This paper suggests that learning a language is accomplished through the formation of new language identities and explains this process through the use of existential phenomenology. In order for learning (and specifically, the learning of a language) to happen, a permanent change in the identity of the learner must occur. The paper suggests the introduction of the concept of linguistic ego states as a model for such a change in learner identity which, in turn, brings about the embodied (not (...) just cognitive) retention of the acquired knowledge. In order for such retention to occur the situation must bring about anxiety, an existential crisis, or the distress and turmoil mentioned in the article’s title. This leads to a leap of faith, or an irreversible, qualitative personal change, a move to a different existential mode of being. (shrink)

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this (...) regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge. (shrink)

When using the phenomenological method, one aims to capture the essential structures of lived experiences. It has been my experience that phenomenology does this well, when researching experiences that are lived through our bodily senses and understood with our minds. When trying to capture and describe experiences that are beyond the understanding of the body and the mind, namely experiences of deep meditative states, one is confronted with the limitations of the research method itself. One of the fundamental concepts (...) within the phenomenological method is that of Intentionality. It is assumed that human beings experience themselves and their worlds from the perspective of an individual ego that intends an object of consciousness. This subject-object interaction comprises the contents of consciousness itself. The challenge, in this paper, is to describe deep meditative states, whereby the subject and the object of consciousness become one. The phenomenological epoché is performed so that the researcher can be completely open to how the experiential data itself describes mystical experiences. This means bracketing out all preconceptions, all theories including that of intentionality, so that the researcher can open her/himself up to the essence of mystical meditation. When this is done, the mystical state informs an expansion of intentionality to include the state of oneness. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 3, Edition 1, November 2003. (shrink)

ABSTRACTInitial acts of self-control can reduce effort and performance on subsequent tasks – a phenomenon known as ego depletion. Ego depletion is thought to undermine the capacity or willingness to engage executive control, an important determinant of success for many tasks. We examined whether ego depletion improves performance on a task that favours less executive control: insight problem solving. In two experiments, participants completed an ego-depletion manipulation or a non-depleting control condition followed by an insight problem-solving task. Participants in the (...) depleting condition demonstrated greater insight problem-solving accuracy than those in the non-depleting control condition. Priming theories of willpower did not impact these results. Although ego depletion is widely regarded as a “state of impairment”, attendant decreases in executive control may foster insightful thinking. (shrink)

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as (...) believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)

_Requiem for the Ego_ recounts Freud's last great attempt to 'save' the autonomy of the ego, which drew philosophical criticism from the most prominent philosophers of the period—Adorno, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Despite their divergent orientations, each contested the ego's capacity to represent mental states through word and symbol to an agent surveying its own cognizance. By discarding the subject-object divide as a model of the mind, they dethroned Freud's depiction of the ego as a conceit of a misleading self-consciousness (...) and a faulty metaphysics. Freud's inquisitors, while employing divergent arguments, found unacknowledged consensus in identifying the core philosophical challenges of defining agency and describing subjectivity. In _Requiem_, Tauber uniquely synthesizes these philosophical attacks against psychoanalysis and, more generally, provides a kaleidoscopic portrait of the major developments in mid-20th century philosophy that prepared the conceptual grounding for postmodernism. (shrink)

The subjective effects and therapeutic potential of the shamanic practice of journeying is well known. However, previous research has neglected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the subjective effects of shamanic-like journeying techniques on non-shamans. Shamanic-like techniques are those that demonstrate some similarity to shamanic practices and yet deviate from what may genuinely be considered shamanism. Furthermore, the personality traits that influence individual susceptibility to shamanic-like techniques are unclear. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the (...) effect of shamanic-like techniques and a personality trait referred to as "ego boundaries" on subjective experience including mood disturbance. Forty-three non-shamans were administered a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and a measure of ego boundaries (i.e., the Short Boundary Questionnaire; BQ-Sh). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: listening to monotonous drumming for 15 minutes coupled with one of two sets of journeying instructions; or sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' subjective experience and mood disturbance were retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the Profile of Mood States-Short Form, respectively. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the PCI major dimensions of visual imagery, attention and rationality, and minor dimensions of imagery amount and absorption. However, the shamanic-like conditions were not associated with a major reorganization of the pattern of subjective experience compared to the sitting quietly condition, suggesting that what is typically referred to as an altered state of consciousness effect was not evident. One shamanic-like condition and the BQ-Sh subscales need for order, childlikeness, and sensitivity were statistically significant predictors of total mood disturbance. Implications of the findings for the anthropology of consciousness are also considered. (shrink)

In this paper an "unconscious" structure common to such altered psychological states as dreaming, schizophrenic disintegration, out-of body experiences, and creative acts is described. This description is accomplished by setting psychoanalytic, clinical, and empirical studies zuithin a phenomenological framework. Phenomenological self-reflection is first made a party to discussions which focus on memories and the experience of the lived body. The configurations of "unconsciousness" then take precedence in describing relationships between the "I" of waking consciousness and a transformative body image (...) . A unique experience of the self-as undergoing a process of ego "duplication" and body "doubling"-is highlighted. (shrink)

Well-known predictors of prejudice toward Muslims include social dominance and authoritarianism. However, a gap exists for variables reflecting a rejection or mitigation of ideological motivations associated with prejudice toward Muslims. We examined if quiet ego was related to positive attitudes toward Muslims, and whether this could be explained by lower levels of authoritarianism, social dominance, and the motivation to express prejudice. We explored this possibility across two studies of adults in the United States. In Study 1, regression results showed (...) quiet ego was directly associated with positive attitudes toward Muslims. Study 2 utilized path analyses and found that the direct relationship between quiet ego and positive attitudes toward Muslims was explained by associations between quiet ego and lower endorsement of authoritarianism, social dominance, and the internal motivation to express prejudice toward Muslims. Moreover, these associations held when accounting for several correlates of intergroup attitudes. (shrink)

