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Everyday life suggests that picture seeing is sometimes infused by an emotional charge. However, nobody has addressed the importance of explaining this emotional charge in picture perception. Even our best model of picture perception, the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, which integrates the most important empirical results coming from our best model on vision in neuroscience, the two visual systems model, lacks a reference to this emotional charge. The aim of the present paper is to offer an account of (...) picture perception that is able to regain and explain this neglected emotional charge. My claim is that, as for face-to-face perception, during picture perception, we are not only in a visual perceptual state, but also in an emotional state, which is directly connected to our visual perceptual state. I also show that it is possible to offer this integration while remaining in the philosophical/empirical framework of the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, whose explanatory power is confirmed and improved. (shrink)

Ratajczyk, Z., Subsystems of true arithmetic and hierarchies of functions, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 64 95–152. The combinatorial method coming from the study of combinatorial sentences independent of PA is developed. Basing on this method we present the detailed analysis of provably recursive functions associated with higher levels of transfinite induction, I, and analyze combinatorial sentences independent of I. Our treatment of combinatorial sentences differs from the one given by McAloon [18] and gives more natural sentences. The same (...) method give also a combinatorial technique with no use of the cut-elimination theorem which is appropriate to study proof-theoretic strength of subsystems of first order arithmetic and some of their expansions. It was used to analyze iterated reflection principle and system of transfinite induction with a satisfaction class. (shrink)

Cognitive semantic studies have shown that our conceptualization of morality is at least partially metaphorical and that our moral cognition is grounded in some fundamental contrastive categories of our embodied experience in the physical environment. It is argued that our moral cognition is built on a moral metaphor system. Within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory, this study aims to examine the spatial subsystem of moral metaphors in English. We set out with five pairs of moral metaphors that involve (...) the following spatial source concepts: HIGH and LOW, UPRIGHT and TILTED, LEVEL and UNLEVEL, STRAIGHT and CROOKED, and BIG and SMALL. These metaphors were found to constitute the spatial subsystem of moral metaphors in Chinese. Our primary goal is to find out if the five pairs of moral–spatial metaphors are manifested in English as well. To that end we collected linguistic data from the Corpus of Contemporary American English and searched Google Images for multimodal evidence. Our finding is that the five pairs of moral–spatial metaphors are applicable in English as they are in Chinese. We also discuss issues related to conceptual metaphor theory. (shrink)

This paper presents an exposition of subsystems and of Quine's , originally defined and shown to be consistent by Crabbé, along with related systems and of type theory. A proof that (and so ) interpret the ramified theory of types is presented (this is a simplified exposition of a result of Crabbé). The new result that the consistency strength of is the same as that of is demonstrated. It will also be shown that cannot be finitely axiomatized (as can and (...) ). (shrink)

It is necessary to distinguish among representations caused directly by perception, representations of past perceptions in long-term memory, the representations underlying linguis- tic utterances, and the surface phonological and grammatical structures of sentences. The target article dealt essentially with predicate-argument structure at the first of these levels of representation. Discussion of the commentaries mainly involves distinguishing among various applications of the term “predicate”; clarifying the assumed relationship between classical FOPL and language; clarifying the status of unique individuals as conceived by (...) humans; and addressing the issues of motion-perception, binding between object-percepts and predicate-percepts, and target-driven versus stimulus-driven attention. (shrink)

The overall dorsalizing effect proposed by the authors may be consistent with behavioral evidence showing that the dorsal cortex of reptiles functions like the hippocampal formation of mammals. It is suggested that the dorsal cortex of reptiles expanded in this dorsalizing process to become both entorhinal/subicular cortex and sensory neocortex.

Where the isocortex comes from is an important question, but even more important is understanding what it leads to – that is, what advantage is afforded by its peculiar organization in layers of distinct neuronal types. A computational hypothesis accounts for granulation and for the differentiation between supra- and infragranular pyramidal layers, as quantitatively advantageous to support fine topography in sensory maps.