Although there have been numerous studies using stress and coping theories to explain the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression, few of them have attempted to verify these theories against adult male data. There is also a shortage of Korean studies, both theoretical and empirical, on the role of ego-energy as a moderating variable in the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression. This study uses a multiple-group analysis to investigate the moderating effects of the ego-energy on the aforementioned (...) relationship in adult males. A transactional analysis tool showing the total amount of ego-energy called Ego-gram is used in this study. The tool reflects personality traits based on ego-energy state structural and functional analyses. The researchers collected empirical data to test the research model by conducting an online survey of adult males aged 20–50, residing in seven metropolitan cities and in the Gyeonggi Province. The survey yielded 567 samples. The data were then analyzed through structural equation modeling to understand the relationship between various factors. The results showed that, first, stress was positively correlated with drinking motives. Second, drinking motives had some influence on depression. Third, stress, drinking motives, and depression had statistically significant relationships between low-ego-energy and high-ego-energy groups. Overall, this study found a difference between the two ego-energy groups concerning the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression. Based on these results, practical implications were discussed as to how to strengthen the ego-energy, while also presenting future research directions to shed light on the precise mechanism of depression. This study is significant for exploring ways in which adult males cope with and prevent stress and depression, while also offering the basic data for improving the mental and physical health of adult males. This study is also significant for drawing attention to the necessity of developing various health and wellness programs adapted to the needs of this specific population segment while providing the data that may serve as the basis for developing such programs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ego CredoMichel Serres (bio)Saint Paul combines in one singular person the three ancient formats, Jewish, Greek, and Latin, from which the Western World sprang. A devout Pharisee, he was born in Tarsus into a family of the Diaspora, and educated in Jerusalem under Gamaliel; he observed Mosaic Law and constantly cited the Torah, both Psalms and Prophets, with erudition. It also seems likely that he knew Greek philosophy, at (...) least by way of Philo the Jew, since he wrote and spoke the Greek language and cited some of its authors, saying that he admired its wisdom, practiced its elegance, and dreaded its reason. As a Roman citizen, like his father, he took pride in this status; he must have known Roman Law, since after being sentenced by the imperial courts, he addressed an appeal to them.Saint Paul not only symbolizes the cultural melting pot among Mediterranean sailors, port-merchants, and occasional scholars during the Pax romana; he above all embodies the integral man built by the Law, the Logos, and the Administration, three formats forged in the fires of Hebraic monotheism, Hellenistic rational Wisdom, and Roman Law, themselves respectively shaped by ritual in the Temple, harmony in the Cosmos, and the City-State in the Empire. This triple belonging to an organized society, a systematic world, and an all-powerful god promotes excellent modes of conduct.Triply formatted in this way, Saint Paul, newly named, rose up out of the trinity of his belonging; he traveled the world over, and he invented the coming era. In so doing, he braved three disasters: the persecution of his fellows, the mockery of Greek philosophers on the Areopagus, and his trial and probable execution by Rome. In and through Paul, all the superior and lasting achievements of the Indo-European and Semitic traditions stem from this original bifurcation; the good news he proclaims is incarnated and grafted on him and through him; from him, the branch of a new creature springs forth.Although his ancient formats imply a belonging to three different communities, the new man identifies with none of them in order to create something entirely new. But what? [End Page 1]Belonging and IdentityIn a previous book, I wrote that my identity cannot be reduced to my belonging to certain groups. So do not call me "old man," a male, or a writer, but put me, if you must, in whichever subcategory designates the corresponding age, sex, or profession. Apart from these characteristics, who am I? Me. All the rest, including what the government bureaucracy obliges me to write on my so-called "identity" card, merely indicates some of the subcategories to which I belong.If you confuse belonging and identity, you make a logical error that is certainly serious, but, in the end, relatively benign. Moreover, you set yourself up to make a deadly mistake, that of racism, which consists precisely in reducing a person to one of his groups. We owe this distinction (which is so important that I like to repeat it) to Saint Paul. We owe it to him both in theory, because he elaborates it, and in terms of his life, because the Good News that he brings breaks with the three ancient formats, all three of which were associated with groups."There is neither Jew nor Greek," says Paul, "there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female" (Gal. 3:28). All he mentions here are classes, sexes, languages, or nations—in short, all categories or groups. What he means is that there is no longer any belonging in the earlier sense, leaving only the identity I = I: "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).For Paul, the only thing left is this "new creature": I, the adoptive Son of God, through faith in Jesus Christ; I, full of faith and without works, without pride; I, empty, poor, and nothing: universal.Who am I? I am I, and that is all. If we put aside the subcategorical definition of belonging (x å A), the principle of identity becomes evident, not in a formal way, as in the Aristotelian sense of a... (shrink)

Shaw explores the concept of the ego and its role in human psychology and philosophy. He discusses different theories of the ego and its relationship to the self and society. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in psychology or philosophy. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and (...) possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

After a long time, people are still debating over “Cartesian-like Dualism” (CLD), i.e. towards the separation of “res-extensa” from “res-cogitans”. Since we suspect that this is due to a general attraction of mind towards the darkness of metaphysics, we have investigated the mental origin of this attraction. In human mind, we can envisage three different functional levels emerging one from the other like in a Matrioska; the three levels cause the arousal of as many forms of “dualisms”: 1) The 1st-level (...) corresponds to the “Dual-state” of mind, an archetypic dualism made of Unconscious Mind (UM, the domain of biophysical/biochemical signals) and Conscious Mind (CM, the domain of thoughts, images and sounds), genetically committed to reciprocal and fruitful interactions. 2) the 2nd-level corresponds to “Double-perspective” dualism; it emerges from CM’s splitting into two opposite perspectives: the 1st-order perspective (1PP) (subjective, emotional, Self-oriented, etc.) and the 3rd-order perspective (3PP) (rational, objective, Self-detached, etc.), that are in psychological contraposition. During individual growth, Ego-sense installs in CM with the illusion of possessing FW, and dominates 1PP. Conversely, 3PP is typically interested in scientific argumentations and investigations; so, 3PP confutes 1PP’s convictions on scien-tific bases (e.g. 1PP’s conviction that the binomial Ego-FW is real). Yet, on the one hand, 3PP hasn’t got a scientific alternative to explain “who we really are”, on the other hand, 1PP exhibits a great success in everyday life cognition. Then, we necessarily step over the dualism of the 3rd-level, “Cartesian-like Dualism” (CLD). The emotional origin of this CLD holds back 1PP’s trick to claim its supremacy over 3PP. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to Max Stirner's critique of liberalism and to show the ways in which his rejection of essential identities and universal rational structures allows us to reflect upon the limits and epistemological conditions of liberal political theory. Through his rejection of Feuerbachian humanism, Stirner unmasked the obscurantism and domination behind modern secular political systems like liberalism, which was still trapped in idealist abstractions and universal assumptions derived from Christianity. He showed that liberalism, which is founded (...) on the idea of the autonomous and rational individual, is actually a denial of individual difference and singularity and a mediation and disciplining of subjectivity through the structures of state authority. Moreover, Stirner's extreme individualism, while problematic in many respects, nevertheless points to the possibility of a reformulation of liberalism in terms of a contemporary politics of singularity and difference. (shrink)

Roger W. Sperry received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of (...) mind-body interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states. (shrink)

The current stage of the development of amateur stayer running practices can be characterized as personality-building, since the main goals of runners (especially marathon runners and super marathon runners) are not so much related to strengthening health, as to the sphere of personal improvement and self-knowledge: the development of will, character, testing yourself in an extreme situation, testing previously inaccessible emotions and states of consciousness. The object of the study is ego texts (books for a wide audience, including the (...) online "samizdat") of modern Russian running enthusiasts. The method of studying these texts is the biographical method, which makes it possible to determine the multidimensional influence of running activity on fundamental changes in personality development and the formation of her life path. The analyzed biographies inherit both the confessional tradition of Augustine (the contrast of the aimless and vicious "pre-race" life, as well as the traumatic experience of running neophyte and significant achievements in many areas of personal development after the adoption of the values expressed through running Coubertin's "religio athleticae"), and the adventurous and heroic biographical tradition noted by M. M. Bakhtin, inherent in the Renaissance, as well as romanticism and Nietzscheanism with their focus on the formation (in our case, through a stayer run) of a new (or "super-") person. The qualitative result of running activity is the achievement by the subject of a new stage of development – a person running (homo currens), which is characterized by activity, mobility, heroism, asceticism, striving for maximum self-realization, achieving harmony of body and spirit. Homo currens opposes both virtual pastime and the fetishization of comfort culture, suggesting, referring to the concept of Viktor Frankl, filling life with new meanings and values through overcoming the inevitable suffering for a stayer run. Amateur running is considered by writers as a publicly available and effective means of gaining physical, mental and social well-being, which expresses its humanistic essence and gives philosophical and anthropological significance to the works under study. (shrink)

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, a new Cold War is being waged in our societies. During the Cold War a theoretical model of man was developed by economists and the military, an egotistical being interested only in his own benefit and in duping his opponents to achieve his ends: a modern homo oeconomicus. After his career in the Cold War ended, he was not scrapped but adapted to the needs of the twenty-first century. He became the (...) ringmaster of a new era of information capitalism. He sought to read, control and influence thoughts; to predict, price and eliminate risks. Today stock-market trading is guided by him. He uses computer algorithms and Big Data to build up detailed pictures of our preferences and then suggest and sell goods to us. The model has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are no longer the masters of our own fate. The Game of Life runs without us. Schirrmacher traces the progress of this extreme rationalization of social life from the Cold War games of the 1950s Rand Corporation to the stock-market trading techniques that brought about the financial crash of 2008, showing how these developments were interwoven with the rise of game theory, rational choice theory and neoliberal economics. The state and politics increasingly submitted themselves to the logic of computerized game theory and an economistic view of the world, evading real decision-making in the process. In this brave new world individuals, alone in front of their computers, may think they are constructing a reality of their own choosing, but in fact they are being manipulated all along by others who are setting the rules of the game. This international bestseller by one of Germanys most distinguished journalists is a powerful indictment of a way of thinking that has become pervasive and threatens to undermine not only parliaments and constitutions but also the sovereignty of the individual to be the person he or she wants to be. (shrink)

I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for (...) accounting for the possibility of the type of capacity to have I* thoughts and attitudes is based on the assumption that being conscious necessarily entails being self-aware in at least a minimal sense, and then proceeds to explain how it I*-thoughts and attitudes are possible on the basis of those minimal states of self-awareness. Yet if Sartre's account of self-awareness is so much as plausible, this kind of strategy is bound to be incomplete. By helping itself to a notion of minimal self-awareness that is purportedly constitutive of consciousness, it fails to account for what is, by its own lights, the most fundamental form of self-awareness. (shrink)

From the beginning of the modern period to the mid-twentieth century most people who wrote on matters of philosophy and psychology assumed that the self is the ego, an inner subject that is the centre of conscious experiencing and an agency of thought and will. However, in the second half of the twentieth century — indeed, beginning even earlier, in the 1920s and 1930s — the notion of the ego became a target of criticism for theorists of widely differing points (...) of view. This critical attention has turned opinion against the notion of the ego in many circles and has raised the issue of its legitimacy. In this paper I address the issue of legitimacy by undertaking a survey of major historical conceptions and criticisms of the ego to see if the notion of the ego might be reconceived in a way that satisfactorily meets critical challenges. The survey begins with Descartes and then works its way forward in time to consider the views of Hume, Kant, Freud, Hartmann, Heidegger, Sartre, object relations theorists, Lacan, postmodernists, and materialists in the philosophy of mind. I state and comment on each of these views. Of necessity, statements of views are highly condensed. The comments assess the views by evaluating each in terms of the others and offer proposals about how particular conceptions of the ego might be reformulated to meet the criticisms discussed. Having completed the historical survey, I gather together proposals from the comments and present a revised conception of the ego that, I believe, is tenable in light of historical criticisms. This revised conception is presented here as a proposal only, a proposal, moreover, that outlines one of perhaps multiple ways in which the ego can be reconceived to meet critical challenges. (shrink)