AimVisual functions of the dorsal stream are considered vulnerable in children with early brain damage. Considering the recognition of objects in suboptimal representations a dorsal stream dysfunction, we examined whether children with early brain damage and impaired object recognition had either general or selective dorsal stream dysfunctions.MethodIn a group of children with early brain damage we evaluated the dorsal stream functioning. To determine whether these patients had an increased risk of a dorsal stream dysfunction we (...) compared the percentage of patients with impaired object recognition, assessed with the L94, with the estimated base rate. Then we evaluated the performance levels on motion perception, visual attention and visuomotor tasks in patients with and without object recognition abnormalities. A general dorsal stream dysfunction was considered present if a patient showed at least one abnormally low score in two out of three additional dorsal stream functions.ResultsSix of the eighteen patients with object recognition problems scored abnormally low on at least two additional dorsal stream functions. This was significantly higher than the base rate. The difference of 24.1% between the patients with and without object recognition problems was not significant. Of the patients with object recognition problems 72.2% had at least 1 dorsal weakness, whereas this was only the case in 27.3% of patients without object recognition problems. Compared to patients with normal object recognition, patients with object recognition problems scored significantly more abnormally low on motion perception and visual attention but did not differ on visuomotor skills.ConclusionChildren with object recognition problems seem at risk for other dorsal stream dysfunctions, but dysfunctions might be rather specific than general. Multiple functions/aspects should be evaluated in neuropsychological assessment of children at risk. (shrink)

This paper formulates a notion of independence of subobjects of an object in a general (i.e. not necessarily concrete) category. Subobject independence is the categorial generalization of what is known as subsystem independence in the context of algebraic relativistic quantum field theory. The content of subobject independence formulated in this paper is morphism co-possibility: two subobjects of an object will be defined to be independent if any two morphisms on the two subobjects of an object are jointly implementable by (...) a single morphism on the larger object. The paper investigates features of subobject independence in general, and subobject independence in the category of C∗ - algebras with respect to operations (completely positive unit preserving linear maps on C∗ - algebras)as morphisms is suggested as a natural subsystem independence axiom to express relativistic locality of the covariant functor in the categorial approach to quantum field theory. (shrink)

Purpose: This article investigates the emergence of subsystems in societies as a solution to the double contingency problem. Context: There are two underlying paradigms: one is radical constructivism in the sense that perturbations are at the centre of the self-organising processes; the other is Luhmann’s double contingency problem, where agents learn anticipations from each other. Approach: Central to our investigation is a computer simulation where we place agents into an arena. These agents can learn to (a) collect food and/or (b) (...) steal food from other agents. In order to analyse subsystem formation, we investigate whether agents use both behaviours or just one of these, which is equivalent to determining the number of self-referential loops. This is detected with a novel measure that we call “prediction utilisation.” Results: During the simulation, symmetry breaking is observed. The system of agents divides itself up into two subsystems: one where agents just collect food and another one where agents just steal food from other agents. The ratio between these two populations is determined by the amount of food available. Key words: Social systems, constructivist paradigm, cybernetics, double contingency, symmetry breaking, emergence. (shrink)

Experimental data suggest that the division between the visual ventral and dorsal pathways may indeed indicate that static and dynamical information is processed separately. Contrary to Hurford, it is suggested that the ventral pathway primarily generates representations of objects, whereas the dorsal pathway produces representations of events. The semantic object/event distinction may relate to the morpho-syntactic noun/verb distinction.

Fertilization triggers cytoplasmic movements in the frog egg that lead in mysterious ways to the stabilization of β‐catenin on the dorsal side of the embryo. The novel Huluwa (Hwa) transmembrane protein, identified in China, is translated specifically in the dorsal side, acting as an egg cytoplasmic determinant essential for β‐catenin stabilization. The Wnt signaling pathway requires macropinocytosis and the sequestration inside multivesicular bodies (MVBs, the precursors of endolysosomes) of Axin1 and Glycogen Synthase Kinase 3 (GSK3) that normally destroy (...) β‐catenin. In Xenopus, the Wnt‐like activity of GSK3 inhibitors and of Hwa mRNA can be blocked by brief treatment with inhibitors of membrane trafficking or lysosomes at the 32‐cell stage. In dorsal blastomeres, lysosomal cathepsin is activated and intriguing MVBs surrounded by electron dense vesicles are formed at the 64‐cell stage. We conclude that membrane trafficking and lysosomal activity are critically important for the earliest asymmetries in vertebrate embryonic development. (shrink)