André Comte-Sponville is a French philosopher-essayist, pondering the problems of morality and life wisdom. He develops the conception of ego-philosophy that is the theory based on the analysis of the subjective existential human experience. As an initial evidence of consciousness and a point of support for philosophical reasoning, he cites feelings of anxiety, despair and suffering. Ego possesses being, it is a subjective reality that is revealed to a man as a result of free and creative perception of the world. (...) This knowledge is always unique, situational, not amenable to formalization and unification, because it is a result of a personal relation of man to the absolute. Ego-philosophy is not a traditional scientific discipline, summarizing specific facts and formulating theories. Ego-philosophy expresses itself in a generally accessible language and appeals to all mankind. This is an art of life wisdom, indicating to the individual a path to true ideals, allowing one to gain dignity and happiness, to free oneself from temptations and passions. Comte-Sponville substantiates the ethical theory that, under the conditions of the crisis of traditional ideas about moral norms, a person must strive to fill the emptiness of the world with his own creative energy, give meaning to life, affirm positive values. The philosopher creates a theory of virtues in which he takes the leading role in sublime love (agape) as the apotheosis of generosity and mercy. In the area of politics, Comte-Sponville adheres to the position of socio-liberalism. Recognizing the economic efficiency of market relations and the principle of freedom action, the philosopher believes that the logic of economic activity does not coincide with socially important tasks and ethical values. In order for society to develop harmoniously, it is necessary to create a welfare state and reliable political institutions that ensure the observance of the principles of humanism, high culture and justice. (shrink)

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective (...) self-awareness concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary (...) experiences. I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 349-351 [Access article in PDF] Mystical States or Mystical Life?Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu Perspectives Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton THIS IS AN ORIGINAL and conceptually precise paper. It is a significant attempt to bring religion and psychiatry into conversation. With particular reference to three Oriental epistemologies—Tibetan and Zen Buddhism and Tantric Hinduism—Caroline Brett seeks to offer a means of differentiating mystical (...) class='Hi'>states from psychotic ones. She is critical of reductionism in modern psychiatry that seeks either to elide religious experience into psychopathology, or seeks too sharp a distinction between them. Brett claims, by implication, to offer a more fundamental level of discrimination between religious experience and psychopathology than the "cognitive problem-solving model" that Jackson and Fulford propose (1997a).In both mystical and psychotic states, the author argues, there are radical alterations in the structure of experience. Psychotic states, however, result from failures to complete, or, at least, to negotiate smoothly, the transition from a commitment to an epistemology based on illusory reality to one structured according to ultimate reality—a reality that is brought into focus through an alignment of transcendent vision and mundane cognition. Although this epistemological "stuck-ness" can manifest itself in action as destructive behavior, for example, psychological isolation or social and occupational dysfunction, the basis of the distinction between mystical and psychotic states lies in real differences in the states themselves.In our view, there is a tendency in much psychiatric and theological literature to homogenize mystical states and to treat experiences that (arguably) occur on a number of different levels as if they were on the same level. It is still widely thought that a mystical consciousness can somehow be abstracted from the religious traditions out of which this consciousness emerges. It is assumed that we can talk about experience in abstraction from the shared consciousness produced by schooling in a specific historical religion (Shannon 1985, 493). Thus, the altered mystical state of a Zen Master or Saint Teresa of Avila in ecstasy are regarded as identical states of consciousness. Yet it is far from clear that mystical states can be talked about without explicit reference to the language and tradition in which the self is formed, or, in terms that would have different meanings in Abrahamic and Oriental religious traditions, un-selfed. [End Page 349]There is a related tendency to regard religious doctrines as attempts to interpret mystical experience, as second-order reflections on the language of experience, as if religious doctrines were local religious dialects into which core experiences could be translated. We suggest, rather, that there is an iterative relationship between a mystical experience and the religious framework out of which it emerges. Religious doctrines are better seen as sets of instructions designed to guide the movement of prayer, and the movement of prayer, in turn, exemplifies the religious doctrine that shapes it.So could mystical states within the framework of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism and Tantric Hinduism better be understood as exemplification's of the worldviews of those particular religious traditions? For example, the relinquishing of ego structures, the dissolution of subject/object boundaries, the yielding of the contrastive identity between experience and the world, and progress toward undifferentiated union of the self with the cosmic self, seem to exemplify the monist cosmology associated with some of those traditions. By the same token, the psychotic state could be interpreted as an exemplification of an existential stance that has for some reason defected from the movement toward transcendental cognition. The point is that the "real differences" Brett identifies in the two states cannot be understood apart from the religious epistemology and doctrines, which those states, positively or negatively, exemplify. "So far 'from mystical states' being a sort of paradigm of certainty, they have authority only within a frame of reference which is believed in on quite other grounds and are therefore properly to be tested according to their consistency with this" (Williams 1991, 149)The force of Brett's paper, like Jackson and Fulford, is to identify the boundaries... (shrink)

This article offers three reflections on the nature of the metaphysical ‘wall’ erected between the ‘Included’ and the ‘Excluded/Other’ by the concept of private property and its implementation in a state’s legal apparatus. The first reflection explores the reality of the concept of private property, using Louis Althusser’s conception of ideology, in order to demonstrate that the liberal conception of private property masks power operating on two levels: the formal, repressive state apparatus, and the deeper, the personal, the real, the (...) actual level, which allows the Included to act upon ego in ways that negatively affect the Excluded/Other found in the ideological state apparatus. The second argues that the masked power that is private property permits war to be waged by the Included as against the Excluded/Other at two levels: intra-state and inter-state. This reveals a paradox in the distinction between Included and Excluded/Other: while the distinction demonstrates the allocation of power over resources, the reality is that every individual on earth is both Included and Excluded/Other. The final reflection briefly considers what could replace private property as a means of allocating goods and resources within a society. (shrink)

Dalla Prefazione di Manfred Frings: «Il libro di Guido Cusinato non solo riesce a mettere in evidenza la molteplice rilevanza della filosofia di Scheler […], ma illumina anche nuovi aspetti e apre nuove prospettive di indagine. Questo obiettivo viene raggiunto da Cusinato con rigore metodologico e attraverso uno sforzo teso a verificare tutta una serie di affermazioni che erano state fatte finora in modo forse un po’ troppo affrettato. Per es. dimostra che Scheler non era né un dualista né un (...) panteista, come invece spesso si è sostenuto […] Cusinato offre al lettore elementi finalmente efficaci per rivedere parecchi luoghi comuni. In particolare Cusinato ritiene importante, mettere da parte quella categoria interpretativa del “dualismo” fra spirito e vita, che così spesso è stata invece applicata alla sua metafisica. Al suo posto Cusinato suggerisce di intendere la concezione scheleriana della relazione fra spirito e vita, o meglio, fra spirito e pulsione (Geist e Drang), facendo ricorso ad un termine che compare negli ultimi scritti: quello di interpenetrazione (Durchdringung). […] Fra le analisi che Cusinato svolge […] le più preziose e originali mi sembrano essere quelle relative all’umiltà (Demut). Invece nella maggior parte della letteratura su Scheler l’umiltà, uno dei tre atti morali fondamentali per accedere all’atteggiamento filosofico, non viene neppure menzionata. L’interpretazione che ne dà Cusinato, ponendola a fondamento di una «riduzione catartica» pensata in contrasto con la consueta riduzione husserliana, offre senz’altro spunti promettenti per le indagini future» (M. S. Frings, Prefazione, in: G. Cusinato, Katharsis, pp. 6-7). (shrink)

I continue here to consider concretely the states of consciousness that are held to be the fundamental durational components of James’s famous stream — my ideal purpose being to arrive eventually at a general description applicable to every one of them. I closely attend therefore to James’s account of the sense of personal identity, not for its own sake but for what it further reveals regarding the specific states of consciousness that James called individually “the present, judging Thought.” (...) These states, which are the inner awarenesses, remembrances, and appropriations of other states of consciousness in the same stream, are supposed to provide us with a sense of our own diachronic continuity. According to James, they are the only “I” there is. I bring out among other things that, notwithstanding James’s rejection of an entitative Ego responsible for apprehending and appropriating the states of consciousness and other components of our empirical “me,” James in effect assigned this job to the total brain process. Embodying all the information required, it is this physical process that is proposed to produce each Thought full-blown. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to see the similarity between the Shankara’s notion of Ätman and Husserl’s Transcendental Ego. Both thinkers, Husserl and Shankara trace true knowledge to the transcendental self. The former describes the self as the embodiment of absolute knowledge that transcends the limitations of the body, the senses and the intellect. In the state of bondage and ignorance, this Transcendental Ego is oblivious of its ontological and cognitive priority or transcendence and seeks knowledge in the natural world (...) of relative truths. It forgets that this world is merely an appearance (vivarta) rooted in the Ᾱtman which is identical with Brahman. (shrink)

Thaddeus Metz in Meaning in Life centers his research within western philosophical thought. I will engage early Buddhism to see whether its thinking about meaning is compatible with Metz’s fundamentality theory of what makes life meaningful. My thesis is: Early Buddhist thinking generally supports a fundamentality reading of meaning but in the ethical state of nibbāna (nirvana) the Arahant (enlightened one) is in a state that has access to the pure potentiality for meaning.

Consciousness6 carries the connotation of a state of consciousness . It is an emergent property of a gestalt phenomenon, namely the psychophysiological state of the organism . In this article, I extend my previous discussion of states of consciousness , embedding this within the wider perspective of both Gestalt psychology and psychoanalytic ego psychology. Gestalt notions, such as Prägnanz and microgenesis, are shown to be highly relevant to this theme. Natsoulas’ recent appraisal of my viewpoint has goaded me into (...) reiterating the argument for looking at a qualitative change in thought, characterizing the shift in consciousness6, as being a promising area for further development. This hypothesized change in mode of thinking is of a metaphoric—symbolic nature, what such authors as Hunt and Haskell would term symbolic cognition. I discuss the relationships among perceptual experience, symbolic cognition and state of consciousness, concluding with some comments on Natsoulas’ reservations. (shrink)

An adequate understanding of ‘the self’ and/or ‘primary-process consciousness’ should allow us to explain how affective experiences are created within the brain. Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms of consciousness. At present, abundant evidence indicates that affective states arise from the intrinsic neurodynamics of primitive self-centred emotional and motivational systems situated (...) in subcortical regions of the brain. Accordingly, a neural understanding of ‘the self’ may arise from a study of how various biological value-coding systems converge and interact with coherent brainstem representations of the body and nearby attentional/waking systems of the brain. Affective feelings may be caused by the neurodynamics of basic emotional circuits interacting with the neural schema of bodily action plans. One key brain area where such interactions occur is found within centromedial diencephalic midbrain areas such as the periventricular and periaqueductal gray and nearby tectal and tegmental zones. Here I will envision that a Simple Ego-type Life Form is instantiated in those circuits The ability of this ’primal SELF’ to resonate with primitive emotional values may help yield the raw subjectively experienced feelings of pleasure, lust, anger, hunger, desire, fear, loneliness and so forth. A study of such systems is a reasonable starting point for the neurological analysis of affective feelings, which may lie at the periconscious core of all other forms of animal consciousness. If such a neurodynamic process was an essential neural preadaptation for the emergence of higher levels of consciousness, it may help us close the explanatory gap between brain circuit states and the psychological nature of affective feelings. Thereby, it may also help us conceptualize the nature of psychological binding within higher forms of consciousness in new ways. (shrink)