The author argues that the theory of a dorsal/ventral stream for visual processing can be used to reconcile the constructivist and direct perception theories. My commentary discusses neurophysiological and psychophysical studies that run counter to the view. In addition, the central issue of debate between the constructionist and direct perception approaches regarding what is visual information is discussed.

Aggleton & Brown propose that familiarity-based recognition depends on a perirhinal-medial dorsal thalamic system. However, connections between these structures are sparse or absent. In contrast, the perirhinal cortex is connected to midline/intralaminar nuclei. In a human, a lesion in this thalamic domain, sparing the medial dorsal nucleus, impaired familiarity-based recognition while sparing recollective-based recognition. It is thus more likely that the intralaminar/midline nuclei are involved in recognition.

We show that certain model-theoretic forcing arguments involving subsystems of second-order arithmetic can be formalized in the base theory, thereby converting them to effective proof-theoretic arguments. We use this method to sharpen the conservation theorems of Harrington and Brown-Simpson, giving an effective proof that WKL+0 is conservative over RCA0 with no significant increase in the lengths of proofs.

This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program of Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincar\'e to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak K\"onig's (...) Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others. (shrink)

Aggressive behavior is instinctively driven behavior that helps animals to survive and reproduce and is closely related to multiple behavioral and physiological processes. The dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) is an evolutionarily conserved midbrain structure that regulates aggressive behavior by integrating diverse brain inputs. The DRN consists predominantly of serotonergic (5‐HT:5‐hydroxytryptamine) neurons and decreased 5‐HT activity was classically thought to increase aggression. However, recent studies challenge this 5‐HT deficiency model, revealing a more complex role for the DRN 5‐HT system in (...) aggression. Furthermore, emerging evidence has shown that non‐5‐HT populations in the DRN and specific neural circuits contribute to the escalation of aggressive behavior. This review argues that the DRN serves as a multifaceted modulator of aggression, acting not only via 5‐HT but also via other neurotransmitters and neural pathways, as well as different subsets of 5‐HT neurons. In addition, we discuss the contribution of DRN neurons in the behavioral and physiological aspects implicated in aggressive behavior, such as arousal, reward, and impulsivity, to further our understanding of DRN‐mediated aggression modulation. (shrink)

The Logic of Proofs realizes the modalities from traditional modal logics with proof polynomials, so an expression □F becomes t:F where t is a proof polynomial representing a proof of or evidence for F. The pioneering work on explicating the modal logic is due to S. Artemov and was extended to several subsystems by V. Brezhnev. In 2000, R. Kuznets presented a algorithm for deducibility in these logics; in the present paper we will show that the deducibility problem is -complete. (...) Both Kuznets’s work and the present results make assumptions on the values of proof constants. (shrink)

By means of the examples of classical and Bohmian quantum mechanics, we illustrate the well-known ideas of Boltzmann as to how one gets from laws defined for the universe as a whole to dynamical relations describing the evolution of subsystems. We explain how probabilities enter into this process, what quantum and classical probabilities have in common and where exactly their difference lies.

The minimal ingredients to describe a quantum system are a Hamiltonian, an initial state, and a preferred tensor product structure that encodes a decomposition into subsystems. We explore a top-down approach in which the subsystems emerge from the spectrum of the whole system. This approach has been referred to as quantum mereology. First we show that decomposing a system into subsystems is equivalent to decomposing a spectrum into other spectra. Then we argue that the number of subsystems (the volume of (...) the system) can be inferred from the spectrum itself. In local models, this information is encoded in finite size corrections to the Gaussian density of states. (shrink)