In his book A History of the Culture of the Modern Period, the eminent scholar Egon Friedell wrote concerning Descartes's influence in seven-teenth-century France that all the efforts of the great philosopher's critics notwithstanding, "his school inexorably extended its influence not only through the ‘occasionalists,’ as his closest disciples and followers in philosophy were called, and through the remarkable logic of the Port-Royal school The Art of Thinking and Boileau's tone-setting work The Poetic Art: rather, all of France, headed by (...) the "Sun King," who at one time had banned Descartes's works, became his school. The state, economy, theater, architecture, religious affairs, strategy, and the art of gardening all became Cartesian. Descartes reigned unrestricted, as a sovereign, in all things: in tragedy, where the passions struggled with one another; in comedy, where algebraic formulas were devised for human characters; in the area around Versailles, dominated by the abstract symmetry of gardens; in the analytic methods for waging war and running the economy; and in the so to speak deductive ritual of hairstyles and manners, dances and genteel conversation. One can even say that to this day every Frenchman is a born Cartesian.". (shrink)

The explanatory gap—the apparently ineliminable chasm between physical, bodily processes and states on the one hand, and subjective, lived experience on the other—belongs among the greatest problems of contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research concerning consciousness. According to some scholars—such as eliminativist philosophers like Paul and Patricia Churchland—it is a pseudo-question. However, in our interpretation, an accurate phenomenological reflection on one’s own consciousness convinces the attentive and careful philosopher that it is very much a real question—and in fact (...) a crucial one. The present paper endeavours to show how Husserl’s theory of the bodily self-constitution of the ego could help us, not to close the explanatory gap in a reductionist manner, but rather to bridge this gap by rendering apparent the necessary connection between the subjective, phenomenal side of experience and its bodily basis. In this interpretation, Husserl’s conception of embodiment could even provide a more rigorous and firmer theoretical foundation than any which currently undergirds empirically related research regarding the origins of consciousness in the natural world. In the first half of the study, I outline Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s attempt to bridge and, in a further step, to eliminate the explanatory gap, in which they proceed from the external world to the interiority of mind. The second part of the paper presents a phenomenological analysis that aims to demonstrate that a Husserlian attempt would follow the opposite direction: from the inside proceeding outwards towards the external, physical reality. (shrink)

The article presents Richard Rorty’s religious metaphors in the context of the concept of civil religion derived from The Social Contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau and primarily used today for the sociological analysis of the relationship between religion and the state. It is paired with Rorty’s conception of pragmatism as romantic polytheism and its fundamental notions of romance, polytheism, and poetry. Parallels between social and religious institutions formulated by the American neo-pragmatist, such as priesthood and sanctuary, provide the details of (...) his proposition. The article opposes the interpretation of Jason Boffetti, who suggests that the use of religious language is a sign of a considerable change in Rorty’s standpoint. A characteristic feature of Rorty’s philosophy is its secularism. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between his vision of civil religion and that of other scholars. This discrepancy has its source in Rorty’s pragmatist position and underlines the political character of his philosophy. (shrink)

Three traditions have influenced the idea of the state in India – the Hindu Rajah, the Islamic View and the European Secular State. From biblical and theological considerations, Christians must reject the totalism and ego-centrism of modern states and work for greater accountability and decentralised decision-making.

In social interactions, emotional biases can arise when the emotional state of oneself and another person are incongruent. A person’s ability to judge the other’s emotional state can then be biased by their own emotional state, leading to an emotional egocentric bias (EEB). Alternatively, a person’s perception of their own emotional state can be biased by the other’s emotional state leading to an emotional altercentric bias (EAB). Using a modified audiovisual paradigm, we examined in three studies (n = 171; two (...) online & one lab-based study) whether emotional biases can be considered traits by measuring two timepoints within participant and relating empathy trait scores to emotional biases, as well as the electrophysiological correlates of emotional biases. In all studies, we found a congruency effect, reflecting an EEB and EAB of small size. Both biases failed to correlate significantly within participants across timepoints and did not display significant relationships with empathy trait scores. On the electrophysiological level, we did not find any neural emotional bias effects in the time–frequency domain. Our results suggest that EEB and EAB effects are strongly task sensitive. Caution is warranted when studying interindividual differences in emotional biases using this paradigm, as they did not show significant test-retest reliabilities. (shrink)

This volume is a reissue of an 1889 translation of Fichte’s third book, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, which first appeared in Jena in 1796. Fichte here attempts to reconcile his belief in the sacredness of the rights of the individual with his conviction that the individual is a member of a community of rational beings, and thus man develops his moral self only through relationship to others. ‘…Ego is the individual, the rational being determined as such through (...) opposition to another rational being’. His thesis is that human rights are essentially social rights and that, since the freedom of the individual implies responsibility, concrete freedom is necessarily finite. This affirmation of the limitation of a self by its relation to other selves corresponds with Fichte’s exposition of the mutual limitation of the ego and the non-ego in his theory of the intellect in his Science of Knowledge. Fichte declares that the fundamental principle of The Science of Rights is that each individual must restrict his freedom through the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the other. (shrink)

A pesar de matices y variaciones de significado, la intencionalidad husserliana sigue al servicio de la verdad como adaequatio, adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Sin embargo, en la conciencia interna del tiempo se ve la dificultad de interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, con lo cual peligra la vocación por la verdad de la intencionalidad. A partir de la constitución eidética, se busca una génesis pasiva del sentido ideal intencional, sin perder su referencia egológica. Despite (...) the nuances and variations in meaning, Husserlian intentionality continues to be at the service of truth as adaequatio, adapted to the monadic order of transcendental consciousness. However, the internal consciousness of time reveals the difficulty of interpreting the passive sphere of consciousness intentionally, which jeopardizes intentionality's vocation for truth. On the basis of eidetic constitution, a passive genesis of ideal intentional meaning is sought, which does not lose its reference to the ego. (shrink)

This is a groundbreaking application of contemporary philosophy to human rights law that proposes significant innovations for the progressive development of human rights. Drawing on the works of prominent 'philosophers of the Other' including Emmanuel Levinas, Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, Judith Butler and, most centrally, the Argentine philosopher of liberation Enrique Dussel, this book develops an ethics based on concrete face-to-face relationships with the Marginalized Other. It proposes that this should inspire a human rights law that is grounded in transcendental justice (...) and framed from the perspective of marginalized groups. This would continuously deconstruct the original violence found in all human rights treaties and tribunals and promote preferential treatment for the marginalized. It would be especially attentive to such issues as access to justice, voice, representation, agency and responsibility. This differs markedly from more conventional theories that prioritize the autonomy of the ego, state sovereignty, democracy and/or equality. (shrink)

This paper tackles through Eric Berne's transactional analysis the psychological games companies play in their corporate responsibility actions. A link between Berne's ego-states (Child, Parent and Adult) and corporate personality types (two-faced, desperate and responsible) is established. Berne's reciprocal and unfulfilled transactions are examined in corporate responsibility(CR) behaviour between two-faced, desperate and responsible corporations. Utilitarian, nursing, helping, dutiful, problem-solving and virtuous CR behaviour is identified in reciprocal transactions while tempting, disciplining and well-intentioned CR behaviour is discovered in unfulfilled transactions. (...) Certain patterns of corporate transactions, which pop up repeatedly, can be called corporate games: most Berne's games played by individuals match the corporate games played by two-faced and desperate companies, but responsible corporations create new games in order to to cooperate with others. (shrink)

The results of a study of ego states, self-esteem and life positions effects on teachers’ subjective career success are presented. The sample includes 324 teachers between 24 and 65 years. The results obtained present preferences for the ego states Nurturing Parent and Adult, and for the life position „I am OK, you are OK“, which are manifested through characteristics such as affection, friendliness, analyticalness and devotion to others. The established average self-esteem level suggests for positive attitude towards oneself (...) and career satisfaction. The ego states Natural Child, Caring Parent, Adapted Child, the self-esteem and the life positions „I am OK, you are OK“ and „I am not OK, you are not OK“ have significant effects on subjective career success. Personal characteristics such as empathy, concern for others and the promotion of development lead to a sense of subjective career success. The results are applicable for the implementation оf teacher competency improvement programs, which will not only increase their sense of career success, but will also have a positive effect on the quality of the educational process. (shrink)

ICD-10 and DSM-5 do not provide clear diagnosing guidelines for DID, making it difficult to distinguish ‘genuine’ DID from imitated or false-positive cases. This study explores meaning which patients with false-positive or imitated DID attributed to their diagnosis. 85 people who reported elevated levels of dissociative symptoms in SDQ-20 participated in clinical assessment using the Trauma and Dissociation Symptoms Interview, followed by a psychiatric interview. The recordings of six women, whose earlier DID diagnosis was disconfirmed, were transcribed and subjected to (...) interpretative phenomenological analysis. Five main themes were identified: (1) endorsement and identification with the diagnosis. (2) The notion of dissociative parts justifies identity confusion and conflicting ego-states. (3) Gaining knowledge about DID affects the clinical presentation. (4) Fragmented personality becomes an important discussion topic with others. (5) Ruling out DID leads to disappointment or anger. To avoid misdiagnoses, clinicians should receive more systematic training in the assessment of dissociative disorders, enabling them to better understand subtle differences in the quality of symptoms and how dissociative and non-dissociative patients report them. This would lead to a better understanding of how patients with and without a dissociative disorder report core dissociative symptoms. Some guidelines for a differential diagnosis are provided. (shrink)

: The central aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of phenomenological studies on dreaming and to put forward a draft for a phenomenological theory of the dream state. Prominent phenomenologists have offered an extremely valuable interpretation of the dream as an intentional process, stressing its relevance in understanding the complexity of the mental life of subject, the continuous interplay between reality and unreality, and the possibility of building parallel spheres of experience influencing the development of personal (...) identity. Taking into consideration the main characteristics of dream experience emphasized by these scholars, in the final part of the paper I propose to elaborate a new phenomenology of dreaming, which should be able to offer a theoretical description of dream states. My sketched proposal is based on Eugen Fink’s notion of the dream as “presentification”. By combining the past and the present of phenomenological investigation, I aim at suggesting a philosophical framework to explain the intentional features of dreaming as Erlebnis. Keywords : Phenomenology; Dreaming State; Presentification; Erlebnis; Ego La coscienza sognante: un contributo dalla fenomenologia Riassunto : Lo scopo principale di questo articolo è offrire una ricostruzione storica degli studi fenomenologici sul sogno e proporre un abbozzo per una teoria fenomenologia dello stato onirico. Importanti fenomenologi hanno offerto un’interpretazione particolarmente valida del sogno inteso come processo intenzionale, mettendone in rilievo il significato per la comprensione della complessità della vita mentale del soggetto, la continua interazione tra realtà e irrealtà, e la possibilità di costruire sfere parallele di esperienza che esercitano un’influenza sull’identità personale. Prendendo in considerazione le principali caratteristiche dell’esperienza onirica messe in luce da questi studiosi, nella parte finale dell’articolo propongo di elaborare una nuova fenomenologia del sogno, che dovrebbe essere in grado di offrire una descrizione teoretica degli stati onirici. Il mio abbozzo di proposta si basa sulla nozione di “presentificazione” di Eugen Fink. Mettendo insieme il passato e il presente dell’indagine fenomenologica, il mio obiettivo è proporre una cornice filosofica per chiarire le strutture intenzionali del sogno inteso come Erlebnis. Parole chiave : Fenomenologia; Stato onirico; Presentificazione; Erlebnis; Ego. (shrink)

The presence of reference frameworks in psychology is complemented by the existence of this concept in transactional analysis. In their current understanding, they are the structure of interrelated responses from the integrated ego-state to specific stimuli. Reference frameworks provide an individual with the opportunity to develop a general perceptual, intellectual and emotional system that influences his behaviour. They constitute a system used to define oneself, other people and the world. The system of reference is present in the individual’s script, his (...) psychological games and transactions. As far as transactions are concerned, they are often tangential, blocking, or refracted. Apart from individual reference frameworks, transactional analysis is interested in their broader social and cultural contexts, which constitute their subsystem functioning as a source of identity. It reveals itself during intercultural exchanges or confrontations. Reference frameworks, being a kind of a window to the world, influence interpersonal relations and the links that exist within them. (shrink)

In this pleasantly written book Carter describes what he considers to be the core of Japanese ethics by recalling the influence of Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Zen Buddhism. Drawing heavily on certain Japanese authors, he points to such fundamental categories as man, nothingness, sincerity, family. Finally he develops the theme of enlightenment. From the very start Carter stresses the pre-ego state of compassionate awareness and the resolve to interfere minimally with the natural world characteristic of the Japanese. The oneness of (...) things is the theme which runs like a red thread through the entire book, a monism which abandons the opposition between the ego and the world and between good and evil. Evil is the substantializing of the ego. Carter himself turned to the East to find a way out of the problems besetting Western societies. (shrink)

_In the light of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, this paper looks into some of the problems of contemporary man as an individual, a member of society, a citizen of his country, a component of this world, and of nature itself. Concepts like Science; Nature,;Matter; Mental Being; Mana-purusa; Prana-purusa; Citta-purusa; Nation-ego and Nation-soul; True and False Subjectivism; World-state and World-union; Religion of Humanism are the focus of this paper. Nature: Beneath the diversity and uniqueness of the different elements in Nature there is (...) an essential unity that not only allows for this diversity but even supports it. Nature is both a benefactor and a force: a benefactor, because it acts to carry out the evolution of mankind; a force, because it also supplies the necessary energy and momentum to achieve it. Natural calamities: If mankind can quieten the tsunamis and cyclones and droughts and earthquakes that rage within, and behave with care and compassion towards Nature, not exploiting, denuding, or denigrating it, there is a strong possibility that Nature too will behave with equal care and compassion towards man and spare him the natural calamities than rend him asunder. Science: The limitation of science become obvious, according to Sri Aurobindo, when we realize that it has mastered knowledge of processes and helped in the creation of machinery but is ignorant of the foundations of being and, therefore, cannot perfect our nature or our life. Science and philosophy: The insights of philosophy could become heuristic and algorithmic models for scientific experimentation. Matter: An interesting aspect of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is his acceptance of the reality of matter even while highlighting its inadequacies; the ultimate goal, according to him, is the divination of matter itself. Purusa: If the mana-purusa (mental being) were to log on to the genuine citta-purusa (psychic formation), without necessarily logging off from the prana-purusa (frontal formation), it may help quieten the turbulences within, which may be a prelude to the quietening of the disturbances without, whether it be physical maladies, cravings (for food, fame, fortune, etc.), destructive competitiveness; or wars, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, communal riots, and the other such social maladies that afflict mankind today. Nation-ego (false subjectivism) and Nation-soul (true subjectivism): Sri Aurobindo considers Nation-ego an example of false subjectivism, in which national identity and pride are stressed to prove one's superiority and suppress or exploit the rest. The Nation-soul, as an example of true subjectivism, attempts to capture one's traditional heritage and values in its pristine form, not as a reaction to hurts and angers or as compensation for real or imagined injuries or indignities of the past. World-state (false subjectivism) and World-union (true subjectivism): Similarly, a World-state founded upon the principle of centralization and uniformity, a mechanical and formal unity, is an example of false subjectivism, while a World-union founded upon the principle of liberty and variation in a free and intelligent unity is an example of true subjectivism Human actualization: Even if two human beings are similar, in so far as they are human beings, there is so much diversity between them. Part of the movement towards human self-actualization lies in the fact that this diversity should not be forcibly curbed, as also the realization that beneath all that appears disparate there is an essential unity. Also, man is not the end product of evolution but an intermediate stage between the animal and the divine. Moreover, he is endowed with consciousness that enables him to cooperate with the forces of evolution and speed up and telescope the next stage of evolution._. (shrink)

The object of this study is to find a coherent theoretical approach to three problems which appear to interrelate in complex ways: (1) What is the ontological status of consciousness? (2) How can there be 'un conscious,' 'prereflective' or 'self-alienated' consciousness? And (3) Is there a 'self' or 'ego' formed by means of the interrelation of more elementary states of consciousness? The motivation for combining such a diversity of difficult questions is that we often learn more by looking at (...) interrelations of problems than we could by viewing them only in isola tion. The three questions posed here have emerged as especially prob lematic in the context of twentieth century philosophy. 1. The question of the ontological status of consciousness The question 'What is consciousness?' is one of the most perplexing in philosophy-so perplexing that many have been motivated to proceed as though consciousness did not exist. If William James was speaking rhetorically when he said "Consciousness does not exist," 1 many behaviorists of the recent past were not. 2 James meant only to imply that consciousness is not an independently existing soul-substance, along side physical substances. He did not mean that we do not really 'have' consciousness, and he did not provide final resolution for the problem of the causal interrelations between consciousness and the physical realm (e. g. , our bodies). Many recent philosophers and psychologists, however, try to proceed as though these problems did not exist. (shrink)